1. We ask for information about the regulatory impact of our provisional proposals in this paper (paragraph 1.35).

2. We provisionally propose that three standard possibilities should be recognised:

(1)      no requirement for consent;

(2)      a requirement that the landlord gives consent, which can only be withheld on reasonable grounds; and

(3)     a landlord’s veto.

These will be contained in the occupation agreement as appropriate (paragraph 2.24).

3. We further provisionally propose that the relevant term in the agreement should provide that any request for consent should be made in writing and that proof of service, for example by recorded delivery, should be obtained (paragraph 2.25).

4. We provisionally propose that what is meant by “reasonable” should not, in general, be statutorily defined (paragraph 2.32).

5. We invite views on whether the discretion of the court to determine reasonableness in this context should be statutorily structured, and if so what factors should be taken into account (paragraph 2.33).

6. We provisionally propose that it should be a compulsory term in the agreement that where a person whose consent to a transaction is required fails to respond within a given period to a request for consent, this should be regarded as an unreasonable refusal of consent, so that the requisite consent should be deemed to have been given (paragraph 2.38).

7. We invite views on what that appropriate period should be (paragraph 2.39).

8. We provisionally propose that where landlords think they have reasonable grounds to refuse consent, they should be required to inform the occupier of the reasons why consent was refused (paragraph 2.41).

9. We invite views on whether the landlord should be required to provide a written statement of reasons and, if so, whether this should be a universal requirement to apply in all cases or one that only arises where the occupier asks for it (paragraph 2.42).

10. We invite views on the sanction that should be applied to the landlord who fails to provide a written statement of reasons, following a request – properly made – so to do (paragraph 2.44).

11. We provisionally propose that the occupation agreement should make clear that any transaction carried out by the occupier, which was either contrary to the landlord’s veto or subject to consent which has been reasonably withheld, will expose the occupier to the possibility of possession proceedings for breach of the occupation agreement, and will not bind the landlord (paragraph 2.48).

12. We provisionally propose that after a prescribed maximum period during which the landlord should be able to take such payments without starting possession proceedings, a fresh agreement, covered by our new scheme, should be taken to have been created if, after termination of the original agreement, the landlord accepts payments from an unlawful occupier in return for delaying, or not taking, possession action against them as trespassers (paragraph 2.64).

13. We invite views on whether there should be a prescribed maximum period of time during which the landlord should be able to take such payments, without starting possession proceedings, and without being taken to have created a new agreement. Alternatively should it be left as a matter of fact to be determined by the court whether the landlord has agreed to refrain from or delay possession action in return for the payments (paragraph 2.65)?

14. We provisionally propose that, if there is to be general requirement on social landlords to use type I agreements, one of the exceptional circumstances justifying use of a type II agreement would be where the landlord wished to make a temporary arrangement with a new occupier who has been granted the right to occupy without the landlord’s consent or in breach of a landlord’s veto (paragraph 2.67).

15. We provisionally propose that there should be no limit to the number of people to whom joint rights of occupation may be granted, subject to the overall limit imposed by the laws against over-crowding (paragraph 3.17).

16. We provisionally propose that, where an occupation agreement is entered into by more than one occupier, there should be a default term that liability of the occupiers under that agreement should be on the joint and several basis (paragraph 3.28).

17. We provisionally propose that there should be a compulsory term in the agreement that an occupier should be able to apply to the landlord for permission to have someone else brought into the agreement as a new joint occupier. The landlord should be able to refuse consent unless it is unreasonable to do so (paragraph 3.40).

18. In this context, the assessment of reasonableness should take account of all relevant circumstances including in particular any prejudice to the landlord that might arise if the new person ended up as sole occupier (paragraph 3.41).

19. It should also take account of the numbers that would reside in the premises and the landlord’s interest in retaining control over those numbers (paragraph 3.42).

20. We invite views on whether the right to apply for a joint occupation agreement should be limited to particular categories of people. If so, we invite views on what those categories should be (paragraph 3.43).

21. We invite views on whether the provisional proposal should be limited to type I agreements only, or should apply to all agreements falling within our proposed scheme (paragraph 3.44).

