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High Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> U. & Ors -v- MJELR & Ors [2008] IEHC 385 (11 December 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2008/H385.html Cite as: [2008] IEHC 385 |
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Judgment Title: U. & Ors -v- MJELR & Ors Composition of Court: Judgment by: Hedigan J. Status of Judgment: Approved |
Neutral Citation Number: [2008] IEHC 385 THE HIGH COURT 2008 434 JR
F. U., C. U. (A MINOR, SUING BY HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, F.U.), T. U. (A MINOR, SUING BY HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, F.U.), I. U. (A MINOR, SUING BY HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, F.U.), AND S. U. (A MINOR, SUING BY HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, F.U.). APPLICANTS AND
THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND IRELAND RESPONDENTS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION NOTICE PARTY
1. The applicants are seeking leave to apply for judicial review of two decisions of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (“the Minister”): (i) The decision to make deportation orders in respect of them, and (ii) The decision not to grant subsidiary protection to them. 2. They are also seeking interlocutory relief restraining their deportation pending the determination of the within proceedings. 3. The Minister’s decision to make deportation orders is one to which section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 applies. In order to obtain leave, therefore, the applicants must show substantial grounds for the contention that the said decision should be quashed. The somewhat lower threshold set out in G v DPP [1994] 1 IR 374 applies, however, to the subsidiary protection decision. Background 5. By letters dated 28th June, 2007, 19th July, 2007 and 27th November, 2007, representations seeking leave to remain were made on behalf of the applicants. The Minister was informed inter alia that the two of the minor applicants were in school and the other two were in pre-school, that the applicants would be forced to live in poverty if they were returned to Nigeria, and that there would be very few prospects of obtaining employment. 6. In July, 2007, the Minister acknowledged receipt of the first of the above letters and informed the applicants of their entitlement to apply for subsidiary protection under the European Communities (Eligibility for Protection) Regulations 2006 (S.I. 518 of 2006). A short period of delay ensued and an application for subsidiary protection was eventually made on 11th September, 2007; the minor applicants were included as dependents therein. The applicants were informed by letter dated 23th October, 2007 that their application had been rejected. 7. In January, 2008, the applicants’ file came to be considered pursuant to section 3 of the Immigration Act 1999 and section 5 of the Refugee Act 1996. The applicants have not pursued any complaints in respect of the section 3 or section 5 analysis; instead, they have focused on the analysis of their rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The analysing officer accepted that the deportation would engage the Article 8 rights of the first named applicant and her children. She found, however, that although the deportation may constitute an interference with their right to respect for private life, it would be proportionate to the legitimate aim of the State to maintain control of its borders and therefore necessary in a democratic society. As to the family life aspect of Article 8, she noted that the first named applicant does not know her husband’s whereabouts and has no other family ties in the State, and she found that the proposed deportation would not interfere with her right to respect for her family life. The Minister made deportation orders in respect of the applicants on 26th February, 2008; those orders were notified to them by letter dated 11th March, 2008. Extension of Time THE APPLICANTS’ SUBMISSIONS 10. The applicants also complain that by failing to provide a guarantee that the first named applicant and her children would not be separated during the deportation process, he made a decision that could give rise to a breach of the applicants’ right to respect for their family life under Article 8. That submission is made in the specific context of the applicants’ present circumstances, namely that since 4th December, 2008, the first named applicant has been detained in Mountjoy women’s prison and her sons have been placed in temporary foster care by the HSE. 11. A secondary challenge is made in respect of the Minister’s decision to refuse subsidiary protection: it is argued that there was no real consideration of the risk of serious harm faced by the minor applicants if returned to Nigeria; it is submitted that their case was, in effect, subsumed into their mother’s case. THE RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS 13. With respect to the applicants’ arguments with regard to their family rights, it is submitted that it is pure speculation that the State would separate the mother from her children and it is argued that no such intention is present on the part of the State. 14. The respondents further complain that a period of delay elapsed between the subsidiary protection decision and the issue of the within proceedings, during which time the applicants took no action in respect of the subsidiary protection decision. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 16. The applicant in Üner alleged a violation of Article 8 on the basis that the State had failed to take into account the interests of his Dutch partner and Dutch children. In its judgment, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights referred (at § 57) to the eight criteria set out in Boultif v Switzerland (App no. 54273/00, ECHR 2001-IX) which the Court considered it appropriate to use in order to assess whether an expulsion measure was necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Court then stated (at § 58) that it wished to make explicit two criteria which, it stated, may already have been implicit in the criteria identified in Boultif. The first of the two criteria identified was:- “[…] the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled”. 