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Irish Times Newspapers Ltd/Retailers [1997] IECA 477 (11th March, 1997)
COMPETITION
AUTHORITY
Competition
Authority Decision of 11 March 1997 relating to a proceeding under Section 4 of
the Competition Act, 1991.
Notification
No CA/112 - 114/92E - Irish Times Newspapers Ltd / Retailers.
Decision
No. 477
Price £2.00
(£2.70 incl. postage)
Notification
nos. CA/112 - 114/92E - Irish Times Newspapers Ltd / Retailers.
Decision
No. 477
Introduction
1. This
notification concerns a standard distribution agreement between The Irish Times
Newspapers Ltd and newspaper retailers, which was notified to the Authority on
25 September, 1992. The notification requested a certificate under
Section 4
(4) of the
Competition Act, 1991 or, in the event of a refusal by the
Competition Authority to grant a certificate, a licence under
Section 4 (2). A
Statement of Objections was issued on 19 December 1996 to the notifying party
indicating the Authority’s intention to refuse to issue a certificate or
grant a licence in respect of the notified agreements. The Irish Times, in a
letter dated 5 February 1997, offered to amend the clause in the agreements
which the Authority found offensive.
The
Facts
(a)
The Subject of the Notification
2.
This notification concerns a standard agreement for the supply and distribution
of a newspaper - The Irish Times - to newsagents throughout the State by the
publisher. The agreement sets out the various requirements for the supply of
newspapers to the retail outlets around the country such as opening hours,
minimum orders, premises, credit-rating, location and price. The agreement
applies to all new outlets, transferrees and defaulters. A number of
newsagents is supplied on the basis of older agreements which have not been
notified. The Irish Times submitted three notifications concerning three
different aspects of the arrangements for the distribution of newspapers -
method of payment, minimum orders and the price of newspapers. In fact, these
are clauses of a single standard agreement. The Authority has pointed out
previously that, in its view, only an entire agreement can be notified and
certified or licensed. Individual clauses of an agreement cannot be notified.
(b)
The Parties involved
3. The
Irish Times Newspapers Limited is a subsidiary of The Irish Times Trust
Limited. The Group is involved in the publication and distribution of
newspapers. The other parties to this agreement are certain newspaper retailers.
(c)
The Products and the Market
4. The
products involved are daily newspapers. There are four domestically produced
national daily newspaper titles on sale in the State (The Irish Times, Irish
Independent, The Cork Examiner and The Star), two domestically produced evening
titles (Evening Herald and The Evening Echo) and four domestically produced
Sunday titles (The Sunday Business Post, The Sunday Independent, The Sunday
Tribune and The Sunday World). In addition eleven UK national daily newspapers
and nine UK Sunday titles are distributed and sold throughout the State. The
Authority stated in its interim report on the newspaper industry that there
were several distinct newspaper markets in the State.
[1]
The arrangements relate to the Irish Times a daily newspaper which is published
six days per week. In the case of daily newspapers the Authority concluded
that there was a distinct Irish quality daily newspaper market which is the
market in which the Irish Times competes.
5. Table
1 indicates that total daily sales of Irish national newspapers in between
January and June 1996 were just under 399,000. Sales of the Irish Times
amounted to 101,223 or just over 25% of all Irish daily newspaper sales. Sales
of the Irish Times in the first six months of 1996 rose to 101,223. The Irish
Independent was the largest selling Irish daily with average daily sales of
157,393 in the first half of 1996. According to the National Newspapers of
Ireland (NNI), sales for all UK daily newspapers in Ireland amounted to 27% of
daily paper sales in 1995. The Star, a tabloid newspaper, had daily sales
amounting to 85,973 in the first six months of 1996. The Irish Press has not
been published since 26 May, 1995. Sales of The Cork Examiner Group are
largely confined to the Munster region.
Table 1: Irish Daily Newspaper Sales in Jan-Jun 1996
Title
|
Number
|
Percentage
|
Irish
Independent
|
157,393
|
39.44%
|
Irish
Times
|
101,223
|
25.37%
|
The
Star
|
85,973
|
21.55%
|
Cork
Examiner
|
54,406
|
13.64%
|
TOTAL
|
398,995
|
100.0%
|
Source:
ABC
The
Distribution System
6. The
distribution system for newspapers and magazines in Ireland was described in
detail in the 1979 report by the Restrictive Practices Commission.
[2]
Essentially, the actual system of distribution has not changed a great deal
since that date. Irish national newspapers are primarily distributed by the
publishers, acting as their own wholesalers, to a large number of retail
outlets. Time is an essential factor in the publishing and distribution of
newspapers, and since they are generally considered to be a highly perishable
product with a short shelf life, they have to be distributed quickly and
frequently to many outlets throughout the country.
7. There
are differences in the methods of delivery of newspapers between Dublin and the
rest of the country and between the morning, evening and Sunday papers. Each
newspaper publisher is responsible for its own despatch operation. In the
Dublin area each newspaper carries out its own delivery service to retail
outlets, with the exception of city centre news vendors who are supplied by
"shoppers" who take bulk copies of newspapers and resell to the vendors.
Deliveries outside Dublin involve parcels of newspapers being transported by
train and by trucks to certain focal points throughout the country and
thereafter transferred to buses, district mail vans, postmen, private
contractors, local hauliers or special delivery agents. Independent Newspapers
uses its own wholesale distributor (Newspread) for newspapers in a few
locations (Cork, Enniscorthy and Donegal). The Cork Examiner is mainly
delivered in its own vans with a small proportion of deliveries being
transported by mail vans, bus and local trains.
8. There
are approximately 6,000 to 7,000 outlets in the country for the sale of
newspapers. Street vendors are not included in this figure. The multiple
supermarkets have also commenced selling newspapers in their outlets with
Dunnes Stores selling newspapers in 45 of their branches and Quinnsworths
selling newspapers in 36 of their branches.
