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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Macdonald v. Newall [1898] ScotLR 77_2 (16 November 1898)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1898/36SLR0077_2.html
Cite as: [1898] SLR 77_2, [1898] ScotLR 77_2

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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session

Page: 77

Court of Session Inner House First Division.

Wednesday, November 16. 1898.

[ Lord Kyllachy, Ordinary.

36 SLR 77-2

Macdonald

v.

Newall

et e contra


Subject_1Sale
Subject_2Sale of Heritage
Subject_3Objections to Title
Subject_4Personal Bar.

Sale — “ Subjects known as the Royal Hotel” — Extrinsic Evidence.
Facts:

A purchaser who had been in possession of the subjects sold for tour months objected to the title offered by the seller, on the ground that it contained a reservation of minerals. It was proved that prior to the entry of the purchaser the titles had been examined by his agent, and no objection taken to the reservation of the minerals which appeared ex facie of the title. Held that purchaser was personally barred from insisting in the objection.

Per Lord President—Possession is only a circumstance in the case.… It is not a just inference to adopt that mere possession of itself would bar a party from objecting to the title on the ground that minerals were reserved.

Circumstances in which held further that the purchaser was personally barred from insisting in an objection that the title did not include the whole subjects contained in the missives.

Opinion reserved (by Lord M'Laren) whether the purchaser of a dwelling-house on a feu is entitled to refuse the title tendered on the ground that it does not contain a conveyance of the minerals.

Certain subjects were described in missives of sale as “the property known as the Royal Hotel.” The purchaser having refused to accept the title offered him, on the ground that it did not comprehend all the subjects included in the above description, held that it was competent to identify the subjects by extrinsic evidence, and in particular to inquire what were the subjects known to the purchaser under that description, and for that purpose to ascertain what were the subjects pointed out or described to him prior to the sale.

Headnote:

Mr Peter Macdonald, wine merchant, Glasgow, was the heritable proprietor of subjects at Portmahomack, near Tain, consisting of the property known as the Royal Hotel. In June and July 1896 he advertised this for sale, and on 6th July an offer was made by Mrs Elizabeth Newall, 3 Steeple Street, Kilbarchan, with the consent of her husband Charles Newall. The offer was accepted by Mr Macdonald, the offer and acceptance being in the following terms:—

“1 and 3 Steeple Street, Kilbarchan, 6 th July 1896.

I hereby offer you the sum of Five hundred and twenty-five pounds (£525) stg. for the property known as the Royal Hotel at Portmahomack, near Tain, in Ross-shire, belonging to Peter MacDonald, Esq., including the goodwill, bar, and cellar fittings, utensils, grates, brackets, and lamps; and agree to take over at mutual valuation the furniture and stock at mutual valuation, paying proportion of licence and taxes from date of entry, all provided I obtain a valid title to the property with searches if I think necessary, and obtain a transfer of the licence. I am prepared to consign in bank upon deposit-receipt in our joint names upon acceptance hereof the sum of £525, which will be indorsed by me when these conditions are fulfilled, and when the vendor (Mr Macdonald) grants a bond at 4 per cent. for the amount of the value of the furniture and stock, and should that be less than £300, he shall be

Page: 78

bound to make it up to £300 in cash at the settlement.—Yours truly,

Elizabeth Newall,

I consent, Charles Newall.

I accept the above, Peter Macdonald.

Walker Gray, witness,

Hugh M'Coll jr., witness.”

6d., Stamp 7 th July 1896.

The titles were sent in the beginning of August to Mrs Newall's agents, who pointed out a defect which they claimed should be rectified, and after considerable correspondence between the parties' agents it was agreed that this should be done. The titles disclosed the fact that the whole minerals in and under the property were reserved to the superior, but no objection was taken to this reservation by Mrs New-all's agents. On the 6th November possession of the hotel was given to Mr and Mrs Newall, the licence was transferred, and the stock was valued and taken over, and the price of the hotel, which had previously been consigned, was paid over. The parties being unable to agree as to the terms of the disposition of the subjects which was to be granted, an action was raised by Mr Macdonald on 19th February 1897, craving for declarator that the property sold to the defender Mrs Newall, conform to the missives of 6th July, “does not include the tap-room and stables belonging to the pursuer adjoining the said subjects, and that the defenders should implement their part of the contract by accepting a valid disposition.

