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was neither deduced against him, nor he ever warned thereto, nor yet was the same intimated to him; so that it was lawful to him to pay his creditor, and satisfy whatever he was bound in to his creditor, albeit the creditor had made another assignee thereto; yet satisfaction being given by the debtor to the cedent, before any legal intimation made by the assignee, the same would have freed him also against the assignee; so ought the like to be in this case, where he knew nothing of the comprising.——THE LORDS repelled this reason, and found, That the discharge of the bond, being given to the compriser's debtor, after the comprising; whereby the bond was assigned to the compriser judicially, the bond could not thereafter be validly discharged by the creditor, in prejudice of the compriser, and the judicial assignation: For the bond contained an obligation, made by the granter thereof, to infeft this debtor to the compriser, in lands therein comprised; so that, if the discharge was granted by real fulfilling of the same, viz. That the maker thereof had given real infeftment to his creditor, as the bond obliged him, which was not done, *eo casu* the infeftment would have been profitable to the compriser, and accresced to him; but that not being done, the discharge given, granting the bond to be satisfied, and no infeftment really given, but being discharged without implement, it was not found such a satisfaction, as thereby the compriser might be prejudged: And therefore it was found, That the compriser might still charge for giving to him the infeftment, obliged by the bond, notwithstanding of the discharge.

Clerk, Hay.

*Fol. Dic. v. 1. p. 14. Durie, p. 764.*

1727. January 31. The DUCHESS of ARGYLE against M'NIEL of Loffet.

In a contract of wadset, Killellan disposes his lands to M'Niel of Loffet, holding feu of the dispoñer, for yearly payment of 2000 merks of feu-duty; and the clause of reversion obliges the dispoñee to renounce his right of wadset, upon payment of 5000 merks. The Dutchess of Argyle, and M'Niel of Loffet, having both of them led adjudications against Killellan the reverfer, the question occurred, 'If a simple adjudication, without a charge or infeftment, was effectual to carry this right of reversion, so as to exclude all adjudications without year and day?'

And it was *contended* for the Dutchess of Argyle, who had an adjudication with a charge against the superior, but not within year and day of Loffet's, That her adjudication must be considered as the first effectual, with respect to the reverfer's right, because the common debtor remaining still in the property of the land, burdened only with a pignus or wadset, he cannot be denuded, but by infeftment; and therefore, a simple adjudication, in this case, will convey no more

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than a simple disposition. Had, indeed, the lands been disposed, holding of the reverfer's superior, nothing remaining with the disponent, but the naked faculty of redemption; this personal right might be carried by a simple disposition or adjudication without infeftment; but here the lands were disposed, holding of the reverfer himself; his infeftment was not taken away by the wadsetter's, but both subsisted together; for a proof of which, when the wadset-right is renounced, the reverfer will not need a new infeftment; whereas a reverfer who has disposed his lands, to be holden of his superior, must have a letter of regrefs, and a new infeftment. All which is to shew, that the reversion here is real in the lands, and cannot be carried but by infeftment; and that therefore, with respect to this subject, more than lands, a bare adjudication without a charge or infeftment, cannot be reckoned an effectual diligence, in terms of the act 1661.

On the other hand, it was *contended*, That a decreet of adjudication, without charge or infeftment, is sufficient to carry this right of reversion. To make out which, the common debtor's right of superiority in the lands, was distinguished from his right of reversion; the first subsisting by infeftment, it was yielded, could only be transmitted by infeftment; the other arising from a personal obligation upon the wadsetter in the contract of wadset, was a mere personal faculty, transmissible by a simple assignation or adjudication: For here it was noticed, the disposition was in form of an absolute conveyance; Loffet, the disponent, became thereby absolute proprietor of the lands holding of the disponent, and the right of redemption did not arise from any quality in the conveyance, but from the personal obligation upon the disponent, which he bound himself in by the contract. Where, indeed, the wadset is contrived in form of a qualified or conditional conveyance, consistent with the radical right of property in the person of the reverfer, (*see* Lord Stair, tit. Wadsets, § 1.) to fall *ipso facto* upon payment or configuration of the wadset sum; there the reverfer continuing in the radical right and property of the lands, his right of reversion cannot be carried otherwise than by infeftment; and that equally, whether he disposes the lands holding of his superior, or of himself: But, as is said, where the reversion is not a quality of the right, but a personal obligation upon the proprietor, the right arising therefrom cannot be other than personal, and transmissible as all other personal rights are.

Hence it was contended, the proper distinction is not betwixt wadsets holding of the reverfer, and holding of the reverfer's superior; but betwixt wadsets where the conveyance is qualified, and where it is absolute, with a personal clause of redemption: In that case, the reverfer remaining radical proprietor, needs no new infeftment when the wadset is extinguished; and his right of redemption being in consequence of his radical right of property, can only be carried by infeftment: In this case, the wadsetter is absolute and sole proprietor; and whoever has the right of redemption, must have the wadset conveyed to him, with new infeftment; which is the only way this case can be expedited, if that single

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instance be excepted, where the right of redemption is competent to the superior, who already standing infeft as superior, needs not a new infeftment as proprietor: And therefore, the reversion here being only a personal obligation upon the proprietor to denude, may be carried by an adjudication without infeftment, as well as by assignation.

' THE LORDS found, That Loffet's adjudication of the reversion of the wadset-right, was sufficient to carry the same, without necessity of infeftment or charge against the superior; and therefore, preferable to posterior adjudications, with a charge against the superior not within year and day.'

*Fol. Dic. v. 1. p. 14. Rem. Dec. v. 1. No 91. p. 179.*

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1738. December 1. RAMSAY of Wyliecleugh against BROWNLEE.

FOUND, That an apprising, and whole sums therein contained, without distinction between principal sum and annualrents, accumulate sum and annualrents thereof, or accessories thereto, do belong to the heir, and no part thereof to the executor, notwithstanding the appriser died within the legal.

The question arose upon the allegation of the reverser, That the apprising was extinguished by the possession of the appriser's heir within the legal, which depended upon this, whether the bygone annualrents, at the appriser's death, belonged to his executors, or to his heir? If to his executors, the apprising was extinguished by the heir's possession, within the legal.

It had been a received notion, that the bygone annualrents, at the appriser's death, fell to his executors; and there were several instances condescended on, of confirmations of such bygones; and so much was the Court of that opinion, that when this question was first stirred, the President, and he only, spoke of it as a doubtful point. But when the matter came to be more maturely considered, the Court came unanimously into the above decision; as great inconveniences must have arisen from a contrary judgment, and occasion been given to many questions, not dreamed of, concerning estates possessed upon apprisings.

So, upon examining the nature of an apprising, it was judged to be a proper sale under redemption, whereby the land which descends to the heir, comes in place of the debt, which no more exists as to either principal or annualrents; whereas, were it a *pignus praetorium*, or legal disposition in security during the legal, (which had been the common notion,) then the debt, still subsisting till expiry of the legal, the appriser dying within the legal, the bygone annualrents of it would fall to his executors.

*Fol. Dic. v. 1. p. 13. Kilkerran, (ADJUDICATION.) No. 3. p. 3.*

No 6.

Whether an apprising be a *pignus praetorium*, or a sale under redemption.