H379
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High Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> A.M.G (Pakistan) -v- Refugee Applications Comissioner & ors [2014] IEHC 379 (25 July 2014) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2014/H379.html Cite as: [2014] IEHC 379 |
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Judgment Title: A.M.G (Pakistan) -v- Refugee Applications Comissioner & ors Neutral Citation: [2014] IEHC 379 High Court Record Number: 2009 1329 JR Date of Delivery: 25/07/2014 Court: High Court Composition of Court: Judgment by: Barr J. Status of Judgment: Unapproved |
Neutral Citation: [2014] IEHC 379 THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW [2009 No. 1329 J.R.] IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 5 OF THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS (TRAFFICKING) ACT 2000 BETWEEN A.M.G. (PAKISTAN) APPLICANT AND
REFUGEE APPLICATIONS COMMISSIONER, REFUGEE APPEALS TRIBUNAL, THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM, IRELAND AND ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barr delivered the 25th day of July, 2014 Background 2. The applicant states that he made a report to the police concerning an incident on 14th November, 2004, in the following terms:-
Signature of applicant Police proceedings: in the light of the information written above, a case is hereby registered against unknown people and sub inspector Muhammad Aslam has been appointed for investigation. A copy of the case is being dispatched to the office of the district police officer, Sialkot. "
Signature of applicant In the light of this statement registered above, a case is hereby registered and an investigation team and a patrolling team have been sent to [address redacted] moreover a wireless message has been left for intelligence and necessary action. A copy of the case has been forwarded to the district police officer."
Signed A case is hereby registered against receipt of the said information and patrolling teams have sent a car off the road. The centre and office of the district police officer and the mobile police have been informed of the incident on the wireless. " 6. On 14th March, 2006, the applicant travelled to Ireland on a visitor's Visa. The Visa expired on 9th April, 2006. The applicant stayed on in Ireland. 7. The applicant states that in 2007, his father-in-law received another threatening phone call from the Taliban. His wife was told to divorce the applicant or she would be killed. 8. On 20th March, 2009, the applicant was stopped by the Irish immigration authorities. He applied for asylum at that time. He said that he had been thinking of applying for asylum due to a deterioration of the situation in Pakistan. He says that it was coincidence that he made the decision to apply for asylum at the same time as he came to the attention of the Irish immigration authorities. 9. In the s.13 report dated 29th September, 2009, the Refugee Applications Commissioner (hereinafter "RAC") came to the conclusion that the applicant had not established a well founded fear of persecution as required by s. 2 of the Refugee Act 1996 (as amended). The applicant appealed this finding to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (hereinafter "RAT"). In a decision dated 2nd November, 2009, the RAT affirmed the recommendation of the RAC made in accordance with s. 13 of the Act. 10. By notice of motion dated 23rd December, 2009, the applicant sought various reliefs, including an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the second named respondent and an order of mandamus directing the respondents to readmit the applicant to the asylum process at the appeal stage before the second named respondent and to consider the appeal by way of an oral hearing. Delay
The applicant received the respondents' decision on 5th February 2009, which indicates that proceedings ought to have issued by 19th February 2009. Proceedings issued on 11th March 2009, a delay of approximately 20 days. I accept that the applicant is blameless in the delay and acted in a manner consistent with a keen interest in the institution of judicial review proceedings. He contacted the Refugee Legal Service in Cork within the 14- day period for the institution of proceedings. They were unable to assist him and he then contacted a private solicitor in Dublin who did not receive the applicant's full file until 26th February 2009. Counsel was instructed and with admirable expedition, prepared an opinion within three days. I have no hesitation in finding, in accordance with the dicta of Irvine J. in A. & Anor v. Refugee Applications Commissioner [2008] IEHC 440 that good and sufficient reasons have been advanced to extend time and I do so without hesitation. To this, I wish merely to add that I would be extremely reluctant to entertain an application to dismiss proceedings four years after the institution of those proceedings where the first indication of a complaint about delay is to be found in the written submissions filed in the days before the hearing. If a State respondent is keen to pursue a genuine delay point, this itself should not be delayed, and I say this having regard to the particular circumstances of failed refugee judicial review applicants who live, generally, in very difficult circumstances on a mere €19 or so a week. It would be unconscionable to permit proceedings to fail on a time point where an applicant might have endured significant hardship over many years waiting for such a simple point to be determined. There would be much merit in such time points being advanced expeditiously and by motions in limine. " The grounds on which the RAT's decision is impugned
15. It was argued on behalf of the applicant that the case law establishes that the RAT must have regard to documentation submitted by an applicant. In I.R. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Anor [2009] IEHC 353, Cooke J. set out a number of principles which should be observed when coming to a conclusion on the credibility of an applicant. He had the following to say in relation to documentary evidence at para. 11:-
