THE HIGH COURT
		JUDICIAL REVIEW
		1997 452 J.R.
BETWEEN 

DAVID HYLAND 
		APPLICANT
AND
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PATRICK MC CARTAN AND
1THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
		RESPONDENTS

Judgment of Miss Justice Laffoy delivered on 26th day of  June 1998

	This is the Applicant's application for an Order of Certiorari by way of application for judicial review quashing various orders made by the first Respondent in the Dublin Circuit Court on 23rd July, 1997 affirming orders of Judge Windle made in the District Court on 12th September, 1996 on the ground that the first Respondent should have imposed a lesser sentence on the Applicant than the maximum sentence of imprisonment on foot of his plea of guilty.
	On 12th September, 1996 the Applicant appeared in the District Court to answer 23 charges under the Road Traffic Acts.  He pleaded guilty to all of the offences which occurred on four separate occasions, namely, on 19th July 1995, 19th August 1995, 20th September, 1995 and 3rd November, 1995.  The Applicant pleaded guilty to the charge of driving without insurance on each of the four occasions.  Judge Windle imposed terms of imprisonment in respect of some of the offences charged and, in total, the Applicant was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment, being the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed pursuant to the provisions of Section 5 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1951, as amended by Section 12 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984.
	The Applicant appealed the orders of the District Court to the Circuit Court and the appeal came on for hearing before the first named Respondent on 23rd July, 1997.  The Applicant was represented by a solicitor and counsel and, in effect, the appeal was an appeal against the severity of the sentences imposed in the District Court.  Counsel for the Applicant told the first Respondent that the Applicant was a drug addict and was trying to deal with his habit and that a reduction or suspension of sentence would help his rehabilitation.  Having enquired as to the Applicant's previous convictions, the first Respondent was apprised that the Applicant had twelve previous convictions including convictions on 28th June, 1994 for making a false declaration to obtain insurance, uttering a forged driving licence and having no driving licence or insurance, for which he received a six month suspended sentence and was disqualified for twelve years.  The list of previous convictions and penalties also included the imposition by the first Respondent of a five months suspended sentence and disqualification from driving for seven years four weeks earlier, on 27th June, 1997, for driving without insurance on which occasion the Applicant had made a plea in mitigation similar to the plea he made on 23rd July, 1997.  In affirming the orders of the District Court, the first Respondent stated that the Applicant had an "appalling record".
	On behalf of the Applicant Mr. O'Kennedy submitted that in imposing what he contended was the maximum penalty and in failing to give the Applicant a "discount" for his plea of guilty, the first Respondent acted in a manner which was inconsistent with the duty imposed by law on him and in excess of his jurisdiction and that, in the circumstances, the remedy of Certiorari is available to the Applicant.  In support of his contention that the first Respondent was obliged to "discount" the maximum sentence in favour of the Applicant on account of his guilty plea, Mr. O'Kennedy cited the Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal delivered on 15th December, 1997 by O'Flaherty J. in The People (D.P.P.) -v- Martin Gannon, in which the accused had pleaded guilty at the Dublin Circuit Court to a count of unlawful possession of a quantity of heroin for the purpose of sale or supply contrary to Sections 15 and 27 of the Misuse of Drugs Act, 1977, as amended.  In reviewing the sentence imposed, O'Flaherty J. said:-

	"The accused pleaded guilty and even if the evidence was strong this Court has repeatedly said that nonetheless a discount has to be given in respect of a plea of guilty".

	On behalf of the Respondents, Mr. McDonagh took issue with the proposition that the maximum penalty had been imposed on the Applicant, in that, in addition to a maximum custodial sentence of 24 months, the District Court and the Circuit Court could have imposed fines aggregating £7,700 on the Applicant.  Moreover, it was contended that it is not correct to characterise what happened in either the District Court or the Circuit Court as the imposition of the maximum sentence allowed by law; rather what happened was that Judge Windle was constrained by the relevant provisions to impose consecutive sentences amounting in total to a period not greater than 24 months.  In any event, Mr. McDonagh submitted, at all times the first Respondent was acting within jurisdiction and within the parameters of the authority conferred on him by the Oireachtas. The nub of the Applicant's complaint, it was suggested, is that the first Respondent gave excessive weight to one aspect of the factual matrix within which he was operating - the Applicant's previous record - and not sufficient weight to another aspect- the Applicant's plea of guilty.  Certiorari is not a form of appeal and Certiorari does not lie to quash a decision within jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal on the grounds that the decision is wrong on matters of fact.  In support of this contention Mr. McDonagh cited the decision of this Court (O'Hanlon J.) in  Lennon -v- Clifford (1993) I.L.R.M. 77, affirmed by the Supreme Court on 23rd May, 1996, and the decision of this Court (Murphy J.) in Roche -v- District Judge Martin (1993) I.L.R.M. 651.
	In The People (D.P.P.) -v- Tiernan (1988) I.R. 250, in delivering the majority decision of the Supreme Court, Finlay C.J. considered the relevance of a plea of guilty generally in sentencing and said:-

	"A plea of guilty is a relevant factor to be considered in the imposition of sentence and may constitute to a lesser or greater extent, in any form of offence, a mitigating circumstance." 

	Having outlined the significance of an admission of guilt at an early stage followed by a plea of guilty as a mitigating factor in a case of rape, Finlay C.J. went on to say:-

	"Such an admission of guilt may, depending on the circumstances under which it is made and the extent of the evidence apparent to an accused person as being available against him, also be taken in some circumstances as an indication of remorse and therefore as a ground for a Judge imposing sentence to have some expectation that if eventually restored to society, even after a lengthy sentence, the accused may possibly be rehabilitated into it".

The word "may" to which I have added emphasis in quoting the above passages, indicates that the weight to be given to a plea of guilty in the particular circumstances of any imposition of sentence is a matter of fact within the discretion of the sentencing judge.
	In affirming the Order of Judge Windle, who had undoubtedly acted within his jurisdiction, the first Respondent also undoubtedly acted within jurisdiction.  There were various factors which he was required to have regard to in imposing a sentence.  The weight he attached to the various factors is not a matter which this Court is entitled to scrutinise on an application for judicial review.  In essence, what the Applicant seeks is that this Court should find that the first Respondent did not give sufficient weight to the plea of guilty as a mitigating factor.  Such a finding would be outside the scope of this Court's jurisdiction in judicial review.  In the circumstances this application must fail.  
	Accordingly, the relief sought by the Applicant is refused.