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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Strachan v M'Dougle [1835] CA 13_954 (19 June 1835)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1835/013SS0954.html
Cite as: [1835] CA 13_954

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SCOTTISH_Shaw_Court_of_Session

Page: 954

Strachan

v.

M'Dougle
No. 287.

Court of Session

1st Division

June 19 1835

Ld. Corehouse.

John Strachan,     Claimant.— D. F. Hope— More. Miss Jane M'Dougle,     Claimant.— Robertson— Neaves.

Subject_Arrestment—Insurance—Foreign.—

1. An arrestment of the contents of a policy of life assurance, where the debtor died before any new premium fell due, held competent and effectual. 2. An arrestment held preferable to an unintimated assignation of a policy of life assurance, although the policy had been delivered, along with a letter of assignation, to the assignee in England. 3. Question, whether an arrestment remains effectual after a new premium of insurance has been paid under a policy, and a new year has commenced.

In 1825, the late Robert Strachan, W.S., effected a policy of insurance of £1000 upon his life. The policy bore, that he had made payment of the premium “of £48, 13s. 4d., being his first annual contribution to the stock and funds of the said Society, together with £5 in name of entrymoney; Now these presents are to certify, that, in consideration of the premises, the said Robert Strachan has been duly admitted a member of the Society, and that his heirs, executors, and assignees, shall be entitled to receive out of the stock and funds of the said Society, at the end of six months after his decease, the sum of £1000 sterling; but which sum shall not be exigible until three months at least after proof of the said decease shall be made to the satisfaction of a Court of Directors of the said Society, or such other sums as shall become due on the contingency before expressed, agreeably to the laws and regulations of the said Society; but always with and under this condition and provision, that the said Robert Strachan shall duly pay, or cause to be paid, at the office of the said Society in Edinburgh, the future yearly contribution of £48, 13s. 4d., on or before the 13th May in every succeeding year during his life-time, or within thirty days thereafter: And, further, providing and declaring, that in case the said Robert Strachan shall, within the time to which this certificate is limited, depart beyond the limits of Europe, &c, or in case payment of the said yearly contribution shall not be regularly made as aforesaid, then, and in every such case, this certificate shall be void, and all claim to any benefit out of, or interest in, the funds of the said Society, in virtue of these presents, shall cease and determine.”

In February, 1830, Strachan, being indebted in £1000 to Miss: M'Dougle, residing in Berwick-upon-Tweed, addressed the following letter to her:—“Madam,—I now send you herewith my promissory note of this date, for £1000 to your order, payable at Whitsunday, 15th May next, and to bear interest from that date at five per cent; in return for which, you will be so good as return my former note for the same amount. I also herewith send you a policy of insurance of my life for £1000 with the Scottish Life Insurance Office, the premium on which has been paid in advance up to 13th May next; and which policy is to remain deposited with you, as a farther security, until my promissory note shall be paid. And I hereby engage not only to pay the premium as it becomes due, and to report to you the receipts for the same, but also, whenever required, to grant in your favour a regular conveyance of said policy; but declaring that, in the mean time, in the event of my death, you shall be entitled to receive the whole sums thereby clue, so far as sufficient to pay my said promissory note and interest due thereon at the time.” The policy was delivered to Miss M'Dougle at Berwick, and remained in her hands until the death of Strachan, which happened on 23d April, 1832. No assignation was executed in her favour, and it was only in June, after Strachan's death, that she made intimation of her right to the Assurance Office.

On the 13th of March preceding, Strachan granted his promissory note for £1621, 10s. at one day's date, in favour of his son, John Strachan. It was said that this was for behoof of the family of the granter, as true and lawful creditors to that amount. Letters of horning were raised on the note, and arrestments were used on the 5th of April, in the hands of the Assurance Office, of all sums “due by them to Robert Strachan, or to any other person for his behoof, by bond, bill, &c. certificates or policies of insurance, &c.” A competition arose, after Strachan's death, for the contents of the policy; and the Assurance Office raised a multiple poinding, and consigned the money in Court.

The validity of Strachan's debt was challenged by Miss M'Dougle, but, in disposing of the following question, it was, hoc statu, assumed to be a true debt.