The
Irish Times sells its newspaper through [ ] of these outlets. These outlets
are described in the Irish Times notification as the ´buyers', 'who
purchase the newspaper titles' from the company. The notified agreement applies
to only about [ ] retailers. None of the newsagents appointed under the
notified agreement sell less than the minimum of 60 copies per week specified
in the agreement. There are [ ] newsagents which sell less than 60 copies
per week and [ ] newsagents which sell less than 5 copies per day under older
agreements. Some multiple supermarket outlets also sell newspapers. [see para.
34] The Irish Times stated that it only refused to supply a relatively small
number of applicants and that such refusals were based on objective criteria
such as credit worthiness or opening hours.
Newspaper prices
9. It
appears that newspapers are almost always sold at the stated cover price which
is printed on the masthead. In its Interim Report on the Newspaper Industry
the Authority noted that there was a remarkable similarity in the timing of
price changes of three of the Irish daily newspapers papers over a period ten
years. The Irish Times and the Independent had repeatedly increased prices on
the same day and by the same amount while constantly maintaining a price
differential of 5p between them. Following publication of the Report the price
of the Irish Independent was initially increased by 5p. The Irish Press had,
with one or two exceptions, almost always simultaneously increased its prices
by an identical amount over most of this period, with some deviations from this
pattern in recent years. The Report also noted that Independent Newspapers ran
a campaign, in October 1994, whereby copies of the Saturday edition of the
Irish Independent were effectively sold at 30p in certain retail outlets in
South Dublin City for two successive Saturdays.
[3]
In addition Independent Newspaper introduced a direct delivery service in
parts of North County Dublin in 1994. A feature of the service was that
consumers were offered the copies of the Independent Newspaper titles for less
than the cover price. Discounts are also given to students.
(d)
The Arrangements
10.
The notified arrangements involve a standard newspaper distribution agreement
in the
form
of terms and conditions of supply. These arrangements apply to all newly
appointed retailers, transferees and outlets which have failed to maintain
payments under older agreements. Around [ ] of the [ ] outlets selling the
Irish Times are party to the notified arrangements in September, 1992.
11. The
notified arrangements included the terms and conditions of the company and an
application form for completion by the applicant. The Application Form which
the Applicant completes requires certain information to be provided including
details of the Applicant, the premises - whether it was owned, leased or rented
- the nature of the business, what newspapers were sold at the premises,
whether magazines or paperbacks were sold, hours of business, etc. The
Applicant was asked if a home/office delivery service would be provided.
Details were also requested of any new developments in the area such as new
housing estates, shopping centres and new factories/offices.
12.
After an initial 12 week probationary period, the agreement is of an
indefinite duration. The terms and conditions include the following clauses.
Under clause (B) the newsagent is required to pay all charges on a weekly basis
by means of a Direct Debit (the relevant forms are completed along with the
application form). The newspapers remain the property of the Company (Irish
Times) until all sums due have been paid to the Company, the newsagent holding
all monies in trust for the Company. All unsold copies of the newspaper
returned to the Company within four weeks of the date of publication will be
credited to the account of the newsagent, subject to a limit of 5% of
newspapers supplied to the newsagent during that period. There are requirements
to maintain sufficient stocks of the papers, to display them in a prominent
position at the premises, to arrange a suitable location for the delivery of
the papers, to keep records of all sales of newspapers and to notify any
non-delivery of newspapers before 10.00 a.m. on the same day, failure to do so
could result in a refusal of credit allowances for claims in respect of same.
13. Clause
(G) requires the Newsagent to purchase a minimum of 10 copies of the paper per
day or 60 copies per week from the Company; and additional copies may be
supplied occasionally by the Company. Clause (I) of the Terms and Conditions
states that: "A recommended retail price, as indicated from time to time on the
respective mastheads of each of the Newspapers, shall apply to all sales of the
Newspapers by the Newsagent". The agreement is personal to the newsagent who
is prevented from assigning or transferring the agreement to anyone else
(clause (K).
14. The
Agreement may be terminated by giving at least four weeks notice in writing to
the other party, or if the newsagent's business goes into liquidation or
receivership, by the non-compliance of the newsagent to any of the provisions
of the agreement or if there is a change in the control of the newsagency
business without the prior written consent of the Company. Under clause (P) the
Company reserves the right to amend any of the terms and conditions of the
agreement by notice in writing to the newsagent.
(e)
Submissions by the Parties
15. The
Irish Times submitted that the relationship between the Company and the
newsagents was not an agreement between undertakings because the newsagent was
merely an agent and not an undertaking within the meaning of the
Competition
Act. The relationship between the Company and the newsagent was that of an
agency relationship as was shown by the Authority's decision on ESSO Contractor
Agreement.
[4]
The newsagents were self-employed intermediaries between the Company and the
purchasers of the newspapers and were not employees of the Company. They
concluded sales of newspapers on behalf of the Company, for an indefinite
period, but the Company continued to own the newspapers and the proceeds of the
sales were held in trust for the Company. The price was set by the Company, who
was entitled to do so as the owner of the goods, as was the norm in a
principal-agency agreement. The sale proceeds were collected weekly by direct
debit. The newsagents accepted some risk, the employment of staff was the
concern of the newsagents only. The profits on the sale of the newspapers
accrued to the Company as well as any losses such as returns for non-sale of
the newspapers (the limit of 5% on returns did not apply to exceptional
circumstances where extra copies were supplied by the Company). The newsagent
was obliged to comply with all the instructions in the Terms and Conditions.
The Company concluded from the Authority's decision in respect of the ESSO
Contractor Agreement and Abbey Sun/Capitol Holdings
[5]
that the agreement was not one between undertakings as only the Irish Times was
an undertaking. The Company submitted, in the event that the Authority did not
accept the reasons stated above, the agreement should be granted a certificate
on the same grounds.
16. The
Company submitted, in support of its request for a licence, that the Irish
Times required a system for distributing to a very large number of outlets
varying quantities of newspapers in the shortest possible time-frame due to the
short shelf-life of the product. They maintained that a distribution-type
arrangement with distributors placing individual orders on a daily basis would
be unduly expensive to operate. Because of the very high demand for newspapers
there was a need for a large numbers of outlets but in convenient locations
with long opening hours. They concluded that the market would not withstand a
reduction in the number of outlets. Due to the high credit risks involved, the
publisher had to ensure that the relationship with the newsagent was on a
secure financial basis, since the publisher gave newspapers to the agent
without any guarantee of payment. Therefore the agreement was designed to
ensure a guarantee of supply for the agent and payment for the publisher.
