Director of Public Prosecutions v Eadon [2019] IESC 98 (20 December 2019)

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JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice William M. McKechnie delivered on the 20th day of

1. On the 5th February, 2014, the Appellant was convicted of the murder of his mother

Noreen Kelly on the 9th March, 2011. A plea to manslaughter was offered in advance of

trial but was rejected by the DPP. The fact of the killing was not in dispute at trial. In

effect, the only two issues for the jury concerned the partial defences of diminished

responsibility and intoxication. Both were relied upon by the Appellant; if either had been

accepted by the jury, the appropriate conviction would have been for manslaughter rather

2. The Appellant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the trial judge

misdirected the jury concerning the issue of his intoxication and its relevance to the jury’s

assessment of the issues. His appeal was dismissed, but he has been granted leave to

further appeal to this Court on two points of law of general public importance. The first

concerns the adequacy of the judicial direction instructing the jury on intoxication and

specific intention: is it sufficient for the trial judge to charge the jury on the issue of

whether the accused had the necessary capacity to form the intention, or must the judge

stress that the applicable test is whether the accused in fact had the necessary intention?

The second issue is whether it is permissible to have regard to counsels’ closing speeches

for the purposes of remedying any deficiencies in the judge’s charge.

3. There was no real dispute as to the essential facts at trial. As will be seen, it was accepted

by all that the Appellant had unlawfully killed his mother by stabbing her multiple times

with a knife on the 9th March, 2011. The Appellant was charged with murder. He made an

offer to plead guilty to manslaughter ahead of the trial but this plea was rejected by the

4. At his trial the Appellant raised two alternative defences, either of which, if accepted by

the jury, would have resulted in a conviction for manslaughter rather than for murder. He

sought to rely, first, upon the statutory defence of diminished responsibility, as provided

for by section 6 of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006, arguing that at the time of the

killing he was suffering from a mental disorder which was such as to diminish

substantially his responsibility for the act, albeit accepting that it was not such not such

as to justify finding him not guilty by reason of insanity. Second, and in the alternative,

he raised the defence of intoxication, insofar as that can be a partial defence to a crime of

specific intent such as murder, arguing that by virtue of his intoxicated state he lacked

the specific intent necessary for the homicide to be characterised as murder rather than

manslaughter. These two defences were, in effect, the only live issues in the case.

5. The factual background is set out at paras. 5-15 of the judgment of the Court of Appeal

and does not need to be repeated in full here. However, in light of the particular issues on

which leave has been granted to appeal to this Court, it is necessary to set out, in

perhaps a little bit more detail than would usually be the case, the salient portions of

counsels’ closing speeches, as well as the learned trial judge’s charge, the requisitions of

6. The trial was heard before Carney J and a jury in the Central Criminal Court over nine

days from the 24th January, 2014 to the 5th February, 2014. As stated, much of the

factual background was accepted at trial, and certainly is not in dispute on appeal.

7. In the early hours of the morning of the 9th March, 2011, the Appellant stabbed his

mother to death in a frenzied knife attack. She sustained some 19 stab wounds, mostly to

the face and chest. The Appellant was 19 years old at the time and had no previous

history of violence towards his mother, with whom he lived in the family home together

8. The defence case, insofar as it related to intoxication, was that the Appellant was in a

drug-induced psychosis at the time of the killing. Evidence was given of his serious and

longstanding substance abuse issues. The jury heard that he had abused alcohol and

cannabis since he was 13. In the two years prior to this incident he had begun consuming

other drugs including amphetamines, cocaine, crystal methamphetamine, ecstasy and

methadone. In the 18 months prior to the incident he had been spending approximately

€400 per week on drugs and drank large quantities of alcohol almost every day.

9. The evidence was that the Appellant had consumed a large amount of drugs in the days

leading up to this incident, and that owing to his methamphetamine use he had not slept

for four days. Several witnesses testified as to the effects that these drugs were having

on him during this time period; as summarised by the Court of Appeal:

“During this period he suffered paranoid delusions and engaged in erratic

behaviour: spraying deodorant to ward off demons; believing he was being pursued

by aliens and making crop circles to communicate with them; asserting that fire

ants and demons were emerging from the walls; imagining that the house was full

of smoke; blocking the air vent in his bedroom with coins and stones because he

believed the room was being filled with poison gas; and setting on fire an electrical

Further examples could be added: he believed that people were spying on him; that the

army were looking for him and had used some sort of gas around his house; he poured

petrol around the house and was going around with a hatchet; he was seen being cruel to

animals; and he believed that there had been a nuclear explosion the previous morning.

In interview with the Gardaí he expressed the view that certain people (including,

10. This evidence came from a number of witnesses who saw and interacted with the

Appellant during the days prior to the incident. These included his father, Mark Eadon,

who was separated from the Appellant’s mother and had fallen out with the Appellant

some months earlier; the deceased had sought his help in dealing with the Appellant on

the 8th March, 2011. When he arrived at the house he found that the Appellant had

barricaded his mother and younger brother out of the house and that he came across as

paranoid and delusional. The jury heard from the Appellant’s uncle Patrick Kelly, brother

of the deceased, whom she had also looked to for help on the 8th March, 2011. He was a

long-time member of Alcoholics Anonymous and visited the house with a friend, Mr Kevin

Mitchell, who was a recovered drug addict. Mr Kelly knew that “there was something

seriously wrong”. Mr Mitchell gave evidence that the Appellant’s mind was gone and that

he had never seen anyone that bad before. Diane Macko, a friend of the deceased, also

visited the family home on the 8th March and gave evidence as to the Appellant’s

paranoid state. The jury heard from the Appellant’s younger brother, Ferdia Eadon, that

he believed that his brother was suffering from heavy delusions, paranoia and

hallucinations and that there appeared to be something mentally wrong with him in the

days leading up to the 9th March. Finally, a Mr John Scott, whose home was in a

neighbouring townland, gave evidence that the Appellant showed up at his house at

approximately 7.20a.m. on the 9th March wearing only tracksuit bottoms, with his body

covered in cuts and scratches. Mr Scott believed that the Appellant had been outside for

some time. He gave evidence that the Appellant had told him that he had been abducted

by aliens who experimented on him, that the army were looking for him, and that he

11. Between them, these witnesses gave evidence that the Appellant was “paranoid”, “just in

a completely different place”, “very scared and … hallucinating”, “agitated and disturbed”,

“behaving abnormally”, “hallucinating … tripping out in some way and not knowing what

the hell was going on around him”, “on edge, irritable, uneasy and over the top”, “didn’t

seem to be sane”, “acting very strange … there was something mentally wrong with him

… his head wasn’t right from the drugs he was on … I think he completely lost it that

night”. It was said that “his mind was gone” and “it was hard to get any sense out of him

12. It was in these circumstances that the defence relied upon the defence of intoxication.

Medical evidence was given by both sides and, on the Appellant’s submission, this

supported the defence of intoxication. Dr Paul O’Connell, a consultant forensic psychiatrist

at the Central Mental Hospital, gave evidence for the defence. He carried out a psychiatric

assessment of the Appellant over a period stating in October 2011. In his opinion, at the

time of the killing of his mother the Appellant was not simply intoxicated but grossly

intoxicated and was experiencing psychotic symptoms as a result of the intoxication. He

considered that the Appellant was experiencing a substance-induced psychosis for a week

or more before the killing. He stated that someone in this state would not be capable of

exercising reasonable judgement or behaving appropriately. He acknowledged in evidence

that this was something that could affect the capacity to form specific intent. He stated

that in the Appellant’s state of mind he would have been so grossly impaired as to have

affected his ability to form specific intent. Dr Conor O’Neill, a consultant psychiatrist also

based at the Central Mental Hospital, gave evidence for the prosecution. During cross-

examination he accepted that being highly intoxicated could possibly have interfered with

the Appellant’s capacity to reason, his judgment, his ability to control himself and his

13. The prosecution’s case theory, on the other hand, was that the Appellant blamed his

mother for the disappearance of his drugs and that this was the trigger for what

subsequently transpired. The prosecution placed particular importance on the Appellant’s

garda interviews, which, it was said, demonstrated that the Appellant had the necessary

intent for murder. For example, he said in interview that he had left the drugs in full view

in his room, that someone had taken them and that this pissed him off. He acknowledged

in interview that he remembered stabbing his mother, but said that at the time he did not

know that it was his mother, that she was a danger, an intruder and a “completely

different person”. He said that “It was my own fault. It was me who done it.”, but then

added that “I didn’t know it was my mother … I didn’t realise what I’d done at all.” In his

sixth interview, when asked about bruising to the hand of the deceased, the Appellant

