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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Rennie v. Reid [1908] ScotLR 814 (03 July 1908) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1908/45SLR0814.html Cite as: [1908] ScotLR 814, [1908] SLR 814 |
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Page: 814↓
[Sheriff Court at Glasgow.
The Workmen's Compensation Act 1906, section 13, enacts—“‘Workman’ does not include … a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business …”
A jobbing window cleaner was in the habit of going to a doctor's house once a month to clean the windows. There was no formal contract between the parties, and no invitation was sent or special permission given, but the window cleaner went on the chance of getting the job, rang the door bell, was admitted by the servant, and did the work. Among the windows he cleaned was included that of the doctor's consulting room or surgery. On the occasion of one of his visits, while cleaning the dining-room window, he fell into the area and was injured.
Held that the employment was of a casual nature and was not for the purposes of the employer's trade or business, and that accordingly the injured man was not a “workman” within the meaning of the Act, and was not entitled to compensation.
Hill v. Begg, June 4, 1908, Times L.R., vol. 24, p. 711, followed.
In an arbitration under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906, between George Rennie, window cleaner, Glasgow, and Dr W. L. Reid, 7 Royal Crescent, Glasgow, the Sheriff-Substitute at Glasgow ( Boyd) refused compensation. At the request of Rennie he stated a case on appeal.
The following facts were set forth as proved—“(1) That the respondent resides with his family at 7 Royal Crescent, Glasgow, and also uses a portion of the premises in connection with his professional practice. (2) That the appellant is a jobbing window cleaner, and that on 27th December 1907 he was cleaning the dining-room window in the respondent's said house, when he fell into the area, and sustained injuries which have since incapacitated him for pursuing his usual employment. (3) That his average weekly earnings were £1. (4) That for some years the appellant has been in the habit of cleaning the respondent's windows about once a month. (5) That the work occupied about three or four hours, and the appellant was paid 3s. 4d. on each occasion, being at the rate of 2d. per window. (6) That he did not wait for a special invitation on each occasion, nor did he ask special permission, but he called, was admitted, and did the work. (7) That
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there was no formal contract between the parties, and that the respondent might have engaged any other person to clean his windows, or might have refused the appellant admittance whenever he came prepared to clean the windows.” On these facts the Sheriff-Substitute found that the appellant was a person whose employment was of a casual nature, and who was employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business, and therefore assoilzied the respondent from the conclusions of the petition.
Argued for the appellant—The employment was not of a casual nature. There was here an implied contract to do regular work at regular intervals. This was shown by the fact that the workman came without special invitation and was admitted by the servant as a matter of course. The English case of Hill v. Begg, June 4, 1908, 24 T.L.R. p. 711, was different, for there the workman came at no fixed periods and only when he was summoned by letter or post card. If, however, the employment was of a casual nature the workman was none the less entitled to compensation because it was employment for the purposes of the doctor's business. He cleaned the consulting room window, and the keeping of the consulting room in proper order was a part, if a humble part, of the doctor's business.
Counsel for the respondent were not called upon.
The solution of the question depends upon the definition of “workman” contained in the thirteenth section of the Act. That section provides that “workman” “does not include a person whose employment is of a casual nature, and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business.” Under this section, therefore, in order to entitle the appellant to compensation it is essential ( first) that his employment should not have been of a casual nature, and ( second) that it was for the purposes of the respondent's business. Both of these conditions must be present.
Now, with reference to the first of these requirements, the facts as found in the case are that the appellant did not wait for a special invitation on each occasion, nor did he ask special permission, but called at the respondent's house, was admitted, and did the work. There was no formal contract between the parties, and the respondent might have engaged other persons to clean the windows, and might have refused the appellant admittance whenever he came prepared to clean the windows. Could there be a more typical example of employment of a casual nature than this? The appellant went to the respondent's house on each occasion on the chance of being permitted to clean the windows. That chance was no doubt a good one, but it cannot possibly be said that the employment was, to use the words of Buckley, L.J., in Hill v. Begg, 24 Times L.R. 711, either permanent or periodic. Accordingly, I think that the appellant has failed to show that his employment was other than of a casual nature.
Further, I am of opinion that the appellant was not employed for the purposes of the respondent's business. It was argued that the fact that the appellant cleaned the windows of the rooms in the house used by the respondent in connection with his medical practice was sufficient to satisfy this requirement. I cannot agree with this argument, and in my opinion it would be absurd to make the respondent's liability to compensate the appellant turn upon the question whether the appellant had or had not, on the particular occasions on which he went to the house, cleaned the windows of the surgery as well as the other windows of the house. Essentially the employment was in connection with the respondent's private residence, and not for the purposes of his business. On the whole matter I am of opinion that we should answer the question of law in the negative.
Mr Thomson, however, contended further that even if that was so, the appellant was none the less a “workman” within the meaning of section 13 of the Act, because he was employed “for the purposes of the employer's trade or business.” It seems to me that to say that a window-cleaner who cleans the windows of a doctor's house, among them being the windows of his surgery or consulting-room, is employed for the purposes of the doctor's trade or business, is straining the language of the Act beyond all sense and reason.
I will only add that I concur in the opinions delivered by the learned Judges in the English case of Hill v. Begg which was
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The
The Court upheld the decision of the arbiter.
Counsel for the Appellant— Crabb Watt, K.C.— F. C. Thomson. Agents— Weir & Macgregor, S.S.C.
Counsel for the Respondent— D. P. Fleming. Agents— Mitchell & Baxter, W.S.