17. They
submitted that it would be impossible for the Company to distribute to each
reader in the country, therefore an intermediary was required. A newsagent was
ideal for the purpose of selling newspapers. Because of the need to distribute
newspapers swiftly and efficiently, appointing agents was the only way to
ensure an adequate sales coverage. The agency arrangement in this case was more
appropriate than that of a distributor because (i) the goods would have to be
bought by a distributor, (ii) the number of copies required by the newsagent
can vary so the agency arrangement provided more flexibility, (iii) as demand
for newspapers was unpredictable the newsagent could be left with many unsold
copies and the agency arrangement allowed the newsagent to return the unsold
copies to the publisher, whereas a distributor would have to suffer the loss.
18. The
Company submitted that the idea of having a dedicated newsagent who had a
guaranteed minimum supply of newspapers each day was very beneficial to the
consumer as the consumer did not have to search out supplies. They maintained
that a uniform cover price was advantageous to all consumers as it would be
socially undesirable for readers in remote areas to pay more for their
newspapers than those who were closer to the place where the newspaper was
printed. They pointed out that the Competition Authority had not objected to
the sale by oil companies through agents of oil products at a uniform price
throughout the country. For example, copies of the Irish Times sold in Cape
Clear were transported by truck to Cork, by van to Clonakilty, by another van
to Baltimore, by boat to Cape Clear and by another van to the shop. They
maintained that the implication of having floating newspaper prices were so
serious that the Irish Times Ltd requests the Competition Authority to seek the
opinion of the Minister for Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht if such a move was
even contemplated.
19. The
Irish Times submitted that only a few applicants had been refused supplies of
newspapers for reasons such as poor credit risk, unsuitable premises (e.g.
could not store and keep dry the newspapers when delivered or not open in the
morning for the sale of a morning newspaper - off-licences), the shop was not
open every weekday and Saturday or incomplete information was provided. They
submitted that [ ] of newspapers were returned, this figure was higher than
the one in the agreement. The company gave fair allowance for exceptional
circumstance such as bad weather, late delivery and full allowance for
"box-outs". No newsagent was appointed under this agreement with a minimum
order of less than 10 per day or 60 per week, but there were [ ] newsagents
with orders of less than 60 per week and [ ] with orders of less than 5 copies
per day under older agreements.
Minimum
Orders
20. The
Irish Times submitted that the minimum orders requirement ensured the
economically efficient distribution of the newspapers and did not adversely
affect competition. They stated that the level of order varied so that a
different minimum applied in high density population urban areas (a normal
industry practice both in Ireland and abroad). The minimum number in each case
would be determined objectively and they claimed that it would not be possible
to set the minimum number in advance. The arrangements facilitated the
establishment of efficient competitors in the relevant market to stimulate
further competition by offering high quality products on efficient terms. There
would be no significant reduction in the number of competitors, but rather an
increase in trade by virtue of maintaining a market for the products. The
notified agreement set the minimum order at a level of 10 per day or 60 per
week. This was stated to be to accommodate newsagents who had a very high
demand on Saturdays and a lower demand on weekdays.
21. The
company submitted, in their arguments in support of a licence, that the EU
Block Exemption on Exclusive Distribution agreements (1983/83) did apply even
though the distributor undertook to purchase minimum quantities and likewise in
the Block Exemption on Exclusive Purchasing agreements (1984/84). They
submitted in the present case that there were no restrictions on the retailer
from carrying competing goods i.e. titles. They cited the
Carlsberg
Beers
[6]
decision by the EU Commission where the Commission allowed a restriction to
stand whereby Grand Metropolitan Ltd was required to purchase over half of its
requirements of lager beers from Carlsberg. They submitted that the present
minimum order requirement would be significantly less than half of the total
requirement of newspapers and would be determined by market forces as well as
the strong retailer lobby. Similarly, in
Goodyear
Italiana Spa
[7]
the Commission
permitted an obligation to purchase agreed minimum quantities and the breach of
same allowed Goodyear Italiana to terminate the contract. They submitted that
the minimum order requirements were not restrictive of competition but rather
promoted competition by improving the distribution of goods without any
indispensable restrictions.
Method
of Payment
22. The
company submitted that the requirement to pay by weekly direct debit
facilitated the establishment of efficient competitors in the market to
stimulate further competition by offering high quality outlets which were
commercially viable. The number of competitors would not be reduced as a
result of the measures. They claimed that the number of retailers selling The
Irish Times had risen since the introduction of the Direct Debit Method of
payment. The arrangements allowed the creation and maintenance of new
competitors in the geographical market because of the ability to use a local
distributor with local contacts, local advertising, marketing capabilities and
distribution arrangements. The company submitted that where an arrangement did
not have an appreciable affect on trade in Ireland then the Authority might
issue a certificate.
23. The
company had introduced the direct debit system method of payment in April, 1989
because the previous system of [ ] credit had resulted in a significant number
of outlets defaulting on their payments - up to [ ] of retailers had failed to
comply with it. They maintained that the direct debit mechanism was a common
and widespread one used by many other businesses. It had been introduced as a
weekly system so as to ensure that there was an early indication of defaulters
and it was limited to new outlets, transfers and defaulters to avoid objections
by the current retailers. At present, approximately [ ] of the total [ ]
outlets in Ireland for the Irish Times operate this new system.
24. The
company believed that the payment arrangements did not have an appreciable
effect on competition. They stated that the average retailer took approximately
[ ] copies of The Irish Times each per day. The difference over one month
between paying weekly by variable direct debit or [ ] in arrears was the
deposit interest to be earned on [ ] and in one month, this amounted to [ ]
for the average retailer out of a total cost of [ ].
25. The
company submitted, in support of the granting of a licence, that direct debit
would improve the distribution of newspapers while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit because it prevented bad debts from mounting up
for the company which could affect the price at which the newspapers were sold
to consumers. They maintained that every new retailer and every transferee
after the change in April, 1989 was treated equally and all were being asked to
use the direct debit system. No new applicant or transferee was given the old
system. The company submitted that the collection of payment by way of direct
debit was merely an accounting procedure.
