![]() |
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | |
High Court of Ireland Decisions |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Jobling-Purser v. Jackman [2001] IEHC 186 (27th November, 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2001/186.html Cite as: [2001] IEHC 186 |
[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]
1. The
plaintiff had originally brought proceedings in the Dublin Circuit Court in a
Civil Bill dated the 11th December, 1985 and she got a decree on foot of it
from Judge Smith (as he then was) on the 30th October, 1986 which was for the
sum of £11,250.00 together with interest thereon at the rate of 11% per
annum on the principle sum from the 29th November, 1985 to the 29th October,
1996 and costs when taxed and ascertained. Subsequently by an order dated the
17th February, 1987, Judge Cassidy ordered an inspection of the accounts in the
Bank of Ireland, 1 Main Street, Dundrum, Dublin 14 and in the Allied Irish
Bank, 43 Prussia Street, Dublin 7 and all accounts with the Irish Permanent
Building Society under the provisions of the Bankers Book Evidence Act, 1897.
On the 8th July, 1996 before Judge O’Connor, the defendant sought an
order setting aside the proceedings on the grounds of irregularity and on the
basis of fraud and misrepresentation and mistake and looking to extend the time
for an appeal. The court ordered that the defendant’s application be
refused. This ordered that the plaintiff be at liberty to execute the order of
the court dated the 30th October, 1986 and made no orders as to costs. While
these proceedings commenced on the 3rd June, 1992 at first the impression might
be given that the matter was moving very slowly. However it was perpetually in
and out of court. Practically all judges in the High Court have been involved
in this case at some stage or other. The matter has also of course been
several times in the Master’s Court and indeed on at least one occasion
in the Supreme Court. The President of the High Court directed that this court
should hear the case and proceed with it to a final conclusion. Because the
defendant and possibly the plaintiff felt that they were badly treated in some
of the Irish courts and the defendant certainly finds his treatment in the
Californian courts unfair, this court has extended every possible facility to
both parties to present their case as their advisors deem necessary. While
this court might be accused of spending far too much time on the case both
parties seem satisfied that they got the opportunity of putting their
respective cases to the court. Unfortunately there were occasions when the
parties did not have lawyers representing them. There had been about thirty
three orders in this case already in the courts in Ireland and there have also
been innumerable applications for adjournments. Two weeks before the case
started the first named defendant served notice that he wished to rely on the
Statute of Frauds. However, it was agreed by both parties that that could only
arise after the evidence and after certain findings of fact by this court. As
already noted in the Circuit Court the judgment was entered for the sum of
£11,250.00 which by 1993 was £17,500.00. The plaintiff has sought to
execute it against the defendant but has failed on all occasions. After a
short recess and certain terms, the plaintiff agreed to the amendment of the
defence and was to provide a further amended reply.
2. The
plaintiff has made it clear that her claim was restricted to the four sums
mentioned by her Counsel and the court need not concern itself with any other
matters.
3. Costello
P. dealt with the slander of title action in which the plaintiff had purported
to sell land to a Philip Kelly but the defendant claimed he had one acre of it
and wrote a letter as a result of which the sale fell through: the deposit was
forfeited and it was a number of years before the lands were sold. Costello P.
held that the defendant was not entitled to the one acre of land and
accordingly the issue remains one of assessment of damages only claim, arising
out of the actions of the defendant. However, Counsel for the plaintiff stated
that at this stage they were not proceeding with that aspect of the case “
but
it is still there
”.
It will be held in abeyance. If the plaintiff fails in any money claims the
court should adjourn any issue in relations to the issue of the assessment of
damages for another day.
4. The
first named defendant filed the first defence and also a counterclaim. In
paragraph 1 of the latter he states:-
5. He
further alleges
that
the plaintiff maliciously and/or fraudulently and/or negligently intervened in
the SIGC claim in the US (which the court will discuss at a later stage).
6. However,
this counterclaim was struck out by the President of the High Court in its
entirety. As regards these American proceedings, it is submitted on behalf of
the plaintiff that this matter cannot be heard in this court because of the
aforesaid order of the President of the High Court.
7. Much
of the submissions were concerned with various pleadings and with the
particulars and also very markedly with the lack of particulars.
8. It
is contended that the defendant’s claims are fraudulent, malicious and
vexatious. However, it will be seen later that paragraph 80 of the
plaintiff’s reply to the defendant on the counterclaim may be relevant
when we come to consider the American proceedings. Mr Nolan also argued on
behalf of the plaintiff that even if monies are not part of a trust, the
decision of the American court in 1989 and the findings of the American court
gave a cause of action against Mrs Jackman because it constituted a new cause
of action starting in 1989,
proceedings
in this matter were issued in 1992
.
He is merely alerting the court at this stage that this argument might be
pursued at a later stage. Gold coins which are now in the possession of this
court were claimed by Mrs Jackman before Costello P. as entirely her property.
Costello P. therefore directed that she be joined as the defendant and the then
President determined that that issue, (i.e. the ownership of the gold coins) be
heard in this case and directed amended pleadings. Defence was amended by
order of O’Donovan J. on the application of Mr Vincent Browne BL, to add
the defence,
9. It
is alleged that this paragraph is entirely contradictory to the one recently
recited in paragraph 1 of the counterclaim and also paragraph 3 of that
document which reads:-
11. However,
as we have seen, he then also pleaded he only offered advice solely on an
informal,
ex
gratia
basis arising from their friendship.
12. These
statements certainly seem inconsistent. The American judge specifically found
that there existed a fiduciary relationship between the parties. Mr Nolan
referred to paragraph 6:-
13. And
yet he executed a document as a trustee saying that such a debt did exist and
that in fact it was to be paid over to the plaintiff, yet here he says:-
14. As
we shall see there were in fact initially two trust documents and it is alleged
by the plaintiff that the first named defendant is still a trustee of both of
them. In his defence the first named defendant concedes that he had entered
into a partnership with one Christopher Delahunty (about whom more anon) in
furthering a venture (unrelated to the issues of these proceedings) but in the
event no such venture materialised. At paragraph 16 the first named defendant
pleads:-
16. It
is the plaintiffs case that the defendants jointly opened accounts for their
daughter Catriona, purchased coins while the American proceedings were in
being. The plaintiff says that it was an attempt by them to avoid any form of
tracing by the plaintiff of their funds, although the plaintiff has not
actually seen the accounts of either of those banks. As already noted, both
parties here dispensed with solicitors initially and acted on their own behalf
for several years. Indeed the plaintiff succeeded (by her advisor Mr Hyland)
before the President, her application to strike out of the defence and
counterclaim. The court than read some of the orders and in particular a
Mareva type order granted by Blayney J. on the 4th June, 1992. The next Order
by Costello J., as he then was, was made on the 22nd June, 1992. It was made
on notice giving the plaintiff the right to inspect certain bank accounts. The
first named defendant was restrained from leaving the jurisdiction. He had to
deliver his passport, and the third and final order drawn to the court’s
attention was particularly drawn and made on the 6th July, 1992, also by
Costello J., as he then was, and it altered the
Mareva
type order allowing Mr Jackman to receive his United States disability pension.
Then the court was referred to order of Lynch J. on the 16th July, 1992
ex
parte
,
which allowed the then solicitor for the plaintiff to carry out inspection.
17. On
the 22nd July, 1992 Morris J. gave permission for the plaintiff’s
solicitor to search the defendant’s house and to hold custody of certain
documents. This was blocked so Morris J. made a further Order. On 28th July,
1992 Lardner J. returned the passport on certain terms.
19. The
plaintiff and the defendants agreed that the following issues are issues to be
determined by this Honourable Court namely:-
20. The
first named defendant in his evidence produced a document he alleges
purportedly gave him effective control. It provides certain preconditions then
it will end up/ the first named defendant to continue as sole trustee
representing John Purser and the plaintiff’s interests.
21. It
is an interesting aspect of this case that while both parties blame Mr CJ.
Delahunty neither side called him or joined him as a party. However it
transpires that he is living in this jurisdiction and it is also alleged that
he is avoiding a jail sentence in California. Unfortunately Mr Jackman made
speeches in replies to questions by his counsel. The court and his counsel
tried to contain him and as the transcript shows he wandered far from the
issues which were agreed by the parties to be before this court. The
ubiquitous Mr Delahunty was the sole owner of Brentwood Securities. There was
a meeting of debtors of Brentwood Securities in the Hilton Hotel on the 10th
December, 1984. Their claim was made by the first named defendant and indeed
by the plaintiff. The court was then referred to a document filed the 7th
February, 1985 between the Securities Exchange Commission, plaintiff and
Brentwood Securities Limited and Christopher Delahunty, defendants and the
facts are summarised in this document (P.51) and for the purpose of this
judgment the court has edited the original:-
22. As
noted above from 18th July, 1977 to the 13th December, 1984, Brentwood engaged
in the business of buying and selling securities for its own account as well as
the accounts of its customers. In December, 1984 the staff of the commission
received information which indicated that serious improprieties were occurring
at Brentwood. Accordingly, the staff commenced an investigation which revealed
evidence set forth below that Christopher Delahunty was systematically stealing
large amount of money from his clients.