22. We provisionally propose that where the occupier regards the refusal of consent as unreasonable, he or she should have the right to apply to the county court for a determination of the matter (paragraph 3.47).

23. We further provisionally propose that, in appropriate cases where the landlord was held to have been unreasonable, the court should have the power to add a new occupier to the agreement (paragraph 3.48).

24. We invite views on whether the court should have any wider power to vary the terms of the agreement (paragraph 3.49).

25. We provisionally propose that a joint occupier under a type I agreement should be able to terminate his or her interest in the agreement by written notice to the landlord without this bringing the whole agreement to an end (paragraph 3.82).

26. We further provisionally propose that a copy of the notice should be served on the remaining occupiers (paragraph 3.83).

27. We invite views as to whether the copy should be served by the occupier seeking to withdraw from the premises, or by the landlord (paragraph 3.84).

28. We invite views on whether, following the departure of one or more joint occupier or occupiers, the landlord of a type I tenancy should be able to seek repossession of the home, subject to reasonableness and the provision of suitable alternative accommodation, if the home is no longer suitable for occupation by the remaining occupier or joint occupiers (paragraph 3.85).

29. If there is to be a special ground of possession, we also invite views on whether the landlord should be required to make use of it within any defined time limit. If so, what should the time limit be? Should there be a period before which the landlord should not be able to take proceedings, to enable the remaining occupiers find a lodger or a replacement joint occupier (paragraph 3.86)?

30. We provisionally propose that a joint occupier under a type II agreement, should be able by written notice to the landlord to determine his or her interest in the agreement without this bringing the whole agreement to an end (paragraph 3.92).

31. We provisionally propose that it should be a default term of fixed term type II agreements with a break clause that where one of a number of joint occupiers exercises the break clause, it will have the effect of only terminating his or her rights under the agreement and will not bring the entire agreement to an end. The remaining occupiers will be entitled to remain in occupation, having assumed all the rights and obligations under the agreement (paragraph 3.100).

32. We provisionally propose that the procedure whereby a landlord may seek to terminate an occupation agreement, where it appears that the premises have been abandoned, should also apply where a joint occupier has abandoned the premises. If the first notice produces no response, the landlord should be required to serve a second notice giving the occupier another eight weeks in which to apply to court to challenge the finding of abandonment (paragraph 3.106).

33. We provisionally propose that, when the landlord intends to use the abandonment procedure against a joint occupier who has withdrawn from the premises, the landlord should also notify the other joint occupiers of this intention (paragraph 3.109).

34. We further provisionally propose that where a landlord has used the proposed abandonment procedure against a departed occupier, the remaining joint occupiers would continue to be jointly and severally bound by the agreement in the same way as if the removed occupier had given notice under a notice clause (paragraph 3.110).

35. We provisionally propose that, where there is a response from the departed joint occupier to the initial notice, which is equivocal as to whether the occupier has or has not abandoned, there should be a procedure to enable the landlord to obtain an declaration from the court. If satisfied that the occupier has demonstrated an intention no longer to accept being bound by the agreement, the court should declare that the agreement has terminated in respect of that occupier (paragraph 3.112).

36. We provisionally propose that our new scheme should include rights for non-contracting occupiers to be notified of any possession proceedings (paragraph 3.120).

37. We invite views on whether the procedure for so doing should be modelled on the rights of “qualifying occupiers” in the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, sections 14 and 15, or to the provisions relating to mortgage possession hearings in the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (paragraph 3.121).

38. We further invite views as to whether the people who must be notified should also have a right to be joined as defendants, or should only be able to do so at the court’s discretion (paragraph 3.122).

39. We further invite views as to whether these notice requirements should attach to all discretionary possession proceedings or only those which arise from type I agreements (paragraph 3.123).

40. We invite views as to whether there are – currently or potentially – significant problems arising from attempts by landlords to regulate those who may live with the occupier on a non-contracting basis (paragraph 3.127).

41. We provisionally propose that the occupation agreement should contain a default term which allowed the occupier the freedom to control who would occupy the premises on a non-contractual basis, with any departures from the default being regulated under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (paragraph 3.131).