The Closing Speeches, the Judge’s Charge, Counsels’ Requisitions and the Judge’s Re-

14. One of issues on this appeal is whether it is permissible to have regard to the exposition

of the law in counsels’ speeches for the purpose of supplementing the judge’s charge to

the jury where the same might fairly be described as terse or lacking in detail. Here, the

argument is whether the trial judge’s sparse treatment of the issue of intoxication should

be assessed in light of what had already been said about that matter by counsel in their

closing speeches. For that reason, it is necessary to set out in some detail what was said

15. The closing speeches were made on Day 8 of the trial. As part of her speech counsel for

“Now, on the evidence the prosecution say to you that this man, this young man,

Celyn Eadon, was clearly on the night in question, he was intoxicated. And it’s clear

that this was also what we call voluntary intoxication; in other words, that he

ingested those substances himself, bearing in mind that he had also ingested that

type of substance over a period of time and before this date. And intoxication in

and of itself is not a defence. But it is relevant and material to the question of

whether or not a person had the necessary intention to kill or to cause serious

injury. That is the specific intent required for a charge of murder. So it is relevant

and it is material to that, and that, ladies and gentlemen, is entirely a matter for

you to assess on the evidence. And it is, as I said to you, for the prosecution to

prove each and every element of the offence, and of course that includes that the

prosecution have to prove to you that he had the necessary intent to kill or to

cause serious injury on the night in question.” (Transcript, Day 8, Page 4, Lines 19-

16. Prosecution counsel then reminded the jury of the relevant evidence in support of the

issue of the Appellant’s intent. The prosecution’s case, as noted above, was that the

Appellant became aggressive after the disappearance of his drugs and that this was the

trigger for the awful events that subsequently unfolded. In support of this case theory,

counsel for the DPP used her closing speech to remind the jury of, inter alia, the evidence

of the Appellant’s younger brother Ferdia Eadon, John Scott and Kevin Mitchell, as well as

medical evidence. Counsel also attached considerable importance to the Garda interviews

of the Appellant, which were also said to support the view that he was angry over the

disappearance of his drugs. Having reminded the jury of the evidence, counsel stated as

“So, they're all matters for you to consider and to consider the sequence of the

interviews and to look to see does he become less and less intoxicated. When the

prosecution say to you that he had the necessary intent for murder, but as I said,

the question of intent is a matter entirely for you to consider but you can see what

he says in your interviews and you can see the accounts that he gives and you can

see that he says various things, including at the end indicating that she hit him and

that he stabbed her and you have that bruising to the back of her knuckles for your

17. At the end of her closing speech, counsel for the DPP stated:

“You consider the entirety of the evidence which you have heard, which include of

course the memoranda of interview of the accused man and the progressively

coherent way that he addressed matters as those interviews continued and what

the prosecution say to you, that the evidence points to a person who was solely

acting under the influence of an intoxicant and not a person with a mental disorder

and that the prosecution have proved the necessary intent to you for the offence of

murder, but these matters are all entirely for you and for your consideration and for

your assessment of the evidence, bearing in mind that the burden rests with the

prosecution, as I said to you on a number of occasions, to prove the guilt of the

accused man to the standard required which is, for the prosecution, beyond

18. Next it was the turn of the defence. In introducing the various topics which he proposed

“I’m going to deal with the issue of voluntary intoxication as it is in this case and

I’m going to address you then on what you ought to consider when you’re

considering the ultimate question as to whether Celyn Eadon can genuinely be said

to have intended the death of his mother; that he did what he did.” (Transcript,

“You’re going to find it hard to determine what in fact happened ... It’s, in my

submission, impossible, almost impossible for you to discover or decide or elaborate

or set out step by step what precisely happened, other than knowing that this

young man, in my submission, mustn’t have been in any rational state of mind, was

in the complete grip of these hallucinating, paranoid-making drugs, and unable to

reason in his own mind about what was happening and how he should react and

how he should control himself in any way. And in those circumstances it’s a matter

for you to actually decide this, needless to say; I make no decision, I can only urge

you to take a view of the facts, but I would submit to you that on any view of the

facts he must have been and you should so regard him as being so completely

intoxicated as being not able to form the necessary intent to kill his mother, the

statutory intent to kill his mother.” (Transcript, Day 8, Page 24, Line 19 – Page 25,

20. Defence counsel then referred to the evidence of Dr O’Connell to the effect that the

Appellant’s intoxication would have been likely to have impaired his capacity to reason, to

exercise judgment, to control his actions and to form the intent necessary for murder.

Counsel then set out the law in relation to intoxication and crimes of specific intent; if I

“Everyone’s agreed he was grossly intoxicated and this leads me to the next issue

that you have to consider and I just want to be clear to you that this is wholly

separate and distinct from the issue of mental disorder and diminished

responsibility. It’s complete[ly] separate; it's an alternative, as it were. For

instance, if there was no question of a mental disorder of whatever nature arising,

you’d still be required to face this issue of intoxication. Now, intoxication as a

matter of law covers intoxication by virtue of alcohol or drugs, prescription or

otherwise, or illegal, and the law relating to voluntary intoxication is quite clear.

Firstly, intoxication in itself is not a mental disorder or a mental illness. Secondly,

intoxication isn’t and can’t ever normally be equated with any form of insanity. As

we all know, intoxication in different forms, it can be temporary and transitory and

for the vast bulk of criminal law offences intoxication is not a defence to a crime

because it would be a blackguards’ and a criminals’ charter if it were, people could

go out drunk and commit offences and say, ‘I was drunk at the time; I can’t be held

responsible’. But the law is different in one respect in relation to a very small

category of offences and they are offences that require something more than the

basic criminal act and the law relates to offences which are held to require proof of

a specific intent and murder is one of that limited category where the law requires

not merely proof of an unlawful killing, voluntarily done by an accused, but proof of

the further intent at the time of the killing that the additional, specific intent that it

must have been done with the intent to cause serious bodily injury or death and it’s

in that limited context that intoxication can become relevant and in many cases it

won’t be relevant but Ms Kennedy, on behalf of the prosecution, has very properly

said to you today that it is both material and relevant, the level of intoxication here,

And it follows that if, as I suggest you should, you first consider the issue of

diminished responsibility based on a mental disorder, if you rule that out, you go

ahead and consider the effect in your view of the type of intoxication that you’ve

heard about upon Celyn’s ability to form the specific intent required for murder.

Obviously, if you, having considered the issue of mental disorder and diminished

responsibility, if you find that he had a mental disorder and that that diminished his

responsibility, you find him guilty of manslaughter on the basis of diminished

responsibility and you don’t go on to consider this issue and his lordship may or

may not agree that you should decide the things in those sequence, but in my

submission to you, it’s a logical way to proceed and if you get to this stage you can

consider, in my submission to you, notwithstanding the absence of a mental

disorder, whether this intoxicated and psychotic episode interfered with his capacity

to form an intention to commit the offence in question here. Could it – could it and

did it, in your view – have the effect of impairing his ability to make such a decision

in relation to what he was doing, in relation to what he thought he was doing, in

relation to what he intended to do, in relation to what he sought to achieve and in

relation to what he desired as the natural and probable consequences of his actions

and in my submission the background is such that on any reasonable consideration

of it by you, you will be compelled to the view that he did not intend, in any real

sense, to kill or to cause the death of his mother by a serious injury, having regard

Now, that doesn't mean he’s not guilty of an offence. It means he’s not guilty of the

offence of murder; he’s guilty of the offence of manslaughter because the

prosecution at the end of the day still have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to

your satisfaction that he had such an intent before you could convict him of

murder. And that’s at the heart of the case: what, in reality, was his capacity and

intent at the time.” (Transcript, Day 8, Page 32, Line 13 – Page 33, Line 28)

21. Finally, in summing up his speech, counsel stated the following:

“You’d be mistaken, in my submission to you, to consider that issue on the basis of

the memos on their own. Your duty, in my submission, is to consider all of the

other evidence in relation to that: the evidence of the two psychiatrists; the

evidence of Diane Macko; the evidence of Kevin Mitchell, the evidence of his father,