23. In
September, 1981, Michael Jackman a customer of Brentwood who at the time
resided in Ireland, wired $200,000.00 into Brentwood bank account for the
purpose of purchasing US$ 2 million Treasury Bonds on margin. On the same day
without Jackman’s knowledge or consent, $5,000 of these bonds were
transferred to the account of American Middle Resources Corporation controlled
by Mr Delahunty. Also on the same day Brentwood issued a cheque signed by
Delahunty for $180,000.00 payable to Delahunty. This cheque was a deposit into
Delahunty’s personal bank account. Delahunty then wrote a personal
cheque in the amount of $120,000.00 to Wedwudge (sic), Brentwood’s
clearing agent for the account of Jackman.
Instead
of
purchasing
$2 million worth of US Treasury Bonds on margin for Jackman from the account,
Delahunty purchased only $1 million worth. As noted above Jackman, a US
citizen during this time was residing in Ireland when he received an account
statement and noticed that only $1 million US Treasury Bonds had been purchased
and that $80,000.00 of his original $200,000 was missing. Jackman contacted
Delahunty for an explanation. Delahunty assured Jackman that everything would
be all right. Soon thereafter in November, 1981, Jackman instructed Delahunty
to sell his US Treasury Bonds. On the 25th November, 1981 the settlement date,
$1 million in US Treasury Bonds were sold for approximately $69,000.00. At
Brentwood's instruction and without Jackman’s knowledge a cheque payable
to Jackman in the amount of $120,000.00 was issued by Wedwudge (sic) out of
Jackman’s account. Jackman never received either a cheque or any
proceeds from the sale. The cheque was apparently forged. Again Delahunty
offered new excuses about where this money had gone and Jackman hesitatingly
accepted. On December 17th, 1981, Brentwood issued instructions to Wedwudge
(sic) to wire transfer $40,000.00 from Jackman’s account. Jackman was
unaware of these instructions and never received these funds. On the 28th May,
1982, again on the instructions of Brentwood and without Jackman’s
knowledge, Wedwudge (sic) issued a cheque to Jackman in the amount of
$10,000.00. Jackman never received this cheque. Again it appears that the
cheque was forged. During this time “Jackman was still residing in Ireland
”.
27. It
would appear that Mr Delahunty did not contest the injunction and it became a
permanent one. Mr Jackman insisted that it was he who ranted at the Securities
Exchange Commission to produce the results of closing down Brentwood and
barring Mr Delahunty for life. Mr Jackman then took up the matter with SIPC
which were the compensation board for brokers. By September, 1985, Mr Jackman
believed the claim was going to be honoured in cash of $100,000.00 and Bonds
$400,000.00 to be paid; the cash within two or three weeks and the securities
within three or four months. In May of that year the plaintiff asked to have
back the power of attorney given to him. He eventually sent it back. He had
had the power of attorney since October, 1981. It was conceded by Counsel on
both sides that the decision of Judge Russell went on appeal and was upheld.
Subsequently it was appealed to the Supreme Court but that was not prosecuted
and was struck out. Mr Jackman believed because he pursued the state
authorities and that Mr Delahunty faced criminal proceedings and there is an
indictment of the grand jury in October, 1986. It records the set up of a
scheme to collect money for his representation. It falsely and fraudulently
represented that he would invest all the money entrusted to him by victim
clients in the United States Government Security and that he did in fact invest
and that they would be safe. On foot of the Grand Jury indictment, Mr
Delanunty came on for trial. Mr Delahunty pleaded guilty. None of the counts
specifically referred to Mr Jackman’s predicament. He says that they
just took two victims out of 131. Mr Delahunty was sentenced on the first
count to 5 years with eligibility for parole after serving one third of the
sentence and an order for restitution of a specific sum to John McGill, an
aggrieved party. Mr Jackman maintains that he has tried to get Mr Delahunty
extradited to the United States but was told that if he attempted to do so he
would be shot.
28. He
alleges his wife purchased the new coins for the benefit of his daughter and
her future education. He alleges his wife purchased the coins, put them in a
brown envelope and put them into a box. They then deposited them in the bank.
The first named defendant was involved in establishing various companies in
Shannon mainly to enable Americans to trade in the EU. Most of these were
dormant because of the plaintiff’s injunctions. There was a
Mareva
injunction granted against Mr Jackman in 1992 and it is still extant.
29. A
report was handed in from the well known consultant psychiatrist Dr. Peter Fahy
who has been treating Mr Jackman and who is very critical of his insurance
company and those advising it. He states that underlying the anxiety state,
the depression and the other disorders described there is probably some
conflict situation or unresolved conflict such as an inferiority complex. He
is on continuing medication.
30. Under
cross-examination he agreed that he had involvement going back to 1965 in
various institutions including insurance companies and the bank where he worked
in the consumer loan department, in the mortgages services department, the auto
loan department, and the trusts department. He had developed a knowledge of
trusts and how they operated during these years. He had become President of a
bank which had 2,000 - 3,000 employees in California. He agrees that he has
good recall of what has happened but says that he has been exposed to court for
the last 10 years. He was essentially a salesman and was quite successful to
his own amazement. He had met the plaintiff through mutual interest in
transcendental meditation. He agreed that she was not a person who understood
the world of finance. He agreed that the year that they met or indeed the next
year that she was not competent to handle her own financial affairs.
31. They
had met in February, 1975 in Cruise’s Hotel in Limerick. By May, 1975 Mr
Jackman clearly knew a great deal about the affairs of the plaintiff and her
position. Undoubtedly from a very early stage in their relationship the
plaintiff was relying on the first named defendant for financial advise and in
fact he was actually dealing long before he had power of attorney, by giving
directions to brokers. The witness stressed many times the importance he
attached to his social security from America and that he did not wish to be
involved in any relationship in which he would be paid. He did not want his
social security payments to be threatened. Mr Jackman agreed that £100.00
in June, 1975 would be worth approximately £500.00 in today's money. Mr
Nolan Barrister-at-Law, cross-examined Mr Jackman over a large number of days.
Mr Jackman in the course of these lengthy proceedings protested on his own
behalf. He says he has been in the High Court over 200 times in the past few
years and he still does not understand them or know anything about them. Mr
Nolan pointed out that four cheques or at least three of them which he denied
receiving on the previous day, he now admits he must have received, after he
had seen the originals. He was then asked about a document emanating from him
to the plaintiff dated 27th September 1976, confirming payment to him of
£30,000.00 Stg. He undertook to insure his life so that she might benefit
from his death benefit. His explanation is that he wanted to give her some
comfort. She had offered him the £30,000.00 as a gift for his services
during the previous year and eight months. He says he did not need the
£30,000.00. He says that it was a mistake, that in fact it should be
£32,000.00. He got this money for investment. Mr Jackman agrees that he
did not give back the £30,000.00 or £32,000.00 and says he was
prevented from doing so by the intervention of the plaintiff in his claim to
SIPC.
32. He
believed that the Californian Board were going to pay him in full and that they
changed their minds after the intervention by the plaintiff. He agreed that he
did not take out the insurance mentioned in this letter but fabulated at length
that he took out insurance every time he flew and that he did a lot of flying.
He was not able to explain why he inserted the word ‘Sterling’ in
the letter when at the time he was getting IR£. The currencies were, of
course, interchangeable at that time. He does not know why he put
£30,000.00 and he admits it was £32,000.00. Mr Jackman insists that
the plaintiff was part of the syndicate but she has categorically denied it.
She was not part of or knew anything about the syndicate.
33. Mr
Jackman had very clear recollection of dates in the 1970’s. He was able
to correct counsel on several occasions in relation to dates. Mr Jackman was
very emphatic that there were no discussions between himself and Mr Delahunty
about joint partnership or anything of that nature while he was in America and
that it only arose later in Ireland. Mr Jackman got a letter from Mr Delahunty
on the 5th February, 1977 which he says came as a surprise to him as there had
been no mention of a partnership up to that time. The quotation was:-
34. He
was referred to the agreement entered into on the first day of January, 1977
between Christopher J Delahunty and Michael C Jackman both of Santa Monica,
California. He had insisted that the discussion about partnership took place
at the end of 1977. The witness did not give any clear explanation as to the
reference in the letter of the 5th February to partnership. He denied he ever
entered into a partnership with anyone, even with Mr Delahunty, then he agrees
that he signed the document and says the partnership never developed! Mr
Jackman purchased two copies on Partnership Law by Westwood and sent one to Mr
Delahunty. He says that he did this because of Mr Delahunty’s constant
questions about partnership agreements but it “had nothing to do with
me”.