Price
of newspapers
26. The
company submitted that its resale pricing policy had been adopted to ensure an
economic and equitably efficient distribution of its newspaper titles, and in
the absence of same a different price would apply in Dublin (where the company
prints) to other parts of the country. They maintained that there was a
justification for distinguishing newspapers from books because of (i) the need
to transport newspapers quickly, (ii) their short shelf-life (iii) the social
functions of newspapers and (iv) newspapers were generally regarded as being
special in terms of pricing arrangements (in Japan RPM for newspapers was
exempted). They conceded that the resale price concept might restrict some
outlets from selling the titles at other prices.
27. The
company submitted, in support of their request for a licence, that while EU
Competition Law did not normally favour Resale Price Maintenance (RPM), it had
recognised the particular and peculiar nature of newspapers. In the Court's
decision on
Binon/AMP[8],
it was recognised that there might be reasons to exempt the resale price
maintenance scheme for newspapers because of the need for publishers to take
back unsold copies. The Commission proposed, in its decision on
AMP[9]
to exempt AMP's selective distribution system for newsagents, but had postponed
a decision until the review of the notice on commercial agents.
28. The
Irish Times submitted that RPM performed an important social function in that
if market forces operated then, for example, The Irish Times might sell for 50p
on D'Olier Street but would sell for, perhaps £2.50 on Cape Clear Island.
They maintained that there was great merit in having RPM in the context of such
a socially valuable good as a newspaper, otherwise regions far away from the
place of printing (who had an equal right to information) would be severely
disadvantaged by differing prices. They argued also that as the primary
readership for the paper's series of articles in the Irish language probably
was in Gaeltacht areas, the same price criteria might apply in those areas i.e.
the price of the paper could be twice or three times its current price.
29. The
company maintained that as the EU was concerned with the protection of small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and had developed a policy on SMEs
generally, it would be incongruous if the EU's competition policy was very
stringent on such businesses. The Irish Times submitted that as small and
medium-sized businesses were very important in the Irish context, the
Competition Authority should be anxious to ensure that its application of the
competition rules did not unduly restrict the development and maintenance of an
Irish small and medium-sized business sector. If there was no RPM, the Irish
Times could be sold by large multiples at a discount and the SMEs such as
tobacconists, newsagents, grocers and others could suffer irreparable damage.
They submitted that there was also a regional policy argument in favour of RPM.
30. They
submitted that all of the terms and conditions were indispensable. The
Company submitted that the notified arrangements did not afford the
undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of the
products in question because (a) there were many newsagents around the country;
(b) The Irish Times Ltd needed these newsagents to sell its products and (c)
the respective market shares of each of the parties meant that it was
impossible for either side to eliminate competition.
(f)
Submissions by third parties
RGDATA
31. RGDATA
submitted that there had been continual difficulty over the supply of
newspapers to new outlets and that no objective criteria were published by the
newspapers to determine on what basis outlets did or did not receive
newspapers. They submitted that the payment of accounts by direct debit on a
weekly basis did not apply to all accounts at present. It should be applied to
all accounts and not be compulsory for new applicants only. They maintained
that the terms of payment were onerous for the retailer and that this also
provided significant benefits to the newspaper company in terms of collection
and other costs at the expense of the retailer. RGDATA believed that the terms
of payment should be on a monthly basis and that retailers should not be
required to pay by Direct Debit, except where this had been negotiated with the
retailer. They also pointed out that all the newspaper companies had adopted
this practice now and it could be considered as a concerted practice by them.
32. RGDATA
also objected to the question on the Irish Times application form which
concerned the distance of the new applicant's premises from that of the nearest
existing newsagent which they considered to be anti-competitive. (Such a
question does not appear on the application form submitted to the Authority as
part of the notified arrangements). They considered the question concerning
the hours of business to be irrelevant in deciding whether to supply newspapers
or not. RGDATA maintained that the requirement that all publications must be
sold at the cover price only was a form of resale price maintenance and was
prohibited by
Section 4 (1). The Association did not object to a standard cover
price on newspapers provided it was applied to all newsagents. They considered
it essential that all newsagents received the same gross margins on sales.
33. RGDATA
stated that it did not know what the minimum order of copies required by the
newspapers was, but it recognised the need for a minimum order provided the
quantity was stated by the newspaper companies, it was not excessive and that
it applied to all customers. RGDATA assumed that if the arrangements received a
certificate or a licence that any amendments to the terms of business would
have to be notified to the Authority.
Power
Supermarkets
34. Power
Supermarkets Ltd objected to the requirement by the Irish Times for the payment
of accounts by direct debit before supply would be commenced. They maintained
that this requirement should be on a voluntary basis only and they had no
objection to the Irish Times offering an incentive to retailers to pay on a
direct debit basis. They did not believe that a direct debit requirement should
be one of the conditions of sale of any supplier. They contended that this
condition offended against
Section 4(1) (d) - application of dissimilar
conditions to equivalent transactions - of the
Competition Act because this
requirement applied as a condition of sale to new applicants only and not to
the existing outlets. They further submitted that it also offended against
Section 4(1) (e) of
the Act - making the conclusion of contracts subject to
supplementary obligations .
Other
Submissions
35. One
individual submitted that they had taken over the proprietorship of a retail
outlet and was refused supplies of newspapers until the debts of the previous
operator have been paid.
36. A
retailer submitted that he objected to the application by the Irish Times
seeking the grant of a licence for the operation of new trading conditions. He
referred in particular to clause G of the Contract, which stipulated that a
minimum of 10 copies a day or 60 copies per week must be purchased by the
newsagent. This clause was being operated on a selective basis with certain
newsagents only. He had no objection in principle to a minimum order quantity
being imposed provided such a requirement applied to all newsagents and that
it was not at the discretion of the supplier to decide the manner in which
these newsagents were selected. He objected to the continuation of the
selective procedure whereby some newsagents were supplied under the old terms
and conditions and new entrants to the market had to operate under different
terms and conditions.