Martin; the evidence of his brother, Ferdia; and his uncle Paddy Kelly. And if you

keep a firm and rational grip of everything that they have said to you about his

behaviour on the day and leading up to the night in question, you couldn’t but be

persuaded that this man’s, this young man’s capacity and intent and actions were

undoubtedly affected by the toxic substances, the cocktail of -- the shocking

cocktail of drugs that he’d consumed in the lead-up to this: four nights without

sleep, it's been said, and drugs all day, consuming whatever he could get his hands

on. So, at the end of the day, you have to reach a verdict and, in my submission,

both a fair and just verdict is to acquit him of the offence of murder and to convict

him of the offence on manslaughter, whether on the grounds of diminished

In relation to such a crime of murder, it goes, as I’ve said to you at the outset, it

goes against every natural feeling, every fibre of one’s body to think that a young

man, living with his mother, who appears on the evidence to have been having

good relations with her – in fact there’s evidence that they shared cannabis joints

together even – that he would have wickedly and with full intent to have decided to

kill her, to knife her to death, intending that that should happen. In my submission,

the only just verdict that you ought to record is one of manslaughter. Thank you for

your attention.” (Day 8, Page 33, Line 28 – Page 34, Line 16)

22. Enter the trial judge. The learned judge’s charge to the jury followed on immediately after

defence counsel’s closing speech. The judge began his charge to by referring to the

“If there was any little bit of my charge that [prosecuting counsel] didn’t hijack,

[defence counsel] certainly captured it. You now have to hear from me and you

have to hear from me in relation to matters you’ve heard of from counsel already

perhaps several times over but the law is you must hear these matters from me ...”

23. Thereafter the trial judge proceeded to charge the jury in relation to the burden and

standard of proof; the respective functions of judge, jury and counsel; the drawing of

inferences; the presumption of innocence; the ingredients of murder; the doctrine of

transferred malice; and the rebuttable statutory presumption that a person intends the

natural and probable consequences of their actions. Some of the most relevant aspects of

the judge’s charge on these issues are set out at paragraphs 19-23 of the judgment of

the Court of Appeal in this case. Few, if any, judges in the history of the State can have

had more experience charging murder juries on these very issues. The learned judge’s

charge on such matters was beyond reproach and no issue was taken with any of it at

24. The judge then turned to the issue of diminished responsibility, in the context of the

statutory definition of a mental disorder for the purposes of the 2006 Act, he charged the

“‘‘Mental disorder’ includes mental illness, mental disability, dementia or any

disease of the mind but does not include intoxication.’ It is the situation of our law

that voluntary intoxication or the taking of drugs in the words of the former Chief

Justice, ‘Does not afford a defence to criminal responsibility or any mitigation in

As can be seen, the defence of intoxication was, in a sense, rolled up and dealt with

alongside and simultaneously with the defence of diminished responsibility. It is not

disputed that this is all that was said by the trial judge on the issue of intoxication in the

25. The trial judge then proceeded to engage in a careful review of the evidence of the

Appellant’s psychiatrist, Dr Paul O’Connell. This is set out at paragraph 25 of the

judgment of the Court of Appeal. He also summarised, in much less detail, the evidence

of the prosecution’s psychiatrist, Dr Conor O’Neill. Finally, he charged the jury in relation

“The first thing that is capable of going into that box is the word ‘guilty’, and that

would mean that the accused was being found guilty of the full grown crime of

murder, namely that he killed Noreen Kelly and in doing so had the statutory intent

requisite for murder; that he intended to kill her or cause her serious injury. Now,

the second thing that’s capable of going into that box is the formula ‘Not guilty of

murder but guilty of manslaughter’, and the accused sought to plead guilty on

those terms at the start of the trial but the prosecution declined to accept that and

proceeded with the murder count. Now, that would arise in the circumstance where

you found that Celyn Eadon did kill his mother, and of course that’s not in dispute,

but the necessary intent had not been proved. And the third thing that is capable of

going into the box is ‘not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter on the

grounds of diminished responsibility’, and that would arise where you found that he

did the act alleged and at the time was suffering from a mental disorder, and the

mental disorder was not such as to justify finding him not guilty by reason of

insanity but was such as to diminish substantially his responsibility for the act, and

you’ll recall that Dr O’Connell said, well, he couldn’t help you on that, that is a

26. Following the judge’s charge, defence counsel made a two-part requisition complaining,

first, that the trial judge had dealt together with the issues of diminished responsibility

and voluntary intoxication and, second, that the judge had not given the jury any other

direction in relation to the issue of intoxication. Counsel asked that the court cure this by

referring to the case of The People (DPP) v. Reilly [2005] 3 IR 111, wherein it had been

decided that DPP v. Majewski [1977] AC 443 should be followed in this jurisdiction. As

stated by defence counsel, he wanted the jury to be told “that intoxication can be of such

a proportion as to be capable of interfering with capacity to form intent and the formation

27. In fact, counsel had not finished his full requisition in this regard before the learned

replied by stating that “I’m going to deal with this very shortly and simply, I’m not going

“Madame Foreman, members of the jury, in relation to what I said to you about

intoxication, it’s suggested that I ought to have given that direction in a

freestanding manner, and not included it when I was dealing with the question of

diminished responsibility. So the first thing goes to the architecture of my Charge;

treat what I said about intoxication as a freestanding matter, freestanding direction

to you, and what I said to you about intoxication is that a former Chief Justice had

said that the voluntary taking of drink and drugs does not under our law form a

defence or any mitigation in one’s responsibility to society, and that is so and that

is the law. But it is of course the situation that intoxication is part of the mix in

relation to whether a person is capable of forming the necessary intent …”

28. Having done so, the trial judge asked counsel whether they were happy with the

recharge. Both prosecuting and defence counsel confirmed that they had no difficulty and

no further requisitions were raised. The learned judge therefore directed the jury to

continue their deliberations. Later that afternoon the jury returned with their verdict,

having deliberated for two hours and twenty-two minutes. They found the Appellant guilty

of the murder of his mother Noreen Kelly, for which he received the mandatory sentence

29. The Appellant appealed his murder conviction to the Court of Appeal. He accepted the

verdict of the jury with respect to their rejection of the defence of diminished

responsibility; the appeal therefore concerned the intoxication issue only, as does the

appeal to this Court. The Appellant contended, in essence, that he ought to have been

acquitted of murder because he lacked the necessary specific intent and that the trial

judge had misdirected the jury on the issue of his intoxication and its relevance in the

assessment of his intent. The DPP, while accepting that the trial judge’s charge on

intoxication had been succinct, argued that it was accurate and that, when it was taken

together with the closing speeches, the jury could have been in no doubt that intoxication

was capable of interfering with the capacity of the Appellant to form the intent required

30. By judgment delivered on the 15th May, 2018, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal

([2018] IECA 145). The judgment of the Court was delivered by Edwards J, with whom

Mahon and Hedigan JJ agreed. The Court held that it was a correct statement of the law

for the trial judge to tell the jury that voluntary intoxication does not provide a defence to

criminal responsibility (para. 39). Edwards J pointed out that the learned trial judge

properly instructed the jury as to the burden and standard of proof, the ingredients of

murder, the rebuttable presumption contained in section 4(2) of the Criminal Justice Act

1964, and the requirement that it is for the prosecution to prove specific intent beyond a

31. Edwards J acknowledged that the trial judge, in his initial charge, “dealt tersely and only

very briefly” with the issue of intoxication (para. 43). He stated that if this had been the

extent of the learned judge’s charge, the Court of Appeal would have had a concern as to

its adequacy. In the view of the Court of Appeal, “it required to be specifically drawn to

the jury’s attention that evidence of voluntary intoxication was potentially relevant to the

issue as to whether the accused had formed the requisite specific intent at the time of the

killing” and this was not done initially (para. 44). The Court then observed, however, that

in his re-charge the trial judge added that “it is of course the situation that intoxication is

part of the mix in relation to whether a person is capable of forming the necessary

intent.” Edwards J stated that while it may have been better had the trial judge

elaborated and added the words “and whether he actually formed that intent”, the

instruction given was adequate given the overall run of the trial (para. 45).

