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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> The Commissioner of an Garda Síochána & Anor -v- Oberoi & Ors [2013] IEHC 267 (30 May 2013) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2013/H267.html Cite as: [2013] IEHC 267 |
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Judgment Title: The Commissioner of an Garda Síochána & Anor -v- Oberoi & Ors Neutral Citation: [2013] IEHC 267 High Court Record Number: 2012 136 MCA & 2012 174 MCA Date of Delivery: 30/05/2013 Court: High Court Composition of Court: Judgment by: Feeney J. Status of Judgment: Approved |
Neutral Citation [2013] IEHC 267 THE HIGH COURT [2012 No.136 MCA] IN THE MATTER OF AN APPEAL PURSUANT TO SECTION 79(7) OF THE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACTS 1998 – 2004 BETWEEN THE COMMISSIONER OF AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA APPELLANT AND
RAVINDER SINGH OBEROI RESPONDENT AND
THE DIRECTOR OF THE EQUALITY TRIBUNAL NOTICE PARTY
[2012 No. 174 MCA] BETWEEN RAVINDER SINGH OBEROI APPLICANT AND
THE COMMISSIONER OF AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA RESPONDENT Judgment of Mr. Justice Feeney delivered on 30th day of May, 2013. 1.1 These proceedings are an appeal and a cross-appeal brought pursuant to s. 79(7) of the Employment Equality Act 1998 (as amended) (hereinafter “the Equality Acts”). Section 79(7) of the Equality Acts provides: “. . ., the complainant or respondent may appeal to the High Court on a point of law from a decision made by the Director under this section.” As there is an appeal and a cross-appeal for ease of reference Ravinder Singh Oberoi will be referred to in this judgment as the complainant and the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána shall be referred to as the respondent. 2.1 The complainant made a complaint under the Equality Acts which complaint was referred to the Equality Tribunal. The complainant claimed that he had been discriminated against on the grounds of religion and/or ethnicity contrary to s. 8 of the Equality Acts. The complainant is a member of the Irish Sikh community and in accordance with the requirement of his Sikh faith he does not shave his beard and wears a turban. Unshaved hair and the use of a turban are part of the articles of faith of Sikhism. The complainant is a follower of Sikhism and a member of the Sikh people. The complainant’s complaint arose in circumstances where he had applied to join the Garda Reserve and had met the selection criteria for entry and had completed the first three stages of training when he was informed, at the commencement of the fourth stage, that he was required to wear a full Garda uniform, including a Garda hat, during training and would not be permitted to wear a turban. As a result of that requirement the complainant claims that he was unable, due to his religious beliefs and ethnicity, to continue his training and thereby become a member of the Garda Reserve. 2.2 In making his complaint under the Equality Acts, the complainant claimed that he had been treated less favourably in accessing employment, in his conditions of employment and in relation to training for employment and/or in relation to vocational training due to his religion and his ethnicity in that he was prohibited from wearing his turban and so was unable to complete his training and become a member of the Garda Reserve. 2.3 The complainant’s complaint came on for hearing before the Equality Tribunal on the 24th November, 2010 and the Garda Commissioner (the respondent) raised a preliminary issue in relation to the jurisdiction of the Equality Tribunal to hear and determine the complainant’s complaint. That issue was raised on the basis that it was claimed that the Equality Acts do not apply to members of the Garda Reserve as they are not “employees” within the meaning of the Equality Acts. The decision in relation to that preliminary issue was given by the Equality Tribunal in March 2012. The decision of the Equality Officer was communicated by letter dated the 16th March, 2012. The decision set out in the letter stated that the Equality Officer had decided that the complainant was not an employee for the purpose of the Equality Acts and that the Equality Officer would “provide detail of this consideration on the preliminary issues in my final written decision”. The Equality Officer further determined that the complainant was correct in his submission where he had placed reliance on s. 12 of the Equality Acts and that the induction process into the ranks of An Garda Síochána constituted vocational training within the