42. We provisionally propose that Family Law Act 1996, section 30 be amended to refer to occupiers under our new scheme (paragraph 3.133).

43. We provisionally propose that, in relation to cases where the occupier obtains an adjournment, stay, suspension or postponement of a possession order, a partner’s matrimonial home rights to occupy and tender rent should be preserved until the possession order is enforced (paragraph 3.136).

44. We further provisionally propose that the current law should be expanded so that those with matrimonial home rights are given the right to be joined to possession proceedings with the same rights as the occupier to defend themselves against the making of a possession order and to apply after a possession order for any adjournment, stay, suspension or postponement (paragraph 3.137).

45. We provisionally propose that the right of a person to take in a lodger should be extended to all those with type I agreements, by means of a compulsory term to that effect (paragraph 4.5).

46. We provisionally propose that there should be a statutory definition of “lodger” for the purposes of the right to take in lodgers.

47. We further provisionally propose that “lodger” should be defined as a person who occupies premises where there is a resident landlord who shares accommodation with the lodger, irrespective of whether the person does so under a tenancy or a licence (paragraph 4.18).

48. We invite views on whether the unprotected status of an occupier as a “lodger” should continue, even where the resident landlord no longer actually shares the accommodation with the lodger but retains the contractual right to do so (paragraph 4.19).

49. We provisionally propose that the right to take in a lodger should be exercisable without a consent requirement, as at present (paragraph 4.28).

50. We invite views on whether or not occupiers under a type II agreement should also have the right to take in a lodger (paragraph 4.35).

51. If the answer to the question is yes, we also invite views whether the right should be an absolute one, or one that can only be exercised with the consent of the landlord (paragraph 4.36).

52. We provisionally propose that there be no requirement for the provision of a written agreement between a lodger and his or her resident landlord (paragraph 4.41).

53. We provisionally propose that, on termination of an agreement covered by our new scheme, the head landlord should not be bound by any lodging agreement entered into by the former occupier, irrespective of whether that lodging agreement amounted to a tenancy or a licence (paragraph 4.46).

54. We provisionally propose that the issue of whether or not an occupier should be able to enter a sub-occupation agreement of the premises should be determined by a term in the original agreement (paragraph 5.10).

55. We provisionally propose that there should be a compulsory term in the type I agreement that the occupier may enter a sub-occupation agreement of part of the premises, subject to the consent of the landlord, which may not be unreasonably withheld. This right would not however be available where the occupier would have to cease to occupy the property as a home in order to grant the sub-occupation agreement (paragraph 5.18).

56. We provisionally propose that it should be a default term in the model type I agreement that there be a landlord’s veto on the granting of a sub-occupation agreement which would involve the occupier moving out of the whole of the premises (paragraph 5.28).

57. We provisionally propose that the principles relating to sub-occupation agreements under type I agreements should apply equally to type II agreements (paragraph 5.33).

58. We provisionally propose that the model agreements contain a default term which provides that any sub-occupation agreement should be a type II periodic agreement (paragraph 5.46).

59. We provisionally propose that landlords, on giving their consent to the creation of a sub-occupation agreement should be able to impose reasonable conditions as to the type or terms of the sub-agreement (paragraph 5.55).

60. We further provisionally propose that breach of these conditions should not invalidate the consent, but that any sub-occupation agreement created without compliance with such conditions should be deemed to be a type II periodic agreement (paragraph 5.56).

61. We provisionally propose that, where a sub-occupation agreement has been properly entered into, the same rules and sanctions relating to the provision of a written copy of the agreement by the occupier to the sub-occupier should apply as they apply to the original agreement (paragraph 5.58).

62. We provisionally propose that, as between the landlord and the sub- occupier, the question of what type of agreement the landlord should be bound by should be determined by the type of agreement created by the original occupier with the sub-occupier (paragraph 5.65).

63. We further provisionally propose that if the landlord has given consent, or has included a term in the agreement allowing sub-occupation agreements to be made without consent (replacing the default term), then on the termination of the original agreement:

(1) The landlord should be bound by the sub-occupation agreement if the original occupier terminated the agreement by giving notice to quit or by exercising a break clause or surrendering. The sub-occupier should step into the shoes of the original occupier but only under the terms of the sub-agreement.