35. The
idea of a partnership agreement was Mr Delahunty’s but I did not accept
that it was going to be with me. He was interested in the partnership
per
se
.
He stated -
36. He
later said there were vague discussions, no precise discussions on what the
partnership was about. Mr Nolan then drew Mr Jackman’s attention to his
own letter to Mr Delahunty:-
37. Under
pressure he agreed that he had a joint account in 1977 with Mr Delahunty in the
Bank of America in Dublin. He agreed that it was a joint account but says that
it had nothing to do with partnership. He was referred to hand-written
documents about the partnership that its business shall be to invest and that
was signed by Michael C Jackman and Christopher J Delahunty. He insisted that
this was looking for a vehicle for Mr O’Brien. He keeps denying that he
had any involvement in a partnership but was listening to Mr Delahunty yet he
sent him a book on Partnership Law and he enquired about life insurance policy
“for the protection of our clients in the event of your (Delahuntys)
death.” He was then referred to another letter emanating from himself
and his wife where he asked if “
we”
can proceed with investment in Canadian Mortgage. Mr Jackman was then
cross-examined about the evidence he had given in the SIPC proceedings in
California. It is obvious from the transcript that his evidence before this
court on material points differed from what he had given before Judge Russell.
He excuses himself on the grounds that he has been ill continuously since 1971.
38. He
also admitted that he had got three cheques from Mr Delahunty which were
apparently all cashed on the one day. He assumes they were to pay off a
mortgage due by Mr Delahunty. He was then asked about various cheques stamped
by the Bank of America between the years 1976 and 1978 totalling £8,862.92
which were paid by the plaintiff to him. The witness does not deny that he
received the many cheques put to him by Mr Nolan but while he had a good memory
for many details he could not recall a lot of these transactions.
39. Mr
Nolan spent many days testing the memory and the accuracy of Mr Jackman’s
evidence. Mr Jackman suffers from diabetes but is not insulin dependant and
obviously has suffered from nervous complaints. However taking all that into
account this court is not happy with much of his evidence. He agrees that he
was sent a document from Mr Delahunty which says
41. Apparently
cheques over $5,000.00 were referred to the Federal Reserve. This was to
protect against drug money being laundered. Having sworn that he received no
money from Mr Delahunty it is obvious that he did in fact receive a number of
cheques from him. He protested that he had never read the partnership
agreement which was produced to him in court but agrees he signed it. He
maintained that he had never read the document not even when he came into
court. He was referred to paragraph 111 (2) of the agreement which reads:-
42. When
he was asked about what exactly that paragraph meant he disagreed with the
interpretation because he said, “I never read it before”. Before
Judge Russell he had sworn twice that he did not sign it. However, he was
looking at an unsigned copy when he was before that court. He now accepts that
the copy produced in this court was signed. This court finds the evidence of
Mr Jackman on this point unsatisfactory to put it mildly and believes there was
in fact an agreement for partnership between the first named defendant and Mr
Delahunty. He did eventually agree before the plaintiff actually met Mr
Delahunty that he had discussed the affairs of Jobling Purser and her mother.
It transpired that certainly Mr Delahunty was advising the first named
defendant about the affairs of Jobling Purser company and particularly the
plaintiff and her mother. He kept protesting his integrity that he takes the
oath seriously and explained the discrepancies between his current testimony
and that before Judge Russell in California was due to the fact that he was
very ill, mentally ill. “Anxiety neurosis is a mental problem”.
He got £3,000.00 from the plaintiffs sister. Later the plaintiff refunded
her sister this sum. The first named defendant was confused in his evidence
about this particular item. He explained that it would not be possible to
withdraw the £3,000.00 as there would be a loss involved and therefore the
plaintiff should pay the £3,000.00 once her sister started demanding it
back. Mr Jackman got caught out by Mr Nolan in his careful cross-examination
on many points. It is not necessary for the court to deal with them in any
great detail. Mr Jackman said that nobody persuaded Judith Jobling Purser to
do anything. “I did not persuade the plaintiff ever in my life”.
Mr Jackman was then asked about a withdrawal of £10,000.00 by the
plaintiff on the 7th April, 1978 from Norwich Union Funds. He said he did not
receive it. He knows that for a fact. He then told the court that he had
given the US$50,000.00 to Mr Delahunty and that he invested them in Cattle Feed
Fund or so he said. He agreed this was not a trust fund. The fund was a tax
shelter fund for rich Americans. He would not agree that that was not the
purpose for which he gave him the money, namely for the purpose of investing in
dollar securities. However, that is what he told SIPC but says that was a
mistake and that he made a lot of mistakes at that time. He states that he was
totally traumatised by the intervention of the plaintiff in the SIPC case. His
mental health was bad. He agrees that he may have made a few mistakes, but had
been correct in most things. He just doesn’t know. Apparently Mr
Delahunty had invested the $50,000.00 in about eight different programmes. He
persisted that the $50,000.00 was a gift and that he wouldn’t take it.
It was not a breach of trust, it was her own private money and he invested it
on behalf of the plaintiff. Mr Jackman contradicted himself on a number of
issues such as involvement of Mr Delahunty and himself in ACS Factory in
Shannon. He blames another barrister whom he had retained for two years and
nine months for throwing his papers all over the place, and that explains why
he didn’t have certain documents. He did not receive anything from AAMR,
however, it was proved that in fact he did. He then disputed it on the grounds
that he thought it meant cash when in fact it was a cheque. The plaintiff was
agitated during his cross-examination and was given breaks whenever required.
He denies he has told lies. Some of his testimony is inconsistent with what he
gave in the American Court. He said this was due to trauma due to the
intervention of the plaintiff who caused him so much anxiety and lost him so
much money. He produced a CV prepared by himself in which he describes himself
as follows:-
43. He
does not believe that that is in fact true although he prepared it himself. He
agrees he helped with the first trust to get the plaintiff’s mother out
of a problem and he then was appointed to the second trust. He was then
referred to a letter of the 9th July, requiring £102,500.00 given from the
trust fund to the plaintiff to deposit in her name and Mr Jackman’s in
AIB Prussia Street, Dublin, subject to a sub trust. If the sub trust was not
created the money would be returned with interest to the original trustees. On
the same day the money was then transferred from this new deposit account into
Jackman’s own deposit account. He denied that he authorised this
transfer. He then had to retract his evidence.
44. He
agreed that the money that went to the United States was the money from the AIB
account and the question for this court is whether or not it was free from a
trust. He took the money from the Chase Bank £15,232.96. He agreed that
the $200,000.00 was the plaintiff’s money and that it was to invest in US
Treasury Bonds. He blames all his misfortunes on Mr Delahunty who tried to
kill him twice (but he never sought the assistance of the police). Once he was
thrown off a four storey building.
45. However,
later he makes the point that he did not understand the word “
owe”
and he made a mistake. When it was pointed out that he had made a mistake he
said the plaintiff did also. He was referred again to the depositions when he
was asked for the origin of the $200,000.00 deposit at Brentwood. He agreed
that this was from AIB and was totally the property of the plaintiff. However,
his deposition in the American Court suggested that at least three people were
involved in making up this fund. He agreed in the American Court that he owed
money to several people and that he owed Juliet £102,000.00 and
approximately another £30,000.00 but added “but Juliet also owes
me”. In this court he agreed that that was his testimony and he stood
over it. He agrees that he was asked in the American proceedings the purpose
of the transfer and says “She was the beneficiary.... was to loan me the
money interest free and that I could do exactly as I pleased with the funds
because I was totally trusted by Juliet”. He agrees that the $200,000.00
were transferred from AIB and actually transferred into Mr Delahunty’s
account. He alleges then that Mr Delahunty withdrew a $180,000.00 cheque for
himself out of the Brentwood account and forged Mr Jackman’s signature on
it. He also stated that he misinterpreted the questions asked in the American
proceedings. In his American deposition he agreed that of the £102,500.00
some of the money went into ACS and it started to happen in November/December,
1981 but he now says that is not so. He stressed that these were not lies in
his depositions but merely mistakes. In his American deposition he agreed that
some of the money put into ACS’s was the plaintiff's. He made the point
that she had the majority in ACS, namely 45%.
46. It
is quite clear that his evidence in America does not coincide on many points
with his evidence here. He was obviously trying to get as much money as he
could, understandably from the American fund, and he blamed the intervention of
the plaintiff for his failure to achieve that goal. Mr Jackman agreed that the
money belonged to the plaintiff and was originally intended to be invested in
securities then he subsequently said this was not true and that he could put it
in anything he chose. Mr Buckley of A & L Goodbody stated that most of the
instructions came not from the plaintiff but from Mr Jackman who because he was
on total disability could not be described as a ‘financial
advisor’. Mr Jackman’s attention was then drawn to two documents
which he has signed and has the words ‘Financial Advisor’ under his
name. He was referred to a letter of the 10th November, 1981 in which he was
offered a partnership in Brentwood Securities Inc., on his arrival in U.S. in
March, 1982.