32. The Court then turned to the issue of counsels’ speeches. Edwards J noted that while a

trial judge cannot abdicate responsibility for correctly charging the jury on the basis that

they have already heard a detailed and correct exposition of the law in the closing

speeches, the fact that the jury may have already heard such an exposition from counsel

is not wholly irrelevant, particularly where the judge refers to counsels’ treatment of the

law with ostensible approval. In such circumstances, the Court of Appeal held, a

somewhat briefer and less detailed treatment of the law may be justified than the trial

judge might otherwise have given (para. 46). Thus, when Carney J had referred to

intoxication being “in the mix”, this was not a concept being introduced to the jury for the

first time: they had been told the same thing, in detail, by counsel. Therefore, while the

trial judge’s supplemental instruction was “economical and to the point”, the jury would

have immediately understood and appreciated its import in light of counsels’ speeches,

and thus the instruction was adequate (para. 47). The Court further observed that

defence counsel had expressed himself satisfied with the re-charge at the time, although

it noted that, in light of that defence counsel’s affidavit explaining why no supplemental

requisition had been raised, it would not be appropriate to refuse to entertain the

33. As regards the issue of the appropriate direction to the jury where intoxication is raised as

a defence to a crime of specific intent, Edwards J stated as follows at para. 50:

“While the trial judge did tell the jury in the course of his re-charge that intoxication

is part of the mix in relation to whether a person is capable of forming the

necessary intent, and that was correct, he did not at any stage suggest, or seem to

suggest, that the jury’s inquiries should be confined to the issue of capacity, or that

they did not have to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the existence of an

actual specific intention to kill or cause serious injury in order to convict. Whether

an accused had the capacity at the material time to form the required specific

intention will often be a relevant enquiry, but it is not the critical question. For the

avoidance of doubt, the critical question will always be whether the accused in fact

34. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held that in a murder case in which intoxication is an

issue, the critical question must always be whether the prosecution have proven beyond

reasonable doubt that the accused had the necessary specific intention (para. 52). The

Court then reiterated that the trial judge had correctly charged the jury in relation to

specific intent, the burden and standard of proof, the rebuttable presumption that a

person intends the natural and probable consequences of their actions, and, in his re-

charge, had added that intoxication is part of the mix in relation to whether a person is

capable of forming the necessary intent. In the Court of Appeal’s view, there was nothing

wrong with any of this, particularly having regard to the run of the trial.

35. Finally, Edwards J was satisfied that there was evidence before the jury that allowed them

to bring in the verdict that they did. The verdict was open on the evidence and could not

be considered perverse. The Court of Appeal therefore held that the Appellant’s trial was

36. The Appellant sought leave to appeal to this Court from the judgment of the Court of

a) In directing the jury in a case where intoxication arises, is it sufficient to direct

them that the issue is determined on the question of whether the accused had the

b) In determining the adequacy of the judge’s charge and necessarily whether a trial

was in due course of law, can regard be had to counsels’ speeches for the purposes

37. By determination dated the 16th April, 2019 ([2019] IESC DET 84), the Court granted

leave to appeal in respect of both points. In relation to the first point, the Court was

satisfied that the law in this jurisdiction is not clear cut and that this is a point of general

public importance which should be clarified. As to the second point, the Court observed

that although this issue would not have satisfied the constitutional threshold if it was the

only point on which leave to appeal was sought, in the circumstances of this case the

second issue is so interlinked with the first question that leave should be granted on that

question also. Accordingly, both issues now fall to be determined by this Court.

38. The Court was greatly assisted by the written and oral submissions made on behalf of

both parties, for which it is grateful to counsel. What is presented next is a short

summary of the positions adopted by the parties on this appeal; the Court’s engagement

39. The Appellants submits that intoxication was at the centre of this case, and so it was of

the utmost importance that the jury received adequate judicial direction as to how they

should treat the evidence of intoxication and the effect it could have on their verdict. It is

submitted that it was incumbent on the trial judge to direct the jury that before they

could convict of murder, the prosecution had the onus of establishing that the Appellant’s

intoxication did not prevent the formation of the necessary mens rea for murder.

40. The Appellant argues in his written submissions that the trial judge erred in law “in

singularly failing to instruct the Jury of the legal consequences which would follow if they

were of the view that it was reasonably possible that the Appellant’s level of intoxication

had caused him not to have formed the requisite intent to kill or cause serious injury and

in particular in failing to instruct them that the effect of the Appellant’s intoxication could

in fact be a defence to the charge of murder although not to a charge to manslaughter.”

It is further said that by directing the jury that voluntary intoxication could not be a

defence to murder, the learned trial judge left the jury with the impression that even if,

as a result of the Appellant’s intoxication, they had a doubt as to his guilt, this would not

give them the option of acquitting the Appellant of murder. It is said that in so doing he

41. The Appellant refers to the principle that intoxication can never be a defence to a crime of

basic intent but may be a defence to a crime of specific intent, such as murder. He refers

to the what the UK courts have determined to be the correct charge to the jury in cases

of specific intent where the defence of intoxication is raised. There it has been said that

the question is not whether the defendant was so intoxicated as to lack capacity to form

the specific intent required for the crime, but rather whether he did in fact form the

intent. In this regard the Appellant has cited R v. Sheehan and Moore (1974) 60 Cr. App.

R. 308, R v. Garlick (1981) 72 Cr. App. R. 291 and R v. Brown and Stratton [1998] Crim.

L.R. 485 (Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, judgment of the 2nd October, 1997).

42. The Appellant submits that, prior to the decision of the Court of Appeal in this case, there

has been very little authority in this jurisdiction on the issue of how a jury ought to be

directed where the defence of intoxication is raised in relation to a crime of specific intent.

He submits that the decided cases in Ireland have tended to prefer the “capacity”

approach, referring in this regard to Attorney General v. Manning [1955] 89 I.L.T.R. 155,

DPP v. McBride [1996] 1 I.R. 312 and DPP v. Cotter (Unreported, Court of Criminal

43. The Appellant notes that the Court of Appeal, in its judgment herein, has clarified that the

capacity approach is not the correct test, with the critical issue being whether or not the

accused actually formed the specific intent required. As such the Court of Appeal has

declined to follow the approach in Manning, McBride and Cotter. This being so, it is

submitted on behalf of the Appellant that it is incompatible with this principle for the

judge in his charge to the jury to refer only to capacity, as is said to have happened in

this case. The Appellant argues that what is required is a charge per the UK case of R v.

44. Given this error, the Appellant submits that the judge’s charge in this case, seen against

the backdrop of complaints by the trial judge as to counsels’ prolixity, was inconsistent

with his constitutional right to a trial in due course of law. He notes that the judge’s

charge had, by implication, cut off the defence of intoxication and submits that a charge

which is incomplete or incorrect on a crucial part of the law cannot be “in accordance with

45. The Appellant submits that the law requires that a judge in his or her charge must

identify correctly and in plain language the relevant law applicable to the issues falling to

be determined by the jury. It is submitted that the charge and re-charge did not meet

this minimum standard. Moreover, the Appellant argues that such error cannot be cured

by “subcontracting” the judge’s charge out to counsel in their closing speeches. He

submits that counsels’ speeches cannot be sufficient to remedy defects in a judge’s

charge because the trial judge ought to (and did) tell the jury that the judge is the master

of the law. Accordingly, the jury could not look to counsel for the law. The Appellant

refers, in this regard, to the decision of this Court in DPP v. Rattigan [2017] IESC 72. It is

therefore submitted that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that counsels’ closing

speeches could supplement the instruction of the learned trial judge so as to render an

inadequate charge satisfactory. For these reasons the Appellant submits that his trial was

46. The DPP accepts that it is well-established that intoxication may be a defence to a crime

of specific intent, such as murder, but that it can never be a defence to a crime of general

or basic intent. It is acknowledged that the Irish courts have emphasised a test of

capacity to form the necessary intent (and it is recognised that this test was utilised in the

within trial) as opposed to a test based on the actual formation of intent. This preference

for a “capacity” test is said to be evident from Attorney General v. Manning, DPP v.

McBride and DPP v. Cotter. Moreover, the Respondent accepts that, by contrast, the UK

courts have moved away from the capacity test and favour instead a test based on the

formation of intention (see R v. Sheehan and Moore, R v. Garlick, R v. Brown and Stratton

and DPP v. Beard [1920] A.C. 479). It is said that the capacity standard has also been

47. The Director adopts the position on this appeal that it is correct that the “capacity” test be

rejected in favour of a standard based on the formation of intent. This, it is submitted, is

precisely what the Court of Appeal has – correctly – done at paragraph 50 of the

judgment under appeal. Thus the Respondent submits that that court has now placed the

formation of intention, rather than the capacity to form an intention, as the critical factor.

