Jersey Unreported Judgments

Debt - decision on the quantum of damages

[2023]JRC177

Royal Court

(Samedi)

30 September 2023

Before     :

Sir William Bailhache, Commissioner, and Jurats Le Cornu and Le Heuzé

 

Advocate K. O. Dixon for the Plaintiff.

Advocate L. A. Ingram for the Defendants.

judgment

the COMMISSIONER:

Introduction

1.        On 15 May 2023, a preliminary judgment was handed down by this Court (Forward Group Limited v Balfour Investments Limited and Ors [2023] JRC 077) (the "Judgment") in respect of the Plaintiff's claims for outstanding fees alleged to be due by the Defendants in respect of the provision by the Plaintiff of trust company business services, either directly or through four wholly owned subsidiaries within its group.  It is not necessary to repeat the provisions of that judgment, which has been published, save insofar as is material for this judgment.  The definitions used in the Judgment are carried forward in this judgment.

2.        The nature of the contractual arrangements between the Plaintiff and the various Defendants is set out in the Judgment.  As asserted by the Plaintiff, the contractual arrangements were particularly complex and were to be drawn from five different documents.  The Court, however, found (at [66] of the Judgment) that, whatever was the position before the PTC Agreement was executed in June 2019, that document novated the previous agreement and represented the basis upon which the fees and charges were thenceforth agreed.  Furthermore, although the PTC Agreement was executed only by Staznet, Mr Halabi, and the Plaintiff, Mr Halabi accepted in his evidence that each of the other corporate Defendants was bound by the contract reflected in the PTC Agreement.

3.        One of the issues in dispute in December 2022 was the issue of whether there was a firm agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendants that additional bookkeeping to complete the historical accounting work in respect of financial years to 5 April 2018 should be completed by 31 December 2020.  At [78] of the Judgment, the Court found that there was no such agreement, which therefore had the consequence that some fees for this work could properly be charged after that date.  However, the Court made it plain that the quantum of fees claimed was a different matter.

4.        At [91], the Court noted that there was no sign of any paid invoices in the bundles of documents put before us, and that Mr Halabi had not been challenged in his evidence to the effect that the Defendants had paid some £340,000 for six months work.  At [92], we noted that the financial books of the individual Defendant companies had been neglected in the past and required a good deal of work to be put in order.  That work was to be charged as an additional fee and did not fall within the annual charge.

5.        We referred to the contractual position under Clause 4.2.3 of the PTC Agreement that it was the Plaintiff's responsibility to ensure that its work was done in a timely and efficient manner and we referred also to Article 29 of the Supply of Goods and Services (Jersey) Law 2009, the effect of which when applied to the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendants was that there was a warranty by the Plaintiff that the services which it was supplying would be carried out within a reasonable time. 

6.        Having concluded that the work on the historical accounts was or should have been completed by 31 January 2021, we felt that we had insufficient information to assess whether the contractual or statutory warranty could be asserted by the Defendants in respect of that work, even if executed before 31 January 2021. 

7.        At [98], this culminated in the following passage:

"Because Mr Halabi raises the reasonableness of the overall charges in his pleading, this is one of the key points at issue remaining between the parties.  In our view there was insufficient attention given to the issue by either counsel in summing up.  Accordingly, we invite counsel to make written submissions within the next twenty-one days following the handing down of this interim judgment on the quantum which can be justified on the evidence, having regard to the comments we have made about the effect of Article 29 of the 2009 Law and the charges levied both before and after 31 January 2021 in respect of both historic bookkeeping and the preparation of accounts and the administration charges generally which are in issue on the pleadings."