47. Then
there was the extraordinary position of the plaintiff and Mr Jackman who got Mr
Buckley, the solicitor, to prepare documents stating that there was a loan to
ACS. There is an assignment of debt of £118.527.00 which is allegedly
owed by ACS to Michael C Jackman and the plaintiff as trustees as being
assigned to the plaintiff absolutely and it is signed by the plaintiff and
underneath ACS Teoranta acknowledge receipt of the notice of assignment of
debt. It is signed on the 15th September, 1982 by Mr Jackman for ACS. Mr
Jackman told Mr Buckley that in fact there was no loan outstanding. This is
denied by Mr Buckley. Then a letter was produced to Mr Jackman which had been
drafted or at least signed by him to Mr Delahunty in which he mentions
“This represents a return of my $200,000.00 to the extent that it is
has
not already been paid”.
Through a great deal of investigation it is not clear what exactly that meant.
He says that nothing has already been paid. He points out he didn’t
write it. It was typed but he agrees that he signed it. He was then asked
about his interest in AMR as mentioned in correspondence but he stated he had
nothing to do with it. Under pressure he agreed that what he had written in
the letter namely that he has “invested a lot of money in ACS and in
AMR” was untrue. The first named defendant was very confused about a
letter which apparently was drafted by a lawyer employed by him. He alleged
that he was intimidated by Mr Delahunty and wrote that letter at his dictation.
However, in his own discovery it would appear that his own lawyer drafted this
letter and gave it to him and made suggestions as to alterations he might put
into it . The court warned him about perjury. He clearly received advice from
a lawyer who sent him a draft letter. However, Mr Jackman swore in this court
that he did not have anything to do with the drafting of it. The next day the
first named defendant, Mr Jackman had apparently in error taken a double dose
of valium and was unfit to attend court although he was in the building. It
was then adjourned to a date to suit both parties. So as not to waste time and
with the agreement of both parties, Mr Brian Nolan was called. This witness is
a first cousin of Counsel appearing for the plaintiff so the barrister very
properly withdrew and left the cross-examination of this witness to his
solicitor. The barrister maintained that this witness was called primarily to
embarrass counsel.
48. Mr
Nolan said he had known Mr Jackman since the 1970’s and had invested
$50,000.00. He stated that he was not really investing in any particular
commodity but was investing in Michael Jackman and that he regarded his money
that had been invested as lost, but he felt that he was owed in a moral sense a
percentage of what he invested. He was aware that there was a number of other
people who had invested in similar circumstances; however, he had not given a
power of attorney to Michael Jackman.
49. Because
of the complexity of the issues, the court requested Counsel to prepare
submissions in writing to deal
inter
alia
with the evidence which indicates the existence of a partnership and the duties
of a partner one to the other in relation to funds entrusted to one or other of
the partners. Was the money transferred by Mr Jackman to the US Trust Funds?
The court wanted a trail of specific sums also. The court wished to be
addressed on the question of the statute of limitations since it was pleaded.
The court was anxious to deal with it as a preliminary matter but counsel on
both sides pressed that it be left until after the evidence. Submissions could
not be prepared until after the transcript was available. The final transcript
was received during August.
50. He
has chronic anxiety neurosis since 1971. On the 19th day of the trial, Mr
Jackman was still in the box when a Western Union telegram from his wife,
apparently to SIPC, states clearly that $200,000.00 deposited in Brentwood in
September, 1981 was not part of any 1950 settlement (2) where The claim
against Brentwood is filed on my own behalf (3) Under no circumstances should
any monies due to me from my claim with SIPC be given to any other person or
persons. He maintains that the plaintiff has changed her mind completely.
When she was dealing with SIPC it was trust money but when it was transferred
to America in 1981 it was out of trust. He persisted in stating that he was
denied access to the plaintiff’s discovery. However, his counsel
accepted that his solicitor and counsel have seen all the discovery and have
got copies of everything they wanted and the copies were of course available to
their client. However, Mr Jackman insisted that the documents and copies
thereof were not made available to him, even by his own solicitor.
51. Mr
Jackman, an American Citizen, invested in America but could not let mere Irish
Citizens do it, without the consent of the Irish Central Bank. Thus money had
to be in his name and that is why he pursued the matter in his own name against
SIPC. That is why he pretended to that organisation that he was the full owner
of all the monies involved. Mr Jackman complains at the time that in fairness
he made lots of speeches. Frequently not on the point phrased by counsel. He
complained also that this was the first opportunity he was getting to state his
case. He complained that he has filed a case against the State because of the
way he was treated. He was asked why his wife closed her account just two
weeks after Judge Russell had come to a conclusion against him in his SIGC
claim. He was then asked about what Judge Russell had said in the SIGC case
namely:-
52. Basically
Judge Russell did not believe him. He denied that he ever had a joint account
with Mr Delahunty other than the Bank of America one which he allowed Mr
Delahunty to use, then he withdrew all his money from it and left it entirely
to Mr Delahunty. He agrees that there was a partnership account in the Bank of
America in Grafton Street, he recently signed the partnership to Mr Delahunty
to produce letters only in relation to one project name needed to set up a bank
to exchange money. Then Mr Delahunty was involved in a car accident and was
completely out of commission for a long time. He strongly denies that he ever
took advantage of the plaintiff and says that when his daughter was expected he
went with her brother to India where she had become ill and he went to
California with her before that in 1978 to rescue her brother who had similar
problems. He was to give him money to go on his own but then decided he was
coming with him because he was not well enough to travel. Since then she has
sued him for the £7,500 that he never got from her. He has appealed that.
There is a mystery regarding this appeal. He was advised by the trial judge,
his Honour Judge Kieran O’Connor to appeal. There was apparently a file.
Despite diligent searching by this Court’s Registrar and several other
people at the Central Office the file cannot be found. When he was asked did
he hold the $200,000 dollars and other trust monies as a nominee for the 1950
Trust until a sub-trust was created, he answered:-
53.
Mr Jackman had an account in Merrill Lynch in London but it was in dollars that
was held for the gain of his investors. He apparently was not paying tax in
America, England or Ireland. It was pointed out to him but he insisted that he
was banned from travelling, that he was free to travel but on conditions but
would be available to the court within fourteen days from date of notification
from his solicitor of the plaintiff’s intention to cross-examine.
54. As
to “your assets” the company it was suggested to him was not
prevented from trading but was prevented from reducing its assets below
£150,000. The injunction restrains a company from reducing its assets
below a certain figure. He repeats that he didn’t delegate any
responsibilities as a trustee. He said that and other money were taken out of
his account by cheques payable to him and forged by Mr Delahunty. In other
words Mr Delahunty stole the money from him.
55. The
court pointed out that it needed to be addressed on the facts and on the law
particularly on the question of two trustees abolishing the trusts and then
what happened to the trust fund and why the plaintiff is claiming the trust
fund when she has in fact given the defendant power of attorney over all her
estate and she herself abolished the trust she transferred all this to the
first named defendant and he says it is not trustee funds at all.
56. Did
Ms. Jobling-Purser give Mr Jackman the money for a specific purpose? In
re-examination he gave a history of the establishment of ACS with grants from
Údarás in Galway and efforts to establish bank meetings with the
Chairman of the Board of the Equity Bank in Limerick. In May, 1980 Mr
Delahunty had a major automobile accident and everything just collapsed then.
Letters which had previously been opened in part were now opened in full. The
first was a letter from Brentwood Securities Inc. dated the 10th of November
1981 signed by Mr Delahunty part of which reads
“similarly
you will be admitted as a partner of the firm on your arrival here in March
1982”.
Mr Jackman insisted that SIPC were going to pay him in full in cash and bonds
in other words 100% of what had been appropriated “we wouldn’t have
lost anything on the investment of $200,000 dollars we would have a profit of
about four times...approximately three to four times that 300% - 400%.
57. The
plaintiff’s case is that she gave money for the purpose of having it
specifically invested in a specific fund and this was not done. It was mixed
with other money and was transferred to the ubiquitous Mr Delahunty.