The pursuer averred—“(Cond. 5) On the day on which the defenders took possession of the subjects purchased by them, they were quite aware that the subjects bought by them did not include the taproom with flat above, or the stables or the yard behind, and the property included in the sale, being the subjects described in the advertisement, was pointed out to them. They remarked that the tap-room and stables, which belonged to the pursuer, and which adjoined the subjects sold, might be useful to them in connection with the property which they had purchased, and Mrs Newall accordingly offered to lease the said tap-room and stables from the pursuer at a rental of £12 per annum. Her offer therefore is in the following terms:—

Portmahomack, 6th Nov. 1896.

Peter Macdonald, Esq., Glasgow.

Dear Sir,—I hereby agree to rent from you, for the year from Martinmas 1896 to Martinmas 1897, the tap-room off the hotel proper, and the stables adjoining thereto, at a rent of £12 sterling.—Yours truly,

Elizabeth Newall.’

“ The pursuer accepted said offer, and the defenders accordingly got and now hold possession as tenants of the said tap-room and stables. The pursuer retained and retains possession of the flat above the tap-room, and it has been unoccupied all along. The defenders took possession of the subjects described in the advertisement as the whole property purchased by them, and did not claim, and did not get possession as purchasers, of the tap-room or flat above, or stables or yard behind the same.”

He pleaded that the defenders were barred by personal exception and their own actings from insisting in the defences made by them.

The defenders averred that “they took and held possession of the hotel, tap-room, and hotel stables as part of the subjects sold under the missives; that no document of the tenor or effect condescended on (in Cond. 5) was written or subscribed by the defender Mrs Newall or her husband.” They further averred that the subjects, “including the said tap-room, stables, and yard, as and from the time when the pursuer obtained a licence, have been known as the Royal Hotel, Portmahomack,” and that the tap-room and stable had always been used by him in connection with and for the purposes of his business as keeper of the hotel, and were essential for the proper carrying on of the business. The defenders further averred that the pursuer was not in a position to give a title to part of the subjects sold, viz., the minerals.

An action was raised on May 18, 1897, by Mr and Mrs Newall against Mr Macdonald craving for declarator that they were en titled to rescind the contract of sale, and that the defender should be ordained to repay the purchase price.

The pursuers made averments with regard to the tap-room and stable of a similar character to those made in the other action, and averred further that the pursuer refused to give and could not give a valid title to the minerals, which were reserved to the superior, and that the pursuer Mrs Newall would not have taken possession except upon the faith of the defender's giving a valid title to the whole property sold. They maintained that in consequence of the defender's failure to fulfil the conditions of the contract of sale they were entitled to resile.

The defender averred that the subjects sold did not include the minerals, and further “(2) that long before the pursuers took possession of the subjects purchased, viz., on 1st August 1896, the titles were sent to their agents, and were examined by them, and disclosed the fact that the minerals were reserved by the superior; (3) that in the knowledge of the state of the title and in particular of the reservation of minerals to the superior, the pursuers took possession of the property on 6th November 1896, paid the price, obtained a transfer of the hotel licence, and have ever since continued to occupy the property and carry on the business; and (4) that in point of fact during all the period since July 1896 no question ever was raised by the pursuers with regard to the minerals, and the service of this action was absolutely the first intimation of the objection which has been given.” He maintained, accordingly, that the pursuers were barred from insisting in the action.

The two actions were conjoined by the Lord Ordinary, and a proof was allowed.

The proof was directed towards identifying what were the subjects known

Page: 79

as the Royal Hotel, and the import of it appears in the opinion of the Lord Ordinary. On 26th February 1898 his Lordship pronounced the following interlocutor:—“The Lord Ordinary having considered the conjoined actions (1) in the action at the instance of Peter Macdonald against Elizabeth Newall and another, Finds, declares, and decerns, in terms of the declaratory conclusions of the summons; quoad ultra continues the cause, reserving meantime the question of expenses; (2) assoilzies the defender from the conclusion of the counter action, and decerns: Finds the defender entitled to expenses.”

