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Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions >> Gana Construction & Gama Endustri -v- Minister for Enterprise and Employment [2009] IESC 37 (30 April 2009) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/2009/S37.html Cite as: [2009] IESC 37, [2010] 2 IR 85 |
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Judgment Title: Gana Construction & Gama Endustri -v- Minister for Enterprise and Employment Composition of Court: Denham J., Hardiman J., Fennelly J., Macken J. Judgment by: Kearns J. Status of Judgment: Approved
Outcome: Allow And Set Aside | ||||||||||||||
THE SUPREME COURT Denham J. Hardiman J. Fennelly J. Kearns J. Macken J. [S.C. No. 288 & 289 of 2005] BETWEEN GAMA ENDUSTRI TESISLERI IMALAT MONTAJ A.S. RESPONDENT/APPLICANT AND THE MINISTER FOR ENTERPRISE, TRADE & EMPLOYMENT AND EDWARD NOLAN APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS AND BETWEEN GAMA CONSTRUCTION IRELAND LIMITED RESPONDENT/APPLICANT AND THE MINISTER FOR ENTERPRISE, TRADE & EMPLOYMENT AND EDWARD NOLAN APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS This is an appeal brought by the Minister for Enterprise, Trade & Employment from the judgment of the High Court (Finlay Geoghegan J.) delivered on the 14th June, 2005 and the subsequent Order made on the 23rd June, 2005 herein which granted a declaration that the preparation of a report dated 4th May, 2005 by the second named respondent was ultra vires his powers as an Inspector under the relevant Employment Acts. The appeal is brought also from the Order restraining the respondents from further circulating or publishing the said report, or any earlier version thereof, and further challenges the Order of Finlay Geoghegan J. which quashed the said report in its entirety. Whilst there are two sets of proceedings in being, both were brought on behalf of the Gama company. The applicant first named in the title hereof (hereinafter “Gama Turkey”) has its primary seat or location in Turkey. The second named applicant is Irish based and was incorporated in 1999. It is a company ultimately owned by Gama Turkey. Gama Construction Ireland (hereinafter “Gama Ireland”) has a number of Irish subsidiary and related companies. Gama Ireland is involved in the construction industry. It commenced operations in Ireland in 2000 and competed successfully for several important public sector projects, funded mainly from the National Development Programme. Projects in Ireland include major road projects, power stations and social housing. The value of the work carried out by Gama Ireland and its related companies in the calendar year 2003 was of the order of €89 million. According to the 2003 audited Gama Ireland Group accounts, there were 1,066 employees in Gama Ireland who received wages and salaries of €28,051,524 in that year. In March, 2005 Gama Ireland had 927 current work permits, of which 924 were in respect of Turkish nationals. Before deciding to grant work permits to Gama, the Work Permits Section of the Department of Enterprise, Trade & Employment had received assurances from Gama Ireland and its legal advisors at that time that all provisions of Irish employment law would be observed and that the ‘going rate’ would be paid to all Turkish workers. In work permits documentation, the Turkish workers were described as employees of Gama Ireland or other Irish-registered companies. On 8th February, 2005, Mr. Joe Higgins T.D. made the following statement in Dail Eireann in respect of alleged abuses of employment rights by Gama Ireland:-
(a) Gama Ireland was paying unskilled construction workers €2/€3 per hour and skilled workers somewhat more than €3 per hour and was, therefore, in breach of the requirements of, inter alia, the National Minimum Wage Act 2000; and (b) Gama Ireland was requiring its workers to work “grotesque” hours and was therefore in breach of the requirements of, inter alia, the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. The second named respondent, Edward Nolan, (hereinafter “the Inspector”) is the head of the Labour Inspectorate. By warrant of appointment dated 12th December, 2000, the Inspector was appointed by the Minister to be:-
· National Minimum Wage Act 2000 · The Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 · Protection of Young Persons (Employment) Act 1996
· Redundancy Payments Acts 1967 to 1991 · Employment Agency Act 1971 · European Communities (Safeguarding of Employees Rights on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 1980 · Protection of Employees (Employers Insolvency) Acts 1984 to 1991 · Payment of Wages Act 1991” The investigation commenced on 9th February, 2005. On the same day, Mr. Karaalioglu, the managing director of Gama Ireland, wrote to the Minister in the following terms:-