58. After
a very long delay in this very protracted case submissions on the evidence and
particularly on the relevant law were made by the two excellent counsel (who
have throughout shown a fantastic knowledge of all the documentation). The
court is extremely grateful to both of them for all their assistance and their
submissions. Before the matter came to this court there were twenty-three
Orders already made contained in a separate Booklet of Orders. A
Mareva
injunction was granted. Lardner J. subsequently altered it but this did not
prevent the defendant from leaving the country nor did it prevent the
institutions known as Amtrade International Limited or STE from trading. The
order merely prevented them from reducing their assets below the sum of
£350,000 in this State. In his judgment delivered the 12th January, 1995
Costello P. made a number of findings of fact. These included that the first
named defendant had become a financial adviser to the plaintiff; that the first
named defendant was handling her investments; that the plaintiff obtained
advice from the first named defendant in relation to family trusts; following
the said advice various appointments were made by the trustees of the
settlement; that monies the plaintiffs got from the trust together with other
monies were given to the defendant and on the advice of the first named
defendant the plaintiff allowed substantial sums of money to be invested in
Brentwood Securities and that the financial arrangements entered into by the
first named defendant went disastrously wrong. In the course of his considered
judgment Costello P. says:-
59. Counsel
and the respective solicitors are tired of clarifying the issues of what had
become an extraordinary complicated case. These have been set out earlier in
this judgment where documents edited “agreed facts - issues” is
recited. The judgments of Judge Russell have been agreed in material respects
as set out in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the agreed facts and issues. It is
argued by the plaintiffs that there is one issue which is not open to this
court to determine; namely whether or not the facts found by Judge Russell and
the conclusion of law found by him in the US Bankruptcy Court are well found
and made. It is the submission of the plaintiff that this court does not have
jurisdiction to confirm or in any way alter or comment upon the judgment of
Judge Russell. That is perhaps stating the matter too broadly. There is no
doubt the court accepts the matter was heard by Judge Russell. He made certain
findings, and made certain orders. They are entitled to the respect due under
the comity of courts. It is also clear he gave the matter a very full and
considerate hearing. However this court is not bound by the decision of Judge
Russell. It must make its own decision on the evidence produced here which of
course includes the agreed judgment of Judge Russell. It is also argued that
this court cannot in anyway determine whether it was inappropriate on the part
of the plaintiff to intervene in the SIPC proceedings since that is a matter
clearly for the jurisdiction of the American courts as to who could or could
not intervene in those proceedings. In the opinion of this court that is
stated too broadly. There is a presumption that the American court acted in
accordance with law and correct procedures. There is no doubt that the
American courts on the facts before them had to decide whether or not it was
appropriate for the plaintiff to intervene in those proceedings. However this
court on the evidence produced here is quite satisfied that it was appropriate
for the plaintiff to intervene in the American proceedings. As a result of her
intervention she has received $20,000 from the judgment of Judge Russell and is
prepared to give credit for that amount against whatever this court determines
is the liability of the first named defendant. While the behaviour of the
plaintiff was certainly unusual if not bizarre she confirmed that the monies
were at all time part of a trust. She is supported in this by the evidence of
Mr Buckley, Solicitor Messrs A& L Goodbody who confirmed for the purpose of
various letters produced to the court to transfer monies to the plaintiff and
the first named defendant not yet trustees of the plaintiffs sub-trusts to say
that they both acknowledge that they are holding the monies on behalf of the
children’s trust. If it were not possible for any reason to go ahead
with the sub-trusts he would return the money with interest. He is a well
known and respected solicitor and he confirms that at no stage were the monies
free of trust.
61. In
an action of deceit the plaintiff must prove actual fraud. Fraud is proved
when it is shown that a false representation has been made knowingly or without
belief in its truth or recklessly without caring whether it be true or false (
Derry
& Ors v. Peek
,
(1889) 14 App Cas 337). Mr Nolan in his written submission listed a number
of conflicts in the evidence of the first named defendant. The list is
certainly not a full one. The court quotes from the submission:-
62. In
Book 12, while admitting that he signed the partnership agreement in 1977 he
denied that he had any involvement in the partnership with Mr Delahunty (book
12 page 30 onwards) yet when his deposition in the SIPC were put to him (page
50) where he denied that he signs the partnership he alleges that he was very
ill.
63. In
relation to cheques received from Mr Delahunty he initially denied that he
received any cheques but then in reference to correspondence from Mr Delahunty
in April of 1977 could not comment on how many cheques he received (book 15
page 30-38).
64. While
on the one hand he is stating that he did not have a joint account with Mr
Delahunty he accepted on production of cheques that Mr Delahunty had the right
to draw cheques from his Bank of Ireland Account (page 27 of book 15). In book
16 the first named defendant concedes that he deliberately told untruths in the
SIPC proceedings and he goes on to state that others have done likewise and
more particularly Mr Buckley (book 16 page 15 and page 118). Undoubtedly the
onus of proof in the case of fraud lies firstly on the plaintiff but it is on
the balance of probabilities. It can be inferred from the facts submitted or
proved. The required inference must of course not be drawn lightly or without
due regard to all the relevant circumstances including the consequences of
fraud. (
Banco
Ambrosiano S.P.A.
v.
Ansbacher and Co
.,
(1987) ILRM 669,
per
Henchy J. p.672) Mr Nolan submits that the pertinent frauds seem to be as
follows:-
65. It
is also argued expressly the defendant was a constructive trustee where
“....when a beneficiary has a vested interest in his trust fund so that
he has a right to payment of the income, the trustees must at all reasonable
per
times .. give him full and
accurate
(emphasis added) information as to the amount and state of the trust
property..... (Kenny J. in
Chaine-Nickson
v. The Bank of Ireland
[1976] I.R. 393 at p. 396). In the current case it is very strongly suggested
that the beneficiary concurred but there has been a fraudulent breach of trust.
She was agreeable to the break-up of the trust. She gave the first named
defendant the power of attorney and trusted him completely. The position is
stated clearly in Keane
Equity
and the Law of Trusts in the Republic of Ireland
(1988), paragraph 10.25 where the author (now Keane C.J.) states:-
67.
The first named defendant made a representation to the plaintiff that this sum
was invested by him for her sister in a U.S. bank account in dollars. Further
the first named defendant represented to the plaintiff that if the investment
were cashed the plaintiff’s sister would lose on her investment and that
it would be preferable for her to take over the investment and pay off her
sister. On that representation she did as she was asked. However no evidence
whatsoever has been adduced by the first named defendant to support this
contention. No account has been shown and no independent documentation has
been presented. Accordingly it was a false representation made knowingly or
alternatively made without any belief in its truth. In point of fact no
evidence whatsoever has been furnished by the first named defendant in relation
to where that sum went. Accordingly the representation was untrue and dishonest.
68. The
court then concerned itself with the question of the Statute of Limitations
pleaded in an amended pleading. Section 44 provides:-
69. Fraud
required by s. 44 of the Statute of Limitations amounts to dishonesty. See
Murphy
v. A.I.B.
[1994]
2 ILRM 220,
per
Murphy J. Under s. 71 of the Act a period of six years is fixed for the
purposes of bringing an action based on the fraud of the defendant or its agent
or the right of action as concealed by the fraud of any such person. But the
period of limitation shall not begin to run until a plaintiff has discovered
the fraud or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. Fraud covers
conduct which, having regard to some special relationship between the two
parties concerned, is an unconscionable thing for the one to do towards the
other. It is alleged that as there was a special relationship between the
parties it would be inequitable to allow the defendant to rely upon the statute.
70. The
definition of partnership is contained in s. 1, Partnership Act, 1890 and it is
as follows:-
72. This
court is quite satisfied from the evidence of the first named defendant and
from the various documents including the correspondence between the first named
defendant and Mr Delahunty and the unsigned partnership agreement and the fact
that there were to be small cheques (so as not to attract attention). The
letter of the 1st July, 1978 which uses the term Jackman and Delahunty in
relation to its investments and the management by the first named defendant and
Mr Delahunty of the Bank of Ireland bank account in Grafton Street support the
case that this was a partnership. The plaintiff was totally unaware of its
existence. Also the findings of Costello P. in these proceedings which might
give rise to
res
judicata
but this court is not deciding this power.
73. The
defendant’s submissions prepared by Mr Boyle were very able argued by
him. He states that clearly there was a good friendship between the plaintiff
and the first named defendant from 1975 until at least 1985. He puts a gloss
on the statement by the first named defendant that the plaintiff was not
capable of managing her financial affairs. He says that he is clearly
referring to investments. He says that the plaintiff was fully capable in day
to day financial matters. He points out that Mr Buckley believes she
understood the meaning of the sub-trust in 1981 and she understood what she was
doing when she entered into the assignment that he drafted in September, 1982.