18. It has been argued that the findings of the Tribunal on the applicant's credibility are inconsistent with the acceptance by the Tribunal of the genuineness of the three police reports. This is not addressed by the Tribunal. I think that this point is well made on behalf of the applicant. If the Tribunal wished to make an adverse credibility finding against the applicant, they had to deal specifically with the three police reports which corroborated the applicant's story. If they wished to ignore or disregard the police reports, there was a duty on the Tribunal to set out clearly why the documents were being disregarded. In this case, no such explanation was forthcoming. On the contrary, the reports were relied upon by the Tribunal when examining the issue of State protection. 19. I, therefore, find that the Tribunal's finding on the credibility of the applicant's story cannot stand and must be quashed. State Protection 21. The Tribunal noted that the country of origin information (hereinafter "COI") indicated that Pakistan had ordered its military to launch a full scale offensive against the leader of the Pakistani Taliban and his militant network. In the circumstances, it would appear that there was evidence on which the Tribunal could find that if the applicant had a genuine fear of persecution at the hands of the Taliban, that the Pakistani authorities would take his complaints seriously and would take action to protect him from the Taliban. The Tribunal noted that in relation to the three police reports, the authorities appeared to take all appropriate action to deal with the applicant's complaints. This was a finding that was open to the Tribunal on the evidence. 22. In the circumstances, I am of opinion that the finding that there was adequate State protection available to the applicant within Pakistan was a finding which the Tribunal was entitled to make on the basis of the evidence before it; namely the three police reports and the COI available to the Tribunal. Internal Relocation 24. It should be noted that when the applicant moved out of his house, he was able to move to other areas in the province of Punjab, without interference from the Taliban. In particular, he spent a reasonable amount of time in Lahore without any contact from the Taliban. In argument, it was pointed out by counsel for the respondents, that the applicant did not make speeches or otherwise come to public attention. Accordingly, it will be easier for him to relocate within Pakistan in safety. 25. In DDA (Nigeria) v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Anor [2012] IEHC 308, the applicant faced persecution on ethnic grounds. This was found to be credible. The Tribunal looked at internal relocation. The applicant claimed that he would be found even in Lagos, which had a population of 12m people. There was specific COl which showed that given the structure of Nigerian society, it would be impossible for him to find work without the help of family or people of his own ethnic grouping. The Tribunal Member when referring to the COl available merely stated: "There is little to support him in the country of origin information from Nigeria in this regard". The court held that this was a response which was inadequate because the basis for it was by no means clear. Cooke J. stated at pp. 11 and 12 of his judgment:-
27. In P.O. (Nigeria) v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IEHC 513, it was held that in relation to internal relocation it was not necessary for the respondent to build a case for internal relocation brick by brick. Ryan J. stated as follows at p. 4 of the judgment:-
It does seem to me that it is not sufficient for an applicant to sit back, so to speak, and demand that the Tribunal or the presenting officer or some other agency should establish a case block by block as to an alternative life that the applicant might be able to live and that, in default of establishing such a putative alternative existence, the applicant must succeed. I think that internal relocation has to be seen in a case like this, as in all other asylum cases, by reference to the particular facts. I do not take the UNHCR Guidelines, which are extremely helpful to decision makers and to courts in analysing the work of decision makers, to establish a rigid requirement that places on a decision maker in every case where internal relocation is relevant an obligation to explore in great detail the alternative life open to the applicant. In particular, it seems to me that where the threatened persecution is local and limited in area and personnel, that it may be sufficient to point out, if the evidence justifies that conclusion, that some or many or most other regions of the country in question are available to the asylum seeker for sanctuary. In the present case the applicant is protesting about a conclusion that she could have remained in Delta State, where she was able to remain for two months in safety and without any threat to her, instead of travelling all the way to Ireland and applying for asylum. I believe the Tribunal member was entitled to reach this conclusion on the basis of the information before her. Accordingly, insofar as the question of internal relocation is concerned, I am not satisfied that the applicant has established substantial grounds for challenging the Tribunal's decision. " Conclusions
(b) The finding of the RAT that the applicant's account was not credible cannot stand, due to the fact that the Tribunal found that the three police reports were genuine. The findings that these documents were genuine, but that at the same time the applicant's story was incredible, are inconsistent findings. As there was no adverse finding in relation to the content of the police reports, nor any indication that the documents could not be relied upon, the Tribunal's finding on credibility cannot stand. (c) The findings of the Tribunal in relation to State protection are founded on evidence that was before the Tribunal. The decision in this regard is valid and should not be quashed by order of this Court. (d) The findings of the Tribunal in relation to internal relocation are founded on evidence that was before the Tribunal. There was no irrationality on the part of the Tribunal in finding that the applicant could avail of internal relocation within Pakistan so as to avoid persecution. (e) The findings on State protection and internal relocation can be severed from the findings on credibility. Accordingly, I dismiss the applicant's application for judicial review herein. |