Opinion.—“The question in this case is whether Mr and Mrs Newall (whom I shall call the defenders) are entitled to resile from a contract of sale whereby they purchased from the pursuer ‘the property known as the Royal Hotel at Portmahomack, near Tain.’ The contract was made by missives dated on 6th July 1896, and the defender has been in possession since November following. The counter actions, which are now before me, were raised respectively on 19th February and 13th March 1897; and the claim to rescind is rested on two grounds—the first of which is that the pursuer is not in a position to give a title to a part of the subject sold, viz., the minerals, which it appears are by the titles of the property reserved to the superior.

“It appears to me that this objection (assuming it to be otherwise good) comes too late. The facts are these—The property was bought, as I have said, on 6th July, and shortly afterwards, in the beginning of August, the titles were in usual course sent for examination to the defenders' agents. The titles disclosed the reservation of the minerals, but the defenders' agents took no objection to that head, being probably satisfied that the reservation was of no practical moment. They did, however, point out a defect in the title of a different kind—a defect which they claimed should be rectified. After some correspondence this claim was conceded, and it was agreed that the title should be rectified in the manner proposed. Thereafter on the 6th November possession of the hotel was given and taken, the defenders urging that as their agents were now satisfied with the title there was no need for further delay. The hotel licence was at the same time transferred, and the stock valued and taken over. The price of the hotel (£525), which had previously been consigned, was also uplifted and paid. In short, although there has been some delay in preparing the disposition, the transaction was, for all practical purposes, concluded in the month of November 1896, and it was not until the defenders had been four months in possession that the objection now in question was at length taken.

In these circumstances it is, in my opinion, impossible to hold otherwise than that the defenders waived any question as to the reservation of the minerals, and accepted, or became bound to accept, as in implement of their purchase, a conveyance of the subjects as they belonged to the seller. It is said that until the disposition was adjusted, objections to the title were still open and must be held as reserved. I doubt if, in the circumstances, that was so; but in any case I do not consider that such reservation could extend beyond defects in the title which were capable of being rectified, and of which rectification could be enforced consistently with the contract.

The second ground of rescission is that the defenders have been refused possession of a certain tap-room and stable, which are adjacent to the hotel, and the former of which is directly connected with it. The defenders contend that these premises fall within their contract. The pursuer contends the contrary, and contends separately that the defenders have here also waived the alleged objection by accepting possession, as in full implement of the contract, of what has been called the hotel proper, and by taking a lease from year to year, at a certain rent, of the alleged adjuncts.

In this matter I am of opinion, in the first place, that extrinsic evidence is competent and necessary to identify the subjects described in the missives as the property “known as the Royal Hotel, Portmahomack.” In particular, I consider that it is competent to inquire what the subjects were which were known to the defenders under that name, and for that purpose to ascertain what were the subjects pointed out or described to them prior to the sale. In the next place, that being so, I hold it proved beyond all doubt (1) that before the sale the defenders were expressly told that the tap-room and stables were to be reserved; (2) that the building which was for sale was at the same time pointed out to them on a plan and also a photograph; (3) that the property was advertised with reference to particulars which were furnished to the defenders, and which described the subjects by boundaries and measurement; (4) that before the purchase the defenders were advised to visit the premises, and are understood to have done so. Further and separately, I hold it proved that the defenders on 6th November accepted possession of what I have called the hotel proper as in full implement of their contract, and executed of the same date the missive of lease quoted on record, by which they became tenants of the tap-room and stables at a rent of £12 a-year.

That is my view of the import of the proof, and I need not, I think, say more as to this second ground of rescission. The defenders got, in my opinion, implement of their contract according to its just construction. But in any view they must be held to have accepted, as in full implement, the subjects of which they got possession as purchasers. The result is that I hold the defenders to be bound by their purchase, and I think it follows that the pursuer must have decree of declarator in terms of the first declaratory conclusion of his summons, and must be assoilzied from the conclusions of the defenders' counter action. The remaining conclusion of the pursuers' action must, it was agreed, await the

Page: 80

adjustment of the disposition, and accordingly I shall, for that purpose, continue the cause. As to expenses, the pursuer will have expenses in the defenders' action. In his own action the expenses will, in the meantime, be reserved.”