It was pleaded by Miss M'Dougle, who produced the policy in support of her claim—1st, That, as nothing was due under the policy to Robert Strachan during his life, but the sum therein mentioned became due and exigible only after his death, and was payable only to his representative, it was incompetent for a creditor of Strachan to arrest it as “due to him, or to any other person for his behoof.” And, though the terms of the policy gave him a share in the profits, it did not alter the nature of the obligation to pay the contents. 2. That the claim was contingent and conditional, depending on the termly renewal of the contract by paymen of the premium—the non-violation of any of the conditions as to going beyond the limits of Europe, &c. Such a debt could not be made the subject of arrestment. 1

Strachan, besides disputing that the letter of the late Robert Strachan was equivalent to an assignation, pleaded—1. That, as the contents of a policy could be assigned, they must be subject to the diligence of arrestment; and as Mr Strachan became a partner of the Company by the terms of the policy, its contents were as much arrestable as the share of a partner in any other company. 2. That a debt, though contingent, might be attached by arrestment; and sums covered by marine policies frequently were so, although no intelligence of the loss of the ship might have arrived; 2 and, as Strachan died before any new premium fell due after the arrestment, dies cesserat, at the date when the arrestments were used.

The Lord Ordinary reported the cause on Cases. *

When the case was first put out for advising, the Lord President observed, that no plea had been raised as to the effect of the depositation of the policy in the hands of Miss M'Dougle, the right of retention or pledge which might thus arise to her, and the circumstance that the office would not pay until the policy was produced, which she alone could do.

_________________ Footnote _________________

1 3 Ersk. 6, 2 and 8; Dirlet, Doubts v. Arrest p. 7; 3 St. 1, 29;3 Bankt. 1, 35; Horn, Feb. 1, 1034 (I. Bro. Supp. 83); Menzies, Jan. 25, 1711 (770); Clunies, Jan. 19, 1739 (713); Thomson, June 23, 1829 (ante, VII. 783).

2 3 Ersk. 6, 8; Wardrop, Dec. 19, 1774 (1025 and 480); Gordon, Feb. 13, 1740 (715); Grierson, Feb. 25, 1780 (759); Kyle's Trustees, Nov. 14, 1827 (ante VI. 40); Pindar, May 27,1824 (ante, III. 09, or New Ed. 45); Corse, Jan. 31, 1705 (767); Sinclair, Jan. 17, 1739 (V. Bro. Supp. 658).

* “Note.—The Lord Ordinary is inclined to think that the claim of John Strachan is well founded, for the reasons assigned in his case. The sum contained in the policy of insurance, though not payable to Robert Strachan himself, but to his heirs and assignees after his death, was constituted by an obligation in his favour, and it was placed at his absolute disposal. Though a contingent debt, it was not the less liable on that account to be attached by arrestment. In consequence of the payment of the premium for one year, dies cesserat, that is, the sum assured had become payable if the life dropped within that year.

“At the same time, as the point raised does not appear to have received the judgment of the Court, and as life insurance has of late become a very common, as well as an important contract, the Lord Ordinary has thought it right to report the case.

“There seems no room for the objection urged against the arrester's claim, as not sufficiently vouched against Robert Strachan; and it is of no importance in this action that Robert Strachan died insolvent, because the promissory note has not been brought under reduction on the act 1621, or any other ground. The conduct of Robert Strachan was by no means free from blame; but it does not appear that John Strachan, or any of the children for whose behoof he claims, was implicated in the fault, or responsible for it, as representing their father. On the other hand, there was great, negligence on the part of the claimant, Miss M'Dougle, in not intimating her assignation.”

The Court ordered supplementary Cases upon this point. Miss M'Dougle pleaded—1. That the necessity of intimation for completing an assignation had no other foundation than custom, and the reason of it was, that, until the debtor should be put on his guard against paying to the cedent, the assignee's right was only inchoate. But as policies of life insurance were of comparatively recent introduction, and, in some measure, belonged to mercantile law, it was unnecessary that there should be intimation at assigning them. The Assurance Office never paid till the policy was produced, and therefore the reason for intimation, to put a debtor on his guard, had no application. In England, accordingly, in this and many similar instances, a right was effectually transferred, or a pledge effectually created, by mere deposit of the deeds constituting the right. 1

2. There were many documents which, on being pledged, conferred a real right on the pledger, not defeasible by any diligence or voluntary assignment. Such, for example, were bills of exchange; and, in like manner, a bill of lading, 2 by mere delivery, effectually transferred the right to the cargo of the ship at sea. The delivery of a policy of insurance should be attended with equal effects.

3. There was no power of compelling her to give up the policy, and payment could not otherwise be recovered. This right in her was not impaired by the circumstance of a multiplepoinding being raised, and the policy produced with her claim, as that could not alter the rights of parties.