37. He
referred to clause P where the company reserved the right to amend any of the
terms and conditions at any time and he maintained that a proviso should be
included to the effect that the minimum order quantity could not be changed
unless the change applied to all newsagents, regardless of date of contract.
He also contended that the Agreement was not in keeping with the laws of the
Republic of Ireland, especially the
Competition Act and requested the Authority
to refuse to allow any retrospection to apply to any licence regarding the
Terms and Conditions. He also requested the Authority not to allow the dates of
the contract with newsagents to be the deciding factor as to which newsagents
should be included or excluded from any terms and conditions since the
newsagents operating under the new terms and conditions would be placed at a
serious disadvantage vis-a-vis their competitors.
(g)
UK Study of Newspaper Industry.
38. The
UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) was asked to investigate the supply
of national newspapers in England and Wales at two separate levels - the supply
from publishers to wholesalers, and the supply from wholesalers to retailers.
It presented a comprehensive report in December 1993.
[10]
Newspaper distribution had been the subject of previous enquiries by the MMC
and by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). This reference arose from continuing
complaints about refusal to supply would-be retailers, and because there had
been major changes in distribution arrangements between publishers and
wholesalers since the previous review of the newspaper distribution system in
1985.
39. The
MMC noted that the sale or return system weakened the incentives and prospects
for active price competition at both wholesale and retail levels. Publishers
favoured sale or return, though both publishers and wholesalers imposed limits
on the allowed rate of returns. Cover prices were determined by publishers,
and were recommended prices, although they were almost always observed in the
market. Resale price maintenance is prohibited in the UK under the Resale
Prices Act, 1965. In certain circumstances, exemptions may be granted but no
such exemption has been given in the case of newspapers. Wholesale and retail
margins were set at discounts to the cover price, so the cover price also
determined trading margins. The MMC observed that there was near universal
observance of the publishers' cover prices by all retailers, and price
competition at the retail level was virtually non-existent.
40. Newspaper
wholesalers restricted the supply of newspapers to retail outlets of their
choice. The MMC examined the main criteria used, the use of trial periods or
trial supplies, the appeals procedures for applicants that had been refused
supplies, the procedures applied to transfers of supplies when a newsagency
changed ownership, and the costs and resources used within the evaluation
system as a whole. Retailers could not obtain supplies from wholesalers
operating outside their area, and, in order to obtain a full range of titles,
they usually had to obtain supplies from two or more wholesalers. Wholesalers
essentially focused on whether the applicant would make an 'effective'
newsagent, and whether the area was already adequately served. Those refused
could appeal to the wholesaler or to the newspaper publishers. Where a
newsagency changes hands, a simple application procedure applies. It appeared
that wholesalers almost never withdrew supplies from an existing newsagent,
whatever its level of sales or standard of performance.
41. While
some of the criteria could be objectively measured, the MMC considered that
others were a matter of judgment. Wholesalers might offer a trial to an
applicant where there was doubt about whether the criteria are satisfied, after
which supplies were provided or refused, depending upon whether a minimum sales
target had been attained. On average, in recent years, some 22% of applicants
to the larger wholesalers were granted supplies at the first stage, and a
further 13% trial supplies, of which 92% were subsequently given full supplies.
Including a small number granted supplies after appeal to the publishers, 34%
of applicants were ultimately successful.
42. In
its conclusions the MMC stated that the main barrier to entry to the retail
trade was the refusal to supply system operated by wholesalers. It considered
that the sale or return system was an important feature of the industry which
promoted the wide availability of newspapers by encouraging retailers to carry
the whole range of newspaper titles and to have copies on display through the
day. The MMC considered that the display of cover prices restricted
competition in that it encouraged retailers to observe the marked price and
discouraged them from determining their own selling price. It also considered
that the refusal to supply new outlets on the grounds that the wholesaler
considered the area to be adequately supplied, and the ban on retailers
selling-on newspapers, both restricted the number of newspaper retailers. They
thus prevented competition between existing retailers and the potential new
entrants who were denied supply. The proviso that sales might be made only
through the designated outlet restricted the retailer's freedom to sell
newspapers in the way he considered most effective and thus restricted
competition.
43. The
MMC considered that the display of cover prices amounted to effective resale
price maintenance and discouraged retailers from charging lower prices. It
found that it was very rare for national newspapers to be discounted by
retailers and that the maintenance of uniform prices clearly owed much to this.
It found little evidence suggesting that, in the absence of cover prices,
prices to the consumer would tend to be lower. While most retailers regarded
newspapers as a product which would attract custom, it was not one which they
were likely to use as a loss-leader. The fact that they received it on sale or
return terms also discouraged price-cutting. Overall, the MMC was not
confident that a change from the current practice would have beneficial effects
to outweigh the loss of convenience to consumers from knowing the price of the
product and that it would be available at the same price throughout the country.
44. The
MMC also considered whether the use of cover prices encouraged price leadership
among publishers and led to prices higher than would otherwise occur. It was
clear that publishers took account of the present and likely prices of
competing titles in the same segment of the market. Often prices settled at
the same level and moved closely together. This could, however, equally be
seen as a response to competitive forces. There was active competition at the
publisher level for readership and advertising revenue, and price was clearly a
weapon. In the 1993 price contest between The Sun and the Daily Mirror,
competition had led to a downward pressure on prices. While the use of cover
prices might sometimes have led to a more rapid response to a competitor's
price change than might otherwise have occurred, the MMC did not think that
there was any evidence that this had led to higher prices than would have
occurred in their absence. It saw no reason to think that a requirement on
publishers to make clear on the newspaper that the cover price was a
recommended and not a fixed price would have any practical effect in leading to
lower prices.
45. The
MMC stated that the wholesalers' practice of refusal to supply, based on the
criteria of the area being 'already adequately served' and of the suitability
of the applicant, clearly protected existing newsagents. Not only was this
likely to remove the spur that competition would provide to maintain
performance, thus protecting the inefficient newsagent, but the system would
also be slow to respond to changing patterns of demand or to try out new ways
of stimulating sales. The MMC recognised that the present system facilitated
widespread availability of newspapers but it protected inefficiency and
responded slowly to changes in demand, opportunities to offer consumers
improved convenience and new sales methods. The MMC concluded that some
consumers were receiving a lower level of service than would exist in the
absence of the restrictions, that this was an uncompetitive practice, and that
it was against the public interest.
