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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Duthie's Trustees v. Forlong [1889] ScotLR 26_709 (17 July 1889)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1889/26SLR0709.html
Cite as: [1889] ScotLR 26_709, [1889] SLR 26_709

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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session

Page: 709

Court of Session Inner House Second Division.

Wednesday, July 17. 1889.

26 SLR 709

Duthie's Trustees

v.

Forlong.

Subject_1Succession
Subject_2Trust
Subject_3Direction to Hold or Invest
Subject_4Right of Beneficiary to Immediate Payment.
Facts:

A lady in her trust-disposition and settlement left the residue of her estate to certain persons, named equally—“The said shares of residue to vest at my death; declaring that the share falling to any of the said residuary legatees who are females, and may be married at the time of my death, shall be held by my said trustees, or invested for their behoof, exclusive of the jus mariti of their then or any other husband they may afterwards marry, and the annual produce of said share of residue paid to said legatee during her life, and at her death the principal sum shall be paid to her heirs or executors.”

Held that the shares of female married residuary legatees vested in them, and that the trustees were not entitled to retain such shares, the declaration above quoted being void for repugnancy.

Headnote:

Miss Elizabeth Crombie Duthie died on 30th March 1885, leaving a trust-deed of settlement dated 7th July .1877 with several codicils thereto. By one of these codicils of 27th September 1877 Miss Duthie, after directing her trustees to pay certain legacies, bequeathed the residue of her estate to a number of individuals named equally, the said shares of residue to vest at the death of the testatrix, “declaring that the share falling to any of the said residuary legatees who are females and may be married at the time of my death shall be held by my said trustees, or invested for their behoof, exclusive of the jus mariti of their then or any other husband they may afterwards marry, and the annual produce of said share of residue paid to said legatee during her life, and at her death the principal sum shall be paid to her heirs or executors.”

In winding up the estate a question arose as to the effect of this declaration regarding the shares of the residue falling to the females who were married at the time of the death of the testatrix, and a special case was accordingly presented.

The second party, who was one of such female residuary legatees, maintained that it imported an absolute right of fee, which became vested in her, exclusive of the jus mariti of her husband, as at the death of the testatrix, and that she was consequently entitled to have the capital sum falling to her at once paid over in cash.

The trustees, who were the first parties, considered that they were not in safety to comply with the demand of the second party, but that they were bound to hold or invest the shares of residue bequeathed to female married legatees for their behoof, and to pay over to them only the annual produce of such shares respectively during the lifetime of the party entitled thereto.

The following were the questions—“(1) Are the parties of the first part entitled or bound to make immediate payment in cash to the party of the second part of the share of residue bequeathed to her under the said trust-deed of settlement and codicils? Or (2) Are the parties of the first part bound to hold the capital of the said share of residue until the death of the second party, paying to her in the meantime the annual proceeds, and on her death to make over the capital to her heirs or executors?”

Argued for the first parties—The case was ruled by the recent case of Christie's Trustees, July 3, 1889, supra p. 611. It was true that there was here an alternative given to the trustees, either of holding or of investing the shares of married female residuary legatees, but the alternative of investing was ruled adversely to the second party by the former case of Duthie's Trustees v. Kinloch, June 5, 1878, 5 R. 858. There was here no direction to pay, nor anything that could be construed into a direction to pay, and consequently the case was not within the rule of Allan v. Allan's Trustees, December 12, 1872, 11 Macph. 216, and the recent case of Jamieson v. Lesslie's Trustees, May 28, 1889 supra p. 538.

The second party was not called on.

At advising—

Page: 710

Judgment:

Lord Justice-Clerk—I think that this case is ruled by that of Jamieson, not that of Christie.

Lord Young—I am of the same opinion. I think that this lady must have her money, but I am not surprised that the trustees should have brought this case into Court. Indeed it was their duty to do so. It is a very nice question. A very small difference of expression determines the point whether a direction intended for the benefit of the proprietor shall be disregarded as repugnant to the truster's intention, or whether it is operative and may be carried out. If the property is given to anyone, any direct mode of dealing with it would generally be void for repugnancy. It is generally repugnant to the benefit given. On the contrary, there are cases, of which Christie's may be taken as an example, although not by any means a perfect one, where the giver may constitute a protection by keeping the fund out of the hands of the object of his bounty, and putting it under the care of managers of his own appointment. There are such cases in which it would certainly be operative, but here there is no operative restraint upon the proprietor. I think the property is here distinctly and absolutely given, and that the restriction as to exclusion of jus mariti and preserving the capital for the beneficiaries' own heirs and executors are not operative, and cannot be given effect to. They are repugnant to the gift proper.

Lord Rutherfurd Clark and Lord Lee concurred.

The Court pronounced this interlocutor:—

“Answer the first of the questions stated in the case in the affirmative, and the second question in the negative: Find and declare accordingly.”

Counsel:

Counsel for the First Parties— Dundas. Agents— Scott Moncrieff & Trail, W.S.

Counsel for the Second Party— Jameson— Fraser. Agent— F. J. Martin, W.S.

1889


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