(2) If the landlord brings proceedings for possession against the original occupier or if the landlord used the abandonment procedure, then the landlord should have to serve notice on the sub-occupier (at the premises), who should be entitled to be joined in the action. The sub-occupier should be entitled to seek an order of the court converting the sub-occupier into a direct occupier of the landlord, but, again, on the terms of the sub-agreement. The court should do so unless it would have granted possession against this person if they had already been the occupier (paragraph 5.66).

64. We provisionally propose that the new direct landlord should not take the benefit or burden of any breaches of the agreement which occurred before the change of landlord (paragraph 5.72).

65. We thus provisionally propose that the liability of the new direct landlord to the former sub-occupier should be limited to breaches of the agreement occurring after the date on which the new direct landlord became the new direct landlord. Any claims for breach of the sub-occupation agreement occurring before that date should be pursued by the former sub-occupier against the former occupier (paragraph 5.73).

66. We further provisionally propose that the liability of the former sub-occupier to the new direct landlord should be limited to breaches of the agreement occurring after the new direct landlord became the new direct landlord. Where a breach of the sub-occupation agreement occurred before the new direct landlord became the new direct landlord, the former sub-occupier should remain liable to the former occupier (paragraph 5.74).

67. We provisionally propose that any restrictions on the ability of occupiers to transfer the whole of their rights of occupation should be by way of a term in the occupation agreement (paragraph 6.6).

68. We provisionally propose that occupation agreements should contain, as a default term, a provision stating that there is a landlord’s veto against the transfer of the right to occupy by the occupier to a third party (paragraph 6.10).

69. We provisionally propose that the rights of Rent Act statutory tenants to agree with their landlord to transfer their statutory tenancy should be preserved (paragraph 6.13).

70. We provisionally propose that it should be a compulsory term in any type I agreement granted by a social landlord that the occupier should have the right to exchange his or her right of occupation with another occupier granted a type I agreement by a social landlord. The right to exchange would be subject to consent being given by the landlords affected (paragraph 6.13).

71. We provisionally propose that it should be a compulsory term in any type I agreement granted by a social landlord that the occupier should have the right to exchange his or her right of occupation with another occupier granted a type I agreement by a social landlord. The right to exchange would be subject to consent being given by the landlords affected (paragraph 6.19).

72. We invite views on the following questions:

(1) Should private landlords be required to make any provision for a right of mutual exchange in any type I agreement they may enter into?

(2) If the answer is yes, should this be by way of a compulsory term, or a default term?

(3) Would private landlords who might otherwise consider using type I agreements be deterred from doing so by the existence of a right of mutual exchange?

(4) Would the interests of social landlords be prejudiced if mutual exchanges led to their receiving type I agreement occupiers from private landlords who had never been through the allocations procedure of any social landlord (paragraph 6.26)?

73. We provisionally propose that such a clause should not be a compulsory term in any type II agreement (paragraph 6.28).

74. We provisionally propose that the right to exchange should be subject to the landlord’s consent (paragraph 6.35).

75. We invite views as to whether the new scheme should reproduce the current requirements as to the landlord’s consent to mutual exchange in Housing Act 1985, section 92 and Schedule 3, or whether instead a simpler, more clearly time-limited procedure should be adopted (paragraph 6.36).

76. We ask whether, in the alternative, the same criteria of general reasonableness should be adopted as we are suggesting in other cases where consent is required, based on Landlord and Tenant Act 1927, section 19 and the Landlord and Tenant Act 1988 (paragraph 6.37).

77. We invite views as to whether the current requirement for the existence of a complete chain of exchanges should be retained, or whether it should be able to be waived by the landlords concerned (paragraph 6.41).

78. We provisionally propose that type I agreements should contain a compulsory term allowing for the occupier to transfer his or her rights to a potential successor, subject to the landlord’s consent (paragraph 6.47).

79. We provisionally propose that there should be a default term in the type II agreement giving the landlord a veto over the assignment of the agreement (paragraph 6.51).