8.        Both the Plaintiff and the Defendants have responded to that invitation.  In the case of the Plaintiff, Advocate Dixon submitted a nine page document containing forty-nine paragraphs of comment and submissions.  In addition, the Plaintiff put forward a second affidavit from Mr Alun Griffiths, to which was exhibited many pages of invoices, timesheets, disbursements and summaries.  The majority of this material was before the Court last December, albeit we had then been referred to very little of it.  In his affidavit, Mr Griffiths referred to [98] of the Judgment, and the invitation to the parties to compose their submissions "on the quantum which can be justified on the evidence".  Rightly he expressed the view that the parties were not intended to introduce any new or fresh evidence at this stage.

9.        On behalf of the Defendants, Advocate Ingram filed twenty-four pages of written submissions amounting to eighty-seven paragraphs.  Attached to his submissions were some fee analyses for the months December 2020 through to April 2021.  We have not counted the number of pages but they cannot be far short of five hundred pages of spreadsheet in respect of the different charges raised by the Plaintiff.  Although this was an intimidating amount of material, it was sensibly presented - on a month by month basis, the spreadsheets were split into three sections - the first section showing the amount claimed by the Plaintiff against each of the Defendants; the second section showing those charges which the Defendants considered were unreasonable and / or were not to be allowed because the work ought to have been completed earlier; and the third section showed the figures to which the Defendants did not object.  Although the material was to some extent new,  it was all based on material which was before the Court in December.  However, at the end of this bundle of paperwork were some further emails between the parties which were not before the Court last year.

10.      Both parties therefore have largely complied with the obligation not to adduce fresh evidence.  To the extent that each party has produced some evidence which was not originally before us, they would theoretically need to apply on the usual basis for the late application of evidence, their cases having been closed.  However, for three reasons, we do not object to any new evidence being submitted, even though there will not have been the opportunity for the parties to cross-examine on it.  The first is that the fresh evidence is limited in extent, and it would be contrary to the overriding objective to have a further hearing to establish whether it should be admitted and if so whether an opportunity should be given to the other party to cross-examine on it or raise further submissions on it.  The second is that in order to do justice between the parties, it seems to us to be appropriate to allow the evidence in.  The third reason is that it could be argued that notwithstanding the language of [98] of the Judgment, it is entirely natural that fresh submissions might need to be supported by evidence which had not originally been thought to be necessary but was now considered relevant.

The Plaintiff's submissions

11.      The total claimed by the Plaintiff was £112,019.29, plus interest over the Bank of England Base rate calculated at 2% per month until payment, and management charges in pursuing the debt.  Somewhat extraordinarily, the Plaintiff still seeks a judgment debt in the amount of £112,019.29 despite accepting that it should give credit in the sum of £3,825 in respect of the cost of confirmation statement fees of £225 per Jersey incorporated company, payable to the Jersey Financial Services Commission, which in fact the Plaintiff never paid.  Indeed, in calculating the interest it claims, the Plaintiff provided two calculations, first on the outstanding invoices and second on those invoices as reduced by the credit notes.  In our view, that is plainly wrong - the amount which was claimed should have been reduced by the amount of the credit, and the Court makes an assessment of whether the amount claimed, as reduced, was correct.

12.      We feel constrained to add that although the paperwork supplied by the Plaintiff has been extensive, there is no obvious method to its presentation.  The invoices are not in defendant order, nor indeed always in date order.  The aged debt schedules include references to entities which are not defendants.  The underlying time sheets contain references to non-chargeable time and it is not always clear whether this time has actually been charged.  The court does not consider that it is its task to put the financial records in an easily comprehensible state.  Where matters are unclear, the court has applied a broad brush and where there are references to debts due to the Plaintiff by entities which are not defendants, these have been disregarded.

13.      In summary, as to the primary debt, the total fees claimed fall into these categories:

(i)        Costs of general administration in the sum of £66,602.77.

(ii)       Historic bookkeeping costs in the sum of £5,927.50.

(iii)      Historic accounts (preparation and review) costs in the sum of £17,500.

(iv)      What is described as the "remedial work project", namely all the work undertaken by the Plaintiff in checking, remedying and making good the financial ledgers which the Plaintiff had received from the previous administrators, that category of work reflecting £23,437.50 still unpaid.

