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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Yeatman v. Proctor and Others [1877] ScotLR 15_107 (17 November 1877)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1877/15SLR0107.html
Cite as: [1877] SLR 15_107, [1877] ScotLR 15_107

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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session

Page: 107

Court of Session Inner House Second Division.

Saturday, November 17. 1877.

[ Lord Rutherfurd-Clark, Ordinary.

15 SLR 107

Yeatman

v.

Proctor and Others.

Subject_1Error
Subject_2Issues
Subject_3Averments founding an Issue of Essential Error.

Process
Subject_4Review — Statute 48 Geo. III. cap. 151, sec. 15 — Leave to Appeal to House of Lords.
Facts:

Held in an action of reduction of a probative deed on grounds of fraud, facility, and circumvention, that in order to obtain an issue also of essential error the record must contain a specific statement of what the error was, and of what the intention of the granter of the deed had been, and that merely negative averments were insufficient.

Circumstances where leave to appeal to the House of Lords against an interlocutory judgment disallowing an issue of essential error in an action of reduction of a probative deed was refused, with £3, 3s. of expenses.

Headnote:

This was an action raised by Mrs Yeatman, wife of Harry Yeatman, retired commander E.N., against James Proctor and others, some of the next-of-kin and the heir-at-law of Miss Macpherson Grant of Aberlour, Banffshire, concluding for reduction of a pretended deed of revocation bearing to be executed by heron 2d November 1876, and which bore that she thereby revoked all testamentary settlements theretofore executed by her, and

Page: 108

in particular a certain trust-disposition and settlement dated 8th March 1873.

Miss Grant in 1854 had succeeded on the death of an uncle to a fortune amounting to upwards of £200, 000 in land and moveable property. Mrs Yeatman, then Miss Charlotte Temple, had met Miss Grant in London in 1864, and thereafter the two ladies became very fond of one another, till ultimately, in 1865, Miss Temple went to live with Miss Grant, and continued to do so until her marriage in February 1876. More than one will was executed by Miss Grant in Miss Temple's favour, the last of them being dated 8th March 1873, by which deed it was averred by the pursuer in this action that the succession to Miss Grant's estate fell to be regulated.

The document under reduction was executed in October or November 1876, and was in the following terms:—‘I, Miss Margaret Gordon Macpherson Grant of Aberlour House, in the county of Banff, do hereby revoke all testamentary settlements heretofore executed by me; and, in particular, without prejudice to the generality of this revocation, I hereby revoke a trust-disposition and settlement dated the 8th day of March 1873, now in the custody of myself; in witness whereof I have subscribed these presents, written at my request by Simon Keir, Burnside, Duffus, by Elgin, at Aberlour House, on the 2d day of November 1876, before these witnesses, the said Simon Keir, tenant of Burnside, Duffus, by Elgin, and William Watt, my personal servant. (Signed) M. G. Macpherson Grant; S. Keir, witness; William Watt, witness.”

In this action of reduction of that document the pursuer made averments upon which she proposed the following issues:—“(1) Whether the deed of revocation, of which No. 11 of process is an extract, is not the deed of the deceased Miss Margaret Gordon Macpherson Grant of Aberlour? (2) Whether in granting the said deed the said Miss Margaret Gordon Macpherson Grant was under essential error as to its import and effect? (3) Whether at the date of the said deed the said Miss Margaret Gordon Macpherson Grant was weak and facile in mind and easily imposed upon, and whether Simon Keir, tenant of Burnside, Duffus, by Elgin, taking advantage of her weakness and facility, did by fraud or circumvention impetrate and obtain the said deed of revocation from the said Miss Margaret Gordon Macpherson Grant to her lesion?”

There was no objection on the part of the “defenders to the first and third issue. It was, however, contended that there was no relevant statement on record to justify the second issue.

The averments upon which the issue was asked were as follows—“(Cond. 9) No draft of said document was submitted for Miss Grant's consideration, and neither the principal nor a copy thereof remained in her custody, although the said trust-disposition and settlement was carefully preserved by her, and remained in her repositories till the last. The said document was not prepared or revised by or submitted to Miss Grant's solicitor before her signature was obtained thereto, although Miss Grant's local agents, who had prepared her settlement, were at Elgin, close at hand. It was not duly executed by Miss Grant, nor did the witnesses see her sign or hear her acknowledge her subscription, and it is wanting in the solemnities required by law. (Cond. 11) The said deed was signed by her in essential error as to its import and effect, induced by the misrepresentations or concealment of the said Simon Keir. Had she known and understood its import and effect she would not have signed any such document. In particular, she did not understand that the effect of the deed would be intestacy, and that all her directions for the disposal of her estate would be recalled; and she did not understand that the entail which she directed to be made could not be made, and that every one of the special legatees, who were her personal friends, were to be cut out in favour of heirs ab intestato with whom she would not and with whom she never did associate. (Cond. 12)… The effect of said writing, if the same be sustained, is not only to recall the foresaid trust-disposition and settlement of 1873, by which Miss Grant sought to perpetuate the name and family of Grant of Aberlour either in the person of her own descendants or of those of the pursuer or her nephews, but also to revoke the specific legacies in favour of the pursuer and Miss Grant's other friends therein mentioned, which Miss Grant never intended to revoke. The said writing also revokes a deed of directions executed by Miss Grant on 14th April 1874, in furtherance of what had been one of the most cherished schemes of her life, viz., the establishment and endowment of an Episcopal church and schools at Craigellaehie. For this purpose Miss Grant had taken a feu from Lord Fife at Craigellachie, upon which a school was built, which was used as a church on Sundays, and she engaged a clergyman at her own expense to officiate. In 1874 she also acquired a feu from Mr Grant of Elchies of a piece of ground in the village of Aberlour for a girls' school. The services at Craigellachie were so well attended that Miss Grant resolved to build a church on her own property and endow it and the schools; and the foresaid deed of directions was accordingly prepared by her agents and executed. Following out Miss Grant's intentions, a constitution was obtained from the bishop, and as she had undertaken to build and endow the church the patronage was vested in her and her successors in the estate of Aberlour so long as they were members of the Episcopal communion. The church was partly built and consecrated at the time of Miss Grant's death, but no further deed of endowment was executed by her. If the will and deed of directions are to be held as recalled, one of the chief objects of Miss Grant's life will be frustrated. (Cond. 13) If the deed under reduction be given effect to, the result will be intestacy, and the succession will be opened to persons whom Miss Grant never intended to succeed to her, with whom she never in any way associated, and of whom when she spoke of them she did so in terms implying aversion and dislike. She never corresponded with any of them, and though they were in humble circumstances she never aided them by pecuniary assistance. She did not and could not understand that the effect of the deed she was signing was to hand over her property to these persons and divert it from her intimate friends.

