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England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions >> Long v Western Sussex Hospitals NHS Trust [2016] EWHC 251 (QB) (28 January 2016) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2016/251.html Cite as: [2016] EWHC 251 (QB) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
(SITTING AS A JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
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WILLIAM LONG |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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WESTERN SUSSEX HOSPITALS NHS TRUST |
Defendant |
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Mr Matthew Barnes (instructed by Capsticks) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 18,19,20,21,22 and 25January 2016
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Crown Copyright ©
HHJ Collender QC :
INTRODUCTION
"AMENDMENTS TO THE PARTICULARS OF CLAIM"
In consequence of the fact that the Claimant was discharged on 30th April 2008 the Hospital were unable to observe or monitor his deterioration, including vomiting, becoming jaundiced and slipping in and out of consciousness, in the days between then and 5th May.
Further, had the blood tests been repeated on 1st May they would have shown further elevated levels of CRP, WCC and ESR resulting in the infection being diagnosed and debridement carried out by 3rd May.
Yet further, in consequence of the admitted delay between 5th and 10th May the Claimant suffered a further 5 days of serious illness, namely sepsis as documented in the Hospital Notes."
Mr Barnes responded in writing to that proposed amendment as follows:
"First, this is, it appears to the Defendant, an acceptance that the Particulars of Claim require amendment.
Secondly, any application to amend should be rejected given: (i) the late stage we are now at, (ii) the fact that, as a result of the way in which the claim was pleaded, there is no evidence on this issue, save for that of the orthopaedic experts, who have given evidence as to the extent of the delay, but not with the consequences of any delay, and (iii) the Claimant has not raised this issue with any of the Defendant's witnesses.
Thirdly, in the alternative, the absence of persuasive evidence that results from the way in which the claim has been pleaded and conducted leads to the conclusion that, even if he establishes that his CRP, WCC, and ESR would have been raised on 1 May 2008, the Claimant cannot demonstrate that he is materially worse than he would have been in any event, in circumstances where: (i) he would have deteriorated so that he was systemically unwell before intervention, on the evidence of both orthopaedic experts; (ii) it follows that he would have received antibiotics on or about 5 May 2010, and debridement on or about 6 May 2008; and, (iii) there is no evidence that this caused him to be materially more unwell than he would otherwise have been.
Fourthly, as to the last paragraph of the Amendments to the Particulars of Claim, the proposition that there was a delay between 5 and 10 May 2008 is not supported by the orthopaedic experts, who have agreed that the delay was in fact between 6 May 2008, when debridement should have taken place, and 10 May 2008, when debridement did take place."
There is force in those objections. However, I have decided to give my judgment, giving due consideration to the proposed amendments and the Defendant's comments thereon.
i) Were the Defendants in breach of duty in discharging Mr Long, as they did on 30th April 2008, without making arrangements for Mr Long's blood to be re-taken to test his inflammatory markers on 1st May 2008 so that his condition could be re-assessed as an inpatient or an outpatient, on that day?ii) Did the delay (between 3rd and 10th May, if Mr Long succeeds on the first issue; between 6th and 10th May, if he does not) cause Mr Long injury such as to give rise to a sustainable claim for damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity and, if it did, what is the quantum of that damage?
THE FACTS
"Old wound opened up & large amount of pus came out. Going down to the implant. Stitches opened up & necrotic tissue debrided. Thorough washout done…"
THE LAW
"I myself would prefer to put it this way, that [a medical practitioner] is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art. ... Putting it the other way round, a man is not negligent, if he is acting in accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body of opinion who would take a contrary view."
"in my view, the court is not bound to hold that a defendant doctor escapes liability for negligent treatment or diagnosis just because he leads evidence from a number of medical experts who are genuinely of opinion that the defendant's treatment or diagnosis accorded with sound medical practice. In the Bolam case itself, McNair J. stated [1957] 1 W.L.R. 583, 587, that the defendant had to have acted in accordance with the practice accepted as proper by a "responsible body of medical men." Later, at p. 588, he referred to "a standard of practice recognised as proper by a competent reasonable body of opinion." Again, in the passage which I have cited from Maynard's case, Lord Scarman refers to a "respectable" body of professional opinion. The use of these adjectives -responsible, reasonable and respectable--all show that the court has to be satisfied that the exponents of the body of opinion relied upon can demonstrate that such opinion has a logical basis. In particular in cases involving, as they so often do, the weighing of risks against benefits, the judge before accepting a body of opinion as being responsible, reasonable or respectable, will need to be satisfied that, in forming their views, the experts have directed their minds to the question of comparative risks and benefits and have reached a defensible conclusion on the matter."
At page 243 A-D after reference to authorities, he said:
"These decisions demonstrate that in cases of diagnosis and treatment there are cases where, despite a body of professional opinion sanctioning the defendant's conduct, the defendant can properly be held liable for negligence (I am not here considering questions of disclosure of risk). In my judgment that is because, in some cases, it cannot be demonstrated to the judge's satisfaction that the body of opinion relied upon is reasonable or responsible. In the vast majority of cases the fact that distinguished experts in the field are of a particular opinion will demonstrate the reasonableness of that opinion. In particular, where there are questions of assessment of the relative risks and benefits of adopting a particular medical practice, a reasonable view necessarily presupposes that the relative risks and benefits have been weighed by the experts in forming their opinions. But if, in a rare case, it can be demonstrated that the professional opinion is not capable of withstanding logical analysis, the judge is entitled to hold that the body of opinion is not reasonable or responsible.
I emphasise that in my view it will very seldom be right for a judge to reach the conclusion that views genuinely held by a competent medical expert are unreasonable. The assessment of medical risks and benefits is a matter of clinical judgment which a judge would not normally be able to make without expert evidence. As the quotation from Lord Scarman makes clear, it would be wrong to allow such assessment to deteriorate into seeking to persuade the judge to prefer one of two views both of which are capable of being logically supported. It is only where a judge can be satisfied that the body of expert opinion cannot be logically supported at all that such opinion will not provide the bench mark by reference to which the defendant's conduct falls to be assessed."
"It seems to me with respect that Smith LJ asked herself the wrong question. One is not concerned with whether the plaque is in some sense "injury" or (as she went on to decide) a "disease". The question is whether the claimant has suffered damage. That means: is he appreciably worse off on account of having plaques?"
THE EVIDENCE
CONCLUSIONS
"Prospective Analysis of Preoperative and Intraoperative Investigations for the Diagnosis of Infection at the Sites of Two Hundred and Two Total Hip Arthroplasties" by Mark J. Spangehl – [1999 - The Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery]
HHJ Collender QC
28.01.16