(v)       The cost of bookkeeping for current accounts, which is to say after 5 April 2019 in the sum of £14,340; and

(vi)      The remaining items, namely the ISE registration of £150, the Jersey tax work of £5,600 (a charge of £300 per Jersey company) and disbursements of £1,971.02.

The general administrative charges

14.      The submissions made by the Plaintiff in respect of these various expenses did set out clearly the work to which the charges related.  Thus, the "general administration" charge related to all of the fee earner time which was logged for any general administration of the group structure (i.e. "activity" or transactional work), and does not include any bookkeeping, the preparation of any accounts, updating or closing of financial ledgers and / or the review of any accounts.  The submission was that because the Defendants had paid in full invoices from July 2020 to November 2020 at much the same rate, the Defendants should be taken to have accepted the fees for the later period which were not disputed. 

15.      We are generally not impressed with that submission.  There are three reasons for this:

(i)        On the assumption of the work from the previous administration, it was to be expected that more time would be expended in general administrative work than subsequently would be the case.  The lack of familiarity with what was described as a complex structure would certainly be one reason. 

(ii)       There is no evidence as to what, if any, transactional work there was in the six months to November 2020, although Mr Voisin told us in his evidence that there was some, but it does not seem that there was an enormous amount of transactional work after November 2020.  In the circumstances, one cannot make the assumption that the general administration charges should broadly be at the same overall monthly rate.

(iii)      Although this point has not been taken by the Defendants, there is in our view a real tension between the annual fee and the time charged under the heading of general administration.  Taking one example, there is an entry in Cobra Group Holdings Limited, put down to general administration, for Mr Griffiths to attend a board meeting as director.  We have not examined all the entry lines of the spreadsheets, but we assume that that was not an uncommon entry.  However, the annual fee includes a fee for acting as director.  Any standard employment contract for the appointment of a director would assume implicitly if not state explicitly as part of the director's duties that he attend directors' meetings; and his remuneration would naturally cover the performance of that duty.  There is therefore an element of double counting in that respect.  Although we have taken just one example, we consider that there are very many examples indeed of such double counting.  It is an important reason which supports our conclusions as to the figure for which judgment should ultimately be given, which is set down below.

Historic bookkeeping

16.      The Plaintiff submits that the amount claimed of £5,927 in this respect was reasonable.  It relies on our conclusion that the work on the historic accounts was or should have been completed by 31 January 2021 at the latest and it asserts that the work involved in ensuring that all the financial ledgers for the different entities for the financial years ending 5 April 2019 was in fact complete by 31 January, which was within a reasonable period of time. 

17.      Thus it is said that the amount claimed is a reasonable sum.

18.      There are three difficulties with this approach.  The first is that in the Judgment, we expressly left over for further argument the question as to whether the completion of the work by 31 January 2021 amounted to a breach of the contractual or statutory warranty.  To say that the work should have been completed by 31 January 2021 at the latest, does not indicate that leaving the work over for completion by that date was necessarily reasonable.  The two are quite different concepts in this sense - completion of the work after 31 January would be too late and therefore unquestionably unreasonable, but it does not follow that completion before 31 January was by definition reasonable. 

19.      The second difficulty is that in fact some historic bookkeeping work was charged in the period after 31 January, as the Defendants point out in their contentions.  

20.      The third difficulty is that one cannot look at the outstanding claim of £5,927.50 without also having regard to the overall claim for historic bookkeeping work.  This is linked to the third issue, namely the time and cost of preparation and review of historic accounts. 

Preparation of historic accounts

21.      There seems no doubt that the evidence shows that the first drafts of the historic accounts were ready by or before 10 December 2020.  We  understand that the Plaintiff might not be able to finalise those first drafts unless and until any outstanding questions had been resolved, particularly because the inter-company payments within the group structure might well be affected.  Nonetheless, it does not seem to us that it would be possible to prepare a first draft of the accounts for the years prior to the year ending 5 April 2019 without at least having completed the overwhelming majority of the bookkeeping entries that would go with the preparation of those accounts.  The Plaintiff asserts that the first drafts of forty-eight of the sixty-two historic accounts were ready by 30 November 2020.