meaning of s. 12(2) of the Equality Acts. 2.4 The preliminary decisions determined by the Equality Officer resulted in one decision in favour of the complainant and one in favour of the respondent. The complainant has appealed the determination of the Equality Tribunal that he is not an employee within the meaning of the Equality Acts and that the respondent, has appealed the interpretation made by the Equality Tribunal of s. 12(2) of the Equality Acts. Section 79(3A) of the Equality Acts provides that a decision on a preliminary issue can be made by the Equality Tribunal. It is the two preliminary decisions which are the subject matter of the appeal and cross-appeal brought to this Court. The preliminary decisions were, ultimately, set out in a letter of the 5th April, 2012 from the Equality Officer wherein a written reasoned decision was set out. The Equality Officer purported to backdate that decision to the date of the original decision contained in the letter of the 16th March, 2012. No issue arises from either of the parties in relation to the date of appeal and both parties have proceeded on the basis that the decision set out in the letter of the 5th April, 2012 is the decision of the Equality Officer and it is that decision which is the subject of the appeals to this Court. 2.5 The matters which I have to determine is first whether the Director of the Equality Tribunal, his servant or agent, was correct in law in determining that Mr. Singh, the applicant, falls within the ambit of the Equality Acts by virtue of s. 12(2) and secondly, whether he is a member of the Garda Reserve “an employee” within the meaning of the Equality Acts. 3.1 In his appeal Mr. Singh claims that a member of the Garda Reserve is an employee within the meaning of ss. 2(3), 6 and 8 of the Equality Acts. The issues which the Garda Commissioner raises in his appeal is whether the Equality Tribunal has jurisdiction by virtue of s. 8(1)(c) and/or s. 12 of the Equality Acts to rule on a claim of discrimination by Mr. Singh with regard to being permitted to become a member of the Garda Reserve and: whether being a member of the Garda Reserve is “training or experience for or in relation to employment” within the meaning of s. 8(1)(c) or “a course of vocational training” within the meaning of s. 12. The Equality Officer determined that he had jurisdiction to hear the complainant’s complaint on the basis that a Garda Reserve officer was in vocational training. As indicated above, the Equality Officer also determined that Mr. Singh, the complainant, was not an employee as Garda Reserve members are volunteers and do not perform their functions under a contract of employment. 4.1 Discrimination for the purposes of the Equality Acts is set out in s. 6(1) where it is provided:
(a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified . . ..”
(b) a reserve member.” 4.2 Reserve members of An Garda Síochána are provided for in s. 15 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005. Section 15 provides:
(2) A person is not eligible to be appointed as a reserve member unless he or she has completed the prescribed training. (3) Subject to subsection (5), a reserve member has, while on duty, the same powers, immunities, privileges and duties as a person appointed under section 14 to the rank of garda. (4) The power to appoint persons under subsection (1) may be exercised only if – (a) the Garda Commissioner has submitted proposals to the Minister for the training of persons to be so appointed, and (b) regulations have been made concerning their recruitment and training and prescribing the terms and conditions of their position. (5) The Garda Commissioner may determine the range of powers to be exercised and duties to be carried out by reserve members.”
4.4 Section 12 of the Equality Acts deals with vocational training. That section precludes discrimination against a person in the provision of vocational training, access thereto or in respect of the terms offered to them in relation to such training. The relevant part of s. 12 provides as follows:
(a) in the terms on which any such course or related facility is offered, b) by refusing or omitting to afford access to any such course or facility, or (c) in the manner in which any such course or facility is provided. (2) In this section “vocational training” means any system of instruction which enables a person being instructed to acquire, maintain, bring up to date or perfect the knowledge or technical capacity required for the carrying on of an occupational activity and which may be considered as exclusively concerned with training for such an activity.”