It is said that our jurisdiction has therefore joined the trend away from capacity in favour

48. As regards the judge’s charge in this case, the DPP submits that the Court of Appeal was

entirely correct in observing at paragraph 53 of its judgment that the learned trial judge

dealt not only with capacity to form intent but also with the formation of intent. Thus it is

submitted that by stating that intoxication was “part of the mix” in relation to whether a

person is capable of forming the necessary intent, the judge was ipso facto stating that it

is not everything, it is not the critical factor, but that it is in the mix and that proof of

specific intent was necessary before a verdict of guilty of murder could be brought in.

49. Furthermore, the DPP has laid considerable emphasis on counsels’ closing speeches in the

trial. The relevant extracts of the transcript have been set out at some length in the

Director’s submissions. The DPP accepts that the learned judge’s charge on intoxication

was “brief” and “to the point” but submits that the charge must be seen in the overall

context of the trial and the closing speeches, particularly given that the judge had told the

jury that both counsel had “hijacked” his charge by the detail of their closing speeches on

the law. This detail covered the issues of formation of intention and capacity to form the

necessary intent. The DPP says that it was clear that the judge was taking no issue with

any of the points of law stated by counsel or with the content of their speeches. Counsel

dealt comprehensively with intoxication and the trial judge in his charge agreed with the

50. It is therefore submitted that the jury could have been in no doubt that voluntary

intoxication could reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter, that specific intention to

kill or cause serious injury was required, and that intoxication was relevant to the

Appellant’s capacity to form the necessary intent. Although to the point, the re-charge

made clear that intoxication could reduce murder to manslaughter and this is said, on the

run of the case, to have been sufficient. The Director submits that although aware that

intoxication could reduce murder to manslaughter, the jury had heard the admissions of

the Appellant in interview and these pointed to an intention to kill or cause serious injury.

Accordingly, the verdict was in accordance with the evidence at trial.

51. Finally, the DPP points out that the defence raised no further requisitions after the judge’s

re-charge to the jury. If there had been any remaining difficulties, they ought to have

been raised at that point. The DPP argues that the learned trial judge charged the jury

that proof of specific intent was necessary before a verdict of guilty of murder could be

brought in and in his re-charge he set out that intoxication was part of the mix in relation

to whether a person was capable of forming the necessary intention. Thus, although the

charge and re-charge were succinct, they were accurate and, coupled with the detailed

submissions of counsel, with which the trial judge agreed, no unfairness arose. It is

therefore submitted that the trial of the accused on the charge of murder was

52. The first question on which leave was granted asks whether, in directing the jury in a case

where intoxication arises, is it sufficient for the trial judge to direct them that the issue is

determined on the question of whether the accused had the capacity to form the

53. It must be observed at the outset that there is, in truth, very little difference between the

positions adopted by the two parties to the within appeal in relation to this first issue at

the level of legal principle. They have, for the most part, relied in their submissions on the

same extracts from the same decisions, have quoted from the same academic

commentaries on the law, and are generally agreed on what the law should be. There

even appears to be broad acceptance from the parties that the Court of Appeal correctly

stated (or perhaps clarified) the law in relation to charging a jury on the issue of

intoxication at paras. 50 and 52 of its judgment in this case. The point of contention

between the parties is as to whether the trial judge’s charge in this case was satisfactory.

Before turning to the judge’s charge in this particular case, however, it is first necessary

to engage at the level of principle with what the appropriate charge ought to be in cases

where intoxication is raised as a defence to a crime of specific intent.

54. This judgment does not require a full treatment of the law relating to the defence of

intoxication. It is accepted by the parties that intoxication may be a defence to a charge

of specific intent but not to a charge of general intent. Having quoted extensively from

Lord Birkenhead, L.C. in DPP v. Beard [1920] A.C. 479, Lord Elwyn-Jones, in the seminal

case of DPP v. Majewski [1977] AC 443, “[i]t is only in the limited class of cases

requiring proof of specific intent that drunkenness can exculpate. Otherwise in no case

can it exempt completely from criminal liability” (p. 473). Majewski was adopted in DPP v.

Reilly [2005] 3 IR 111 and has since been followed in this jurisdiction.

55. Although it pre-dates Majewski, the following statement of Lord Denning in Bratty v.

Attorney General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 is worth reciting because it

“If the drunken man is so drunk that he does not know what he is doing, he has a

defence to any charge, such as murder or wounding with intent, in which a specific

intent is essential, but he is still liable to be convicted of manslaughter or unlawful

wounding for which no specific intent is necessary …” (p. 410)

56. The first issue on this appeal is as to how the jury should be charged where intoxication is

raised as a defence to a crime of specific intent. The Appellant includes, as a helpful

appendix to his submissions, a Schedule of what are said to be the relevant aspects of

Irish and UK law in this area, together with some academic commentary and criticism. As

earlier noted, the Respondent is largely in agreement with the relevance and import of

these decisions. Both parties accept that the cited case law demonstrates the contrasting

approaches to the proper between charge as between Ireland, on the one hand, and the

57. Three cases are highlighted in support of the proposition that, prior to the within

judgment of the Court of Appeal, at least, the Irish courts have preferred the capacity

approach over a charge centred on the actual formation of intent. The first of these cases

is Attorney General v. Manning [1955] 89 I.L.T.R. 155. The accused was convicted of the

murder of a 65-year old woman; the evidence was that he had consumed around eight

and a half pints of stout over the course of the day. The Court of Criminal Appeal

approved the learned trial judge’s charge to the jury, which had been expressed in the

“The presumption [that a man intends the natural and probable consequences of

his actions] can be rebutted in the case of a man who is drunk, if it is shown that

his mind was so affected by drink as to be incapable of knowing that what he was

doing was likely to cause serious injury … because, unless … that is the situation,

due to drink, you cannot reduce the crime to manslaughter … Drink is no defence if

the only effect of drink is the more readily to allow a man to give way to his

passions. That is insufficient. The effect of drink has to go much further. It has to

go so far as either to render him incapable of knowing what he is doing at all, or, if

he appreciated that, of knowing the consequences or probable consequences of his

58. Also pointed to in this regard is the case of DPP v. McBride [1996] 1 I.R. 312. The

accused was convicted of three separate counts which all related to an alleged assault on

his niece with a pickaxe handle. One of those counts was a charge of causing grievous

bodily harm with intent. The Court of Criminal Appeal in that case took no issue with a

submission that while intoxication is no defence to a criminal charge, it is relevant to

whether the defendant was capable of forming the requisite intent. The Court of Criminal

Appeal upheld a similar direction in DPP v. Cotter (Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal,

judgment of the 28th June, 1999). The accused was convicted of the murder of her

husband. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that “[t]he evidence was not such that the

jury might reasonably have found such drunkenness as materially to impair the capacity

of the applicant to have the intent necessary for murder and a fortiori for manslaughter”

59. The DPP accepts that these cases demonstrate a clear willingness to accept a capacity-

based charge. However, as the cases from the neighbouring jurisdiction illustrate, this is

in contrast with the approach which now finds favour there. The UK courts have moved

away from charging on the basis of capacity to form intent, focussing instead now on the

formation of intent. It should be noted that this was not always the case. In DPP v. Beard

[1920] A.C. 479, for some years the leading case on the defence of intoxication, Lord

“[W]here a specific intent is an essential element in the offence, evidence of a state

of drunkenness rendering the accused incapable of forming such an intent should

be taken into consideration in order to determine whether he had in fact formed the

necessary intention to constitute the particular crime … This does not mean that the

drunkenness in itself is an excuse for the crime but that the state of drunkenness

may be incompatible with the actual crime charged and may therefore negative the

commission of that crime. In a charge of murder based upon intention to kill or to

do grievous bodily harm, if the jury are satisfied that the accused was, by reason of

his drunken condition, incapable of forming the intent to kill or to do grievous bodily

harm, unlawful homicide with malice aforethought is not established and he cannot

be convicted of murder. But nevertheless unlawful homicide has been committed by

the accused, and consequently he is guilty of unlawful homicide without malice

60. The position is now clear, however, that the question for the jury is not whether the

accused was so intoxicated as to lack the capacity to form the specific intent required, but

whether he did in fact form the intent. Dillon (The Law of Intoxication: A Criminal Defence

(Round Hall, Dublin, 2015)) observes at p. 633 that this departure follows from the

seminal decision of the Privy Council in Broadhurst v. The Queen [1964] A.C. 441, where

“The Crown conceded that it is not for an accused to prove incapacity affecting the

intent and that if there is material suggesting intoxication the jury should be

directed to take it into account and to determine whether it is weighty enough to

leave them with a reasonable doubt about the accused’s guilty intent. Their

Lordships approve this concession. The dictum of Lord Birkenhead L.C. [in Beard]

cannot be treated as laying down the law on burden of proof and it is therefore

61. The standard charge in the UK is that set out in R v. Sheehan and Moore (1974) 60 Cr.

App. R. 308. Here the two appellants drunkenly poured petrol over a man and set him

alright, causing his death. As stated by the Court of Appeal at p. 312:

“[I]n cases where drunkenness and its possible effect upon the defendant’s mens

rea is an issue, we think that the proper direction to a jury is, first, to warn them

that the mere fact that the defendant’s mind was affected by drink so that he acted

in a way in which he would not have done had he been sober does not assist him at

all, provided that the necessary intention was there. A drunken intent is

Secondly, and subject to this, the jury should merely be instructed to have regard

to all the evidence, including that relating to drink, to draw such inferences as they

think proper from the evidence, and on that basis to ask themselves whether they

feel sure that at the material time the defendant had the requisite intent.”