22.      In the circumstances, although it is true that no claim for historic accounts preparation is made in respect of the period after 31 January 2021, the amount claimed for December 2020 and January 2021 in the sum of £3,920 is not obviously reasonable in the circumstances that the first draft of the accounts was ready by 10 December 2020.

23.      The second element of the charge claimed under this heading is the work of the directors in reviewing the accounts.  The point has not been taken before us, but as we have mentioned already, the directors have fiduciary duties in relation to the company which would include the obligation to ensure the company's books and records are correct, at least to the best of their knowledge, information and belief.  The claim for director's time in reviewing each set of accounts raises the question of whether that time ought to fall within the overall annual charge for providing a director.  We have not made any deduction because this point has not been taken by the Defendants, but, as previously reflected in [14(3)] above, we have taken this element into account in our overall assessment of what would be a fair outcome.

24.      The final element of this part of the claim is the sum of £2,680 for "closing down" the financial ledgers for one particular year for each entity so that the relevant balances could then be carried over to form the basis of the starting point for the following financial year.  It was said that this could and did, as one would expect, take place in February 2021. 

25.      It is worth reflecting what work is actually involved in this exercise.  In order to prepare the accounts, the financial ledgers would show what figure had to be carried forward to the next year.  Our assessment is that the exercise could be completed by a moderately competent trust officer within an hour and it follows that to charge fifteen hours of a trust officer's time is manifestly unreasonable.

The remedial work project

26.      The Plaintiff's fourth submission concerns the timing and cost of the entire "remedial work project" of which £23,437.50 remains unpaid.  The Plaintiff's contention is that the overall charge for this project was reasonable because in October 2020, an oral estimate was given by the Plaintiff to the Defendants that the exercise would cost "roughly 100k".  In fact, the total charge is £102,922.50.  We do not think there is much in this point and we consider the reasonableness of the total claim to be a distinct concept from an off the cuff oral estimate, the detail of which has not been supplied to us.  The closeness of the figures could be entirely fortuitous; it could be the result of a careful assessment, although there is no evidence to that effect; it could be that the oral estimate was deliberately pitched at a higher level, out of understandable caution, than was anticipated to be the likely true cost.

27.      Next it is said that as there were some sixty-two historic accounts to be prepared, a per unit cost of £1,660, or roughly eight hours of a fee earner's time, is clearly not unreasonable.  That may or may not be a fair contention.  We do not feel we have sufficient information to be able to judge it.  Clearly in respect of some of the companies there were transactional costs which would have been incurred, and these undoubtedly would lead to more work in the preparation of the accounts.  On the other hand, we were told by Mr Halabi in his evidence which in this respect was not challenged that a number of the companies were dormant or merely held an English property where the annual income and outgoings were straightforward.  Accordingly, we do not feel able on the evidence to make any assessment as to whether a per unit cost of £1,660 is or is not appropriate.

28.      Thirdly in this connection it is asserted by the Plaintiff that there has been an overall write-off of time recorded against the particular Defendants - the Plaintiff asserts it has absorbed the cost of a considerable amount of general work on the group structure during its time as the administrator.  The basis for the Plaintiff's contention that its overall recovery rate (time spent against activity fees billed) was 57.8% is new material in a schedule to the recent affidavit of Mr Griffiths on which he has not been cross-examined and which is untested.  In any event, the writing-off of non-chargeable time does not seem to us to be a reason to justify more time being taken for chargeable matters.  There is therefore nothing in this contention.

