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which, by the original agreement, was to be paid immediately, was in the same predicament. But with regard to that for L. 9000, it was

*Pleaded:* By the minute of sale, Sir James Campbell became bound to convey the lands, upon receiving L. 3000, an heritable bond for L. 15,000, and a personal bond for the remainder; and although the minute contained no procuratory, nor precept, by which the purchaser could be instated in the feudal right, yet Sir James Campbell could have been compelled by action at law, or by adjudication, to implement the precise terms of his agreement. The after transaction, therefore, by which the whole price is made a burden on the lands, as also the heritable bond for L. 9000, being a deed entirely voluntary on the part of the debtor, must be affected by the inhibition.

*Answered:* Even after the minute of sale, Sir James Campbell continued in the property of the lands. The insolvency of the purchaser, and his cautioners, entitled him to reprobate their personal security; nor could he have been obliged, either by the purchaser or his creditors, to divest himself before receipt of the price. The condition, therefore, under which this sale was carried into execution, created a real burden on the estate, from which the creditors of the purchaser affecting it, for their payment, cannot shake themselves loose.

As to the *first* point, 'THE LORDS, in respect Mr Garbet was only a cautioner, found, That Mansfield, Ramsay, and Company were not obliged to assign the security granted by him, upon the stock of the Carron Company, in farther security of L. 9000, contained in the bond granted by Charles Gascoigne.'

As to the *second*—THE LORDS 'found, That the inhibition at the instance of Ludovick Grant did not affect either of the bonds in question, so as to make them reducible at his instance.' See INHIBITION.

Lord Ordinary, *Elliock*.  
*Craigie*.

*A& Ilay Campbell.*  
*Fol. Dic. v. 3. p. 72.*

*Alt. Maclaurin.*

*Fac. Col. No 94. p. 180.*

1780. *January 14.*JAMES ERSKINE *against* GEORGE MANDERSON.

MANDERSON and HAY were joint acceptors of a bill payable to Erskine, who sued both of them for payment; and, as Hay pleaded no defence, immediately obtained decret against him.

Manderson, however, being still sued for the whole debt, made offer of payment, on condition of receiving an assignation to the decret against Hay, the *correus debendi*; which being refused, he, in a process of suspension, brought on that ground,

*Pleaded:* 'A creditor cannot arbitrarily discharge his diligence done against one *correus debendi* to the hurt of the rest, who have a right to claim assignation;' Dalrymple's Decisions, No 167.\* When a debt is discharged by a *correus*, it is

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A co-debtor found entitled to receive assignation of diligence from the creditor, that he might the more speedily operate his relief.

\* Page 231. Wallace against Elibank, 25th January 1717, *voce* DEBTOR and CREDITOR.

certainly just that the creditor thus satisfied, should communicate to him a right, which he himself can no longer exercise.

In the present case, the assignation may be of important use; as without the circuit of a process of constitution, it will entitle to immediate execution against Hay; by which means alone, perhaps, such danger as that arising from his suddenly converting his effects into cash, and leaving the kingdom, could be prevented. The creditor, therefore, should not be permitted to withhold that conveyance, notwithstanding the opposite tendency of a decision reported by Lord Stair in 1666,\* and of a later one by Lord Fountainhall,\* which indeed is less connected with the present question, or of the opinion of Mr Erskine,\* founded on the authority of those judgments. It is, however, to be remarked, that Lord Fountainhall has subjoined to the last-mentioned decision, this acknowledgement, 'that with respect to the *beneficium cedendarum actionum*, our practice is not yet arrived at a full consistency.'

*Answered* for the creditor:—By the Roman law, the *beneficium cedendarum actionum* was indeed allowed to cautioners; but the reason of it was, that there were no other means by which they could operate their relief. In ours, such a claim is rejected, because they may obtain relief without that extraordinary remedy; though perhaps it might enable them to execute diligence more speedily. Nor is it necessary to add, that the case of no co-obligant is so favourable as that of a cautioner, which the suspender is, being joint acceptor of a bill for behoof of another. That the above is the doctrine of our law, is evident from Erskine, p. 474.\*; Stair, July 10. 1666, Hume *contra* Crawford;\* and from Fountainhall, v. I. p. 687. Dec. 12. 1695, Wood *contra* Gordon, *voce* DEBTOR and CREDITOR.

THE LORDS found, 'That the creditor was bound to grant the assignation demanded by the suspender.'

Lord Ordinary, *Alva*. A& R. *Sinclair*. Alt. *Buchan-Hepburn*. Clerk, *Campbell*.  
*Fol. Dic. v. 3. p. 72. Fac. Col. No 98. p. 189.*

\* The case reported by Lord Stair, above alluded to, is Hume against Crawford, v. I. p. 393. 10th July 1666. *voce* DEBTOR and CREDITOR: That by Lord Fountainhall, is Wood against Gordon, v. I. p. 687. 12th December 1695; *voce* DEBTOR and CREDITOR: The opinion of Mr Erskine mentioned, is in b. 3. tit. 3. § 68.

*See* DEBTOR and CREDITOR.

*See* CAUTIONER.