46. The
MMC said that the wholesalers' requirements that retailers granted supply of
national newspapers might sell only by retail and only from the designated
outlet were primarily designed to support the main restriction on refusal to
supply and to ensure that it was not circumvented. In order to operate the
main criterion against which the wholesaler considered applications for supply
- whether the area was already adequately served - it was deemed necessary by
wholesalers that newspapers were sold only from identified outlets. This also
prevented retailers from responding to local variations in demand or
transferring them between different branches to take account of local
fluctuations in demand. The practice did have the advantage for publishers and
wholesalers, in that it enabled them to keep tabs on where sales took place and
to control returns. With the increasing use of information technology support,
the MMC thought that some of these advantages could be maintained. The MMC
concluded that the requirement by wholesalers that newspapers be sold only from
designated premises was an uncompetitive practice, which was against the public
interest.
47. Overall,
the MMC stated that remedies were difficult to frame and their effects could
not be foreseen at all precisely, and it had to proceed with caution. It
believed that to remove the present restrictions completely and to require
wholesalers to supply all creditworthy applicants on terms that covered the
extra costs of delivery to that outlet might well lead to a surge in
applications for supply, at least in the short term, because the existence of
sale or return greatly enhanced the attractiveness of newspapers to the
retailer as a virtually risk-free product. The growth in outlets could result
in sharp increases in wastage and higher costs for publishers and wholesalers,
leading either to a cut-back in supplies to individual outlets or to higher
newspaper prices. The MMC considered that the system had tended to protect the
traditional CTN (Confectioner-tobacconist-newsagent) outlet, and had
contributed to its survival. If changes led to a major exodus of these
businesses from the industry, and a reduction in home delivery services and
early opening hours, the loss to consumers would be unlikely to be made good by
the opening of other types of outlet.
48. The
MMC proposed that all existing retailers be given the right to move supplies
between outlets and the freedom, within existing retail margins, to sell on to
other retailers as this would allow retailers the opportunity to respond
sensibly to consumer demand. It would, according to the MMC, also provide a
useful safety valve which would permit those at present refused supply to make
arrangements with a newsagent in the neighbourhood to receive or collect
supplies. The MMC felt that, for various reasons, the scope and extent of this
remedy would be somewhat limited. It believed that copies would only move a
limited distance, where the loss of information to publishers would not have
serious effects. While the total number of outlets selling newspapers would
increase and while the volatility of sales at the individual outlet would
probably increase, the MMC did not think that this need lead to a growth in
waste since the existing controls on returns could continue to be applied at
the main retailer level. It considered that this remedy would provide a
useful, if not complete, answer to the detriments which had been identified,
and it recommended that steps be taken to secure its implementation.
49. The
Minister for Corporate Affairs introduced a code of conduct, agreed between the
newspaper wholesalers and the OFT, to implement more wide reaching reforms of
the newspaper distribution system. The newspaper wholesalers signed legal
undertakings to abide by the code of conduct. The code provides that any
retailer meeting certain requirements must be granted a supply of newspapers.
The main requirement is a minimum entry requirement in the form of a provision
under which the retailer must agree to take a minimum order for newspapers
equal to half the average level of sales in other outlets within the area of
the newspaper title in question. Such order must be on a firm sale as opposed
to a sale or return basis for the first six months. In addition the retailer
must pay a deposit equivalent to the value of three months sales of the minimum
order figure. This deposit is refunded after 12 months. In practice the
average level of deposit works out at around stg£750. Following the
introduction of the new code there was an increase in the number of retailers
selling newspapers. A number of multiple supermarket chains also began selling
newspapers. As new outlets were obliged, under the code, to take supplies of
newspapers on a firm sale basis, some had begun to sell newspapers at a
discount to the cover price.
50. A
number of newspapers in the U.K. were warned by the Director General of the OFT
for breaches of the Resale Prices Act 1976 concerning minimum resale prices
[11]
where clauses in their terms and conditions were found to contain requirements
that their newspapers must only be sold at the cover price displayed on the
mastheads. The newspapers in question were required to give written assurances
that they would not try to maintain minimum resale prices. The Newspaper
Society was also requested by the OFT to bring this fact to the attention of
their members.
(h)
Subsequent developments
51 A
Statement of Objections was issued on 19 December 1996 to the notifying party
indicating the Authority’s intention to refuse to issue a certificate or
grant a licence in respect of the notified agreements. The Irish Times, in a
letter dated 5 February 1997, offered to amend the clause and submitted the
text of a proposed amendment as follows:
´Clause
I of the terms and conditions will provide:
“The
Irish Times shall have the power to recommend a price at which the
Newspapers
are sold by the Newsagent. However, the Newsagent is free
at
all times to set its own price.”
Assessment
(a)
Section 4 (1)
51.
Section
4 (1) of the
Competition Act, 1991, prohibits and renders void all agreements
between undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition in trade in any goods or services in
the State or in any part of the State.
(b)
The Undertakings and the Agreement
52.
Section
3(1) of the
Competition Act defines an undertaking as ´a person being an
individual, a body corporate or an unincorporated body of persons engaged for
gain in the production, supply or distribution of goods or the provision of a
service.' Irish Times Newspapers Ltd is engaged in the production and supply
of goods, in this case newspapers, for gain. The retail outlets are engaged for
gain in the sale of newspapers and other goods. Consequently, both the
publishers and the retailers of newspapers are undertakings within the meaning
of
Section 3 (1) of the
Competition Act. The standard newspaper distribution
agreement between the company and the retailers is an agreement between
undertakings. The relevant geographic market is the State.
(c)
Applicability of Section 4 (1)
53. The
Irish Times claimed that the notified arrangements did not constitute an
agreement between undertakings as the retailers were agents acting on its
behalf. This is a misreading of the Authority's decisions with respect to
agency. The Authority has stated in previous decisions that an agreement
between a principal and its agent is an agreement between undertakings.