80. We provisionally propose that it should be possible for the transfer to a potential successor to lead (subject to any terms in the contract) to the transfer to joint successors (paragraph 6.56).

81. We invite views on whether Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 24, and Children Act 1989, Schedule 1, paragraph 1(2)(d) to (e) should be amended so that they apply to all occupation agreements falling within the scope of our new scheme, irrespective of whether they would otherwise be regarded as creating a property interest (paragraph 6.65).

82. We provisionally propose that the Family Law Act 1996 Schedule 7 should be amended to refer to any agreement covered by our new scheme (paragraph 6.70).

83. We provisionally propose that the model agreements under our new scheme should contain a compulsory term allowing agreements to be transferred by order of the court made under the Family Law Act 1996 Schedule 7 (paragraph 6.71).

84. We provisionally propose that a transfer should not take effect until after any necessary consent has been given by the landlord (paragraph 6.74).

85. We provisionally propose that any transfer should take effect from the moment at which the intention of the transferor and transferee is confirmed either in writing, or by the transferor giving up occupation to the transferee, or by the first instalment of rent which is paid to the landlord by the transferee and not by the transferor (paragraph 6.77).

86. We provisionally propose that the landlord should be required to serve on the transferee a written copy of the agreement, amended to show the change of occupier, within two weeks of the transfer. The same sanctions for failure to comply should be available as would be apply for failure to give a copy of the written agreement to the original occupier at the start of the agreement (paragraph 6.81).

87. We provisionally propose that the effect of a transfer to which the landlord has given consent should be to vest the rights and liabilities under the occupation agreement in the transferee. Thus the original occupier would be replaced by the new occupier as the party to the agreement with the landlord. The transfer should not of itself confer on the transferee any rights or liabilities relating to any time before the transfer took place. The former occupier should cease to have rights and liabilities for any events occurring after the transfer (paragraph 6.100).

88. We provisionally propose that where a sub-occupation agreement has been lawfully created out of a head agreement which is also covered by our new scheme, and the landlord (where consent is needed), the occupier and the sub-occupier have all intended to create a sub-agreement rather than a transfer, then the sub-occupation agreement should take effect as such and should not be deemed to be a transfer even if it is for the whole of the remaining term of the head agreement (paragraph 6.112).

89. We provisionally propose that on the death of a joint occupier, the remaining occupier(s) should take over the occupation agreement (paragraph 7.9).

90. We provisionally propose that survivorship by joint occupiers should take priority over the right of succession under other statutory rules. The statutory succession rules should only take effect on the death of a sole occupier, including the death of the last of any joint occupiers (paragraph 7.11).

91. We provisionally propose that the principle of survivorship should apply irrespective of the number of joint occupiers living in the premises at the date of the death of the occupier (paragraph 7.15).

92. We provisionally propose that there should be a compulsory term in type I and periodic type II agreements that, if the agreement does not pass to a joint occupier or to another person under the statutory rules on succession, the agreement should terminate automatically and without the need for a court order (paragraph 7.18).

93. We provisionally propose that there should be a default term which specifies the moment, after death of the occupier, at which the agreement terminates (paragraph 7.28).

94. We invite views as to whether that default term should provide that the agreement terminates immediately on death, or at the point at which the landlord does or should reasonably have become aware of the death (paragraph 7.29).

95. We invite views as to whether such provisions would cause problems where housing benefit is paid direct to the landlord, and whether any such problems should be dealt with by changes to the housing benefit system rather than to the law on relations between landlords and occupiers (paragraph 7.30).

96. We provisionally propose that fixed term type II agreements should contain a default term providing that the agreement terminates on the death of the occupier. The statute should provide that the parties can exclude the statutory rules on succession, but only where they have replaced this default term with a term allowing for the remaining period of the agreement to pass to another under the occupier’s will (paragraph 7.39).

97. We provisionally propose that fixed term occupation agreements that are licences not tenancies should only be capable of being transferred, on the death of the occupier, under the statutory right of succession (paragraph 7.41).

98. We provisionally propose that a statutory right of succession should be part of the proposed new scheme for the regulation of all the occupation agreements falling within the scope of our proposed scheme (paragraph 7.45).