Strachan answered—1. That it was a fundamental principle of the law of Scotland, that intimation was essential to complete any assignation. If this was founded only on custom, it still had the same foundation with a very large part of the law, which could not now be questioned. Policies of life assurance did not belong to the law mercantile, but, both as to their original constitution and effectual transference, must be governed by the municipal law of the state where the contract was made and transferred. The English decisions supporting the doctrine of equitable mortgage upon the deposit of deeds, had been highly injurious to their law, and the subject of much regret. 3

2. There was a necessity for giving extraordinary privileges to bills of exchange and other negotiable documents; but there was no necessity for extending such privileges to policies of insurance, and it would be contrary, both to principle and expediency, to do so.

3. There was no need for the claimant to possess the policy, or to give it up to the Assurance Office. As a multiplepoinding had been brought, the policy produced in Court, and its contents consigned, the office would be sufficiently discharged by decree of exoneration in this action, in favour of any party preferred by the Court; and, as any other debt might be effectually arrested and made forthcoming, even though the bond by which it was constituted was not in the possession of the arrester, so might the contents of a policy of assurance.

_________________ Footnote _________________

1 1 Ersk. 5, 3; 3 St. 1, 8, and 12, and 15; Dearle, 3 Russ. Chanc. Ca. 1; Hulton, 1 Young's Rep. 602; Foster, 1 Mylne and Keen's Chanc. Ca. 297; Ashley, 3 Simon's, 149; Bell's Princ. p. 53 and 231; Innes, June 22,1821 (ante, I. 82, or 85, New Ed.)

2 1 Bell, 198.

3 Whitebread, 1 Rose, 299; Mountfort, 14 Vesey, 606; Coombe, 17 Vesey, 370; 2 Bell, 23.

Lord President.—When the case was last before the Court, we were unanimously of opinion, that, if the right of Miss M'Dougle rested only on an assignation to the policy, it was ineffectual without intimation, as it was brought into competition with a party who is, hoc statu, assumed to be a true creditor, and who has used arrestments. But we were desirous of seeing farther argument on the effect of the actual depositation and delivery of the policy which had been made in the hands of the creditor for her security. I consider that to be a question which is not free from difficulty. I do not perceive that any party has a right to compel Miss M'Dougle to part with the policy, except on payment of its contents; and, if the office cannot be compelled to pay without delivering up the policy to them, it does not appear clear how far her right can be defeated by the measures which have been taken in this case. For I do not think the rights of parties can be altered by the mere circumstance, that a process of multiplepoinding is the form of action in which these rights now require to be extricated, and that Miss M'Dougle has produced the policy in process in support of her claim. It is to be considered as a document in her hands at this moment, to the effect of preserving entire any right of retention which would have been competent to her had the document not been produced.

Lord Balgray.—I think the decision of this case is not to be arrived at without experiencing some embarrassment. I attach no weight to the plea that the contents of the policy were not arrestable, because they were payable only to the heirs or assignees of the assured, and not to himself. He could have assigned the contents of the policy, and I think them equally liable to be attached by arrestment. Then, it appears that no new premium of assurance fell due after the date when the arrestments were used. The death occurred during the current term, which was then covered by the premium previously paid. Holding the arrestment, then, to be an effectual diligence, I conceive that, according to the principles of the law of Scotland, the right of Strachan is clearly preferable to that of Miss M'Dougle. The letter of the late Robert Strachan to her, and the delivery of the policy, I have no hesitation in considering to be equal to an assignation; but it was never intimated, and nothing can be clearer in our law than that an unintimated assignation is ineffectual in competition with an arrestment. But I have some doubt whether the case should be decided with reference solely to the law of Scotland. Policies of insurance are a new species of instrument, which are of recent introduction in England, and are still more recent here. But they are highly useful and beneficial. They have become important from the extent to which the business of insurance is carried on, and this is every day increasing; and I think the Court ought to view them favourably, and give every facility, consistent with law, to their transference between debtor and creditor. I am doubtful, therefore, whether a question of this kind should not be viewed as belonging to the law mercantile, and whether we ought not to see more of the English practice and decisions in such cases, before we determine in this cause. In general, the assurance office, I understand, holds the jus exigendi to ho inseparable from the; custody of the policy, and will refuse to make payment until it is produced and delivered to them. Miss M'Dougle acquired a legal right to the custody of it under the letter of the late Robert Strachan, and she is now the actual custodier of the instrument. I am very unwilling to give any extension to the doctrine which holds obligatory deeds to be transferred and effectually pledged by mere delivery, but I think it would be proper to see more of the law and practice of England before deciding.