2.5 I therefore conclude that the complainant is not an employee as defined by s. 2 of the Employment Equality Acts.” “3.4 I am mindful of the following issues:
• Members of An Garda Síochána, designated as reserve members, have, while on duty, the same powers, immunities, privileges and duties as a person appointed to the rank of garda (Section 15(3) of the Garda Síochána Act, as amended) • Members of An Garda Síochána, designated as reserve members, are subject to the Disciplinary Regulations of An Garda Síochána for any breach of discipline • Members of An Garda Síochána, designated s reserve members, have to undertake specific training as prescribed by An Garda Síochána before they are eligible to become reserve members • Members of An Garda Síochána, designated s reserve members, are not in receipt of remuneration, neither are they deemed to be employees, and therefore, on the balance of probabilities, must have some other reason to undertake the possibly onerous tasks placed upon them • Experience gained as members of An Garda Síochána, designated as reserve members, must, in accordance with SI 509/2006 - Garda Síochána (Admissions and Appointments)(Amendment) Regulations 2006, be taken into account if/when they apply for a position as a member of An Garda Síochána, not so designated 3.5 Having considered the submissions from both parties, and on the balance of probabilities, it is difficult to conclude that any training system that places such obligations on a person, places a person under the authority of another to such a degree, and places a person in such a visible position of representation of the authority of the State, while not being an employee, can amount to anything other than the vocational training envisaged by Section 12(2) for the carrying out of an occupational activity. 3.6 I therefore conclude that this complaint falls within the ambit of Section 12 of the Acts.” 5.4 The above two matters are the two points of law arising from the decision of the Equality Tribunal which are the subject matter of the s. 79(7) appeal and cross-appeal pursuant to the provisions of the Employment Equality Acts. 6.1 Garda Reserves are trained and appointed to assist An Garda Síochána in performing its functions. The Garda Síochána Act 2005 provides for the establishment of Garda Reserves and the appointment, training and regulation of reserves are governed by the 2005 Regulations (S.I. 413/2006). The Criminal Justice Act 2007 by s. 43 inserted into the Garda Síochána Act 2005 a provision at s. 15(6) which provided that:
7.1 Pursuant to Statutory Instrument No. 509/2006 entitled Garda Síochána (Admissions and Appointments) (Amendments) Regulations 2006, the principal regulations in relation to admissions and appointments were amended. The 2006 Statutory Instrument amendment relating to the admission of a trainee to train to become a member of the guards came into operation on the 9th October, 2006 and provided that Regulation 5(1) of the principal Regulations was amended by substituting the following for sub-paragraph (e):
(i) includes a competitive interview, and (ii) is of such standard and takes into account such matters, including the giving of due recognition to any satisfactory service by the person as a reserve member of An Garda Síochána, as the Public Appointment Service, after consultation with the Minister, determines; and . . ..” 7.2 The evidence available to me is that there are currently some 1,102 members of the Garda Reserve, of which 794 are male and 308 are female. As of February 2013 there were a further 138 persons in training, of which 95 were male and 43 were female. Of the combined total of trained Garda Reserves and trainees, 78 of that number are non-nationals. The current position is that there are no members being recruited to An Garda Síochána due to an embargo on recruitment. That embargo does not apply to reserve membership of An Garda Síochána, such persons being deemed volunteers. 8.1 The first issue I have to decide is whether or not a member of the Garda Reserve is an employee for the purpose of the Equality Acts. The Employment Equality Act of 1998 in the opening words of its long title identifies that that Act is “to make further provision for the promotion of equality between employed persons” and “to make further provision with respect to the discrimination in, and in connection with, employment, vocational training and membership of certain bodies”. For the applicant in this case to be an employee under the provisions of the Equality Acts, he would have to be “a person who has entered into or works under . . . a contract of employment and, where the context admits, includes a member or a former member of a regulatory body, but, so far as regards access to employment, does not include a person employed in another person’s home for the provision of personal services for persons residing in that home where the services affect private or family life of those persons”. An employer is defined as meaning the “person with whom the employee has entered into or for whom the employee works under (or, where the employment has ceased, entered into or worked under) a contract of employment”. A contract of employment means “a contract of service or apprenticeship” or “any contract whereby an individual agrees with another person personally to execute any work or services for that person, or . . . where the contract is express or implied and, if express, whether oral or in writing”. Section 2(3) of the Equality Acts makes it clear that the provisions of the Equality Acts extend to members of An Garda Síochána. Subsequent to the Employment Equality Acts 1998 – 2004, s. 16(6) of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 was inserted by s. 