The current set of accounts

29.      We turn next to the timing and cost of the bookkeeping for current accounts after 5 April 2019, the claim being in the sum of £14,340.  Unlike the work done for the preparation of the accounts for the year ended 5 April 2020, the bookkeeping charges for the year ended 5 April 2019 did not fall within the annual responsibility fee.  It is said that all of the sums claimed under this heading relate to fee earner time which was incurred on or before 31 March 2021. 

30.      We have noted carefully the Plaintiff's contentions under this heading.  We do not feel able to say that these contentions can be justified by the evidence we have heard; which is not to say that necessarily the Plaintiff is wrong in the submissions made.  It is simply that the evidence, as opposed to submission, is not there to justify the claim. 

31.      The Plaintiff submits that the claim represents two years, less six days, of bookkeeping across twenty-three entities, equivalent to £311 per entity.  We have some difficulty in accepting this.  Schedule 3 to Mr Griffith's recent affidavit - on which as we have said he has not been tested - reveals twenty entities under the column for accounts status as at 5 April 2019, of which five already had their accounts signed off at the time of takeover by the Plaintiff. 

ISE and tax work

32.      The final part of the Plaintiff's claim concerns the ISE registration of £150, the "Jersey tax work" of £5,600 and the disbursements of £1,972 which it is said have not been challenged.  The lack of challenge is undeniable; but we cannot help noting that under Schedule 1 Section C of the PTC Agreement, at Clause 19, the obligation of the Plaintiff was to prepare and file declarations, applications and returns required for taxation purposes in Jersey.  It is not apparent to us that the work which is the subject of this charge falls outside the annual fee, although that may be so.  It would take further evidence and an oral hearing with cross-examination to resolve the issue and for the reasons we have given earlier we do not think that would be proportionate at this stage.  However, in reaching our overall conclusions, we have put the uncertainty around this factor into the melting pot for our assessment.

The submissions of the Defendant

33.      We turn next to the written submissions of the Defendants.  As we have indicated, a number of points have not been taken by the Defendants which, so it seems to us, could have been taken, or if they were taken, it was not made expressly clear that that was the position.  An example of the latter point is that, when examining the line by line charges, many of them seem to relate to entities which are not Defendants - for example, Staznet Trust Company Limited was actioned as the Eleventh Defendant as trustee of the Ironzar VI Trust.  We think it is likely that Staznet Trust Company Limited was also the trustee of the Ironzar IV, V, VII and VIII Trusts as well - but it is not actioned in that capacity and the only Defendant who might face responsibility in this connection would therefore be Mr Halabi pursuant to his guarantee.  However, the PTC Agreement, on which the Plaintiff must rely to establish that Mr Halabi's guarantee applies, does not name the trusts of which the PTC is asserted to be trustee.  We think it is highly likely that Staznet Trust Company Limited was in fact the trustee of the different Ironzar Trusts as well as the Interzar Trust, but there is a technical gap in the documentary evidence which has been presented and the Trusts, other than the Ironzar VI Trust, have not been actioned.  Jersey law does require that unless the right be waived, the principal debtor must be actioned at the same time as the guarantor, and there seems to us to be a potential argument that Clause 17.3.3 of the PTC Agreement is not sufficiently precise to amount to a waiver by Mr Halabi of that right. The Defendants do seem to have addressed that argument by omitting the sums claimed in respect of non-defendants from their Schedule, but it is not apparent from the contentions filed that this argument was being run. As a result, the Court had to conduct an amount of cross checking of figures which ought to have been avoidable.

34.      We generally accept the submissions which the Defendants have filed.  Save as follows in this judgment, where there might have been uncertainty or argument, or where further evidence or argument might have been necessary to reach a firm conclusion (which we do not think would be proportionate given the amounts involved) any doubts or uncertainties should in our view be resolved in favour of the Defendants for the reasons given at [14(3)], [22], and [32] above.  We are unsurprised by Mr Halabi's evidence that he considered an enormous amount had already been paid to the Plaintiff in fees, and we recognise the accuracy of Mr Voisin's evidence that the Plaintiff saw the taking on of this business, notwithstanding what he alleged as Mr Halabi's reputation for being difficult over fees, as "a commercial opportunity".  We cannot save Mr Halabi from the terms of the contract he made, which seem very heavily weighted in favour of the Plaintiff and in terms of the service offered could be said to confuse time spent with value. But where there is a doubt, we can take that background as weighing in favour of the Defendants, because in our judgment that reflects the justice of the case.

