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High Court of Ireland Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Kelly v. Cahill [2001] IEHC 2; [2001] 2 ILRM 205 (18th January, 2001)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2001/2.html
Cite as: [2001] 1 IR 56, [2001] IEHC 2, [2001] 2 ILRM 205

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Kelly v. Cahill [2001] IEHC 2; [2001] 2 ILRM 205 (18th January, 2001)

THE HIGH COURT
( PROBATE)
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL CAHILL, DECEASED
and
IN THE MATTER OF THE SUCCESSION ACT, 1965
and
IN THE MATTER OF QUESTIONS ARISING IN RESPECT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL CAHILL, DECEASED
BETWEEN
JOHN KELLY
PLAINTIFF
AND
NELLIE (OTHERWISE ELLEN) CAHILL AND MICHAEL CAHILL JUNIOR
DEFENDANTS
JUDGMENT delivered by Mr. Justice Barr on the 18th day of January, 2001.
The facts relating to this matter are not in dispute and are as follows:-

1. The plaintiff is the sole surviving executor named in the last will and testament of Michael Cahill Senior (the deceased) made on the 23rd October, 1969 who died on 20th March, 1996 without having revoked or altered the will. The other executor appointed by the deceased predeceased him and was not replaced. The plaintiff applied for and obtained probate of the deceased’s will on 22nd January, 1998 and pursuant thereto entered into the administration of the estate.

2. The first defendant (the widow) is the widow of the deceased. The second defendant is a nephew of the testator. The deceased was a farmer and the owner of substantial holdings of registered land. He died without issue. By his last will the deceased devised all of his property to his widow and his brother, Martin Cahill, as joint tenants for life with remainder to trustees in trust for his nephew, the second defendant. Martin Cahill, the deceased’s brother, died on 16th March, 1998.

3. In course of administration of the deceased’s estate certain facts have come to light relating to the ownership of part of the lands comprised in the estate which have caused the plaintiff as administrator to seek directions from the Court, thus giving rise to this action. The matters raised by him include -

  1. The answers to the following questions arising in relation to the administration of the estate of the said Michael Cahill Senior, deceased:
  1. Such directions as may appear to this Honourable Court to be proper on foot of the answers to the questions at paragraph 1 (a) and (b) above.
  2. In the event that the Court holds that the second named defendant is a trustee of the lands comprised in Folio GY043846F as a constructive trustee for the first named defendant, an Order directing the second named defendant to execute such assurance as may be necessary to vest the said lands in the first named defendant.”

4. The facts which have posed the foregoing questions are deposed to by Mr. Joseph O’Hara who was the deceased’s solicitor at all material times and are summarised as follows:-

5. In or about the month of January, 1994 Mr. Michael Cahill, the testator since deceased, and his wife, the first defendant, called upon Mr. O’Hara and he obtained instructions from Mr. Cahill that he wished to alter the will which he had made on 23rd October, 1969. He informed his solicitor that he no longer wished to benefit his nephew Michael Cahill Junior, the second defendant, and that he wished to leave all of his property to his wife, the first defendant. There is no doubt that the testator had at that time changed his mind regarding the disposition of his property and had decided that his entire estate should be inherited by his wife absolutely on his death without any remainder provision and that this should be achieved by way of a new or revised will. However, Mr. O’Hara foresaw a likely disadvantage for the testator’s wife if his revised testamentary intention was achieved in the way intended by him. The difficulty was that a 2% probate tax had been created by the Finance Act, 1993 which the solicitor believed would be payable by the widow on the value of the estate inherited by her. At that time there were no exemptions in respect of such tax. In the light of this Mr. O’Hara advised his client, the testator, that he could achieve the same result without liability for probate tax by transferring his lands into the joint names of himself and his wife, the effect of which would be that the property would then pass to his wife, as sole owner if she survived him. The testator agreed to that course of action. Mr. O’Hara had also ascertained that all of the other assets of his client and his wife were in their joint names. A Deed of Transfer dated 14th January, 1994 was duly drawn up by Mr. O’Hara to give effect to the revised instructions which he had received. The deed provided that lands comprised in Folio 46909 of the Register County of Galway were transferred from the sole ownership of Michael Cahill into the joint names of the latter and his wife, Nellie Cahill. The deed was duly executed and at that time the joint owners and their solicitor believed that it included all of the lands then owned by Michael Cahill. In fact in drawing the deed the solicitor had made an error. He was not then aware that as noted thereon Folio 46909 had been prior to the date of execution of the deed closed to Folio GY043846F of the Register County of Galway (the second folio) of which Mr. O’Hara had no knowledge at that time. The second folio comprised 17 entries of which Nos. 6 to 9 were the lands transferred from Folio 46909. The end result was that through the inadvertence of the solicitor and unknown to the testator and his wife the lands comprised in entries 1 to 5 and 10 to 17 in the second folio were not included in the Deed of Transfer contrary to the express intentions of the testator. No new will was made and the end result was that having regard to the terms of the original will and of the Deed of Transfer per se the lands which had not been transferred into the joint names of the deceased and his wife would on his death pass to her for life with remainder to the second defendant, Michael Cahill Junior, but subject to the widow’s legal right share under the Succession Act, 1965 to one half of the lands concerned, should she elect to make such a claim. Mr. O’Hara has deposed that he does not believe that that would accord with the stated intention of the deceased, which was that his nephew, Michael Cahill Junior, would not benefit from the estate and that his wife would be the sole beneficiary.