He says that she provided an intelligent and robust response in
cross-examination. This must rule out any suggestion of her being a vulnerable
person taking into account the many fluent letters she was able to write
unaided. Her dyslexia is mild. She has a strong personality and she became
the first named defendant’s mentor. She was concerned about his health
and rehabilitation. Indeed she brought him to Donegal in order to help him
recover his self confidence. He alleges that there was never a fiduciary
relationship. The first named defendant’s involvement in her business
was informal. He concedes that his client received monies from the plaintiff
over the years over and above what she is now claiming but he says that these
were for expenses. The relationship was very informal with the first named
defendant. He did not give her receipt as we have seen for the sum of either
£32,000 (she claims is £36,000). Her dealings with the first named
defendant concerning the sums of £10,000 and £3,000 were similarly
informal. She never referred to these sums in her letters to the first named
defendant and did not sue for them even when she was bringing other proceedings
in late 1985. This uncertainty concerning the original donation is hardened
into a claim only in 1992 with these proceedings. The plaintiff has unfairly
used the judgment she obtained against the first named defendant in the Circuit
Court proceedings in 1986 in an attempt to show him in a bad light in these
proceedings. However the first named defendant is insistent that she did not
tell the truth in the Circuit Court of the alleged loan of £7,500 and took
advantage of the fact that the first named defendant was sick in California and
could not attend the hearing. She has a tendency to blame others for her
troubles. She sued her own mother and siblings as well as the first named
defendant but she never pursued these proceedings. She also sued her
solicitors A&L Goodbody arising out of the same matters but did not pursue
these proceedings. She is bitter towards the first named defendant and sees
opportunism in almost every aspect of their former friendship. This and the
multiplicity of court proceedings shows a lack of respect and balance in her
judgement and recollection. She changed her story regarding the first named
defendant’s claim to a site in her farm in Co. Wicklow. At first she
denied that she ever promised it to him but at the hearing before Mr Justice
Costello she admitted she had. His finding was that she did promise it but
that his claim was unenforceable. That finding vindicates the first named
defendant’s stance. Her false claim that she had not promised the site
to the first named defendant greatly damaged him.
74. The
plaintiff’s evidence is that she withdrew £36,000 in cash from
Norwich Union in September 1976 and gave it to the first named defendant to
invest. She says that the first named defendant suggested Canadian Government
Bonds (day six p.p. 16-17). The defendant’s evidence is that in July she
offered him £32,000 or £30,000 as a gift for his work on her behalf
which he felt he could not accept and said he would invest it for her. He said
she agreed to this. He says that it went into an investment fund with his
money and Mr Brian Nolan. It is common case that the first named defendant
took $50,000 or the equivalent thereof to California in November, 1976 and
shortly before he returned to Ireland he gave a cheque for that amount to
Christopher Delahunty to invest with a promise of a return of 28 per cent. The
first named defendant says that this sum was merely a part of his overall
investment fund and is not directly identifiable with the plaintiff’s
investment. She contends that it was her money converted into U.S. Dollars.
The first named defendant says that that investment was turned into shares in
ACS in 1980 and was eventually lost when that company finally collapsed in the
mid-eighties.
75. On
either version the first named defendant was to invest the money. If
investments in Canadian Bonds was an essential term rather than a preferred
option the first named defendant would have been in breach of their agreement
in January, 1977 by giving the money to Christopher Delahunty. The
plaintiff’ says that she discussed her investments informally with the
first named defendant. It is significant that when she came to complain to the
first named defendant about the loss of this investment in her letters of the
28th May, and 30th August, 1985 she did not refer to investing in Canadian
bonds. In the letter of the 28th of May she referred to a promised investment
of 26%. In the letter of the 30th August, 1985 she says “your account
has always been that the IR£36,000 in 1976 were given to Delahunty before
you left America in 1977”. This suggests that if Canadian dollars were
ever mentioned she had accepted instead investment with Delahunty. Accordingly
she cannot now claim that that investment was in breach of her agreement with
the first named defendant.
76. The
plaintiff says that she withdrew £10,118.32 from her account with Norwich
Union on the 7th April, 1978 and gave £10,000 by endorsed cheque (day 7
p69 and p74) to the first named defendant for investment in Merrill Lynch and
retained £118.32. It seems however that Norwich Union record only one
cheque (day 8 pp57-59). The first named defendant denies that he ever received
this money. The court only has only her oral evidence and her recollection
that she paid it to the first named defendant. It is submitted that the court
should be cautious about accepting such evidence at such a remove of time. The
plaintiff did not refer to this sum in her letters to the first named defendant
especially he initial letters of complaint of the 28th May and the 30th August
already referred to. In the second of these letters she says:-
77. It
is not credible that she would write this letter if she believed the sum of
£10,000 should have been invested in Merrill Lynch.
78. The
plaintiff says that in August, 1977 her sister Caroline wanted a return of a
sum of £3,000 that she had invested with the first named defendant. He
said there would be a small loss for Caroline if this happened but the
plaintiff says that the first named defendant suggested she took over the
investment and paid off Caroline by cheque dated the 29th August, 1977. The
first named defendant admits that Caroline gave him £3,000 to invest which
he put into U.S. Dollars so as to the question at that time which was would
there be a loss, he said there would be. There was no agreement with the
plaintiff along the lines she suggests. The existence of Caroline’s
investment and the calculation of the loss are recorded in documents produced
to the court but the alleged agreement is not and the plaintiff did not refer
to it when she came to complain to the first named defendant concerning her
losses in her letters in 1985 already mentioned. That the first named
defendant owed the plaintiff’s sister Caroline was a chose-in-action.
Under s.28(6) of the Judicature (Ireland) Act, 1877 it can only be assigned in
writing under the hand of the assignor (i.e. Caroline). Moreover the section
requires express notice in writing to the debtor. As neither is present here
the plaintiff cannot recover.
79. If
the First Named plaintiff was a constructive trustee of the money for Caroline
the benefit of the trust could similarly only be outlined in writing.
82.
The evidence of the plaintiff, the first named defendant and the bank officials
all shows that thereafter the money was transferred to an account in the joint
names of the plaintiff and first named defendant and from there to accounts in
the sole name of the first named defendant. It is also clear that this was
done with the consent of the plaintiff and that the purpose of this was to
facilitate that the intended investment of the money in U.S. Treasury Bonds in
the United States. The sub-trust was dated the 2nd September, 1981 and was
produced in evidence. There is a dispute as to whether it was in fact signed
on that day. This is immaterial to these proceedings. The plaintiff’s
case is that the money passed from the trust to the sub-trust. The
defendant’s case is that whatever and whenever the paperwork the
plaintiff was entitled to and did bring the trust to an end or else be
concurrent in breaching the trust or the sub-trust. Mr Boyle continues:-
83. It
is further submitted that in agreeing to send the money to the U.S. for
investment in U.S. Treasury Bonds the plaintiff brought the 1950 sub-trusts of
the 1950 Children’s Settlement to an end. The creation of the sub-trust
as Mr Buckley admitted was intended as a device to avoid a tax liability for
the plaintiff and he conceded that she was the beneficial owner of the fund.
By releasing it to the first named defendant in America she certainly behaved
as if she owned it.
84. The
plaintiff knew and consented to the movement of money into accounts in the sole
name of the first named defendant. She knew it was going to be transferred to
the USA and invested there in Treasury Bonds. The first named defendant put
the money in Mr Delahunty’s firm-that in itself is perfectly in order.
The plaintiff had met and knew Mr Delahunty since 1977/78. There is no reason
to believe that she would have at that time have objected to his firm dealing
with her investment. It is well established when a trustee without negligence
is robbed of trust property in his custody, he is not liable for the loss (
Job
-v- Job
[1877] 6 Ch D 562). The plaintiff does allege that there was a partnership
between the first named defendant and Mr Delahunty and that her money was used
for its business without her knowledge or permission. As evidence of this
partnership she points to the undated written agreement signed by Mr Jackman
and Mr Delahunty in which it is stated on its face to come into force on the
1st January, 1977. She also asks the court to draw an inference that a
partnership existed from miscellaneous hand-written notes of the first named
defendant and of Mr Delahunty and from the fact that the first named defendant
and Mr Delahunty had a joint account at Bank of Ireland, Grafton Street in
1977/78. The first named defendant’s evidence was that he did not
discuss partnership, that the agreement was not acted upon and that the
partnership along the lines envisaged in the document never developed. The
first question posed by Mr Boyle is that if it is an alleged partnership, could
that make the first named defendant liable for Mr Delahunty’s wrongdoing.
He submits that that cannot be the case because it is common case that the
plaintiff was not dealing with a partnership. However the plaintiff may not
have been dealing with a partnership. The real question is whether if it was a
partnership, Mr Jackman is liable for Mr Delahunty’s wrongdoing, did the
first named defendant misuse the money either alone or in conjunction with Mr
Delahunty so the alleged partnership is governed by the law of California. The
court has no evidence of Californian law in relation to this alleged agreement.
It is submitted that the first named defendant cannot be liable to the
plaintiff for the wrongdoing of Mr Delahunty under any principle of partnership
law.
85. The
claim against the first named defendant for breach of contract, breach of trust
and negligence became statute barred six years after the cause of action
accrued. As more than six years passed before these proceedings were
instituted on the 3rd June, 1992 the plaintiff must rely on some rule that
extends or suspends the running of time under the statute.
