1. This is an application for judicial review of the decision by a resident magistrate sitting in Belfast Magistrates’ Court on 12 November 1999, whereby he ordered, pursuant to the provisions of the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965 (the 1965 Act), that the applicant be delivered into the custody of a member of the Garda Síochána at some convenient point of departure from the United Kingdom to the Republic of Ireland (the Republic).

2. The applicant appeared at the court on foot of three warrants to arrest issued by a judge of the District Court of the Dublin Metropolitan District. The charges with which they were concerned were (a) having an imitation firearm with intent to cause injury to or incapacitate or intimidate a person (b) assault on one Joseph Kinsella (c) having an imitation firearm with intent to commit an indictable offence, all on 24 June 1992. The warrants were accompanied by the requisite certificates, and no point was taken on behalf of the applicant about the correctness of the documentation grounding the application to the magistrates’ court.

3. Formal depositions were made by an officer of the RUC and a detective garda of the Garda Síochána. No reference was made at the hearing to the possibility that the applicant might be prosecuted or detained in respect of any other offence, and the applicant’s solicitor did not direct any questions to the officers about such a possibility. The solicitors acting for the applicant then entered into correspondence with the Garda Síochána on this question, and it transpired that the police in the Republic did want to interview him in relation to the disappearance of Charles Brooke Pickard in County Kerry on or about 26 April 1991. The circumstances in which it was desired to interview him were set out in a communication dated 10 January 2000 from the Garda Síochána to the applicant’s solicitors:

4. The applicant commenced proceedings for habeas corpus, which were adjourned for a period, and then the court granted bail to the applicant. We were not concerned with the habeas corpus proceedings in the hearing before this court, only the application for judicial review commenced on 28 January 2000. The grounds on which the applicant seeks relief, as set out in paragraph 3 of his statement, are as follows:

5. The argument presented by Mr O’Rourke on behalf of the applicant turned on the interpretation of the 1965 Act and the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978. Section 1(1) of the 1965 Act (as amended) provides for the endorsement of warrants, the inter-State process which operates between the United Kingdom and the Republic, instead of the ordinary system of extradition (although for convenience we shall refer to the process in this judgment as extradition):

6. Section 2(1) provides for the person concerned to be brought before a magistrates’ court, which must order his extradition if the warrant is in order:

7. Section 2(2) then sets out a number of circumstances in which the court is to refuse to make an order for extradition:

8. In 1978 Parliament passed the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 (the 1978 Act), in order to give effect to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, to which the United Kingdom and the Republic are signatories. Section 1, as amended by the Extradition Act 1989, reads as follows:

9. Schedule 1 to the 1978 Act sets out a list of offences which are not to be regarded as offences of a political character, which includes murder, kidnapping and false imprisonment, together with attempts and conspiracy to commit any of the scheduled offences.

10. The first issue which arises is whether the applicant has been “accused” of the offence of false imprisonment, which is material in order to determine the application of the 1978 Act. Although the point was not argued by Mr O’Rourke on behalf of the applicant, we think that it merits some consideration. Section 1(2)(a) of the 1978 Act provides that for the purposes of the 1965 Act no offence to which that section applies is to be regarded as an offence of a political character. By section 1(1) the section applies to any offence of which a person “is accused or has been convicted outside the United Kingdom”. It follows accordingly that for the exception to section 2(2)(b) of the 1965 Act to operate the person whose extradition is sought must have been “accused” of one of the offences specified in the Schedule to the 1978 Act.

11. The Garda have stated that it is their intention to arrest the applicant for the offence of false imprisonment of Mr Pickard and interview him. We have given consideration to the point whether he has been “accused” of false imprisonment, so as to trigger the operation of the 1978 Act. We have come to the conclusion that he has been so “accused”, although he has not been charged with the offence, for the following reasons:

12. We conclude for these reasons that the applicant would constitute a person “accused” of the offence of false imprisonment for the purpose of the 1978 Act.

13. The main point argued on behalf of the applicant was whether on its true construction the 1978 Act applies to offences within section 2(2)(b) of the 1965 Act or whether it is confined to offences to which section 2(2)(a) applies. Mr O’Rourke submitted that the effect of the wording of section 2(3) of the 1978 Act was to confine the operation of the Act to the latter paragraph. Section 1(2) of the 1978 Act provides that for the purposes mentioned in subsection (3) no offence to which the section applies is to be regarded as an offence of a political character. By subsection (3)(c) it is provided that those purposes are those of the 1965 Act --

14. Subsection (4) then reads:

15. The submission on behalf of the applicant was that by defining the purposes in terms of the warrants the legislature intended to confine the operation of the 1978 Act in relation to the 1965 Act to cases falling within section 2(2)(a) of the latter Act. In respect of other offences, those falling within section 2(2)(b), the 1978 Act did not apply and accordingly the person whose extradition was sought must have the opportunity to establish that the other offences are of a political nature. In order to do so, he must be informed of the intention of the police in the Republic to arrest him in connection with any such offence, so that he can seek to establish its nature. When this information was withheld from him and from the court, he was deprived of the opportunity to investigate the issue through cross-examination of the officers who gave evidence. Counsel submitted that deprivation of this opportunity was unfairness of such a degree as to vitiate the proceedings (though he did not contend that it amounted to an abuse of the process of the court).