99. We further provisionally propose that, save for special arrangements made in relation to fixed-term agreements, and cases where the principle of survivorship applies, the only means whereby the benefit of an occupation agreement can be passed on following the death of the occupier should be though the right of succession (paragraph 7.47).

100. We provisionally propose that a surviving spouse should have the right to succeed. “Spouse” should be defined to include the survivor of couples who have lived together as husband and wife, or of same sex couples who have co-habited. We provisionally propose that these principles should apply whether or not either partner has undergone gender re-assignment. Any spouse should have been living in the premises as his or her only or principal home at the time of the death (paragraph 7.59).

101. We further provisionally propose that a list of those potentially entitled to succeed should be set out in the legislation, which would then be capable of being set out in the agreement (paragraph 7.62).

102. We invite views on the categories that should be included in the list (paragraph 7.63).

103. We provisionally propose that a member of the family who wishes to exercise a right to succeed should have resided in the premises as his or her only or principal home before the occupier died (paragraph 7.65).

104. We invite views on what the period of occupation should be (paragraph 7.66).

105. We invite views on the question whether the right to succeed should be specifically extended to carers, on a basis similar to that set out in the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 (paragraph 7.68).

106. We provisionally propose that the rights of succession currently available to Rent Act protected tenants are preserved for that group (paragraph 7.70).

107. We provisionally propose that a surviving spouse should have the automatic right to succeed to a deceased occupier who was not him or herself a successor (paragraph 7.78).

108. We further provisionally propose that, after succession by a spouse, there should be a further right to succeed by another member of the family of either the original deceased occupier or the successor occupier. The spouse of the successor occupier would be included in this category (paragraph 7.79).

109. We provisionally propose that where a person succeeds to an occupation agreement through the operation of the principle of survivorship, this should not count as the use of the statutory right of succession (paragraph 7.85).

110. We similarly propose that where a person succeeds by will or on intestacy to a fixed-term occupation agreement, this should not count as the use of the statutory right of succession (paragraph 7.86).

111. We further propose that the exercise of any analogous contractual rights of succession should be regarded as the use of the statutory right of succession (paragraph 7.87).

112. We provisionally propose that, so long as the successor remains in the same premises under the same or a different landlord, or acquires an occupation agreement by exercise of the right of mutual exchange, that person should retain the status of successor (paragraph 7.93).

113. We further provisionally propose that if that occupation agreement were terminated, and a wholly new agreement relating to different premises was made, whether by the same or a different landlord, the occupier should enter this agreement not as a successor (paragraph 7.94).

114. We propose that where a landlord grants an agreement to another under the mistaken belief that the occupier was entitled to succeed, this should not invalidate the agreement, but rather the agreement should be deemed to be fully valid (paragraph 7.95).

115. Where there is evidence that the occupier had sought to mislead the landlord as to his or her status as successor, this should be the basis for possession proceedings in the normal way (paragraph 7.96).

116. We provisionally propose that a person who succeeds under the statutory right of succession should succeed to the same agreement. (The only exception would be that a non-spouse successor of a former Rent Act tenant would not succeed to the right to a fair rent.) Save as to the identity of the occupier, the terms of the agreement will not change unless a variation is agreed or permitted by the agreement (paragraph 7.99).

117. We provisionally propose that it should be possible for joint occupiers who have the right to succeed, to have the rights of occupation under the agreement transferred to them jointly (paragraph 7.103).

118. We provisionally propose that where there was more than one potential successor, they should seek to resolve any dispute between themselves. However, where there has been a failure to resolve the matter, it should be resolved by the landlord (paragraph 7.107).

119. We invite views as to whether there are special cases where the matter should be resolved by a court (paragraph 7.109).

120. We invite views on whether an alternative approach based on a more limited right of succession, but one which was not limited in the number of successions, and/or was open to a wider group of potential successors, is to be preferred (paragraph 7.112).

121. We provisionally propose that, where the agreement does not terminate following the death of the occupier, the landlord should be required to serve an amended copy of the agreement on the new occupier. The same rent and criminal penalties and time limits for non-compliance should apply as do on the creation of a new agreement. The time limit for this should run from the date on which the landlord is satisfied, or should reasonably be satisfied, that the former occupier has died and a successor has been entitled to take over the agreement without the agreement terminating (paragraph 7.115).