35.      Notwithstanding these last comments, the submissions of the Defendants we do not accept are those set out at paragraphs 81 to 84 of those contentions.  On instructions, Advocate Ingram contends that the Plaintiff failed to file tax returns during January or February 2021 and only provided financial statements for the Defendants for the period ending 5 April 2020.  This would have allowed for the filing of 2020 company tax returns but, as this was not completed, the Defendants have suffered penalties and additional fees running into thousands of pounds. 

36.      Furthermore, it is contended by Advocate Ingram that no orderly or complete handover has taken place, notwithstanding the charges which have been levied under Clause 9.3 of the PTC Agreement for handover.  He is instructed that the Plaintiff has rejected any cooperation to provide company registers for the Seventh Defendant, Chesterhill Properties Limited.

37.      In our judgment, these are not complaints that we can deal with.  The matters have not been pleaded and there is no evidence to support the contentions which are made.  There has been no application to adduce evidence on the usual basis, namely that it is material and was unavailable at the material time.  The assertions made by Advocate Ingram, like Schedules 3 and 4 attached to Mr Griffith's affidavit, have not been subject to any form of testing, rigorous or otherwise.  We do not feel that we can take these questions into account and we do not do so.

Decision

38.      There is inevitably something of a broad brush to our appraisal of the correct order to make.  This is inevitable because we have to make the best we can of the records put before us and because we are making reductions for what we regard as time unreasonably spent.  Doubts have generally been resolved in favour of the Defendants for the reasons given above, especially so where we think there is confusion between what time should be charged and what work is covered by the annual fee.  We have broadly taken the figures from Advocate Ingram's 3^rd Schedule removing the charges to which he has objected, and in addition have deducted the credits of £225 reflected in the credit notes dated 17 August 2021. We have added into the award against Mr Halabi the sum of £8,000.00 awarded by [102] to [105] of the Judgment.  We resolve the issues left over by [98] of the Judgment by reducing the Plaintiff's claims for all the reasons set out in the Judgment and in this additional judgment.  Staznet is responsible for payment to the Plaintiff jointly and severally with each of the other individual Defendants (other than Mr Halabi) in respect of the outstanding sums awarded against those other Defendants (other than Mr Halabi) pursuant to the PTC Agreement, and Mr Halabi is responsible for payment of the same sums jointly and severally with Staznet and accordingly and we award to the Plaintiff damages as follows:

(i)        As against Balfour Investments Limited the sum of £3,574.38

(ii)       As against Beavron Investments Limited in the sum of £4,878.13

(iii)      As against Berkeley Square Investments Limited in the sum of £6,971.88

(iv)      As against Buckingham Corporations Limited in the sum of £1,690.01

(v)       As against Cheddington Lodge Limited in the sum of £2,231.88

(vi)      As against Chermonx Limited in the sum of £3,500.01

(vii)     As against Chesterhill Properties Limited in the sum of £4,424.38

(viii)    As against Cobra Group Holdings Limited in the sum of £14,128.76

(ix)      As against Cobra Investments Limited in the sum of £1,856.88

(x)       As against Hemel Holdings Limited in the sum of £11,238.76

(xi)      As against Staznet Trust Company Limited as trustee of The Ironzar VI Trust in the sum of £2,684.38

(xii)     As against Staznet Family Office Ltd (formerly Mayfair Holdings Limited) in the sum of         £2,081.88