Consequently even if the notified arrangements were to be regarded as a
principle-agent agreement, the claim that it was not an agreement between
undertakings would still be rejected by the Authority.
54. The
Authority did not accept that the present arrangements constituted a
principal-agent relationship. Newsagents were not an auxiliary organ of the
newspaper publishers akin to an employee, nor were they economically dependent
on them, since they were in fact engaged in selling a wide range of goods.
Indeed the claim by the Irish Times that the newsagents were agents who did not
bear any risk was at variance with the statement expressed in their original
submission that the newsagents 'purchase(d) the newspaper titles from the
company'. It was also relevant that newsagents sold competing newspaper
titles. In such circumstances the Authority believed that newsagents were
operating independently and could not be regarded as an auxiliary organ of the
newspaper publishers. This view was in accord with that of the European Court
of Justice in VVR v. Sociale Dienst where it held that:
´..a
travel agent of the kind referred to by the national court must be regarded as
an independent agent who provides services on an entirely independent basis.
He sells travel organised by a large number of different tour operators and a
tour operator sells travel through a very large number of agents. Contrary to
the Belgian Government's submissions, a travel agent cannot be treated as an
auxiliary organ forming an integral part of the tour operator's undertaking.
[12]
55. The
arrangements involved a standard distribution agreement for the Irish Times'
newspapers. Newspapers were supplied to a wide variety of outlets including
traditional newsagents, petrol station forecourt outlets and street vendors,
although the latter were not supplied on foot of the notified arrangements.
The arrangements enabled the Irish Times to adopt a selective approach in
deciding which outlets to supply. Selective distribution agreements may or may
not be anti-competitive and a careful assessment of the facts was required in
each case. Where such criteria was adopted unilaterally by a supplier the
question of an agreement or concerted practice between undertakings did not
arise. The position changed, however, where refusal to supply an outlet was
the result of an agreement or an understanding with existing retailers. Such
arrangements clearly protected existing retailers against the emergence of new
competitors and were contrary to
section 4(1). Where refusal to supply
decisions were based on quantitative rather than qualitative factors, it
implied that the object and the effect was to limit the number of retailers in
order to protect existing outlets and implied a tacit understanding or
concerted practice between the supplier and those retailers. The same would
apply where qualitative criteria were not applied uniformly. The Authority had
received a number of complaints concerning the refusal by newspaper publishers
to supply new outlets. The Irish Times had stated that ´only a handful of
applications are ever refused and the reasons would be, for example, poor
credit risk, unsuitable premises, the shop was not open every weekday or
Saturday or incomplete information was provided.' They also stated that the
applicant was always told the reason for refusal and that when the problem was
sorted out outstanding applications proceeded satisfactorily. While some
outlets had been refused supplies, it had not been shown that this was done for
other than legitimate commercial reasons. On the basis of the information in
its possession, the Authority believed that decisions to refuse supplies have
been based on qualitative rather than quantitative criteria. The distribution
agreements did not therefore offend against
section 4(1)
per
se.
56. Clause
B of the standard terms and conditions provided that retailers had to pay all
charges by means of a weekly direct debit. While a number of submissions had
criticised this provision they had not shown that it was an anti-competitive
practice. The Authority accepted that it was a means of reducing the risk to
the publisher of supplying new outlets. While such provisions did not apply to
existing outlets with a good payments record, those outlets who have fallen
into arrears were subsequently required to switch to a system of direct debit
payments. The outlets not required to pay by direct debit were those which
have an established record for prompt payment. The Authority did not therefore
consider that such a provision involved discrimination between similar
customers or that it was designed to place new outlets at a competitive
disadvantage vis a vis existing outlets. Nor did the Authority believe that
such a provision amounted to making the conclusion of contracts subject to
acceptance by other parties of supplementary obligations which by their nature
had no connection with the subject of such contracts as was claimed.
Consequently the Authority did not believe that this provision offended against
section 4(1).
57. Clause
D provided that unsold copies returned within four weeks of publication would
be credited to the newsagents account up to a limit of 5% of newspapers
supplied during the period. The provision of newspapers on a sale or return
basis was designed to enhance sales. Newspapers were an extremely perishable
product. Unless sold within a few hours of delivery they were unlikely to be
sold at all. Newspapers can be purchased on impulse by consumers. Thus having
supplies available in retail outlets lead to additional sales. In the absence
of sale and return arrangements, the risk to newsagents of not selling copies
would increase and this would prompt them to reduce orders. The likely result
was that overall newspaper sales would be reduced while some consumers who
would buy a newspaper would not be able to obtain one. While sale or return
provided an incentive to retailers not to discount on the cover price, the
Authority believed that its object and effect was to enhance newspaper sales
rather than to restrict competition. Consequently, in its opinion, such a
provision did not offend against
section 4(1).
58. Clause
G provided that a minimum of 10 copies per day or 60 per week must be purchased
from the company by the newsagent. Such provisions helped ensure that it was
economically viable for the publishers to supply new outlets. In such
circumstances the inclusion of minimum orders was not anti-competitive. It was
submitted to the Authority that such conditions were unfair since they did not
apply to existing newspaper retailers. As already stated many outlets were
supplied with less than the minimum order level for new outlets. The minimum
level of orders was not particularly onerous and did not represent a barrier to
entry in the Authority's view. Supplying additional outlets would increase
distribution costs and the suppliers were entitled to impose a minimum order
requirement in an attempt to ensure that it was commercially viable to supply
such outlets. In the Authority's opinion, therefore, such provisions were not
anti-competitive and did not offend against
section 4(1).
59. Clause
I provided that the ´recommended retail price' on the masthead of the
newspapers applied to all sales of the newspapers by the newsagents. In effect
this provision required all retailers to sell the newspaper at the price
specified on the masthead. It therefore amounted to full scale resale price
maintenance (RPM). The Authority had previously set out its views on RPM in
respect of books, where it stated that:
´The
Authority considers that the weight of evidence indicates that RPM is generally
restrictive of competition. Consequently, in its view, agreements involving
RPM will generally offend against
Section 4(1).’
