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Cite as: [1838] CS 16_429

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SCOTTISH_Court_of_Session_Shaw

Page: 429

016SS0429

Suttie

v.

Ross

No. 110.

Court of Session

1st Division

Feb. 3 1838

Ld. Cuninghame. Lord Gillies, Lord Gillies, Lord President, Lord Mackenzie, Lord Corehouse.

Sir George Grant Suttie,     Pursuer.— Counsel:
D. F. Hope— Anderson— Deas.
Adolphus Macdowall Ross, and Spouse,     Defenders.— Counsel:
Sol.-Gen. Rutherfurd— Speirs.

Subject_Jury Trial—Facility and Lesion—Holograph Writ—Proof.— Headnote:

A testator executed a holograph testamentary writing, bearing to be dated 30th October, 1835; the testator died on 7th January, 1836; a reduction of the writing was raised on the ground of facility, circumvention, and lesion; the pursuer alleged that the holograph writing was not executed of the date it bore, that the testator was facile at the date of executing it, and was facile for great part of three months prior to death:—Held, that, if the pursuer proved the existence of facility at the date when the writing was executed, he was not obliged to prove it either before or after that date; and that the issue to try the cause should be, “Whether, between the 30th October, 1835, and 7th January, 1836, at the date when the writing was executed, the testator was weak and facile,” &c.—2. The above holograph writing disinherited the next of kin: Question, if the pursuer proved the existence of facility during a part only of the time between 30th October, 1835, and 7th January, 1836, and if no proof was adduced as to the date of the deed—Whether the legal presumption was that the writing was executed of the date it bore, or that it was executed during the period of facility.—3. The Lord Ordinary pronounced an interlocutor approving of an issue, and finding it settled that the cause should be tried by that issue; the party objecting to it not only presented a reclaiming note against it, but, at the same time, made a motion in the Inner-House, in terms of the prayer of his reclaiming note, the Court altered the interlocutor, but without intimating which mode of review appeared to be most proper.


Facts:

The late Miss Janet Grant Suttie, daughter of the late Sir James Grant Suttie of Prestongrange and Balgone, Bart., died on 7th January, 1836. She left various writings of a testamentary nature, and, among others, a holograph writing commencing with these words:—“I leave and bequeath to James Hamilton, my cousin, the sum of £1000, and to Dr A. M. Ross, who has long been my kind and attentive friend, this mark of my gratitude, £1300, also my writing-case of Russia leather, and all that is in it” The writing then expressed the warmest gratitude to Dr Ross for his services and friendship, and afterwards, with expressions of strong attachment, bequeathed certain furniture, plate, china, linen, and books, to Mrs Hamilton and Mrs Ross, the spouses of the first-named legatees. The writing concluded with this sentence:—“And I write this with my own hand, in testimony of all that this paper and the said inventory contains, at Edinburgh, this 30th day of October, 1835.

Janet Grant Suttie.”

Miss Grant Suttie had an only brother, George Grant Suttie, who, on the death of Sir James in May, 1336, succeeded to large estates. He was married, and had a family, at the date of his sister's death. Nothing was left to him or his family, except the bequest of certain articles of personal ornament. Sir George, as next of kin of his sister, raised a reduction of the testamentary writings, as having been obtained by fraud and circumvention on the part of Dr Ross and Mrs Ross, to the lesion of Miss Grant Suttie, at a time when she was in a state of bodily and mental weakness and facility, which exposed her to their undue influence. Miss Grant Suttie had laboured under disease for a very considerable period before her death, and Dr Ross attended her professionally. Mrs Ross had also been much with her in her last illness. Sir George alleged that Mrs Ross endeavoured to excite Miss Grant Suttie to a state of hallucination on religious subjects, and thereby acquired undue influence over her, and that Dr Ross took advantage of the opportunities of intercourse enjoyed by him as her professional adviser for attaining the same end.

The defenders met the whole of the injurious allegations of the pursuer with an unqualified denial. They renounced all claim under any writing, except the holograph writing already mentioned.