62. The matter is clearer still from the judgment in R v. Garlick (1981) 72 Cr. App. R. 291.

The accused was convicted of murder. In his defence he had raised the defence of

intoxication. In his charge, the trial judge had stated, inter alia, as follows:

“To constitute a defence to this charge of murder the defendant must have been so

drunk that either he did not know what he was doing—which is not suggested

here—or that he was so drunk that he was incapable of forming the intention to kill

or do really serious injury or to realise that what he was doing to Beesley would

probably cause him really serious injury at least.” (Emphasis added)

The Court of Appeal criticised the trial judge’s charge on intoxication, with the error

therein being sufficient for the Court of Appeal to quash the conviction for murder and to

substitute instead a conviction for manslaughter. Lord Lane CJ stated as follows:

“The judge was inviting the jury to answer the question whether or not this man

was incapable of forming the intent to kill or do really serious injury … The result

was that the jury, if they were paying attention to this direction, as we must

assume they were, and as they no doubt were, would be asking themselves

whether or not this man was capable of forming the intent to do really serious

bodily harm and as to that, on the facts as we have briefly outlined, there is only

one possible answer. But they were not invited, as they should have been, to

answer the real question, the one I have already pointed out, namely may this

man, by reason of the drink he had taken, not have formed the necessary intent.”

63. In R v. Brown and Stratton [1998] Crim. L.R. 485, the appellants had been convicted of

causing grievous bodily harm with intent. The UK Court of Appeal acknowledged that an

over emphasis on the fact that “a drunken intent is still an intent” could cause a jury to

fail to give proper consideration to the effect of intoxication on a defendant and the issue

of whether or not he had the requisite intent. The Court stated that:

“In a case requiring a specific intent … it is in our view necessary, as the form of

direction in the Crown Court Bench book makes quite clear, to inform the jury that,

in deciding whether the defendant had the specific intent, they must take into

account the evidence that he was drunk, and that if, because he was drunk, the

jury considers that he did not intend or may not have intended to cause the

requisite degree of harm, then the defendant is entitled to be acquitted. For the

judge simply to make clear to the jury that a drunken intent is still an intent was

64. The DPP, in her submissions, has referred to Dillon’s The Law of Intoxication: A Criminal

Defence (Round Hall, Dublin, 2015), noting that the author observes at p. 634 that most

commonwealth jurisdictions have followed suit and rejected the capacity standard,

referencing the Canadian Supreme Court in R v. Robinson [1996] 105 C.C.C. (3d) 97, the

New Zealand case of R v. Kamipeli [1975] 2 N.Z.L.R. 610 and the Australian High Court in

65. It should be noted that McAuley and MacCutcheon note that the capacity standard seems

to have found favour in some jurisdictions in the United States (McAuley and

MacCutcheon, Criminal Liability, (Round Hall, Dublin, 2000) at p. 599). This appears,

however, to be somewhat of an outlier approach as common law jurisdictions go, at least

66. Moreover, if the prevailing trend has been away from capacity-focussed charges in favour

of charges stressing that the actual formation of intent, the academic literature appears

to present cogent reasons as to why this is so. Writing in the Irish Criminal Law Journal in

1991, Professor O’Malley wrote that if the principle that it is for the prosecution to prove

the necessary intent for murder is to be consistently followed, “the question in all cases in

which intoxication is raised should be whether the accused did in fact form the intention …

By adhering to the capacity standard as articulated in Beard and apparently in Ireland in

Manning, one puts the intoxicated offender at an unfair disadvantage because while he

might have had the capacity to form the intent, he may not in fact have formed it. In the

case of a sober person, the question relates to the actual formation of intent” (O’Malley,

“Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility” (1991) I.C.L.J. 86 at 95-96). This passage is

cited, with apparent approval, in McAuley and MacCutcheon’s Criminal Liability at p. 599.

67. Dillon discusses the capacity standard at pp. 630-638 of his work The Law of Intoxication:

A Criminal Defence (op. cit.). At paras. 14–111 to 14–114 the author discusses the

impact of this approach on the presumption of innocence. The following passages make

“14–111 The capacity standard results in a considerably lighter standard of proof for the

prosecution. For offences of specific intent, a person who is capable of forming the

specific intention but who in fact does not, is nevertheless guilty of the crime of

specific intent. Thus, the defendant may be convicted despite the presence of a

reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant did in fact form the specific intent.

14–114 In reality, the capacity standard operates as a device to force the defendant to

prove he or she did not in fact have mens rea. It does this by requiring the

defendant to raise enough evidence to meet either an evidential burden of proof or

a reasonable doubt as to capacity to form mens rea. This quantum of evidence is

onerous, but if met, disproves any case of mens rea. Thus, the defendant’s

obligation to produce evidence of incapacity releases the prosecution from the

obligation to tender evidence of mens rea for crimes of specific intent. It forces the

defendant to prove that he or she did not in fact have the requisite mens rea for

the crime charged. Thus, the burden of proof relating to mens rea has not merely

shifted to the defendant; it requires the defendant to disprove the prosecution’s

68. Charleton, McDermott and Bolger, in Criminal Law (Bloomsbury Professional, Dublin,

“Voluntary intoxication is not, as such, a defence to a criminal charge. In certain

circumstances, evidence of intoxication can establish the absence of the mental

element of a crime … In some circumstances intoxication may be so severe as to

render an accused incapable of forming the requisite mental element. This is not

essential however as the issue is whether the accused did in fact form an intent …

The issue is not so much his capacity to form an intent ... but whether such intent

was or was not, as a matter of fact, present. Capacity is evidence on an issue.

Clearly however, if the evidence establishes a complete lack of capacity in that

69. Coonan and Foley, in their book The Judge’s Charge in Criminal Trials (Round Hall, Dublin,

2008), note the preference of the UK courts for a charge emphasising the formation of

intent, rather than capacity to form intent. In commenting on the Irish authorities, they

“It should be noted that in [Manning] the Court approved the trial judge’s charge

generally and offered no express comment on this particular issue. Further, the

decision in People (DPP) v. Reilly does not appear to address this particular issue in

any detail. It might be noted that none of the Irish cases seem to address this point

directly and it is certainly open to doubt as to whether the Irish courts have

expressly meant, without saying it directly, that intoxication should be treated as

relevant to capacity rather than to actual intention. It is submitted that the

language used in Cotter and Manning ought to be avoided. However, it must be

appreciated that the only authority in Ireland even remotely connected to this point

seems to use the language of capacity and a trial judge may well be reluctant to do

what may appear to be contrary to even latent suggestions in those decisions.”

70. This appears to be a fair and accurate description of the state of play in this jurisdiction,

at least until the judgment of the Court of Appeal in this case. As earlier noted, that Court

made clear at paras. 50 and 52 of its judgment that while capacity will be relevant, the

critical question will always be whether the accused in fact had the requisite specific

intention. As explained by Edwards J at para. 51 of his judgment:

“If an accused was incapable at the material time of forming the required specific

intention then, of course, it follows that he/she could not, in those circumstances,

have actually formed the requisite intention. Accordingly, if a jury, having weighed

the evidence, is left with a reasonable doubt on the issue of capacity, then their

duty must be to acquit. However, the converse does not obtain. Just because an

accused may have been capable of forming the necessary specific intention, it does

not automatically follow that he/she did in fact form that intention.”