(xiii)    As against Mentmore Greenland Limited in the sum of   £1,161.88

(xiv)    As against Roxmar Investments Limited in the sum of £3,734.38

(xv)     As against Samja Marine Holdings Limited in the sum of £12,780.88

(xvi)    As against Samuel Holdings Limited in the sum of £2,684.38

(xvii)   As against Staznet Trust Company Limited in the sum of £87,859.75

(xviii)  As against Stone Lodge Limited in the sum of £2,820.01

(xix)   As against The Mentmore Estate Limited in the sum of £775.63

(xx)    As against Mr Halabi, as guarantor and as the principal under the PTC Agreement, jointly and severally with Staznet Trust Company Limited the aggregate of the aforementioned sums plus the sum awarded by paragraphs [102] to [105] of the Judgment  in an amount of £8,000.00 making a total of £95,859.75.

Interest

39.      In its Amended Particulars of Claim, the Plaintiff claims interest pursuant to contract or in the alternative pursuant to the Interest on Debts and Damages (Jersey) Law 1996 (the "1996 Law"):

"Claim for interest

28. Sub-clause 15.5 of the Terms states "Forward reserves the right to change interest at a rate of 2% over the base rate published at that time by the Bank of England calculated per month on fees outstanding beyond the 15 day period until each payment is made (after as well as before judgment)," The Plaintiff exercises that right and claims interest pursuant to the Terms or further or alternatively pursuant to the Interest on Debts and Damages (Jersey) Law 1996."

40.      A full review of the Court's approach to the awards of interest is to be found in Doorstop Limited v Gillman [2012] (2) JLR 297.  We have noted that the Court retains a discretion in the award of interest both before and after the termination of the contract and we have applied the principles set out in that case.  We consider that, as the terms of the contract permit the charging of interest, we can in principle award interest under the contract, but we find the contractual rate at 2% over base rate per month to be immoderate and unreasonable in amount, especially so as the Plaintiff is not in business as a moneylender.  We do not consider it reasonable to allow interest on the sum awarded to the Plaintiff by [102] to [105] of the Judgment.  Having regard to all factors including the terms of the contract (not least the oppressive rate of 2% per month over Bank of England base rate), the fact the Plaintiff terminated the contract, the claims for fees which we have not found established, the overall uncertainties mentioned in this judgment and indeed all the evidence we have heard, we do not, in the exercise of our discretion, award the Plaintiff the interest which it seeks.  We do not consider it would be just to do so.  For ease of calculation and in the interests of justice, we will award interest on the total sum outstanding at a fixed rate from 1 April 2019 until 28 days after this judgment or payment of the debt, whichever be the earlier.  Given the changes in base rate we award interest at 3 and ½% per annum on each of the sums which are awarded above for the period stated.  We consider this rate is a fair compromise between the rate which the Plaintiff would have been able to secure had it placed the fees on deposit and the rate which it would have been expected to have negotiated on a medium term overdraft or loan as at 1 April 2021.  Insofar as the judgment against Mr Halabi is concerned, the total interest figure from 1 April 2021 to 28 October 2023 is £7,945.77.  Interest is not awarded on interest and there will therefore be no compounding.  The calculation is a flat calculation on the amount outstanding, calculated on an annual basis, but for the period in question.

41.      If the amount of the award of damages and the interest thereon is not paid within the course of the next twenty-eight days following this judgment being handed down, the Court awards interest under the 1996 Law at the Court rate on the sums outstanding from that date until payment.  Other than the figures actually given in respect of interest due by Mr Halabi, the parties are directed to agree a schedule of interest having regard to our comments, with liberty to apply.

42.      We will hear submissions on costs.

Authorities

Forward Group Limited v Balfour Investments Limited and Ors [2023] JRC 077. 

Supply of Goods and Services (Jersey) Law 2009. 

Interest on Debts and Damages (Jersey) Law 1996. 

Doorstop Limited v Gillman [2012] (2) JLR 297.