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	Scottish Court of Session Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Fulton v Bell [1999] ScotCS 108 (6 May 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1999/108.html Cite as: [1999] ScotCS 108

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After sundry procedure in this process, as recorded in the interlocutor sheets, a Division of the Inner House, on 11 March 1998, refused a reclaiming motion by the respondent (referred to as Mr. Bell), made a finding as to the expenses occasioned by the reclaiming motion and remitted the cause to the Lord Ordinary to proceed as accords. On 12 January 1999 the Lord Ordinary pronounced an interlocutor finding the noter entitled to certain expenses out of the property of the trust and remitted the account thereof to the Auditor of Court for taxation. Mr. Bell marked a reclaiming motion against that interlocutor and lodged grounds of appeal which he was later allowed to amend. The reclaiming motion was heard before an Extra Division (Lords McCluskey, Coulsfield and Allanbridge) on Thursday 6 May 1999.

Mr. Bell, who appeared for himself, submitted no arguments whatsoever relevant to the matters dealt with in the interlocutor reclaimed against. The court refused the reclaiming motion and awarded the expenses thereof against Mr. Bell.

For the record it should be recorded that Mr. Bell presented arguments which we outline as follows.

Mr. Bell maintained that the integrity of the court was involved. The award of expenses was fundamentally flawed for the reasons specified in the Amended Grounds of Appeal, criticising earlier interlocutors in 1994, 1995 and 1998. It was the duty of the judges to uphold the integrity of the Court of Session. They had a duty to apply "the common rule of law regarding integrity". That rule of law was embodied in the insignia within the court and appearing above the mace. It was also part of the judicial oath. He was not able to point to any specific rule of law; but simply suggested that the whole process was vitiated by the fundamental flaws specified. He accepted that he had presented the same arguments to another Division of the Inner House and that they had been rejected. He maintained, however, that the Extra Division before which he was appearing (on 6 May 1999) was in fact the First Division, that it was superior to the Second Division which had decided the matter at an earlier stage and that the Division before which he was appearing on 6 May 1999 had therefore power to overrule the interlocutor of the Second Division of 11 March 1998. In any event, he maintained that as the matters at issue made the cause one of difficulty or importance it was the duty of the Division before which he was appearing to appoint the cause to be re-heard by such larger court as was necessary for the proper disposal of the case. He declined to accept from the court that the court had no competence to review disposals by other Divisions of the Inner House or that section 36 gave no power to the court to re-determine the disposal of a cause which had been determined at an earlier stage. The award of expenses, Mr. Bell maintained, was also fundamentally flawed because it had been granted on the motion of a solicitor advocate. He accepted that his argument in relation to the competence of a solicitor advocate to make a motion in the Inner House had been rejected by a Division provided over by the Lord Justice Clerk but maintained that that decision was "contrary to reason". He suggested that the Court of Session had come to a sorry pass when it could not consider a fundamental flaw of such a character. He tried to argue again the point about the competence of a solicitor advocate but was stopped because that matter had already been determined by the Inner House. He also tried to raise again a question as to the so-called "double imposition", which was a matter determined by another Division of the Inner House at an earlier stage (in November 1996). He tried to refer to a letter which he had written to the sheriff of 7 April 1999 because he thought it might improve the understanding of the court; although he conceded that it was not relevant to the appeal.

Every single argument that Mr. Bell sought to advance - other than the reference to section 36 of the Court of Session Act 1988 - has, as he acknowledges, been advanced by him before and rejected by the Inner House. In these circumstances it is not proposed to repeat the reasons previously given in various Opinions of the Court for rejecting these arguments.