Lord Gillies.—I do not feel the same difficulties with your Lordship and Lord Balgray. An arrestment is preferable to an unintimated assignation. But I do not see how any thing more can be made of the right in favour of Miss M'Dougle than to account it equivalent to an assignation. Even had the policy been indorsed to her, still if an assignation was subsequently executed in favour of another party, and that was first intimated to the assurance office, I am at a loss to see how they could afterwards pay the contents to the indorsee producing the policy. The analogy of a bill of exchange which passes by indorsation is a very dangerous one, because bills necessarily possess extraordinary privileges. But these are not to be rashly extended to documents of a different nature. I think the right of the arrester is preferable; and, in coming to this conclusion, I am not at all influenced by the circumstance that the question arises in a multiplepoinding, where the contents of the policy have been consigned and the policy has been produced by one of the claimants. But, giving to her every benefit which she can legally claim as the custodier of the policy, I think the arresting creditor has a preferable right to the sum assured on the life of his debtor.

Lord Mackenzie.—I concur in much of what has been stated by Lord Gillies. There are some questions of importance raised by the parties in this case, and there is one of some difficulty on which I wish to reserve my opinion, as it is a point not necessary for the extrication of the case. I mean the question, whether an arrestment used during one year would be effectual to attach the contents of the policy not only for the year which is actually current when the arrestment is used, but also for subsequent years, and after other premiums have been paid to keep up the policy? An arrestment is quite good though the day of payment has not come if the term be current; but if it is only after a new term has begun, and a new payment of premium has been made that the contents of the policy ultimately become exigible, the question is very different whether these contents have been effectually attached by arrestments used during a preceding year. On that point I offer no opinion, for in this case the assured party died before any new premium fell due, and I have no doubt that an arrestment was an apt diligence to attach the contents of the policy which became exigible on his death.

The question then remains, whether the right of the arrester was excluded by the prior right of the assignee? I think there is in substance a good assignation in her favour, but it was not intimated, and, by the law of Scotland, an unintimated assignation cannot compete with an arrestment. To obviate this it is pleaded that the delivery of the policy completes the assignee's right without intimation. This is a doctrine of a dangerous tendency. It is an important general principle of our law, and there is none more vital, that the delivery of the corpus of a deed or instrument will not carry the real right that is contained within such deed or instrument. But then it is said, that, from the origin and nature of policies of insurance, the law of Scotland is excluded by what is called the law mercantile; and if any serious doubt is to be raised upon this, I should wish to know what are the precise averments made by the assignee as to the law and practice of England and of Europe, I am a little at a loss to know what she states it actually to be. Is it that a policy will pass from hand to hand like a bill of exchange by a blank indorsation? Or is it that it does not even require an indorsation, but is transferable like a bank note, which is payable to the bearer? If it be only the former which is averred it will not avail the assignee, for there was no indorsation in this case, and it would only injure her right to plead that an indorsation would have availed her, seeing that she has got none, and I can scarcely believe that the latter averment is seriously made, viz. that a policy of insurance, which may be for a very great sum, and generally is for a considerable amount, should circulate from hand to hand like a bank note, to be payable to the bearer, so that whoever presented it at the office, and he alone, should be entitled to uplift its contents, and discharge the office of their obligation.

If such an averment as this should now be seriously made, I should still hesitate whether to give time for enquiry or whether we ought not at once to decide in conformity with our own laws. But I should at all events require a specific averment on the subject, and I think it highly improbable that any such law or practice should any where prevail; for whatever expediency, or rather necessity, there may be for according to bills and notes the extraordinary privileges which they possess, I cannot perceive any reason for extending these to policies of assurance. I am not at all influenced by the plea of Strachan, that the question arises under a multiplepoinding in which the contents of the policy have been consigned and the policy itself produced by a claimant. All that would not alter the rights of the parties. But, independently of that, I think the arresting creditor is to be preferred.

Robertson, for Miss M'Dougle, brought under the notice of the Court that Miss M'Dougle resided in Berwick, and the policy had been sent and delivered to her there. The legal effect of such deposit ought, therefore, to be governed by the law of England.

Lord Gillies intimated that he thought the law of Scotland must rule this case, and

The other Judges concurred.

The Court found, “that the arrestment at the instance of the claimant, John Strachan, was a competent diligence to affect the sum due under the policy of insurance in question, and that the same is preferable to the right contended to be conferred on the claimant, Miss M'Dougle, by the letter of February 20, 1830, accompanied by delivery and possession of the policy of insurance, and remit to the Lord Ordinary to proceed,” &c.

Solicitors: D. Fisher, S.S.C.— J. S. Robertson, W.S.—Agents.

SS 13 SS 954 1835


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