Scottish Court of Session Decisions

Section 22 of the Friendly Societies Act 1875 (38 and 39 Vict. c. 60) provides that every dispute between a member, or person claiming through a member, and the society shall be decided in manner directed by the rules of the society, and the decision so made shall be binding and conclusive on all parties without appeal, and shall not be removable into any court of law or restrain-able by injunction. This enactment is subject, inter alia, to the following provisions :—( a) The parties to a dispute in a society (or branch) may, by consent (unless the rules of such society or branch expressly forbid it), refer such dispute to the chief registrar, … who shall hear and determine such dispute…. ( d) Where the rules contain no directions as to disputes, or where no decision is made on a dispute within forty days after application to the society (or branch) for a reference under its rules, the member or person aggrieved may apply either to the county court or to a court of summary jurisdiction, which may hear and determine the matter in dispute. ( e) The court, chief or other registrar, may, at the request of either party, state a case for the opinion in England of the Supreme Court of Judicature, in Scotland of either Division of the Inner House of the Court of Session, or in Ireland of one of the Superior Courts of common law at Dublin, on any question of law.” …

An action in ordinary form, and not bearing to be under the Friendly Societies Acts, was raised in the Small Debt Court at Paisley by Mrs Janet Linton, Paisley, and others, against the City of Glasgow Friendly Society, 6 Richmond Street, Glasgow. The pursuers claimed the sum of £6, 18s in respect of the death of Mrs Margaret Linton, whose life was insured with the defenders, and who died in August 1895. The defenders disputed that this amount was due.

The Sheriff having decerned in favour of the pursuers, the defenders called upon him to state a case for the opinion of the First Division of the Court of Session, in accordance with sec. 22, sub-sec. ( e), above quoted.

The Sheriff accordingly stated a case, in which, after narrating the circumstances, he submitted the question whether his decision was right in law. The pursuer objected to the competency of an appeal in this form, and argued that the action having been raised as an ordinary action in the Small Debt Court, and not being founded on the Friendly Societies Act, the only competent method of appeal was that applicable to all small-debt actions under sec. 31 of the Small Debt Act of 1837.

At advising—