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1. This is an appeal brought by the respondent, Alice Denton, from the judgment of Mr. Justice McCracken of 1st April, 1998, in regard to the answer that he gave to the first of two question which were put before him by District Judge David Riordan in the course of a case stated.

2. To set the background, I can go to the case stated in which all the relevant details are set forth in the clearest possible way. It is a great help for any appellate court to have a case stated so succinctly and so clearly.

3. The learned District judge sets forth that he was hearing a case in the Dublin Metropolitan District on 1st May, 1996, in which the Director of Public Prosecutions was the prosecutor and Alice Denton was the accused. The charge laid against Miss Denton was that on the 22nd July, 1995, at St. Peter’s Road, Walkinstown, Dublin 12, in the Metropolitan District, she drove a mechanically propelled vehicle in a public place, while there was present in her body a quantity of alcohol such that, within three hours after so driving, the concentration of alcohol in her blood exceeded a concentration of 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood. This was contrary to s. 49 (2) and s. (6)(a) of the Road Traffic Act, 1961, as inserted by s. 10 of the Road Traffic act, 1994.

4. The district judge then goes on to set forth the following facts which were proved or admitted before him:

5. The next part of the case stated deals with what took place subsequent to Miss Denton’s arrival at the garda station as regards the taking of the relevant sample and the result of the analysis when it came back from the Medical Bureau of Road Safety which showed a concentration of 156 ml of alcohol per 100 ml blood. Nothing turns on that sequence of events.

6. An application to dismiss the case at the conclusion of the prosecution case was refused and the accused then gave evidence. She stated that her solicitor had been furnished with a copy of the custody record which had been completed at Crumlin garda station. This was handed into Court and the copy showed the time of arrest as being 4.25 am.. The custody record is something that is provided for in the Criminal Justice Act, 1984 (Treatment of Persons in Custody in Garda Siochana Stations) Regulations, 1987; S.I. No. 119 of 1987.

7. A submission was then addressed to the District Judge which was to the effect that here there was a contradiction in the case. The guard had given the time of arrest at 4.35 am and here was the custody record showing a time of 4.25.am.

8. It should be stated that, of course, the custody record was not made out by the arresting garda. It was presumably made out by the officer in charge of the garda station at the time.

9. It was never put to Garda Harrington that there was a contradiction between his evidence and the custody record. That is the first thing to be said.

10. In any event, it was submitted to the District judge that here were these two contradictory matters that could not stand together and he was invited to say that he should have a reasonable doubt about the matter and this is what he found:

11. He then went on to recite:

12. In regard to this second question, this arose when a question was put by the solicitor representing the Director of Public Prosecutions along the lines apparent from the case stated. In the light of the clear opinion that I have

13. The learned High Court judge ruled as follows:

14. He made an order that the District judge should enter into continuance of the case. I would uphold the essential finding made by the learned High Court judge. It seems to me that the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant is unsustainable. Leaving aside the quality of the custody record as evidence in the circumstances that it was not put to the garda - and I believe that would have been the correct way to approach matters - leaving aside the fact that it was not proved, and taking it at its face value, it did give a time of 4.25 am.

15. Mr. Giblin, S.C., invites us to build on that and to say that if the judge was entitled to have a reasonable doubt about the time and that meant that the time 4.25 am as the time of arrest should stand. If 4.25 am is the accepted time, then the correct sequence must be that the garda arrested the woman before he had

16. But that is to put the entry in the custody record totally out of context and to give it an importance it does not have. The garda had given the clearest possible evidence that he formed the opinion of the woman’s drunkenness in advance of arrest; he produced chapter and verse - and very strong chapter and verse it was - as to the unfitness of this woman to drive a car on that occasion. He formed that opinion and then he arrested her. That finding is there in the case stated.

17. The inexorable result of that must be that the judge would have to hold that everything was in order as it is conceded by the appellant’s counsel that all the requisite procedures under the Act for taking the sample were complied with.

18. So, in the circumstances, the appeal should be dismissed.