

decerned the Earl to sell and dispoſe theſe teinds, for a price mentioned in the decret, being about nine years purchaſe thereof, and therefore the purſuer cannot have right to the teinds themſelves, but only to the annual-rent of that ſum, which was the price. The purſuer answered, That he oppoſed the decret produced, which did not, *de præſenti*, adjudge the teinds to the defender, but decerned the purſuer to ſell them to him, upon payment of the ſaid price, which can give no right to the teinds till the price be paid, or at leaſt offered, which was never done.

The Lords repelled the defence, in reſpect of the reply.

Stair, v. 1. p. 612.

No. 29.
liament or-
daining the
titular to ſell
them at a cer-
tain price,
that price ne-
ver having
been offered.

1671. July 18. EARL of HUME *againſt* The LAIRD of RISLAW.

The kirk of Fogo having been a kirk of the Abbacy of Kelſo, when the ſame was erected; this kirk was reſerved in favours of the Earl of Hume, and diſpoſed to his predeceſſors; whereupon he purſues the Laird of Riſlaw for the teinds of his lands, as a part of the teinds of Fogo; who alleged abſolvitor, becauſe his predeceſſors obtained tack of their teinds from the Miniſter of Fogo, as parſon thereof, which tack, though it be now expired, yet he bruiks, *per tacitam relocationem*. The purſuer repld, that his tacit relocation was interrupted by inhibitions produced. The defender answered, that the inhibitions were only at the inſtance of the Earl of Hume, who was never in poſſeſſion of his teinds, whoſe right he neither knew nor was obliged to know, and the Earl ought to have uſed declarator againſt the defender, and the parſon of Fogo his author, which was the only ha-
bile way, and not the inhibition.

No. 30.
Effect of tacit
relocation in
teinds.

The Lords ſuſtained the proceſs upon the inhibition, and reſtricted the ſpuilzie to wrongous intromiſſion, unleſs the defender could propoſe upon a right in the perſon of himſelf, or his author, that could either ſimply exclude the Earl's right, or at leaſt give the defender or his author the benefit of a poſſeſſory judgment, and put the Earl to reduction or declarator.

Whereupon the defender alleged, that the parſon of Fogo was preſented by the King, as parſon of Fogo, and did ſo bruik by the ſpace of thirteen years, which was ſufficient to defend him, *in judicio poſſeſſorio*. It was replied, firſt, that the Miniſter cannot pretend the benefit of a poſſeſſory judgment, becauſe his poſſeſſion was not peaceable, in ſo far as it was within the thirteen years it was interrupted by the purſuer's inhibitions. The defender answered, that he offered to prove thirteen years poſſeſſion, at leaſt ſeven years peaceable poſſeſſion, before any inhibition, which is ſufficient; for as thirteen years poſſeſſion make a preſumptive title, *decennalis et triennalis poſſeſſor non tenetur docere de titulo*; yet where the defender produces a title, viz. a preſentation as parſon, he is in the common caſe of a poſſeſſory judgment upon ſeven years poſſeſſion. The purſuer further replied, that albeit the ſeven years were peaceable, and ſufficient for a poſſeſſory judgment; yet the defender cannot maintain his poſſeſſion by

No. 30. tacit relocation, for he having no positive right in his person, his tack being expired, he can only maintain his possession upon his author's right, as parson, and so can be in no better case than his author, who if he were compearing, not pleading the benefit of a possessory judgment, he would be excluded by the reply, that he had acknowledged the Earl's right, and taken assignation from him to the tack duty, due by the defenders, which, though it would not be sufficient after the defender's tack, to exclude the same, if it were not expired, yet it is sufficient against his tacit relocation, which can only subsist, while his author hath right and possession, and being but a presumptive continuation of the right, it is easily taken away by any deed of the author. It was answered, that tacit relocation being introduced by law, was as strong as a prorogation, and continuation of the tack, which could not be prejudged by any posterior deed of the parson.

The Lords found the defence upon the parson's right clad with seven years peaceable possession relevant *in judicio possessorio*, to defend the defender's tacit relocation, but found the reply relevant that the parson had accepted assignation from the pursuer, to make the defender liable for the ordinary profits, after the assignation, and after the first inhibition, but only for the tack duty till the first inhibition, and found that the tacit relocation was not in a like case, as if the defender had a tack, or prorogation.

Stair, v. 1. p. 758.

1672. February 27. SCOT against MUIRHEAD.

No. 31.

Teinds were found to be carried by a disposition of lands which contained an assignation to the tacks of the tenants who paid a joint duty for stock and teind.

Mr. John Muirhead having sold certain lands to Walter Scot and his son, they pursue declarator, that thereby they have right to the teinds of the said lands, in so far as the disponer had right, because, by the disposition, though there be no express mention of the teinds, yet the same is implied, in so far as they are assigned to the tenants' tacks without reservation, and they are burdened with £.30 of teind to the Minister, and all subsequent augmentations, and the tenants pay a joint duty, both for stock and teind, and they gave more than twenty years purchase for the rental, comprehending both stock and teind. It was answered, That teinds being distinct rights from lands, the same cannot be conveyed with the lands, unless they be expressed, and not by presumptions or inferences.

The Lords having ordained the communers, writers, and witnesses in the disposition to be examined *ex officio*, they found little clearness thereby; but, by the tenor of the disposition, they found, that the pursuer had right to the teinds; but, in regard that the conception was so unclear, they allowed the defender to be reponed, refunding the price *cum omni causa*, except the composition to the superior.

Stair, v. 2. p. 81.