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007 and that section provided that a reserve member is a volunteer and does not perform his or her functions as such as a member under a contract of employment. The respondent contends that the effect of s. 15(6), as inserted by the 2007 Act, is that the complainant is not an employee and that the Garda Síochána Act which is later in time to the Equality Acts in time overrides s. 2(3) of the Equality Acts. The complainant disputes this contention. 8.2 The complainant argues that the definition of employment in the Equality Acts as inserted in s. 2 by s. 3 of the Equality Act 2004, has the effect of extending the definition beyond employment, or contract for service to include any “other contract whereby an individual agrees with another person personally to execute any work or service for that person”. However, that provision is dealing with and providing a definition of “contract of employment” and the “other contract” referred to is deemed to be within the definition of a contract of employment. The “other contract” must be read as being within an enactment containing a definition and such provision must be read as being applicable to the enactment itself and to the Act under which the enactment is made. The enactment was in the context of employment and the 2007 Act expressly provided that a reserve member does not perform his or her functions under “a contract of employment”. “Other contracts” must be read as part of the definition of a contract of employment. 8.3 A member of An Garda Síochána is identified as working under a contract of service and therefore under a contract of employment by reference to s. 2(3) of the Employment Equality Act 1998. In reliance upon the maxim of leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, the deeming provision set out at s. 2(3) of the Employment Equality Act 1998 does not apply to reserve members of An Garda Síochána. Indeed, an examination of the legislation and its chronology identifies that the deeming provision at s. 2(3) of the Employment Equality Act 1998 cannot apply to Garda Reserve members. At the time of the enactment of s. 2(3) in the 1998 Act, the Garda Reserve had not yet been established. When the Garda Reserve was established, it is apparent that s. 2(3) was not applied to reserve members as s. 15(6) of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 as inserted by s. 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007 provides that a reserve member is a volunteer and does not perform his or her functions as such a member under “a contract of employment”. For me to determine that a member of the Garda Reserve is an employee for the purpose of the Equality Acts would require me to disregard the express terms of s. 15(6) of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 and to ignore its clear meaning and intention. The chronology of the legislation establishes that when statutory provision was made for the establishment and appointment of reserve members it was done so after the enactment of the Equality Acts 1998 to 2004. At the time when the Garda Reserve was established the legislative scheme was such that pursuant to s. 2(3) of the Employment Equality Act 1998, that a member of An Garda Síochána was deemed to be an employee. When s. 15 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 was inserted pursuant to s. 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007, legislation had been enacted for the establishment and operation of a Garda Reserve. It was expressly provided that reserve members were volunteers and did not perform their functions under a contract of employment. It follows that they are not employees and that the deeming provisions applicable to members of An Garda Síochána did not apply and was not intended to apply to reserve members. The consequence of the statutory provision which provides that a reserve member is a volunteer and does not perform his or her functions under a contract of employment is that they are volunteers and are not employed under a contract of employment. That flows from the clear and unambiguous words of s. 15(6). As I am satisfied that a member of the Garda Reserve does not work under a contract of employment, he is not an employee within the meaning of the Equality Acts. Since he is not an employee within the meaning of the Equality Acts, the Equality Tribunal does not have any jurisdiction to deal with the complainant’s complaint under those Acts as the Tribunal is a statutory body which must act within the terms of the legislation. 8.4 The starting point for the correct approach to statutory interpretation can be identified from the words of Kelly J. in the case of Ni Eílí v. Environmental Protection Agency [1997] 2 ILRM 458 where (at p. 464), the Judge stated:
8.5 Even without the provisions contained in s. 15(6) of the Garda Síochána Act 2005, I am satisfied that a reserve member could not be held to work under a contract of employment within the Equality Acts and therefore could not be considered an employee for the purpose of those Acts. For there to be a contract of employment and for a person to be an employee, the requirement of mutuality of obligation must be present. That is, there must be mutual obligations on the employer to provide work for the employee and on the employee to perform work for the employer. In the absence of such mutuality, there is no contract of employment as there is no contract for services. In the absence of a mutuality of obligation, I could not conclude that there was in existence a contract of service or a contract of employment. Under the statutory scheme there is no obligation to provide work to a Garda Reserve and there is, therefore, no contract of service or other form of contract whereby an individual agrees with another personally to execute any work or services for that person. This fundamental requirement, or sine qua non, to the existence to a contract of service or a contract of employment was considered by the Court of Appeal in England and Wales in the case of Cable & Wireless Plc v Muscat [2006] 1 ICR 975. Lady Justice Smith in delivering the judgment of the Court analysed whether or not a person was an employee within the meaning of the UK Employment Rights Act of 1996 and held as follows (at paras. 31 and 32):