As Managing Director of Gama Construction Ireland Limited, I am writing to indicate my company’s willingness to fully co-operate with the planned investigation announced by your Department, following the statement and misinformation by Deputy Joe Higgins, made under Dail privilege. I would request that this investigation be carried out as a matter of urgency so that we can minimise the damage to the company’s reputation. I would like to emphasise that the company is prepared to fully co-operate with any planned investigation carried out by Department officials. We are also happy to produce all documents requested by your representatives to facilitate such an investigation. If your officials wish to meet or interview any of our employees we will also co-operate and facilitate such meetings and ensure that workers attending such meetings are paid as if they were working. If I can be of any further assistance to you or your Department in this matter please do not hesitate to contact me.” By letter dated 3rd March, 2005, a number of significant admissions were volunteered on behalf of Gama Ireland by Mr. Karaalioglu as follows:- · “There have been errors in calculating the payroll. These errors have been rectified with 5.5% additional payment. I attach copy letters from the Head Office. · The company is not keeping working time records in accordance with the regulations. I attach a copy letter from our solicitors of 2nd August, 2002 which did advise me of the formal requirements. I would like to discuss your requirements to rectify this matter going forward. · We have found in the internal investigation that payslips were only handed out in Turkey where the employees have their formal employment contract. Payslips for the February payroll onwards will also be handed to employees in Ireland. In line with advice from SIPTU last week we are going to insert additional information.” On the following day, 4th March, 2005, Murray Consultants issued a statement on behalf of Gama Ireland in which they stated, inter alia:-
The shortfall was discovered last week during a review of payment procedures by management and company advisors. Gama immediately made good the amounts due to each employee. An interest payment has also been added to the amounts paid. A full investigation is underway to discover how this breach of the company’s policies and normal procedures occurred. A number of individuals have been suspended pending the outcome of the investigation. The employees and their unions have been advised of the situation. The auditors and the relevant authorities have been notified. The review has also examined other aspects of payment procedures for expatriate employees and a number of improvements have been introduced.”
In the week commencing 14th March, 2005 an interview was sought by the Inspector with Mr. Karaalioglu. Communications between the Inspector and the former solicitor to Gama Ireland in relation to the arrangements for a meeting with the solicitor became increasingly fraught. There followed a letter from the Inspector to Mr. Karaalioglu on 16th March, 2005. This is a letter of considerable importance because it sets out clearly the basis upon which the Inspector believed he was conducting his investigation. In the letter he stated:-
On 18th March the Inspector was informed that Gama Ireland was now represented by Kilroys Solicitors. On 19th March the interview with Mr. Karaalioglu took place ‘under protest’ by reason of alleged lack of information from the Inspector as set out in a note handed over to him at the commencement of the meeting. At the same time, there were negotiations going on between the Inspector and the solicitors for Gama Ireland and Gama Turkey in relation to their entitlement to see and comment upon the draft report and the timeframe within which that might be done. In this regard it is important to note that there were three draft reports, dated respectively 21st March, 2005, 24th March, 2005 and 13th April, 2005, the first two of which were furnished to Gama’s legal advisors with a view to ensuring that Gama’s observations could be included in the report. The time for comment was extended until 30th March, 2005. On 31st March, 2005, Gama Turkey wrote alleging that the investigation and report were ultra vires the Minister and the Inspector and sought an immediate undertaking that any report would not be published, in default of which proceedings were threatened. At this point, given that it is central to the decision of the learned High Court judge, it is appropriate to refer to the issue of the proposed publication of the report. It is not in dispute that the respondents intended from the very beginning that there would be a general publication of the report and not merely a limited circulation to the Minister and appropriate regulatory authorities. This was the case notwithstanding that a somewhat different intent might be inferred from para. 1.1.2. of the Inspector’s final report dated 4th May, 2005, which contained significant alterations from earlier drafts and in which he states:-
The matter came before the High Court (Kelly J.) in April, 2005 when an interlocutory injunction was sought to restrain the respondents from publishing the report in question, either generally or to the named entities to whom it was intended to be sent. Those entities were:- · The Competition Authority · The Department of Finance (Taxation and Government Contracts) · Department of Transport · Director of Corporation Enforcement · Garda Fraud Squad · Garda National Immigration Bureau · Incorporated Law Society · Irish Auditing & Accounting Supervisory Authority · Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority · Joint Body of Local Authorities · National Roads Authority · The Revenue Commissioners At that point in time, Kelly J. found that only one serious issue for trial was made out, namely, that the investigation and the report was ultra vires because it was intended for general publication, such publication not being contemplated or authorised by any of the relevant statutes. He