86. The
first named defendant said that he told her about the problems with the
American investment in the Autumn of 1982 but she denies this. However on the
28th May, 1985 the plaintiff wrote an angry letter to the first named defendant
complaining about the non-payment of her money and in particular referring to
the sum of £36,000 and the money transferred in September, 1981. On the
30th August, 1985 she wrote another letter in a similar vein. On the 30th
September, she made a competing claim in the SIPC proceedings and wrote to Mr
Steckinger, the Attorney for SIPC, on the 20th and 26th November, 1985
challenging the first named defendant’s right to claim the missing
$200,000. On the 29th November, 1985 she issued Circuit Court proceedings
against the first named defendant claiming repayment of an alleged loan made in
1978. On the 18th January, 1986 she wrote another letter to Mr Steckinger
setting out her complaints against the first named defendant. She received a
notification date on the 14th February, 1986 from SIPC that her claim had been
rejected. The SIPC proceedings including the appeal did not suspend the
running of time. He argued that the test is whether exercising reasonable
diligence the plaintiff had sufficient information to initiate proceedings not
whether she may recover through a regulatory compensation scheme. The
existence of that scheme is not a matter coming with s.71(a) of the Statute of
Limitations to suspend the running of time and the plaintiff did not claim that
she made a mistake within section 72. In fact the first named
defendant’s clear evidence is that he had got an agreement from SIPC to
pay his claim in full. The plaintiff was aware of that when she entered a
competing claim whereas that gave SIPC, a body which the defendant pointed out
is notorious for not paying compensation, an excuse to reject the claim,
consequently she is the author of her own loss in that respect. He argues the
section applies only to express trustees, there is no application to
constructive trustees. He submitted that the plaintiff cannot rely on s. 44 to
prevent the statute from running in respect of personal monies advanced to the
first named defendant (i.e. The sums of £36,000 in 1977, the sum of
£10,000 in 1978, the sum of £3,000 in 1977 and the sum of
£15,000 and £4,000 in 1981). He further submitted that the plaintiff
had not proved fraud by the first named defendant and is not entitled to
judgment for fraud so that s. 44 does not apply to the monies that originated
in the 1950 trust. In the case of
Superwood
Holdings plc. v
.
Sun Alliance & London Insurance plc
.
[1995] 3 I.R. 303, Denham J. stated:
87. He
argues that it is not clear what is the fraud that she is alleging. There
seems to be two possible grounds to the allegation. Firstly that the first
named defendant falsely represented to her that he would invest her money but
took it not intending so to do. Secondly having taken it to invest he
appropriated it either alone or with Mr Delahunty. These possible grounds of
fraud do not stand up in relation to the four sums of money at issue in this
case. In relation to the sum of £30,000 or £36,000 given in 1977 the
first issue is whether the first named defendant agreed to invest it in
Canadian Bonds, this is in dispute. There is no corroboration of the
plaintiff’s allegation. It was never made in writing until these
proceedings where issued. The court will not be justified in a finding of
fraud on this basis. Also there is no evidence that the first named defendant
misappropriated the money. In considering this issue the court should have
regard to the fact that it was given in cash, no receipt was sought, and the
plaintiff did not seek documentation or a detailed account thereafter. This
strongly suggests that she gave the first named defendant a free hand in how he
held, dealt with and invested the money. According to his evidence part of it
was invested with Delahunty in January, 1977 and part of it was invested in
Merrill Lynch. The plaintiff contends that her investment was entirely
comprised in the sum of £50,000 and that it was given to Delahunty as part
of an alleged partnership. There is no evidence that either the first named
defendant or Mr Delahunty considered that to be the case. The first named
defendant says that the sum was repaid with the agreed interest in the form of
shares in ACS.
88. He
argues that if the court were to conclude that it was received by Delahunty as
part of a partnership with the first named defendant that fact would not amount
to fraud for two reasons. Firstly there was the relative freedom concerning
the money which the plaintiff had allowed the first named defendant and
secondly the partnership agreement if it were implemented was precisely for the
purposes of investment of client’s money. Mr Boyle continues that the
plaintiff says that the sum of £10,000 was given to the first named
defendant to invest in Merrill Lynch. There is no corroboration of her alleged
instructions. Indeed her letters of the 28th May, 1985 and the 30th August,
1985 when she complains to the first named defendant and demanded the return of
her money, made no reference to this payment. In the second of these letters
she seems to be surprised to learn that there is a sum to her credit in Merrill
Lynch (this was part of her investment of £32,000). She says it was given
by cheque but she did not at any stage seek in writing investment documentation
or a detailed account. If he got the money to invest there is no evidence that
he misappropriated it. The plaintiff is asking the court to draw an inference
on breach of trust or even fraud for the non-return of the money. It is
submitted that the evidence is certainly too weak to ground a finding of fraud.
89. The
plaintiff says that she “took over” her sister Caroline’s
investment of £3,000 and this is denied. There is no evidence in writing
of this assignment, she did not refer to it in her letters in 1985 again no
evidence was adduced to show the first named defendant appropriated the money
and the plaintiff is asking the court to draw an inference in that regard.
90. The
position with regard to the sum of $200,000 is clear. The instructions to the
first named defendant were to invest it in U.S. treasury bonds but apparently
gave him a free hand as to where and how he did so. He attempted to buy these
bonds at an established stockbrokers - Brentwood Securities Inc. (although he
knew the President Mr Delahunty). His account is corroborated by the
statements of his account with Brentwood Securities. The plaintiff places
great reliance on the letter dated the 1st September, 1981 from the first named
defendant to Mr Delahunty. It was put to the first named defendant that the
letter dated the 1st September, 1981 was a device whereby Mr Jackman invested
in the partnership or gave the money to Delahunty. It is submitted that this
is not credible for several reasons:-
93. It
is the submission of the plaintiff herein that the document could not be what
it purports to be. It is a flimsy typed document and it is unlikely to have
been produced by any reputable organisation of any description. No explanation
has been offered in relation to the location of its execution, the manner of
its execution or the purpose of its execution. Inconsistency arise in the
evidence in relation as to whether it was created in California or New York for
the purposes of opening a chequeing account with Paine Webber or for the
purpose of buying gold coins. Further there is no receipt in relation to any
purchase of gold coins in 1987. No explanation was given for the three year
delay in making an application to the President of the High Court. She had
stated that the payments from the social welfare were for herself and her
daughter. She eventually told the court that the money only came from the
social security payments of her daughter and undoubtedly her credibility was
continually, significantly and seriously put in question in relation to the
source of the funds and the purchase of the gold coins. It is clear however
and the court so finds that the first and second named defendants had a joint
account and that the second named defendant placed her daughter and her own
social security monies into that joint account. It is also clear that the
first named defendant had control over the second named defendant’s
account as evidenced by the cheque made payable to the plaintiff from the
second named defendant’s account.
94. It
was submitted that at all material times the accounts of the first and second
named defendants may be treated as joint accounts from which the gold coins
where purchased and accordingly the gold coins are jointly owned by the first
and second named defendants. There is some corroborative evidence of this by
virtue of the manner in which the gold coins were stored namely the joint
account both in America and in Ireland which came to light pursuant to the
court orders. The court must also have regard to the failure on the part of
the second named defendant to produce proof of documents despite continual
references to such documents. In fact the court suggested that some documents
could be faxed during this long trial. It was not done.
95. Mr
Boyle on behalf of the second named defendant argued that the onus is on the
plaintiff primarily. He argues that even if the coins were purchased from a
mixed family fund it is not possible on the evidence to determine what
proportion if any of the monies of that fund belonged to the plaintiff. The
court would be speculating if it did so. If there were monies in that fund
that belonged to the plaintiff some of which were trust monies her entitlement
to recover that money would have crystallised on the date that she paid it to
the first named defendant i.e. July, 1981. A claim to recover it in the form
of some or all of the coins was long statute barred at the time of the
commencement of the proceedings. He further argues that the second named
defendant holds the coins in trust and relies on what she believes is a trust
document. Ms. Corrigan’s evidence is irrelevant as she was talking about
Irish law. The written trust would be governed by the law of the State of
California of which the court has no evidence. He quotes from Underhill and
Hayton,
Law
of Trusts and
Trustees,
(14th Ed. 1987) at p.39. He sets out basically the three certainties to which
the court has already referred and adds:-
96. He
submits that all these elements are present. The evidence of both defendants
was that Mary Jackman told her husband she was buying the coins for their
daughter to provide for her education. That statement and the purchase of the
coins satisfy all the requirements for the creation of a trust. No writing is
required to create a trust of personal property (Underhill and Hayton,
op
cit
at p.175 and Keane
op
cit
p.89) argues that that Trust will prevail over any claim of the plaintiff
unless she can show that Mary Jackman had noticed that any money contributed by
Michael Jackman was subject to the plaintiff’s trust. However, this
court is satisfied as a matter of probability that the second named defendant
was aware of the involvement of her husband in the trust funds of the
plaintiff. Mr Boyle argues further that even if the trust fails, the result
Ms. Corrigan confirms, that the ownership of the coins revert to the parties
who paid for them, namely Mary Jackman and her daughter. If the first named
defendant is found to have contributed to the coins he may also have an
interest but only if she can show that his share in that fund was trust money
(i.e. of the sub-trust only not her other monies). There is evidence that John
Jobling-Purser gave money to the first named defendant as did Mr Nolan and John
Doran. The plaintiff as a matter of probability would have to show what
interest they might have in the fund that bought the coins. In other words she
must set up some kind of money trail from the $200,000 transferred in 1981 and
the monies used to purchase the first tranche of coins in 1987 and the second
tranche in 1989. It is submitted that she has not come close to establishing
this trail.