32. In the context of statutory employment rights, such as those now granted by the Employment Rights Act 1996, is has been said on more than one occasion that the irreducible minimum of mutuality of obligation necessary to support a contract of employment is the obligation on the ‘employer’ to provide work and the obligation on the worker to perform it. That mutuality of obligation must be accompanied by a sufficient degree of control by the employer over the worker: see Nethermere (St. Neots) Ltd. v. Gardiner [1984] ICR 612, 623 C-G, and Clark v. Oxfordshire Health Authority [1998] IRLR 125, 128, para 22, as approved by the House of Lords in Carmichael v National Power plc [1999] ICR 1226, 1230.” 8.6 For a person to be employed under a contract of service, or a contract personally to execute any work or service, it is necessary that there be not only an obligation to perform work and an obligation to provide work, but also that there be receipt of remuneration. The Supreme Court in the United Kingdom recently considered the position of volunteers in the case of X v. Mid Sussex Citizens Advice Bureau & Anor. [2012] UKSC 59 in a decision delivered on 12th December, 2012. Lord Manse handed down the judgment of the Court. He held that the appellant in that case, as a volunteer for a Citizens Advice Bureau, was not an employee and therefore fell outside the scope of the protection against discrimination on the grounds of disability afforded by the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and Directive 2000/78/EC. The Supreme Court held that since the appellant in that case had no contract of employment, she did not on the face of it benefit by the domestic protection afforded by the UK Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and whether she could have any claim depended upon whether it was the intention of Article 3(1)(a) of the Framework Directive on Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation that there should be wider protection, covering volunteers in her possession. Following a detailed examination of the legal position, Lord Manse concluded (at para. 48):
8.7 A Garda Reserve has no obligation to perform work and can withdraw his or her services with impunity and merely has to notify the District Officer that he intends to be unavailable. There is no contract in writing between the reserve member and An Garda Síochána and there is no legally binding contract implied between the parties. Both the legislative scheme and the documentation relating to the operation of the scheme makes it clear that a Garda Reserve is a volunteer. It is also the case that there is no valuable consideration passing between the parties as there is no remuneration and merely an allowance for expenses. It is also the case that there is no legal obligation to place a reserve member on duty and a reserve member may only be placed on duty by or on behalf of the relevant District Officer. It follows from the above analysis that I am satisfied both from my interpretation of the statutory provisions and from my analysis of the provisions applying to a reserve member and the terms and conditions under which a reserve member operates that a reserve member is not an employee, either for the purposes of the Employment Equality Acts or otherwise. I will, therefore, refuse the appeal by the applicant. 9.1 The second preliminary determination of the Equality Officer which is the subject of appeal relates to his determination that the complainant was correct in his submission when he placed reliance on s. 12 of the Equality Acts, and that the induction process into the ranks of An Garda Síochána constituted vocational training within the meaning of s. 12(2) of the Equality Acts for carrying out an occupational activity. The complainant claims that the Equality Officer has jurisdiction to investigate the complainant’s complaint and submits that s. 12 of the Equality Acts amplifies s. 8 of the Act, so as to place “beyond doubt that it is unlawful to discriminate against any applicant for or participant in all courses of vocational training”. It is also claimed on behalf of the complainant that it is clear from the provisions of s. 12 that the prohibition against discrimination “is engaged irrespective of whether one is engaged in employment or not”. It is claimed that there is no requirement that a person be engaged in employment pursuant to a contract of employment within the meaning of s. 2 of Act before the provisions of s. 12 apply, and “that the provisions of s. 12 are clearly engaged by the facts of this case whether or not the complainant was engaged pursuant to a contract of employment, or a deemed contract of employment”. The respondent claims that the Equality Officer is wrong in law and has failed to apply the definition contained in s. 12(2) of the Equality Acts to the position of a Garda Reserve. The respondent claims that the facts establish that neither membership of the Garda Reserve nor training to become a member of that Reserve is a system of instruction exclusively concerned with training for the carrying of an occupational activity. 9.2 I have already identified the definition of vocational training as contained in s. 12(2) earlier in this judgment. As such definition is central to my determination on this matter, it is appropriate to repeat the definition. Section 12(2) of the Employment Equality Act 1998, which remains in force, provides:-