17. I would have my doubts as to whether the principle set out at § 58 of the Uner judgment applies in a situation such as the present where the family members are not migrants well established in the country but, rather, have entered the State as asylum seekers and have an entitlement to remain here only until their status is determined. In my view, the Strasbourg Court in Üner was not aiming to set out a principle to be followed in cases such as the present; rather, it was setting out the matters to which regard must be had when considering the proportionality of the expulsion of a long-term migrant who has established a family in the expelling State and has then been convicted of a criminal offence. This, in my view, is borne out by the discussion that followed at § 59 in Üner as to the suitability of the Boultif criteria alone “in all cases concerning the expulsion and/or exclusion of settled migrants following a criminal conviction”, and the statement made at § 60 that all of the factors set out in §§ 57-59 should be taken into account “in all cases concerning settled migrants who are to be expelled and/or excluded following a criminal conviction”. It is also noteworthy that notwithstanding the applicant’s long-standing ties to the Netherlands, the Strasbourg Court found that his expulsion was proportionate to the aims pursued in the light inter alia of the serious offences of which he had been convicted, the young age of his children and their adaptability to life in Turkey, and the fact that the applicant had spent sufficient time in Turkey so as to have some social, cultural and linguistic ties with that society. 18. Even if it was accepted that the matters set out at § 58 of the Uner judgment are to be taken as a guideline to be followed by national authorities in all cases when assessing the proportionality of an expulsion under Article 8 where there is the potential that a child will be affected, I am satisfied that the Minister did, in fact, take the best interests of the children into account before making the deportation order. It is true that the analysing officer did not expressly state “I will now turn to the consideration of the best interests of the minor applicants”, but it is not necessary, in my view, to proceed in that fashion. The analysing officer acknowledged that the deportation of the first named applicant and her children would engage their Article 8 rights, and may constitute an interference with their right to respect for their private life within the meaning of Article 8(1). She noted the representations made on behalf of the applicants, and went on to find that the interference would be justified under the Article 8(2) proviso. With respect to proportionality she noted that the first named applicant and her children had been given an individual assessment and due process in all respects, and that there was no less restrictive process available than deportation which would achieve the legitimate aim of the State to maintain control of its borders. She then made express reference to the difficulties that would be faced by the first named applicant and her sons if returned to Nigeria, and expressly addressed those difficulties by referring to the case-law of the courts with respect to the absence of any entitlement to remain in the State purely to benefit from medical, social or other forms of assistance provided by the State. It is, in my view, untenable to suggest that this does not amount to consideration of the interests of the children. 19. My findings in this regard apply equally to the applicants’ complaints in respect of the Minister’s decision not to grant them subsidiary protection. It is important to note with respect to that decision in particular that it does not appear that the applicants adverted to any new or altered facts or circumstances in their application for subsidiary protection other than the facts and circumstances grounding their earlier claim for asylum. Thus, their subsidiary protection application was, in substance, the same as their asylum application, which had already been advanced and rejected before the statutory asylum bodies (i.e. ORAC and the RAT). Moreover, the High Court thereafter found that there were no substantial grounds for the contention that the affirmation by the RAT of the negative recommendation made by ORAC should be quashed. In those circumstances, the role of this Court in reviewing the decision of the Minister not to grant subsidiary protection is, of necessity, limited. Referring to rights (such as the right to subsidiary protection) which have not previously been considered during the asylum process, Charleton J. in Fr N. v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] IEHC 107 summarised the position as follows (at paragraph 46):- “Where, as a matter of substance … a contention as to the factual basis for such rights is the same as that which is already being processed under the Refugee Act, 1996, then the case law clearly establishes that the Minister is entitled to place some degree of weight on the failure of the applicant to succeed in persuading the Refugee Applications Commissioner and the Refugee Appeals Tribunal as to their entitlement to refugee status and as to their credibility.” 20. With respect to the applicants’ complaints in regard to the potential breach of their right to respect for their family life under Article 8 in the event of the separation of the mother and her sons, I am satisfied that although there may be a genuine subjective basis to this fear, it is not well founded and is based purely on speculation. Deportation orders have been made in respect of each of the five applicants; there is no evidence of any nature that the State intends to separate the family unit on a permanent basis, albeit that the first named applicant is currently separated from her children. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that it is appropriate to proceed on the assumption that in circumstances where the protection of the family is enshrined at the heart of the Constitution, the State would never seek to split up a family unit in circumstances such as the present. 21. Finally, I would also note that I have given consideration to the respondents’ submissions with respect to the lapse of five and a half months between the date of the subsidiary protection decision (23th October, 2007), and the issue of the within proceedings (17th April, 2008). As the relief sought is certiorari, the relevant period prescribed by Order 84, Rule 21 RSC is six months. The applicants were not, therefore, out of time. I do not consider it appropriate to make any findings on the applicants’ tardiness in the present case, but I would note that the time limits set out in Order 84, rule 21 are outer limits and the requirement to act “promptly” within those outer limits is not to be disregarded; failure to do so may be accorded due weight in appropriate cases. Conclusion
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