122. We provisionally propose that, in cases of succession under our scheme, the deceased occupier’s estate should retain all the deceased occupier’s rights and liabilities relating to the period before the succession, and the statutory successor, as such, should neither benefit from nor be burdened by them. The statutory successor, and not the estate, should take all the rights and liabilities under the agreement in relation to the period after the succession (paragraph 7.126).

123. We provisionally propose that on the date of the death of the occupier, or the date on which the agreement is terminated, if later, the rights and liabilities of the deceased occupier for events occurring before that date should be taken over by the deceased’s estate. The estate should not be liable for any rights and liabilities arising after that date (paragraph 7.131).

124. We provisionally propose that, in determining whether occupation agreements are binding on successors to the original landlord, existing principles of landlord and tenant law should continue to apply to determine whether such agreements constitute a lease or a licence (paragraph 8.42).

125. We provisionally propose that statutory tenancies under the Rent Act 1977 should, on conversion to type I agreements, take effect as a property interest (paragraph 8.46).

126. We provisionally propose that our new scheme should not interfere with land law on the determination of questions such as whether the occupier has the rights of a leaseholder in relation to third parties such as trespassers or neighbouring landowners who commit the tort of nuisance (paragraph 8.48).

127. We provisionally propose that our scheme should not make any special provision, above that imposed by general landlord and tenant law, for head landlords, whose leases fall outside our scheme, to be bound by occupation agreements covered by our scheme which are created by mesne landlords (paragraph 8.73).

128. We provisionally propose that the process of converting an existing tenancy into an occupation agreement within our scheme should be deemed to be the creation of a “new tenancy” for the purposes of the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 (paragraph 8.86).

129. We further provisionally propose that, save for sections 16 to 20, the provisions of the Act of 1995 which deal with the rights and obligations of assignors and assignees should apply to transfers of occupation agreements, classified in law as tenancies, within the scope of our scheme (paragraph 8.87).

130. We provisionally propose that any notice of disrepair given to a landlord should be effective as notice to a new landlord, though the new landlord’s liability should only start to run from the date of acquisition of their interest in the property (paragraph 8.87).

131. We provisionally propose that the new landlord should have to serve written notice on the occupiers of a name and address for service for themselves and any agents (matching the requirements of the core term in the original agreement) (paragraph 8.95).

132. We provisionally propose that on receipt of this notification the occupier should be entitled to require the new landlord to supply a revised copy of the agreement, as happens on a variation of the agreement (paragraph 8.96).

133. We provisionally propose that if the new landlord fails to give the prescribed information to the occupier within two weeks of the assignment, the new landlord should be liable to an equivalent rent sanction as applies in the case of the original agreements. He or she should be deemed to owe the occupier the equivalent of one day’s rent for each day’s delay, starting with the date of the assignment, up to the date of notification or two months from the assignment, whichever is the shorter (paragraph 8.101).

134. We seek consultees’ views as to whether an ongoing sanction is required for cases where new landlords still fail to provide notification, despite the loss of rent. Do consultees feel that it would be useful and appropriate to create, in addition, a continuing criminal offence of failure to provide notification by the end of the first two months after the assignment (paragraph 8.102)?

135. We provisionally propose that a compulsory term in occupation agreements should require the original landlord, on disposing of their interest to a new landlord, to give the occupier notice of the new landlord’s identity and address for service, or ensure that the new landlord does so. The term should render the former landlord liable for any breaches by the new landlord until either the former or new landlord gives the occupier the required notice (paragraph 8.104).

136. We provisionally propose that current rights for occupiers of social landlords to consultation and participation, including those on disposals of the landlord’s interest, should be retained in our new scheme for those occupiers by being incorporated as a compulsory term in the occupation agreement (paragraph 8.111).

137. We provisionally propose that Landlord and Tenant Act 1987, section 3(1) should be amended so as to continue to apply the right of first refusal to those type I agreement occupiers who were formerly Rent Act 1977 protected tenants (paragraph 8.114).