97. The
plaintiff’s counsel convincingly called into question the
defendant’s capacity to live on their income in the early 1980’s.
He challenged the validity of the Trust document and its provenance. He
queried a transfer of $25,000 by the second named defendant in 1987 linking it
to the unfavourable appeal judgment of Judge Barry Russell and submits that
that is hardly sufficient to ground a claim to ownership of a particular fund.
However, it is significant that these two events could be so close to each
other and the circumstances of each event. This court does not believe that it
was merely a coincidence. The court reserved judgment and spent a considerable
time in reviewing all the evidence. The transcript became available in
instalments over several months. The court prepared in an initial draft as
long ago as last May. However, the court having reread the entire transcript
and deciding that it should make findings of fact indicated that it was very
concerned about legal matters raised by Mr Boyle and wished to be further
addressed. Accordingly a date was set aside and further submissions were
taken. While neither side were wholly convincing in their evidence it seems to
this court that on the balance of probability and having regard to all the
evidence the court should determine the questions submitted to it as follows:-
98.
On the facts she would be entitled to all these sums subject is a legal point
to be considered later. Having regard to her
laches
for which there is no real explanation it does not seem appropriate that there
should be any interest. That answers the next query.
99. As
indicated there was a late amendment to defence and a number of legal problems
were flagged at an early stage in these proceedings. However, both parties
agreed to postpone legal aspects and to await the determination of the factual
issues.
100. After
the evidence was concluded written submissions, with which the court has
already dealt were made. The court then requested various points mainly raised
by Mr Boyle’s written submission to be further discussed. The
plaintiff’s sister was concerned about the morality of her investment.
Rather than realise it, Mr Jackman suggested to the plaintiff that she should
pay her sister and take over her investment. The argument of Mr Boyle was that
this was a debt of the first named defendants owed to the plaintiff’s
sister, Caroline. It was a chose-in-action under s. 28(6) Judicature (Ireland)
Act, 1877. It could only be assigned in writing under the hand of the
assignor. Mr Nolan argued that it was not a chose-in-action and if it were,
Caroline would have had to assign to the plaintiff. He argues there was no
assignment at all, Caroline was paid her money by the plaintiff. Mr Jackman
had told the plaintiff that if Caroline wished to have her money back the
result was that it would reduce the investment. This was a fraudulent
misrepresentation. The money had at that time been already purloined by either
Mr Jackman or Mr Delahunty or both. Indeed Mr Jackman does not say that it was
given to Mr Delahunty and Mr Nolan said Mr Delahunty is not really relevant in
relation to the £3,000. Despite three orders for Discovery there is no
evidence that this £3,000 was ever invested. However, Mr Jackman said it
was invested. Mr Jackman also represented that in fact the plaintiff’s
interest would be increased. There is no evidence that they were in fact
increased. The question of the Statute of Limitations or of the Judicature Act
does not arise if the claim is based on fraudulent misrepresentation. This
case is only concerned with four sums of money out of the many monies alleged
to have taken place between the parties, as regards £36,000 in September,
1976 (or £32,000). This amount is in dispute. That was to be invested
in to Canadian bonds. The documents associated have words like
“sure” and “certain maturity”. The second sum is for
£3,000 in August, 1997. This is Caroline's money which we have just
discussed. The third sum is £10,000 in April, 1978 being monies which came
out of the Norwich Union and would be invested in Merrill Lynch in London and
the fourth sum is $200,000. The court then turns to the consideration of the
Statute of Limitations, in particular s. 44 and s. 71 thereof. It is agreed by
the parties that if a trustee has been guilty of fraudulent breach of trust
then there is perpetual liability. Mr Boyle argues that the first three sums
were at best subject to a constructive trust and that since the definition of a
trust in s. 2 of the Statute of Limitations does not apply to constructive
trust, it couldn’t be protected under s. 44. However, Mr. Nolan argues
it is in fact an express trust and relies on the Judgment of Esher MR in
Soar
-v- Ashwell
(1893) 2 AB 390, at p. 393:-
101. That
passage and several others are approved in the Irish textbook of Kerr and
Brady. Mr Nolan argues that the first three sums of money given to Mr Jackman
for a stated purpose for a stated beneficiary and for a stated sum.
Accordingly, this satisfied the criteria of the three certainties. The fourth
figure of $200,000 is an amalgam. Some came from the ACC, others coming from
Chase Bank and some coming from the monies deposited by solicitors of the
trust. The other two sums into the children’s settlement. Mr Nolan
argues that all of them came within the category of
Soar
-v- Ashwell
.
Mr Boyle relies on
B
and B Han -v- The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland
(date ). Mr Nolan answers that
Derry
-v- Peake
which is the corner store of this branch of the law, basically boils down to
dishonesty. Mr Boyle tries to differentiate between fraud under s. 44 and s.
71. Mr Nolan says that fraud, unless otherwise defined, is fraud. It must
mean the same thing used in the one statute. As regards the institution of
proceedings, Mr Nolan argues that even Judge Russell in California was not able
to resolve the complexity and that the plaintiff would not visibly realise that
she was being defrauded financially by the first named defendant until she
employed counsel to intervene and examine and cross-examine Mr Jackman in
California. If so, that is the date from which time runs. Therefore these
proceedings were instituted within the statutory period. However, Mr Nolan
primarily relies on s. 44. This does not in any way abandon s. 71. The
plaintiff had instituted proceedings for monies against the defendant, monies
borrowed by him but those proceedings were issued in 1986. However, she did
not know at that time that she could make a case in fraud or in breach of trust
or in breach of fiduciary duty. The court was then concerned about the coins
which were purchased from a mixed fund to which the second named defendant and
defendant’s daughter, the first named defendant and various other people
who had invested in Mr Jackman (“the Jackman Fund”). He maintained
they had not put money into specific funds but into him. He made that point in
SIPC Proceedings but it was not accepted by Judge Russell but he has made the
same point in this court. The court pointed out they would not have a proper
paper trail unless it excluded the other sources. If there were a share, the
share would have to be identified. If it is a mixed fund and the plaintiff
cannot trace it, then the coins revert to Mrs Jackman. The first three sums of
money were given before the power of attorney, which was the 29th October,
1981. Mr Nolan submitted that the power of attorney, in fact, had no relevance
to the four sums of money which he is claiming in these proceedings. Mr Nolan
that he had a difficulty in establishing the paper trail in relation to the
coins. It is that the onus is on Mrs Jackman to prove that she didn’t
produce any information about her bank accounts. Mr Nolan in dealing with the
rights of the child who was not represented and whose funds may have
contributed to the mixed fund which bought the coins, eventually conceded this.
The coins were at least half owned by the defendants. They were found in their
accounts and joint accounts in the name of both defendants. Mr Nolan
eventually agreed he would accept one third of the coins. Mr Boyle argues
that even if Mr Jackman is only entitled to half the coins, or one third, we
are back at the basic problem that the money he used was from a mixed fund and
that the other contributors of Mr Jackman have an interest. Mr Boyle argues
that the decision in
Soar
-v- Ashwell
does not support Mr Nolan, on the grounds that in the
Soar
case, the trust fund was in existence under a will in trust for two persons in
equal shares and on the death of each member the share went to the respective
children. There was an express trust and Ashwell was not at any time nominated
as a trustee of that trust. He was the solicitor of the nominated trustee. He
argues very forcibly that
Soar
is not an authority for the proposition that in every case where someone
invests money that somebody else may become an express trustee.
102. I
have already determined the case subject to various legal points. The court is
satisfied that Mr Jackman was an express trustee laid down in
Soar
-v- Ashwell
.
Therefore the defence of the Statute of Limitations does not apply. I also
accept Mr Nolan’s argument, that the section of the Judicature (Ireland)
Act, 1877 relating to assignment of a chose- in- action is not relevant.
Accordingly, the court will give a decree for four sums of money. However, the
court is not satisfied that a proper paper trail has been established between
the plaintiff and the gold coins and in all the circumstances the gold coins
must be returned to Mrs Jackman. This case is based on a decision that Mr
Jackman was an express trustee.