The Law

6. The nett issue which I must address is whether in the light of Mr. O’Hara’s inadvertence regarding the folios in question which resulted in a failure to carry out his client’s instructions to include all his lands in the Deed of Transfer made in January, 1994, a constructive trust arises comprising the lands which were not transferred into joint ownership as intended by the testator. This raises the question as to whether in the circumstances under review it is established that a ‘New Model’ constructive trust as Mr. Justice Keane described it in “Equity and the Law of Trusts in Ireland” has been established and, if so, whether such a trust has a place in Irish law.

7. The concept of ‘New Model’ constructive trusts is explained by Keane J (as he then was) in the following passages from his learned work at pp. 196/7


“In recent years, there has been much discussion in other jurisdictions as to whether a constructive trust can be said to arise in any circumstances where permitting the defendant to retain the property would result in his being ‘unjustly enriched’. This, it has been said, effectively means treating the constructive trust as a form of remedy intended to restore property to a person to whom in justice it should belong rather than as an institution analogous to the express or resulting trust. The constructive trust, in its additional form, arises because of equity’s refusal to countenance any form of fraud: in this wider modern guise it is imposed by law ‘whenever justice and good conscience require it’.”
The latter is a quotation from the landmark judgment in this area of Lord Denning MR in Hussey -v- Palmer [1972] 3AER 744 at 747. In that case, the plaintiff had been living with her daughter and son-in-law. She had paid £607.00 to a contractor to build on another room in the expectation that she could live there for the rest of her life. When disputes later arose and she left, she sought the return of the £607.00. Having regard to the informal nature of the arrangement, she was in obvious difficulty in establishing that it was a loan rather than a gift. However, Lord Denning did not consider that problem insuperable. Having observed that it did not matter whether one proceeded by way of a resulting trust or a constructive trust, he went on
“By whatever means it is described, it is a trust imposed by law wherever justice and good conscience require it. It is a liberal process, founded upon large principles of equity to be applied in cases where a defendant cannot conscientiously keep the property for himself alone, but ought to allow another to have the property or a share of it ....... It is an equitable remedy by which the Court can enable an aggrieved party to obtain restitution”. The end result was that the plaintiff was entitled to a share in the house proportionate to her contribution.
Keane J commented that
“Broadly speaking, it may be said that the application of the principle of unjust enrichment requires the restoration by the defendant to the plaintiff of a benefit which it would be unjust for him to retain. Sometimes this can be done by a simple award of money, e.g., the refund of money paid under a mistake of fact. But sometimes the restoration of the benefit can only be achieved by giving the plaintiff an interest in property. Thus, the constructive trust is imposed by the Court as an equitable remedy intended to restore to the plaintiff the benefit of which he has been deprived. In the words of Cardozo J ‘a constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression’. Beatley -v- Guggenageim Exploration Co. 225 NY 380 at 386.”

8. I adopt with respect the foregoing assessment of ‘New Model’ constructive trusts by Keane J.

9. It seems to me that the kernel of the question I have to determine is whether the evidence establishes a clear, positive intention on the part of the testator that his wife should inherit all of his property on his death; that he took appropriate steps to bring that about and that he could not reasonably have known that through his solicitor’s error the Deed of Transfer, which he and his wife duly executed, did not include all of his lands and that his stated intention to benefit his wife exclusively on his death was defeated in part. In the light of Mr. O’Hara’s and the first defendant’s affidavits, the accuracy of which is not in dispute it is established that the testator expressed such an intention to his solicitor in clear terms and that he had good reason for believing that the Deed of Transfer did in fact achieve his intention that his wife would acquire absolutely as surviving joint owner all of his lands on his death as Mr. O’Hara had advised. In my view it is irrelevant that the second defendant was neither aware of or had any responsibility for the error which was made. The essential element is that the testator changed his mind regarding the disposition of his estate after death and that he took appropriate steps to give effect to his revised intention. That having been established, it follows that in the words of Lord Denning, ‘justice and good conscience' requires that the second defendant should not be allowed to inherit the testator’s property or any part of it on the death of his widow and that his interest in remainder under the will should be deemed to be a constructive trust in favour of the widow. In my opinion a ‘New Model’ constructive trust of that nature the purpose of which is to prevent unjust enrichment is an equitable concept which deserves recognition in Irish law. In that regard I note also that it accords with the following observations of Costello J (as he then was) in HKN Invest OY and Anor. -v- Incotrade PVT Limited (In liquidation) and Ors . [1993] 3 IR 152 at 162.


“ ....... A constructive trust will arise when the circumstances render it inequitable for the legal owner of property to deny the title of another to it. It is a trust which comes into existence irrespective of the will of the parties and arises by operation of law. The principle is that where a person who holds property in circumstances which in equity and good conscience should be held or enjoyed by another he will be compelled to hold the property in trust for another......”

10. And in that context that the learned judge referred with apparent approval to the judgment of Lord Denning MR in Hussey -v- Palmer supra .

11. In the light of my findings the answers to the questions posed in paragraph 1 of the plaintiff’s claims are:-

12. I direct that the second named defendant shall execute such assurance as may be necessary to vest in the first defendant all of the lands comprised in Folio GY043846 of the Register County of Galway.


© 2001 Irish High Court


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URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2001/2.html