In making up a record, Sir George averred that Dr Ross advised Miss Grant Suttie to come from the country to Edinburgh, on 2d July, 1835, for the benefit of his constant professional attendance:—“That, during the period from the said 2d July, 1835, to 7th January, 1836, when Miss Janet Grant Suttie died, she was labouring under a severe and incurable disease of a very overpowering and oppressive nature to the mind of a female, and from which the defender Dr Ross well knew that she could not recover. She was receiving daily, during the said period, by the orders of Dr Ross, opiates or palliatives for the said disease, such as large quantities of brandy, and also of laudanum, and other medicines. She was greatly weakened both in body and in mind; and, for upwards of three months before her death, she was unable to attend to, or transact the business connected with the household, or other matters of which she had previously taken the active charge, and for a great portion of that time, she was totally unfit and unable to attend to or understand any business whatever.” “That the defenders, Dr and Mrs Ross, taking advantage of the opportunities afforded to Dr Ross, by his attendance on Miss Suttie, and confidential communications with her as her medical adviser, and of the foresaid conversations, correspondence, and intimacy between her and Mrs Ross, and also of the weak state of mind and body into which Miss Suttie had been brought by disease, and of the effect produced on her mind and judgment by the foresaid erroneous notions and delusions on religious subjects, acquired an entire and undue ascendency over Miss Suttie's mind and feelings, and succeeded at length in impetrating and obtaining from her (chiefly through the direct instrumentality of Mrs Ross), the wills or testamentary writings quoted in the summons, and produced in process, for the terms of which reference is made to the documents themselves, which are here held as repeated.” That the said testamentary writings “are either without dates altogether, or bear dates which are different from the true dates.” And “that the said Miss Janet Grant Suttie was, at the time of executing the said wills or testamentary or other writings, in a weak and facile state of mind, and the said wills or testamentary or other writings, were impetrated and obtained from her without any onerous or just cause, through fraud and circumvention on the part of the defenders, or one or other of them, and through facility and weakness or mental delusion, on the part of the said Miss Janet Grant Suttie.”

The defenders averred that the holograph writing, founded on by them, bore the true date of 30th October, 1835; that “Miss Grant Suttie's mind was never affected by her bodily indisposition and infirmities;” and that her “judgment and mental powers remained unimpaired till within less than half an hour of her death.”

After a record was closed, a discussion arose respecting the terms of the issue which ought to be framed for trying the cause. The draft of the issue proposed by the defenders, and approved by the issue clerk, was in these terms:—“Whether, on or about the 30th day of October, 1835, or whether, from that date until the 7th day of January, 1836, the period of her death, the late Miss Janet Grant Suttie was weak and facile in her mind, and easily imposed on; and whether the defenders, or either of them, taking advantage of her said facility and weakness, did, by fraud or circumvention, obtain or procure from the said Janet Grant Suttie the will or testamentary writing sought to be reduced, being No. 13 of Process, and bearing to be dated the said 30th day of October, 1835, to the lesion of the granter?”

The issue proposed by the pursuer was in these terms:—“Whether, on or about the 30th day of October, 1835, or whether, between the said 30th day of October and the 7th day of January, 1836, at the date when the will or testamentary writing sought to be reduced, being No. 13 of Process, was granted, the late Miss Janet Grant Suttie was weak and facile in her mind, and easily imposed on; and whether the defenders, or either of them, taking advantage of her said facility and weakness, did, by fraud or circumvention, obtain or procure from the said Miss Janet Grant Suttie, the aforesaid will or testamentary writing, to the lesion of the granter?”

The pursuer, in support of his draft issue, pleaded, that a holograph writing did not prove its own date; 1 and where the writing was impetrated by fraud, through the granter's facility, there was not even the slightest presumption that the date affixed to it was a true date. For sach of these separate reasons, the testamentary writing, founded on by the defenders, was in the same situation as if it had contained no date at all. But if Miss Grant Suttie was in a state of facility, and was subject to fraudulent circumvention at the date when the writing was executed, whatever that date truly was, the writing was reducible. And therefore the issue proposed by the pursuer was exactly adapted to the case, because it put the question to the Jury whether she was facile, &c. at the date when the writing was executed. It was true that, in making up the record, the pursuer had averred, as far as he knew, the date from which the continuous facility of Miss Grant Suttie began; and he meant to prove his averments. But if he should be only able to prove facility during a certain period prior to death, and a shorter period than was averred on the record, it ought still to be left open to him to prove, if he could, that the deed was executed during that period; and, failing such proof, to fall back on the legal presumption that a writing, which disinherited near relations, her next of kin, for strangers to her blood, and which had, in law, no date at all, was executed during the period of facility, and while subject to the undue influence of these strangers.