thus continued the restraint on publication which had been granted at the time of the leave application. He did not, however, accept contentions that the Minister was not entitled to direct the Inspectorate of his Department to investigate the matter and report to him. Nor did he accept that the Inspectorate was not entitled to use its statutory powers granted under the Employment Acts to conduct its investigation. Kelly J. was also of the view that the Minister, on receipt of the information yielded up by the investigation, was “perfectly entitled” to send that information to other enforcement agencies in the State. The matter ultimately came on for hearing in the High Court (Finlay Geoghegan J.) who delivered a written judgment on 14th June, 2005. Because I agree with a great deal of what was said by Finlay Geoghegan J. in her judgment, I propose to refer to it in extenso in this judgment. Executive Power or Statutory Powers? Perhaps the easiest issue to deal with at the outset is to determine whether, as contended for by the respondents, the investigation proceeded under the general and inherent powers of the Executive or whether, as contended for by the applicants, it derived its authority exclusively from the Employment Acts detailed in the Inspector’s warrant of appointment. At p.12 of her judgment, Finlay Geoghegan J. stated:-
Circulation of Report compiled under statutory powers The learned trial judge determined, correctly in my view, that the various statutory powers relied upon by the respondents did not envisage, permit or authorise any general publication of the report. This finding was not challenged or disputed by the respondents during the hearing of the appeal. Instead they fell back on the concept of inherent executive power to provide a justification for the proposed general publication. However any such justification disappears once it is clear that the investigation was a statutory one only. I also agree with the findings of the learned trial judge when she said, assuming the report was compiled for lawful purposes, that it could be passed to the Minister and to persons or authorities concerned with enforcing the obligations imposed by the Employment Acts. At p.20 of her judgment she stated:-
Counsel for Gama did not dispute the fact that Desmond v. Glackin provides a clear authority for the proposition that a lawfully commissioned report obtained by one branch of the Executive may be circulated to other branches of the Executive with a legitimate interest therein. Counsel expressly resiled from inviting this Court to reconsider or redefine the law as laid down in Desmond v. Glackin but argued that the present case is distinguishable from it on the basis that while the information gathered at first instance in Desmond v. Glackin was obtained voluntarily, the information in the instant case was, towards the end of the investigation at least, obtained by a person “clothed with statutory authority” and for that reason could only be used or made available to the Minister and not be used for other purposes. That said, the overall approach of Gama to the appeal was to stand four square over the determination of the learned High Court judge that one of the ‘purposes’ for which the Inspector’s report had been commissioned, namely general publication, was an ‘unlawful purpose’ which vitiated and tainted the entire process and warranted the quashing of the report. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT IN RELATION TO PUBLICATION Under the heading “Vires of Report” Finlay Geoghegan J. (at p.16 of her judgment) noted that it was common case between the parties that the Inspector had no express statutory power under the relevant Employment Acts to prepare a report of the results of an investigation for publication. She noted that the powers conferred on an Inspector by each of the relevant Employment Acts are similar. They are to:- (1) Enter premises at reasonable times (2) Require the production of, examine and take copies of records. (3) Examine and take statements from persons. (4) Initiate prosecution of certain offences under the Acts. (5) Initiate civil proceedings on behalf of a worker in specified circumstances. The only express reference to the preparation of a report by an Inspector is contained in s.34(4) of the National Minimum Wage Act 2000. Finlay Geoghegan J. conducted a careful and detailed analysis of the various Employment Acts. She also considered whether such a power could be regarded as incidental to or consequential upon the express powers given to the Inspector. However, she concluded (at p.20):-
As already concluded, the Inspector has an implicit statutory power to collate and pass to the Minister and other relevant civil and criminal enforcement authorities information, documents and potential evidence obtained in exercise of his express statutory powers for the purpose of those authorities enforcing by the authorised civil procedures obligations imposed on the applicants by the relevant Employment Acts or to prosecute alleged breaches thereof. Such information might be put together in a document called “a report”. The name of the document does not appear important. What is important is the purpose for which the report is prepared. It must be a purpose authorised by one of the relevant Employment Acts. I have already concluded, as a fact, that the Inspector has not prepared a report as described in the preceding paragraph but