Mr and Mrs Newall reclaimed, and argued—(1) The Lord Ordinary had been wrong in allowing extrinsic evidence to vary the terms of the written contract, which showed clearly the tap-room and stable were included in the subjects. It was incompetent to lead evidence tending to show that it had been pointed out to them when the contract was made that the tap-room and stable were not included— Gregson v. Alsop, July 13, 1897, 24 R. 1081. (2) The seller was not able to give a good title to all the subjects sold, viz., to the minerals, and accordingly the purchasers were not bound to accept the property— Whyte v. Lee, February 22, 1879, 6 R. 699; Robertson v. Rutherfurd, November 27, 1811, 4 D. 121. Unless it were proved they had waived their right to resile they were entitled to do so, and waiver must be very clearly proved in order to bar them. The mere fact of taking possession of the subjects was not sufficient to constitute waiver— Carter v. Lornie, December 20, 1890, 18 R. 353, at 361; Burroughs v. Oakley (1819), 3 Swanston 159.

Counsel for the respondents was not called upon.

Judgment:

Lord President—The question of the minerals is treated first by the Lord Ordinary in his opinion, and I agree with his conclusions on it. They are not rested solely on the fact of possession having been taken, but on a train of circumstances, of which taking possession was only a part, though an important and crucial one.

It is plain from the evidence and the correspondence that the titles were at an early date placed before Mr and Mrs Newall's solicitor, and that objections were taken and points considered and reserved, the area of controversy or criticism being narrowed down to the matters specified in the letters. Possession was certainly an important incident in the train of conduct, but I agree with the Lord Ordinary that it is only a circumstance in the case, and accordingly if your Lordships adhere to his conclusion it is not a just inference to adopt that mere possession of itself would bar a party from objecting to the title on the ground that minerals were reserved.

As to the other point also, I agree with the Lord Ordinary. These points are sufficiently clear that the Newalls were entitled under the missives to receive the property “known as the Royal Hotel, Portmahomack,” and I do not think that his Lordship has said or done anything against their right, had nothing happened after the missives, to receive that property as existing at the date of the missives, 6th July 1896, and nothing less than that. He considers the question whether in ascertaining what in fact was the Royal Hotel it is not admissible evidence to inquire what was the knowledge of the Newalls, and what were the statements made by Macdonald as to the subject of the sale. It is impossible to reject evidence upon these points, and the Lord Ordinary accordingly says—“I consider that it is competent to inquire what the subjects were which were known to the defenders under that name, and for that purpose to ascertain what were the subjects pointed out or described to them prior to the sale.” The admission of such evidence was not for the purpose of showing that less was agreed to than the missives set forth; on the contrary, it is because such evidence bears on the question what, as the result of the whole evidence, was known as the “ Royal Hotel.”

I may illustrate this view by referring to the case of Gregson v. Alsop, where the criterion or standard of the tenant's right was “all as sometime occupied by James Brown.” In that case the sole question was one of fact—“What was occupied by James Brown?” Here the question, “What was known as the Royal Hotel?” is again a question of fact, but it is a more complex one, depending not upon the possession of an individual but upon the aggregate knowledge of persons acquainted with the property. Among these I think with the Lord Ordinary the pursuer and defenders must be reckoned, not only from their statements in the witness-box, but from their actings at the time.

Accordingly the Lord Ordinary has not acted in any way contrary to the clear rule that the writing of the 6th July was to determine the rights of the parties.