_________________ Footnote _________________

1 3 Ersk. 2, 22.

The defenders answered that the pursuer had positively alleged the existence of Miss Grant Suttie's facility, and had specially averred on the record that she was oppressed with disease from 2d July, 1835, till her death; that “for upwards of three months before her death” she was unable to attend as usual to household business, and “for a great portion of that time was totally unfit and unable to attend to, or understand any business whatever.” He had, therefore, no right to object to an issue, adapted to the state of the record, and specifying the date from and after which he had averred continuous facility to exist, on the part of Miss Grant Suttie; at least he had no right to object to an issue specifying precisely such date, whether he now undertook to carry it as far back as 30th October, 1835, or to any later period. It was true that a holograph writ did not prove its own date, and therefore the pursuer was not bound to prove Miss Grant Suttie's facility to have existed on 30th October, 1835, unless that appeared to be the actual date of the deed. But still, in justice to the defender, the question of Miss Grant Suttie's facility should be tried in reference to specific dates at which the pursuer alleged it to exist, so that the defender might have fair means of proving the contrary, being certiorated of the dates at which the pursuer was to undertake his proof. And if the pursuer merely proved, that, at a certain period between 30th October, 1835 (the date stated in the writing), and Miss Grant Suttie's death, she had been in a state of facility, there was no ground of presumption that the writing was executed during that particular period. On the contrary, in the absence of all proof of the date, extrinsic of the writing, the presumption of the law was in favour of authenticity, just because in this case, as in every other, the forgery of a date, if alleged, required to be proved by the party alleging it, on whom the onus probandi necessarily lay.

The Lord Ordinary “having heard counsel on the draft of the issues as prepared by the clerk, in respect the same appears to be correctly adapted to the allegations as they at present stand on record, appoints the same to be engrossed.” *

In reference to the issue proposed by the defenders, the Lord Ordinary farther pronounced this interlocutor:—“It is settled that this is the issue to try the cause.”

The pursuer presented a reclaiming note, craving the Court to alter the interlocutors of the Lord Ordinary, to approve of the issue proposed by him (pursuer), or to alter the issue approved by the Lord Ordinary. He, at the same time with moving the reclaiming note, made a motion in the Inner-House, to the same effect with the prayer of the note. He explained that he had adopted this two-fold course of proceeding because it had been doubted whether the regular mode of bringing such a matter under review was by reclaiming note, or by motion, and therefore, ob majorem cautelam, he had resorted to both. 1

Lord Gillies.—The points involved in this discussion are of considerable importance. A holograph deed does not prove its own date; neither does any other deed which is executed without witnesses. In a case of death-bed, that rule is of great importance, because the question whether the granter was in liege poustie or not, depends on the date of the deed, and the presumption is in favour of the heir-at-law, unless the actual date of the deed be proved by the party founding on it against the heir. But I am not prepared at present to say that a challenge on the head of death-bed, is, in regard to this question, parallel to the present reduction. In making up this record, the pursuer has averred, that the testamentary writings “bear dates which are different from the true dates,” and the defenders expressly “deny that they bear dates which are different from the true dates.” And the parties have incidentally discussed the question on whom the onus probandi lies, of proving the actual date of a holograph writing under challenge? That appears to me to be a question of extreme difficulty, and one which we are not called upon now to decide. I have no doubt of its being competent for the defenders to lead proof of the date of the writing, if they possess such proof. But supposing no such proof to be led on either side, does the pursuer mean to contend, that if he shall establish that Miss Grant Suttie was affected with facility on the 6th of January, the day before her death, that, there is then a legal presumption of the holograph writing having been executed on that day?

_________________ Footnote _________________

* “ Note.—It is doubted whether the maxim that holograph deeds untested do not prove their own dates, applies to this case. That rule is of importance in settlements of heritage, because the law of deathbed may strike against them, but it is immaterial in testaments of moveables.

“The date of 30th October is understood to be fixed here, not so much because it is the date of the settlement, but as it is a period at which, and continuously afterwards, the pursuer avers that the deceased was incapable of understanding business.