rather a report for publication. Applying the principles set out by Fennelly J. in Kennedy v. The Law Society of Ireland (No. 3) [2002] 2 IR 458, notwithstanding the implicit power of an inspector to prepare a report of the results of an investigation conducted pursuant to express statutory powers for purposes authorised by statute the preparation of the Report by the Inspector for a purpose not authorised by statute is ultra vires the powers of the inspector.” In Kennedy the Law Society appointed an investigating accountant under the Solicitors Accounts Regulations (2) 1984 to inspect the books and accounts of the plaintiff’s solicitor practice. Unknown to the plaintiff, the Law Society believed that the plaintiff was involved in a number of fraudulent personal injury claims and the accountant was also instructed to search for evidence of such involvement when carrying out her investigation. This was a ‘hidden agenda’ in the sense that it was not communicated to the plaintiff. On the contrary, it was specifically denied when the plaintiff’s suspicions were aroused and he challenged the investigator as to the true purpose of her investigation. It was held by this Court, firstly, that the investigation of fraudulent claims was not an authorised purpose under the Solicitors Accounts Regulations. It was further held that, if the respondents lacked a particular power to investigate a matter notwithstanding the wide powers available to them, necessity was not a good reason for inferring such a power to them. The respondents, as delegatees of statutory powers, could not exceed the limits of the statute or the secondary legislation conferring such power. A persona designata who pursued, albeit in good faith, a purpose not permitted by legislation by, for example, combining it with other permitted purposes, would be enlarging by stealth the range of its own powers. (Cassidy v. Minister for Industry & Commerce [1978] I.R. 297 followed). On the particular facts of the case it was not possible to sever the impermissible purpose from the decision to appoint the third respondent. The impugned decision was a single decision which did not distinguish between the permissible and impermissible purposes underlying same. It was impossible to limit the prospective effect of the decision. Although the respondents were not necessarily acting mala fide in the sense of knowingly exceeding their powers, they deliberately concealed their intentions regarding materials which they were not authorised to investigate. In the course of his judgment, Fennelly J. stated as follows at pp. 488 to 489:-
Neither do I think the appointing decision can be rescued in part by severing the good part from the bad part. In Pigs and Bacon Commission v. McCarron & Co. [1981] I.R. 451, O'Higgins C.J., at p. 469, distinguished Cassidy v. Minister for Industry and Commerce [1978] 1 I.R. 297 on the ground that "… the orders made by the Minister stood and continued to operate to the extent and in the manner contemplated by the empowering legislation." In Pigs and Bacon Commission v. McCarron & Co., the authority had made an order for the payment of a specified amount of levy and the court could not rewrite that by substituting a reduced levy. The appointing decision in this case was a single one. It is not possible for the court to sever it. I reach that conclusion for three reasons. Firstly, it does not distinguish between the valid and the invalid purposes it purports to authorise. Thus it does not lend itself to the sort of severance that occurred in The State (McKeown) v. Scully [1986] I.R. 524 and Glencar Exploration plc v. Mayo County Council [1993] 2 I.R. 237. Secondly, it is not possible to limit its prospective effect, which was possible in the unusual circumstances of Cassidy v. Minister for Industry and Commerce [1978] 1 I.R. 297. If an application for judicial review had been heard before the appointing decision had been acted upon, it might have been possible for the court to make an order limiting the investigation to be carried out. Even then, however, a question might have arisen as to whether a decision so heavily influenced by an impermissible consideration should be allowed to stand: the first respondent might not, it could have been argued, have made the appointing decision at all if it had not been influenced by its concern about fraudulent claims. Thirdly, I think the decision should be quashed in any event, because the first respondent engaged in a policy of deliberate concealment of its intentions, especially when, as this court has held, the concealed intention related to material which it was not authorised to investigate by means of the Accounts Regulations. In saying this, I am not saying that the first respondent was acting mala fide, in the sense of knowingly exceeding their powers.” The intended ultimate publication of any report emerging from the investigation is in my view a collateral and incidental act outside of the purposes of the investigation itself. It is the means whereby the fruits of the investigation are dealt with in a particular way. For example, if a production company were to make a film documentary about working conditions in rural Ireland in the last century, the fact that the company had also decided and intended that the film be released say in Canada but not in the U.S. could hardly be described as a ‘purpose’ of making the film in question. The purpose would always have