[13]
RPM
described a practice whereby a supplier agreed to supply retailers on condition
that they sold the goods at a price specified by the supplier. Such
arrangements restricted the ability of retailers to determine their own prices.
They also eliminated price competition between retailers for the suppliers'
products when, as in this case, it applied to all retailers handling his
products. It was virtually unknown for newspapers to sell at other than the
cover price throughout the State. It was clear that the provision was designed
to prevent price competition in respect of Irish Times' newspapers and that it
had that effect. These accounted for over 25% of Irish daily newspaper sales.
It was also relevant that Independent Newspapers also included provisions for
RPM in its agreements with retailers. While not all other newspapers have
notified their agreements the indications were that RPM was practised widely in
the newspaper trade. Thus in the Authority's view such arrangements had the
object and the effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition.
This provision therefore offended against
section 4(1).
60. Economic
theory argued that RPM might inhibit competition in a number of ways. It could
inhibit the entry of discount outlets and thus prevent retailing innovations.
Manufacturers who had relied on RPM in order to encourage product promotion by
retailers and increased sales might be unwilling to dispense with such
arrangements long after the need to promote new products had ended. Where many
manufacturers engaged in RPM it might be difficult for one to end the practice
since retailers might simply cease stocking the firm's products. While some
economic theories suggested that there might be circumstances in which RPM
might increase overall economic welfare, most goods and services did not appear
to satisfy the necessary conditions for such a result. Newspapers did not
meet such criteria. Consumers did not require detailed advice from retailers
before deciding to buy a newspaper. The evidence suggested that RPM was likely
to restrict competition and result in prices being higher and output lower than
would otherwise be the case.
61. RPM
might be operated as part of a cartel arrangement whether between suppliers or
retailers. In the case of a supplier cartel, RPM might be used as a means of
preventing cheating by cartel members. By preventing discounting among
retailers it reduced the incentives for suppliers to renege on the cartel
arrangement. A retail cartel might also put pressure on suppliers to operate a
system of RPM as a means of ensuring compliance by all retailers.
62. RPM
had been prohibited under the competition laws of most developed countries.
Legislation which permitted RPM in many individual states was repealed in the
United States in 1976 and the Supreme Court has regarded RPM as a
per
se
violation of the antitrust rules. Legislation prohibiting RPM was enacted in
Canada in 1951, in France in 1953 and in the UK in 1964.
63. The
Authority's view was in accord with that of the European Court of Justice in
Binon v AMP which was specifically concerned with the issue of RPM in the case
of newspapers which it found to be anti-competitive and contrary to Article
85(1) of the Treaty of Rome. In its judgment the Court stated that:
´The
requirement in the framework of a selective distribution system for newspapers
and periodicals which affects trade between Member States, that fixed prices
must be respected renders that system incompatible with Article 85(1) of the
Treaty.
[14]The
Court stated that it was a matter for the EU Commission to decide whether they
satisfied the requirements for an exemption under Article 85(3).
64. None
of the other provisions in the notified terms and conditions offended against
section 4(1).
65. The
Irish Times has now amended its terms and conditions by means of a letter dated
5 February 1997 wherein a new clause I was substituted in place of the original
one stating that even though the Irish Times could recommend a price, the
newsagent was free to set its own price.
The
Decision
66. Irish
Times Newspapers Ltd and the retail newsagents are undertakings within the
meaning of
Section 3(1) of the
Competition Act and the notified new standard
terms and conditions of sale of Irish Times Newspapers constitute an agreement
between undertakings. In the Authority's opinion, the arrangements as
originally notified, prevented price competition in respect of the publishers
newspapers between different retail outlets and, in tandem with similar
arrangements operated by other newspaper publishers they restricted price
competition between retailers in respect of newspapers generally. Consequently
the notified arrangements offended against
Section 4(1) and they did not
satisfy the requirements for a licence under
Section 4(2).
As
the offensive provision has now been amended the agreement no longer offends
against
Section 4(1).
The
Certificate
67. The
Competition Authority has issued the following certificate:
Irish
Times Newspapers Ltd has amended clause I of its standard agreement for the
supply and distribution of newspapers as follows:
“The Irish Times shall have the power to recommend a price at which the
Newspapers are sold by the Newsagent. However, the Newsagent is free at all
times to set its own price.”
The
Competition Authority certifies that, in its opinion, on the basis of the facts
in its possession, the standard agreement for the supply and distribution of
newspapers between Irish Times Newspapers Ltd and the newspaper retailers,
(notification nos. CA/112-114/92E), notified on 25 September 1992 under
Section
7, as amended by the revision to clause I, does not offend against
Section 4(1)
of the
Competition Act.
For
the Competition Authority
Patrick
Massey
Member
11
March, 1997.
[1].
Competition Authority [1995], Interim Report of the Study of the Newspaper
Industry, Dublin, Stationery Office.
[2].
Restrictive Practices Commission. Report of Enquiry into the supply and
distribution of daily and Sunday newspapers published in Ireland, and of
newspapers, periodicals and magazines distributed by wholesalers. prl 8380. May
1979, pp. 12-19.
[3].
Consumers entering the outlets were offered vouchers giving 50p off the cover
price.
[4].
Decision no. 328 of 14 May, 1994.
[5].
The Authority rejected an agreement between Abbey Sun Insurance and consumers
on 10 July 1992 as not being an agreement between undertakings.
[6].
OJ 1984 L207/26, 2.8.84.
[7].
OJ L 38/1Q, 12.2.75.
[8].
243/83, 1985 , 3 CMLR 800
[9].
AMP, 1987 OJ C 164/2.
[10].
MMC Report of December, 1993. ´ The supply of national newspapers: A
Report on the supply of national newspapers in england and Wales.’ (UK)
HMSO, Cm 2422.
[11]
. “Fair Trading” Consumer & Competition News from The OFT,
issue no. 12 Autumn 1995; issue no. 13 Spring 1996.
[12].
See WR v Sociale Dienst [1987] ECR 3801.
[13].
Competition Authority decision no. 336 of 10 June 1994, Para 70.
[14].
SA Binon & Cie v. SA Agence et messageries de la presse.
© 1997 Irish Competition Authority
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