“In the argument, the pursuer contended that an issue should be given to meet the case, whether, at any time between 30th October and 7th January, the deceased was incapable, and at such period executed the deed under reduction? This is proposed to meet the possible case of the deceased having been only occasionally affected with imbecility during the period before specified, and having executed the deed during any fit of mental infirmity which might be proved; but the objections to that proposition seem to be insuperable. (1.) It is not an issue adapted to the record as it now stands. (2,) It would be unjust to the defender to compel him to go to issue as to a fraud said to have been practised on a person (in the latter view) only affected with occasional imbecility during a range of three months, without specifying as nearly as possible the place at, and the day on, which the fraud is said to have been committed.”

1 See Stewart, June 11, 1834 (ante XII. 707). The Court, in reviewing the interlocutors, did not express any opinion, or give any judgment, on the point, whether a reclaiming note, or motion, was the proper mode of review.

Dean of Faculty, for Pursuer—If the facts at the trial should render it necessary, I am prepared to contend for that.

Lord Gillies.—That seems to me to be going very far indeed. Suppose that a man executes a holograph will, and lays it past in his drawer, and lives for twenty years thereafter in the enjoyment of perfect health, but then is attacked with disease, and, for six months before death, is in a state of facility; according to the pursuer's doctrine, if the holograph will defeated, to any extent, the legal order of succession, it would be competent for the next of kin to contend that it must be presumed to have been executed in the state of facility, unless its date were established by extrinsic proof. That would appear to be pushing the pursuer's doctrine very far. However, it is not necessary now to decide on that doctrine, and I do not offer any opinion on it. The only point now requiring decision is, which of the two issues ought to be adopted for trying this case. I do not think that the issue which has been approved by the Lord Ordinary should be sustained. That issue begins in this manner:—“Whether, on or about the 30th day of October, 1835, or whether, from that date until the 7th day of January, 1836, the period of her death, the late Miss Janet Grant Suttie was weak and facile in her mind, and easily imposed on.” Now, it appears to me that such an issue requires continuous facility to be proved by the pursuer, from 30th October, 1835, till Miss Grant Suttie's death. According to that issue, even if it were proved that the deed was executed at some date subsequent to 30th October, 1835; and also that Miss Grant Suttie was in a state of facility at the date of executing it; still, if that facility were not continuous and uninterrupted for the whole period from 30th October, 1835, to 7th January, 1836, the day of Miss Grant Suttie's death, the jury could not find for the pursuer. Even though it might appear that she was facile for nine-tenths of the whole time between 30th October, 1835, and 7th January, 1836, still, if she was not facile, during the remaining tenth part of that period, the pursuer would lose his cause under this issue. That appears to me to be a decisive objection to the issue; and I see no similar objection against the other issue proposed by the pursuer. That issue begins in these terms:—“Whether, on or about the 30th day of October, 1835, or whether, between the said 30th day of October and the 7th day of January, 1836, at the date when the will or testamentary writing sought to be reduced, being No. 13 of Process, was granted, the late Miss Janet Grant Suttie was weak and facile in her mind, and easily imposed on.” The whole range of time taken in that issue is only about sixty days, and the question put is, Whether, within that time, and “at the date when the will or testamentary writing was granted,” Miss Grant Suttie was in a state of facility. That seems to me to be the proper issue. The jury are to say whether the lady was facile at the date when the writing was executed. The pursuer undertakes to prove the affirmative of that issue, and I think he should be allowed to do so. I would, therefore, substitute this issue in place of that which was approved by the Lord Ordinary.

Lord President.—I think that the issue approved by the Lord Ordinary, is not properly fitted for trying this cause, and that the issue proposed by the pursuer should be sustained. Under that issue, however, a very important question may perhaps arise at the trial. The holograph writing certainly does not prove its own date. But it will be competent to either party to prove the actual date of the writing, by extrinsic circumstances. If, however, no such proof be led on either side, and if the alleged facility of Miss Grant Suttie be proved only for a portion of the time between the 30th October, 1835, and the day of her death, the question will arise whether the holograph writing is to be presumed to have been written during the period of facility or not. The writing has, in law, no date, as it does not prove the date which it bears. And thus a very serious question may require to be determined, as to the party on whom the onus probandi lies, in the circumstances which I have supposed. But it is not necessary to decide that question now, and I do not offer an opinion upon it.