been to show the working conditions depicted in the film. If publication was deemed to be a ‘purpose’ of an investigation, one might enquire what legal consequences would follow if there was no intention to publish at the start of an enquiry, followed by the formation of an intention to publish in the middle of the enquiry, followed by a still further decision not to publish following completion of the report. Would that report thereby be invalidated ab initio because of an intention formed at a particular moment in time to deal with the fruits of a perfectly legitimate investigation in a certain way? I do not believe so. I am strongly of the view that to conflate the concept of publication with the purposes of the investigation itself was to misapply Kennedy v The Law Society of Ireland in a critical respect to reach an incorrect conclusion as to the validity of the report in this case. In my view the preparation and compiling of the report was a perfectly valid and legitimate exercise under the statutory regime relied upon. Its validity is not undone because of a mistaken belief that the selfsame statutory regime permitted general publication. Even if I am mistaken in the view I have formed, the issue of publication is one which in this case can readily be severed from the commissioning of the investigation and the preparation of the ensuing report. This is not a case like Kennedy where the permissible and impermissible purposes were so interwoven as to be incapable of severance. However, I do not think it is necessary to analyse this potential remedy further in light of the conclusions I have reached. FAIR PROCEDURES As noted by the learned trial judge, another issue in the proceedings was the allegation on behalf of the applicants that the investigation had been conducted and the report prepared in breach of their entitlement to fair procedures. However, it was accepted on Gama’s behalf during the hearing of the appeal that there could be really no complaint about a lack of fair procedures in circumstances where the report and the results of the investigation were confined to statutorily permitted purposes. As I take the view that a circulation of the report confined to the Minister and other civil or criminal enforcement authorities for permitted statutory purposes under the relevant Employment Acts is perfectly permissible, it follows there is no reality in the fair procedures arguments in this case. Any contentions of the applicants in this regard must be seen in the light of the promised co-operation with this enquiry offered at the outset by letter dated 9th February, 2005. For most of its time in preparation, the Inspector’s report was being compiled on the basis, much touted by Gama, that it was fully co-operating with the investigation Furthermore, there is clear evidence from the drafting changes in the successive draft reports that the Inspector was being particularly careful and circumspect in formulating his views. Opportunities were provided at every turn for Gama to make submissions and observations on the draft reports submitted to them and their legal advisors. Any suggested ‘findings’ in early versions of the report became ‘assessments’ in the final version, which said report in turn called for a further inquiry. It seems fairly obvious that legal advice as to fair procedures issues was being taken by the Inspector during the course of preparation of the report and it seems to me the respondents can hardly be criticised for having his work vetted and protected in this way. The net bonus to Gama was that the final report was both muted and provisional. I do not believe that the findings of the learned trial judge on the issue of fair procedures can be impugned in any way. DESMOND v GLACKIN I indicated earlier that some discussion of the decisions of the High Court and this Court in Desmond v Glackin (No.2) [1993] 3 I.R. 67 is both appropriate and relevant to the issues arising in this case. In that case an Inspector had been appointed by the Minister for Industry & Commerce pursuant to the provisions of the Companies Act 1990 for the purpose of investigating the affairs of a number of companies which had been involved in the purchase and sale of a site in Ballsbridge in Dublin. In the course of his investigation the Inspector had requested the Minister to obtain information from the Central Bank through the Minister for Finance concerning exchange control transactions involving one such company. Mr. Desmond contended that there was no entitlement in the Minister for Finance to divulge information obtained by him from the Central Bank, as his agent, in relation to transactions pursuant to the provisions of the Exchange Control Acts 1954 to 1962, to any person for any purpose other than the carrying out of the duties imposed on him by those Acts. This contention was rejected both by O’Hanlon J. in the High Court and by McCarthy J. in delivering the judgment of this Court on this particular issue. At p.102 of his judgment in the High Court, O’Hanlon J. stated:-
I have come to the conclusion that what was done in relation to obtaining information from the Central Bank and making it available to the inspector was permissible and did not involve a breach of a duty of confidentiality arising in favour of the applicants under the provisions of the Central Bank Acts, 1942 to 1989, or the Official Secrets Act, 1963, or at common law or under the Constitution.”