9.4 In the UK volunteers have sought to bring themselves within the scope of discrimination law by contending that they have been discriminated against by an employer in the arrangement he makes for the purposes of determining to whom he should offer employment. Under s. 39(1) of the UK Equality Act 2010, it is provided that an employer must not discriminate against a person in arrangements that the employer makes when deciding to whom to offer employment. Article 3(1)(a) of Directive 2000/78EC requires the scope of discrimination protection to encompass “conditions for access to employment, to self-employment or to occupation, including selection criteria and recruitment conditions, whatever the branch of activity and at all levels of professional hierarchy”. In the Court of Appeal consideration in the case of X. v. Mid Sussex Citizens Advice Bureau [2011] ICR 460, the Court of Appeal considered the issue as to whether a voluntary post with an Advice Bureau could be viewed as seeking to secure advisers to provide advice to its clients or to create a potential pool from which full-time staff could be drawn. In the judgment of Elias L.J. he considered the legal position commencing at para. 9(p. 464) where he set out the provisions of Directive 2000/78. The concept of worker and occupation were addressed at paras. 12 and 13, and the provisions of the UK Disability Discrimination Act 1995, at paras. 14 to 17. At para. 40, Elias L.J. gave the decision of the court in relation to what is described as the vocational training argument and held as follows:-
41. I do not accept that submission. The argument is essentially the same as the domestic section 14C argument which was unsuccessfully advanced before the employment judge and not pursued further, and it fails for essentially the same reasons. The observations of the employment judge reproduced above at para. 24 are equally applicable here and I respectively endorse them. To be vocational training, the purpose of the activity must be to train for a job. It is not the purpose of the CAB when it appoints volunteers to provide training to enable these workers to become full-time workers, either with the CAB or with any other employer. 42. Nor can the advisers, on any sensible meaning of the term, be described as carrying on vocational training. They are not being trained for anything; they are providing services for third parties in the same way as full-time staff would do. The fact that their volunteering provides experience which will improve the chance of obtaining a full-time CAB post, or indeed other employment, is irrelevant. A middle manager is building up experience which will help him to become a senior manager, but it would be an abuse of language to describe him as underling vocational training.”
38. Nor is the purpose to improve the employability of the relatively small proportion of volunteers who may at some later date seek a full-time position. That may be one of the effects or by-products of this arrangement, but it is not its purpose.” 9.5 The correct reading of s. 12(2) of the Employment Equality Act 1998, requires that for vocational training to be within the meaning of that section, such training must be considered as being exclusively concerned with training for such an occupational activity. The Garda Reserve is not an occupational activity and training to be a Garda Reserve is for the purpose of being a Garda Reserve and no more. 9.6 Section 12 can only apply to training to become a Garda Reserve if the Garda Reserve itself is a body exclusively concerned with training for entry into the Gardaí proper. The purpose of training to become a member of the Garda Reserve is training to be a member of that body and is not designed or intended to achieve occupational training or for a person to become a member of An Garda Síochána. The purpose of being a member of the Garda Reserve is not designed to achieve occupational training and, therefore, it cannot be said, in law, that that is what it is. It is unquestionably the case that a trained and successful member of the Garda Reserve gains experience which may assist that person in ultimately becoming a member of An Garda Síochána, but that is a by-product of the training to be a Garda Reserve and being a Garda Reserve rather than its purpose. It follows that the training for membership of the Garda Reserve cannot be considered to be vocational training for an occupational activity so as to come within the scope of ss. 8 and/or 12 of the Equality Acts. It is to become a member of the Garda Reserve which is the end in itself and the fact that some members of the Garda Reserve might have ambitions to become members of An Garda Síochána, and that service in the Garda Reserve can be taken into account in favour of an applicant, is not a basis for characterising training for or service in the Reserve as training for the Gardaí. My conclusion in relation to this matter is reinforced by the use of the word “exclusively” in s. 12(2) of the Employment Equality Act 1998. Membership of the Garda Reserve is an end in itself and even if in some instances members of the Garda Reserve might use such membership as a springboard to becoming members of An Garda Síochána, it cannot be said that the training to be a Garda Reserve is “exclusively” concerned with training to be a member of An Garda Síochána. 10.1 In the light of the findings that I have made in this case, I conclude that the Garda Reserve is not within the scope of the Employment Equality Acts and is not employment within the meaning of that legislation. I am satisfied that s. 15(6) of the Garda Síochána Act 2005, has the effect of expressly excluding members of the Garda Reserve from the provisions of the Employment Equality Acts. I am satisfied that being a member of the Garda Reserve or training to be a member of that Reserve is not training or experience for or in relation to employment within the meaning of s. 8(1)(c) of the Equality Acts, or a course of vocational training within the meaning of s. 12 of the Employment Equality Act 1998. I am, therefore, satisfied that the Equality Officer did not have jurisdiction to proceed on the basis that a Garda Reserve was in vocational training. I will, therefore, allow the appeal brought by the Garda Commissioner and will refuse the appeal brought by Ravinder Singh Oberoi.
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