But I do not need to proceed upon that ground, because the Newalls, by obtaining possession of the premises in question, viz., the tap-room and stable, on the footing of tenants, and by accepting a lease, have barred themselves from maintaining a contrary construction of the missives. It is true that the evidence upon this is chiefly that of the pursuer Macdonald, but that is because the defenders did not choose to come into the witness-box. The result of the evidence is therefore unchallenged and uncontradicted to the effect that when the Newalls came to the hotel they were told that the tap-room and stables were to be built off, and as they desired to obtain possession of them they agreed to take them on the footing of tenants and signed a lease. That is a significant and decisive fact, and it becomes clearer still when we find that Mrs Newall states on record that no such document was signed by her. She does not support this statement in the witness-box, and accordingly it recoils upon her that she makes an unsuccessful attempt to disprove the fact. The Lord Ordinary therefore is right in saying that it is proved that the defenders on 6th November “became tenants of the tap-room and stables at a rent of £12 a-year,” and on this point I agree with his conclusion.

Lord Adam—I am of the same opinion. Two objections have been stated by Mrs Newall to the disposition tendered by the seller. The first is that the subject which she agreed to purchase was the property

Page: 81

known as the Royal Hotel, and that the disposition now tendered contains a reservation of minerals, whereas by the offer which she accepted she was entitled to have not only the surface of the ground purchased hut the minerals also. I agree with your Lordship and the Lord Ordinary on this point. I need not say that the minerals under this property do not appear to be a valuable consideration for the purchase, and I make this observation because it is not difficult to presume that the right to such a shadowy subject might be easily waived. The facts of the case are that the titles were sent in the usual course to the purchaser's agent, who went over them, and returned them with observations on another matter, but made no reference to this objection, which was patent to the eye of anyone reading the titles. The other point raised was settled in full knowledge of this objection, and the purchaser took possession and continued thereafter in possession. In these circumstances I agree that she must be held to have waived objection to the title on this ground.

I also agree on the second point. Without going into the history of the case, I think that the transaction into which she entered is a bar to Mrs Newall now insisting upon having possession of the tap-room and stable. The evidence shows that it was distinctly pointed out to her that she was not to get possession of the tap-room and stable. In this knowledge she took a lease of these subjects, and she possesses them under that lease, and cannot, in my opinion, maintain now that they are part of the subjects sold.

Lord M'Laren—With regard to the first ground for setting aside the contract of sale, namely, the absence of a conveyance of the minerals, I am prepared to accept the ground of decision stated by the Lord Ordinary and your Lordships as sufficient for the decision of the case. I think, especially in the case of an objection which has no substance, if the agent of the purchaser points out certain objections to the title tendered, and says nothing about other objections, he, as representing his client, must be taken to have waived these latter objections. I desire to reserve my opinion on the question whether the purchaser of a dwelling-house on a feu is entitled to refuse the title tendered on the ground that it does not contain a conveyance of minerals. If the house were on a freehold I do not doubt he could, but it is notorious that a superior generally reserves the minerals to himself when giving off feus, and therefore there is no presumption that when a feu of building property is bought the minerals form part of the subject of sale. I have not had an opportunity of reading the case of White cited to us, which is said to be an authority to the contrary, but I understand that in that case the decision of Lord Young was reversed by a Court of three, who themselves differed in opinion, so that we have really the judgment of only two Judges against two.

It is hardly necessary that I should say anything on the part of the case to which the argument was mainly directed. The objection there urged would be substantial if made out, but for the reasons stated by your Lordship and the Lord Ordinary I think there is no foundation for it on the merits. The purchaser knew perfectly that she was not to get the tap-room and stable under the contract of sale, and in that knowledge agreed to take a lease of the very subjects which she now says formed part of the subject sold to her.

Lord Kinnear—I quite agree with the judgment which your Lordships have given, and therefore in concurring with the Lord Ordinary and with your Lordships on the first point, I do not .assume that there is anything unsound in the defender's contention that under the missives of sale which she is asked to implement she was entitled to a conveyance of the lands with the minerals if she had taken the objection to the title tendered in due time. But I think it is a sufficient answer to the defender's contention that the objection—which is not material—was waived by her agent, who kept open certain questions as to the manner in which the title of the seller had been feudally completed, but without raising any question as to the minerals.

The Court adhered.

Counsel:

Counsel for the Reclaimers — Kennedy — J.W. Forbes. Agents — Forbes Dallas & Co., S.S.C.

Counsel for the Respondent — J. Wilson — Gray. Agent — Alex. Ross, S.S.C.

1898


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