Despite the contentions of counsel for Gama, I believe the decision in Desmond v. Glackin, to be a case on all fours with the instant case and quite distinguishable from the decision of Nicholls V-C. in Morris & Others v. Director of Serious Fraud Office & Others [1993] 1 All E.R. 788. In that case the Director of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) was investigating the affairs of an insolvent deposit taking institution (B.C.C.I.) and for that purpose had obtained a large number of documents from various sources, including a firm of chartered accountants who had provided auditing and accounting services to B.C.C.I. for some years prior to its liquidation. The documents had been obtained by the Director pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act 1987. The liquidators of B.C.C.I. wished to obtain access to the records in the possession of the accountants and applied for an order requiring the SFO to produce the documents in its possession, including documents seized from the accountants and other documents seized by the police from the premises of third parties. The question arose as to the extent of the SFO power to make disclosure to the liquidators. Nicholls V-C. held that the powers of the SFO were not to be regarded as encroaching upon the rights of individuals more than was fairly and reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose for which the powers were created. Although the Criminal Justice Act 1987 authorised disclosure of information obtained in the exercise of those powers to certain persons, office holders of a company such as liquidators and receivers were not included amongst those to whom disclosure could be made. He further held there was no justification for implying a general power for the SFO to disclose information obtained in the exercise of compulsory powers to persons not named under the Act as persons to whom the information might be given. At pp.794 to 795, Nicholls V-C. stated:-
Also cited was the decision in Marcel & Others v. Commissioner of Police of Metropolis & Others [1991] 2 W.L.R. 1118 in which an effort was made to secure the production from the police of documents seized by them in the course of investigating allegations of criminal offences so that they could be used in civil proceedings which had been brought by a company with which the plaintiffs were closely connected. The plaintiffs were the persons against whom allegations of criminal conduct had been made and they applied for an injunction to restrain the police from dealing with the documents seized save for the purposes connected with the investigation and prosecution of crime. It was held by Browne-Wilkinson V-C that, since the police were authorised to seize, retain and use the documents only for public purposes related to the investigation and prosecution of crime and the return of stolen property to the true owner, they were not entitled to disclose documents seized under the Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984, to a third party to enable him to use the documents in civil proceedings to protect his legal rights since the public interest in ensuring that the documents were used solely for the public purposes for which the power of seizure was conferred was inviolate and outweighed the public interest in ensuring that in the civil proceedings all relevant information should be available to the court. It was further held that where the police or any other public authority used compulsory powers to obtain information and documents from a citizen, that information and those documents were received solely for those purposes and equity would impose on the public authority a duty not to disclose them to third parties except by order of the court. However, as was noted by O’Hanlon J. in Desmond v. Glackin (No.2) the critical distinction in Marcel v. Commissioner of Police was that the disclosure of information obtained by the police was sought so as to make documents seized by the police available for the purpose of civil proceedings between parties other than the persons whose documents had been seized. Browne-Wilkinson V-C was approaching the issue on the basis that the powers to seize the documents were conferred for the better performance of public functions by public bodies – an intention entirely different from that of making the same information available to private individuals for their private purposes. At p.102 of his judgment, O’Hanlon J. stated:-
I do not believe the respondents have made out any case which would suggest that the principles enunciated in Desmond v. Glackin (2) can or should be revised or qualified in some way, nor have the respondents in my view established any real or meaningful distinction between the facts of that case and those of the instant case. It is important to also note in this context that under the Exchange Control Acts, 1954 and 1962, information had to be furnished to the Central Bank concerning transactions involving the movement of funds into and out of the State, so that the material or information in issue might equally, as in this case, be characterised as having been obtained under compulsion by persons or an authority “clothed with statutory powers” in compliance with the relevant legislation. CONCLUSION For the reasons set out above, I would allow the appeal herein and reverse the order quashing the report of the Inspector herein dated 4th May, 2005. As I do not believe there are any powers of general publication within the statutory regime relied upon for this investigation, I would further direct that the persons or bodies entitled to have sight of the report be confined to those State bodies with a prosecutorial function in relation to the matters identified in the report. These bodies have already been identified in the interlocutory order made herein by Kelly J. | ||||||||||||||