71. On the basis of the foregoing paragraphs, I am satisfied that the Court of Appeal was

correct in holding that the critical question is whether the accused in fact had the

requisite specific intention. To the extent that the previous jurisprudence has suggested

that a charge emphasising capacity to intent, rather than actual formation of intent, is

appropriate (and, as observed by Coonan and Foley, it does not seem that it could be said

that this point was ever previously addressed head on, much less definitively decided), it

72. At the level of legal principle, therefore, I agree with the judgment of the Court of Appeal

insofar as it identified the actual formation of intent as being the critical question. This

being the core issue, it is essential that the same be reflected in the judge’s charge. Thus,

in relation to the first question on which leave was granted, the answer is that it is not

sufficient, in directing the jury in a case where intoxication arises, to direct that the issue

is determined on the question of whether the accused had the capacity to form the

necessary intent. For the reasons set out in the preceding paragraphs, it is necessary to

instruct the jury that intoxication is relevant to the issue of whether the accused in fact

73. With that being said, it is necessary to return to the judge’s charge in this case. The

relevant extracts have been quoted above. It will be recalled that the learned judge

initially dealt with intoxication alongside the defence of diminished responsibility.

Following requisition, he made clear that his charge on intoxication was to be regarded as

a freestanding matter. He added to his original charge that intoxication is “part of the mix

in relation to whether a person is capable of forming the necessary intent” (my

74. This, it will immediately be observed, is not in line with what has been declared in this

judgment to be the proper approach to the charge. This was a “capacity” charge, rather

than one based on the actual formation, in fact, of the requisite specific intent.

Nonetheless the DPP submits, and the Court of the Appeal accepted, that when the

judge’s charge is taken in its totality, the law in relation to intoxication was set out

satisfactorily; succinctly, yes, but satisfactorily. In particular, the Court of Appeal

highlighted the correctness of the charge in relation to the requirement that the

prosecution must prove specific intent beyond reasonable doubt; this, coupled with the

charge that intoxication was “part of the mix” as regards intent, was held to be sufficient,

notwithstanding the concession by the DPP and acknowledgement by the Court of Appeal

that the charge on intoxication was brief, economical and to the point.

75. Before addressing the fact that the learned judge’s charge referred to capacity rather

than actual intent, it seems that there is a more fundamental issue with the charge on

intoxication which must be highlighted. In his initial charge, the trial judge accredited to

“the former Chief Justice” the situation that “voluntary intoxication or the taking of drugs

… ‘does not afford a defence to criminal responsibility or any mitigation in one’s

responsibility to society.’” Requisitioned about the fact that he had not addressed

intoxication as an issue separate from the defence of diminished responsibility, the

learned charge proceeded to charge the jury again in almost identical terms: “treat what I

said about intoxication as a freestanding matter … and what I said to you is that a former

Chief Justice had said that the voluntary taking of drink and drugs does not under our law

form a defence or any mitigation in one’s responsibility to society, and that is so and that

is the law.” He then added that intoxication is “part of the mix.”

76. The Court of Appeal was satisfied that this was a correct statement of the law. It may

however be questioned whether this is so as a matter of strict legal principle. The

statement being attributed to the former Chief Justice appears to be a reference to the

judgment of Murray CJ for the Court of Criminal Appeal in DPP v. Adam Keane [2008] 3

I.R. 177. There the learned Chief Justice stated at para. 83 of the report that “[t]he fact

that the respondent took drinks and some drugs so that he could not remember

afterwards what had occurred does not absolve him from criminal responsibility as the

jury correctly concluded in their verdict”. A similar point was repeated at para. 85.

However, the context of those comments must be appreciated. That judgment concerned

sentencing only; it arose out of an appeal by the DPP against what was considered to be

an unduly lenient sentence in a rape case. The accused had consumed alcohol and

ecstasy prior to the offence being committed. Understood in this light, seems that the

comments of Murray CJ are best understood as applicable to intoxication as mitigation,

77. While never a defence to a charge of general/basic intent, the law recognises that

voluntary intoxication may be a defence to a crime of specific intent. In this regard the

extracts from R v. Majewski and Bratty v. Attorney General for Northern Ireland, set out

at paras. 54 and 55, supra, respectively, set out the general principle. It is true that

voluntary intoxication will never operate to exculpate entirely; while it may negate the

requisite specific intent where that is a constituent element of the offence (as with

murder), it is no defence to a lesser crime not requiring such intent (such as

manslaughter) and so even where the intoxication “defence” is made out in respect of the

greater offence, that defence cannot be relied upon in respect of the lesser offence. In

this sense voluntary intoxication may be considered in one respect to be a partial defence

only. Nonetheless, the fundamental point remains, as has freely been acknowledged by

the DPP on two occasions in her written submissions, that voluntary intoxication can be a

78. So viewed, it can be appreciated that the learned judge’s charge to the jury certainly had

the capacity to mislead. As all have acknowledged, his charge on intoxication was, to use

just one of the many descriptions offered, brief. One thing he was emphatically clear on,

however, was that “voluntary taking of drink and drugs does not under our law form a

defence or any mitigation in one’s responsibility to society”. This, he told the jury, “is the

law”. The judge did not mention what is, on the Appellant’s argument, the fundamental

point: that while voluntary intoxication is not a full defence to criminal liability, it could

operate to reduce the offence from murder to manslaughter if the jury had a reasonable

doubt, stemming from his intoxication, as to his specific intent to kill or cause serious

injury to his mother. Thus on one reading of the charge, the trial judge did not adequately

(or indeed at all) inform the jury of the vitally important point that intoxication can be a

partial defence to murder; indeed, on the basis of the words used it would have seemed

reasonable had the jury gotten the impression that intoxication was being ruled out as a

defence altogether. That, it seems, is the unambiguous and plain meaning of what they

79. There are, therefore, two clear issues of concern with the judge’s charge. There is, first,

the fact that the jury were directed that intoxication was “in the mix” in relation to the

Appellant’s capacity to form consent, rather than his actual consent in fact. More

fundamentally, there is the possibility, which cannot be described as remote or fanciful,

that the learned judge’s charge and re-charge gave the jury the impression that

intoxication could not be relied upon as a defence at all, whereas the position in law is

that it could have operated as a defence to murder, albeit not to manslaughter.

80. With the greatest of respect, I do not consider the fact that the learned judge otherwise

charged the jury properly in relation to the onus and standard of proof, the presumption

of innocence, the ingredients of murder, section 4(2) of the 1964 Act, the drawing of

inferences, diminished responsibility and the functions of judge, counsel and jury, can

ameliorate the deficiencies in the charge as regards the defence of intoxication. It is true

that a judge’s charge ought not readily to be approached with a fine-tooth comb, the

individual sentences parsed for any trivial error of law for the accused to cling to and

claim that his trial was not one in due course of law. In my view, however, the particular

81. At this juncture I would have no hesitation in stating that the judge’s charge, taken alone,

was apt to mislead and could certainly have been understood by the jury to mean that

intoxication was no defence for the Appellant at all. This, then, leads on to the second

issue, which is whether regard may be had to counsels’ speeches for the purposes of

supplementing any legal deficiency in the said charge. The relevant extracts of the

speeches are set out above. It is said that it must have been clear to the jury, on the

basis of counsels’ speeches, that intoxication could be a defence to murder. In effect: can

the charge be supplemented, and saved, by a correct recitation of the law by counsel?