16. The structure of section 1(3) and (4) of the 1978 Act is that subsection (3)(c) commences by defining the particular purposes of the subsection as being those of the 1965 Act, then limits the definition by reference to any warrants covered by an order under subsection (4). Subsection (4) empowers the Secretary of State to make an order directing that subsection (3)(c) shall apply to certain warrants, which must be (i) of the kind mentioned in section 1(1)(a) of the 1965 Act, and (ii) issued while the order is in force.

17. Mr O’Rourke’s contention was that the focus on warrants in section 2(3)(c) and section 2(4) of the 1978 Act was intentional, to differentiate in section 2(2) of the 1965 Act between the offence specified in the warrant and other offences for which the person might be prosecuted or detained, or alternatively that whatever the legislature intended the wording of the 1978 Act had that consequence. We are unable to see any convincing reason why the legislature should have wished to draw such a distinction. Once it decided to limit the category of offences of a political nature by excepting a large range of crimes so that it was no longer possible to resist extradition in respect of these crimes, there is no logic in imposing such a limit in respect of the crimes for which the warrants were issued and not in respect of other crimes for which the person might be prosecuted. It was suggested that a person whose extradition is sought required protection against unscrupulous use by the requesting state of the extradition process to lay hold of him to prosecute him for purely political crimes for which he would not be extradited, but that protection is afforded by the rule of specialty. We accordingly cannot accept that the legislature deliberately made the distinction suggested.

18. Nor do we think that the provisions of the 1978 Act had that effect. The wording is somewhat clumsy in defining the scope of its application by reference to the warrants, when what it really sought to do was to apply the 1978 Act to particular proceedings on foot of the warrants. If the draftsman had used this wording, it would have been more accurate syntax and the meaning would have been incontrovertibly clear. It would be equally clear that both paragraph (a) and paragraph (b) of section 2(2) of the 1965 Act are governed by the provisions of the 1978 Act. One might therefore adopt a purposive construction of the 1978 Act, in the same way as Lord Steyn, with the concurrence of the other members of the House of Lords, did in Re Ismail [1999] 1 AC 320 at 327D, and in section 2(3)(c) and section 2(4) read the words “proceedings on foot of” into the phrase “in relation to any warrant”. We should be prepared if necessary to adopt this purposive construction, but we are of opinion that even if we do not resort to it the applicant’s contention is not well based. Section 2(2)(b) of the 1965 Act refers to “the person named or described in the warrant”, so when the Secretary of State directed that section 2(3)(c) of the 1978 referred to warrants of a certain kind that was sufficient to include section 2(2)(b) of the 1965 Act and apply section 2(3)(c) of the 1978 Act to it.

19. If the provisions of the 1978 Act do not apply to section 2(2)(b) of the 1965 Act, contrary to the opinion which we have expressed, it would be open to the applicant to seek to establish that the offence in connection with which the Garda desire to arrest and question him is a political offence. The phrase “offence of a political character” has, as the commentators state, been found difficult to interpret. Considerable assistance may, however, be obtained for present purposes from the decision of the House of Lords in T v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] AC 742. That case concerned asylum, but it was held that the concept is the same for the purposes of the law of extradition. The definitions of political crime adopted by the members of the House varied somewhat, but the present case would not in our judgment come within any version of the definition. Lord Lloyd of Berwick, with whom Lord Keith and Lord Browne-Wilkinson agreed, propounded the following at pages 786-7, while accepting that because of the difficulty of defining the concept it was more of a description than a definition:

20. Lord Mustill and Lord Slynn qualified this description by specifically excluding terrorist acts from the category of political crimes.

21. In our judgment the false imprisonment for which the Garda wish to arrest the applicant cannot on any version of the definition or description qualify as an offence of a political nature. No evidence has been produced that it had any connection with a paramilitary organisation. There is nothing from which one might conclude that the crime was directed against the State. The abduction of Mr Pickard appears to have been carried out in the course of an attempt to steal money which the perpetrators suspected he had in his possession. The press reports adduced by the applicant show at most that there is a suspicion that the crime was drugs-related. None of these facts come anywhere near making the offence one of a political nature. The fact that the arrest was carried out under section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 does not assist the applicant, for that Act applies to all types of crime, whether “ordinary” or “subversive” in nature: The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Quilligan [1986] IR 495. The applicant has shown nothing which might raise a case that the offence was one of a political nature, and it is not sufficient to say, as Mr O’Rourke attempted to do, that if the applicant’s solicitor had been informed of the intention of the Garda and the details of the offence of false imprisonment he might have been able on cross-examination of the police officers to elicit something which would have satisfied the court.

22. For the reasons which we have given we accordingly do not consider that the applicant has made out any of the grounds for judicial review advanced by him, and the application will be dismissed.