Mr Simon Keir, it may be explained, was a London merchant, who had acted as factor in the keeping of the accounts of estates belonging to Miss Grant in the West Indies. The pursuer averred that he had visited Miss Grant in October and November 1876, and that it was on the

Page: 109

occasion of that visit that “Mr Keir, in order to gratify his feeling against the pursuer, and taking advantage of the facility and weakness of Miss Grant's mind, did, by fraud or circumvention, obtain her signature to the document in question.”

The Lord Ordinary ( Rutherfurd Clark) disallowed the second issue, and approved the first and third for the trial of the cause.

The pursuer reclaimed against this interlocutor, and sought to have the second issue allowed.

At advising—

Judgment:

Lord Justice-Clerk—This is a very clear matter, though one by no means unimportant. An issue has already been allowed the pursuer upon the ground of incapacity on the part of the testatrix when this deed of revocation was executed, and also upon the ground of fraud, and the third ground on which parties have come here is essential error. The Lord Ordinary has refused the pursuer an issue based upon this ground, and practically the averments amount to this, that the deed was not understood by the testatrix, although it is probative and by no means technical, but couched in ordinary popular language. Now I think the deed is very clear about the revocation—[ reads). A probative deed such as this one is conclusive against a mere allegation, and I am unable to find any collateral circumstances to support this ground of action.

As to the statement made here (which might in some circumstances be relevant), that what Miss Macpherson Grant recalled she had very much at heart, it is met by the answer that she might have made a new will. No cases can be cited which come near such a view as is here contended for. It would be entirely a different matter were it alleged, for example, that Mr Simon Keir had received instructions to do one thing and had in error done another, but there is nothing of that kind; and I am clear the Lord Ordinary is right, and that there is no ground for allowing an issue of essential error.

Lord Ormidale:—I am of the same opinion. The only question is whether the allegations on behalf of the pursuer are enough to entitle her to an issue of essential error. If error there has been, we must have some intelligible statement of what it is. What the error was here we are not told. Who prevented this lady from resettling her property? I think there was no error in recalling the deed. There was no error as to the document itself or its nature. If there was any error, it was such as is entirely covered by the other issues.

Lord Gifford—I am of the same opinion, but I base my judgment chiefly on the pursuer's failure to state in the averments made upon record what Miss Grant intended to do. I think that an issue of essential error requires as an absolute essential that the pursuer should precisely condescend upon what the error was. There are two reasons for this—first, the other side are entitled to get due notice; and second, the jury should clearly know what the error was. Now in this record I cannot find what the essential error was. Not only what was done should be fully set forth, but also what was intended to be done which was not done.

The Court adhered and disallowed the second issue.

The pursuers shortly afterwards presented a petition to the Court for leave to appeal against the above interlocutory judgment of the Court to the House of Lords under sect. 15 of 48 Geo. III. cap. 151, by which it is provided “that hereafter no appeal to the House of Lords shall be allowed from interlocutory judgments, but such appeals shall be allowed only from judgments or decrees on the whole merits of the cause, except with the leave of the Division of the Judges pronouncing such interlocutory judgment, or except in cases where there is a difference of opinion among the Judges of the said Division.”

It was argued that this was the proper stage to appeal, and that in several cases like the present leave had been granted— Dunbar v. Skinner, 9 Mar. 1849, 11 D. 1014; Adam v. Allan, 3 July, 1841, 3 p. 1147; Losh v. Martin, 3 Mar. 1858, 20 D. 721

The application was refused, with £3, 3s. of expenses, on the ground that it being in the discretion of the Court whether such applications should be granted, the applicant must shew reasonable grounds for his application; that here he had not done so, as the present question was one of the simplest of its kind, being merely whether certain statements on record were sufficient to warrant an allegation of essential error, and involved no wide questions of law.

Counsel:

Counsel for Pursuer— Fraser—Pearson. Agents— Boyd, Macdonald & Co., S.S.C.

Counsel for Defender (Heir-at-Law)— Asher—Guthrie. Agents— Gibson, Craig, Dalziel & Brodies, W.S.

Counsel for Defenders (Executors-dative)— Balfour—Mackintosh. Agent— T. J. Gordon, W.S.

1877


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URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1877/15SLR0107.html