Lord Mackenzie—I concur in thinking that the issue which has been approved by the Lord Ordinary is not the proper issue to try this cause. It appears to me to be liable to two objections: 1st, It requires not merely facility at the time when the writing was executed, but facility of a certain duration and continuousness; and 2d, It requires unintermitted facility from 30th October, 1835, inclusive of that day, till 7th January, 1836, when Miss Grant Suttie died. The issue runs thus, “Whether, on or about the 30th day of October, 1835, or whether, from that date until the 7th day of January, 1836, the period of her death, the late Miss Janet Grant Suttie was weak and facile in her mind, and easily imposed on.” I read the word “or,” which connects the first clause beginning with the word “whether,” with the second clause beginning with the same word “whether,” just as if it were written “and.” The sense appears to me to be the same, and the issue, therefore, requires the pursuer to make out a case of facility combining both of the qualities which I have mentioned. But I see no reason for fixing down a definite and absolute time for the duration of facility, under the pain of losing the cause if such facility be not proved. It is enough if the pursuer proves the existence of facility at the date when the writing was made. And if the writing does not, in law, prove its own date, and, therefore, in so far, bears no date, that seems to me just to be a reason for not compelling the pursuer to fix, in the issue, a given date for the existence of the facility. At any period within the limited time, specified in the issue proposed by the pursuer, if he proves that facility existed at the date of the writing, he proves enough. And even suppose that, in point of fact, this were a case of constant and unintermitted facility during the whole of that time, I would still object to bind the pursuer to prove all this. If he proves facility at the date of the writing, he is not bound to prove it, for any given period, either before or after that date. And I feel some doubt whether it is necessary in the issue, whatever it may be on the record, to fix down the limit of the time during which the pursuer is to prove facility, in any other way, than by stating it as existing at the date of the writing.

In regard to the presumptio juris which has been alluded to, if facility is proved only for a part of the time between 30th October, 1835, and 7th January, 1836, and if no extrinsic proof is brought of the actual date of the writing, it appears to me to be a question of difficulty; but it is one which it is not now necessary to decide.

Lord Corehouse.—The chief difficulty connected with the discussion that has been raised in this cause, relates to the onus probandi, respecting the date of the holograph writing, a point which is not now before us, for judgment, and on which, therefore, I offer no opinion. In regard to the proper issue for trying the cause, it will be observed that the facility alleged, is not a permanent constitutional facility, but a weakness of mind arising from an attack of continued and severe bodily indisposition, coupled with mental excitement on religious topics. Facility thus produced may have its intervals, like lunacy, or as in the case of a person subject to epileptic fits and the temporary debility arising from them. It seems to me that it would be unwarrantable to impose on the pursuer the necessity of proving continuous facility. There may be quite enough for the reduction of the writing without that. Suppose, for instance, that the pursuer can prove the existence of facility as on lst December, 1835, and for eight days thereafter, and that it was farther proved that the true date of the writing was on 1st December, that would be quite enough for the reduction of the writing, if fraud and circumvention were also proved, though the deceased might not have been facile either before or after the period just mentioned. I think the pursuer proves enough if be establishes, that, at any time within the period specified, the deceased, being facile, did execute the writing under challenge.

When the cause comes on for trial before a jury, the important question, already alluded to, will arise, as to the onus probandi, respecting the date of the holograph writing. But if the pursuer only proves the existence of facility for a short period prior to dissolution, say, for instance, from 31st December, 1835, I feel much doubt whether there is any legal ground for presuming that the holograph writing was executed during the existence of the facility, and not before. But the question is attended with much difficulty, and I shall not dwell longer on it, as it does not now require a judgment. I agree with all your Lordships, that the issue proposed by the pursuer is the proper issue to try the cause.

The Court then pronounced this interlocutor:—“The Lords having heard the counsel for the parties, alter the interlocutor complained of, and approve of the issue proposed by the pursuer, as the issue to try this cause; reserving the question of the expenses of this application.”

Solicitors: A. Smith, W. S— Ker and Dickson, W.S.—Agents.

SS 16 SS 429 1838


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