82. In my view, the short answer is ‘No’. As a matter of routine practice in criminal trials,

counsel for both sides will tell the jury, during their opening (where applicable) and

closing speeches, that the judge is the master of the law. They will instruct the jury that

they are to take the law from the judge, and that where there is any inconsistency

between what counsel says to be the law and what the judge tells the jury is the law, the

83. This is precisely what happened in this case. In opening the case on Day 1 of the trial,

“The trial judge, Mr Justice Carney, has a different role. Mr Justice Carney is the

judge of law and will direct you as appropriate and when matters arise, if they

arise, in relation to issues of law and you take the law from the trial judge”

84. She very properly reminded the jury of this in her closing speech on Day 8:

“You have already heard that the presiding judge in this case, Mr Justice Carney, is

a judge of law. He will direct you on all matters of law, and you take the law from

his lordship. So if I or [defence counsel] Mr McGuinness say anything which differs

on the law from his lordship, you ignore completely what we say, because the law

is for his lordship and only for his lordship.” (Emphasis added) (Transcript, Day 8,

85. Defence counsel too was clear in telling the jury that they were to take the law from trial

“[I]f I can just start with the remaining procedure in the case: his lordship, at the

end of my speech, will give you directions and you’ve been in court now for more

than a week and you have to listen to his lordship and take what he says as gospel

as far as matters of law are concerned.” (Transcript, Day 8, Page 9, Lines 22-25)

86. Similarly, the judge, in charging the jury in a criminal case, should make this same point

perfectly clear to the jury. The judge should tell the jury that he or she will direct them as

to the legal principles and rules that they ought to observe and apply. It is true of course

that it would be somewhat unusual for the judge to ask the jury specifically to discount

what counsel has stated as being the law. However, the general principle is that the trial

judge will tell the jury that they must take the law from the judge. Again, that is precisely

what happened here. Near the outset of his charge, the learned judge stated as follows:

“Now, I’m going to start with our functions and I’ll start with myself … I’m also the

judge of the law in the case. I tell you what the law is and you take the law from

me and you take the law from me whether you like it or not. You have taken an

oath that that is precisely what you will do. If I wander into error, there is another

court in this building that is only poised to put me right …” (Emphasis added)

Thus it ought to have been abundantly clear to the jury by this point that to the extent

that there was any difference in the statements of the applicable law as between the trial

judge and counsel, it was the law as stated by the trial judge which was to be applied.

87. Indeed, the judge and counsel could hardly have been clearer that the jury were to apply

the law as stated by the judge, not that as stated by counsel. It is in this context that the

second question before the court must be considered. To my mind, it seems inconsistent

that all actors involved should (and did) tell the jury that the law is as stated by the

judge, and the judge alone, and yet if there is a legal deficiency in the judge’s charge,

reliance may then be placed on counsel’s speeches – which the jury were repeatedly told

they were not to look to for the law – to supplement the charge or fill in the gaps. All

parties to this case very appropriately told the jury where the law was to come from; that

being so, where there is an error or gap in the charge, it is difficult to see how a correct

88. Moreover, in my view involving counsel in this fashion would be to create confusion and

not clarity. It would diminish the authority of the judge’s charge and is inconsistent with

the judge telling the jury that he is in charge of the law. Whilst counsel for the DPP

generally makes some reference to the law, there is no obligation on defence counsel to

do so, other than not to misstate it where they do venture into it. While counsel are of

course bound not to mislead the court, it is well within their ethical bounds to argue to

the jury the interpretation of the law which favours their client. The jury look to the trial

judge for neutral guidance as to the legal principles which are to be applied. It would be

to alter the nature of counsels’ role in closing the case if their submissions as to the law

were to be elevated to a position alongside that of the trial judge’s charge. Counsel have

a duty to the court not to misstate the law and no doubt will always endeavour to state it

as accurately as possible, but it is in the nature of advocacy that they will state it in a way

which advances their client’s case. This is inherent in the adversarial nature of the process

and it is for this reason that the jury take their law from a neutral judge who states the

law impartially, without the need to advance the interests of a client.

89. Thus, counsels’ speeches cannot supplant the obligation on the trial judge to correctly

state the law, nor should they be used to augment the charge if, in any appellate setting,

some legal deficiency becomes clear. If there was to be any change in this regard it would

most properly have to be made by statute. Furthermore, to place any reliance on what

counsel said as in effect being incorporated into the judge’s charge would be to impose an

additional obligation or onus on counsel which has had hitherto been the case, and which

90. It may be, as the Court of Appeal said, that a somewhat shorter charge may appear

contextually justified if the law has been accurately set out by counsel and this is

endorsed by the trial judge. However, the jury are told that they must take the law from

the judge, and that is what must happen: the function of charging the jury on the law

cannot be outsourced to counsel. It must come from the judge and so the charge must be

able to withstand scrutiny on its own two feet. If counsel have rehearsed the law ad

nauseum then the judge may fear that the jury will consider it tiresome to hear it again,

but that is what must happen. As noted, it may be reasonable in practice if the judge

adopts a briefer approach to the law as a consequence of counsels’ speeches but only

where the charge itself, taken in isolation, is nonetheless accurate, adequate and

satisfactory. If the trial judge relies on counsels’ speeches to the extent that the

applicable law comes from counsel rather than the judge, that is not sufficient. Moreover,

if there is an error of law in the charge, it must go without saying that this cannot be

91. This last point leads to a further reason, on the run of this particular case, for caution in

importing the closing speeches into the judge’s charge. For the reasons set out above, I

do not consider that this would be permissible even where the hypothetically detailed

exposition of the law in counsel’s speeches was in perfect harmony with the hypothetically

legally accurate but incomplete charge from the judge. That, however, is not what

happened here. Counsel – and defence counsel in particular – stated that intoxication can

be a defence to murder. However, the judge in his charge twice appeared to give the

opposite impression: that intoxication is no defence in law. The jury were twice told this

and stating that intoxication was “part of the mix” in relation to specific intent does not, in

my view, undo the potential impact of this instruction. Thus, this was not a situation

where reliance could be placed on counsels’ speeches to put some flesh on the bones of a

thin charge; in fact, the charge appears to have nullified defence counsel’s statement of

the law, or certainly it was open to that interpretation. If counsels’ speeches were

permitted to be supplementary to or part of the charge, then the jury in this case were

told that intoxication is and is not a defence. That is far from ideal.

92. Of course, in come circumstances it may be that a trial judge’s charge will not be found to

be inadequate by reason of having failed to mention a fact if it was otherwise covered in

counsels’ speeches, particularly if the fact was non-contentious or not in dispute.

However, whatever latitude exists in this regard cannot extend to matters of law, which

93. The point was made in the court below that defence counsel did not pursue any further

requisitions following the judge’s re-charge. The DPP suggested that this meant that

defence counsel was to be taken as being satisfied with the law as stated. Somewhat

unusually, that counsel (who is not now representing the Appellant in this appeal) has

sworn an affidavit explaining why this was so. In short, he avers that, his first requisition

having been largely unsuccessful, he considered it a virtual certainty that the learned

judge would not go any further if requisitioned again. He also states that the decision not

to seek a further re-charge was not intended to gain any perceived tactical advantage.

94. The Appellant, in seeking leave to appeal to this Court, pointed out in his Application for

Leave that the issue of the charge, requisitions and re-charge cannot be divorced from a

number of interjections which demonstrated some judicial irritation at the length of the

trial. The relevant extracts need not be set out again here, but they too contextualise

counsel’s decision not to seek a further requisition. It will hopefully suffice to say that

counsel’s belief that he would have gotten short shrift had he sought a further requisition

is not unfounded. The learned judge, having been requisitioned once, said that he was

“going to deal with this very shortly and simply, I’m not going to make a meal of it.” The

jury were then re-charged as set out earlier. In the circumstances, the Court does not

consider that the fact that the point was not further pursued at that stage precludes the

95. Finally, it should be acknowledged once more that the learned trial judge possessed

exceptional knowledge and experience of the criminal law. It may be that there was a

degree of judicial over-familiarity with the applicable legal principles, which resulted in the

jury not getting as full an explanation of the law from the judge as the circumstances

required. Whatever the reason for it, I am not satisfied that the learned trial judge in his

charge adequately set out the applicable law for the jury. He directed them that

intoxication was “in the mix” in relation to capacity to form consent, whereas he ought to

have directed them that it was relevant to the actual formation of intent in fact; more

fundamentally, the learned judge instructed the jury that intoxication is never a defence

in law. The fact that defence counsel explained that it could be a defence to murder but

not manslaughter is not sufficient to save the charge, given the roles of counsel and trial

judge and the repeated instructions to the jury to take the law from the judge alone. It

was for the learned judge to explain to the jury that intoxication may be a defence to

96. Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, the trial of the Appellant on the charge of

murder was unsatisfactory, unsafe and not in accordance with law. I would allow the

appeal and quash the Appellant’s conviction for murder. Notwithstanding, I remain

mindful that this is a case in which a plea to manslaughter was offered and rejected in

advance of trial. Whilst it may be that a retrial is now required, the Court will first hear

from the parties on the issue of the appropriate order to be made on foot of this

Post Scriptum: Having discussed the issue with the parties, counsel on behalf of the

appellant accepted that the plea to manslaughter, offered on arraignment, constituted a

judicial admission and accordingly, stood as valid. Consequently, the indictment has been

adjourned to the next list in the Central Criminal Court to await the decision of the DPP as

to whether to accept the plea, or to seek a retrial on the murder charge.

Result: Appeal allowed

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