BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?

No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!



BAILII [Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]

Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Elabas, Re Petition for Judicial Review [2004] ScotCS 164 (02 July 2004)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2004/164.html
Cite as: [2004] ScotCS 164

[New search] [Help]


Elabas, Re Petition for Judicial Review [2004] ScotCS 164 (02 July 2004)

OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION

P1189/03

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

OPINION OF LORD REED

in Petition of

MUTAS ELABAS

Petitioner;

for

Judicial Review of determinations of a Special Adjudicator and of an Immigration Appeal Tribunal

 

 

________________

 

 

Petitioner: Devlin; Drummond Miller, W.S.

Respondent: Drummond; Solicitor to the Advocate General

2 July 2004

[1]      The petitioner was born on 6 May 1975 and is a national of Sudan. He arrived in the United Kingdom clandestinely. On 17 November 1997 he applied for asylum. By letter dated 20 February 2001 his application was refused by the Secretary of State for the Home Department. On 7 March 2001 he was served with a notice of decision to issue removal directions. He then appealed against the refusal of asylum to an adjudicator. The appeal was heard on 5 September 2001. The petitioner was represented at the hearing by counsel. By a determination dated 25 September 2001 the adjudicator refused the appeal. The petitioner then applied to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal for leave to appeal against the determination of the adjudicator. Leave to appeal was refused in terms of a determination dated 5 December 2001. In the present proceedings the petitioner seeks the reduction of the determinations of the adjudicator and of the tribunal. The only respondent is the Secretary of State.

[2]     
In order to qualify for asylum under the Immigration Rules (HC 251, 1990), the applicant must have the status of a refugee under article 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva, 28 July 1951; Cmnd 9171), as amended by the 1967 Protocol (New York, 31 January 1967; Cmnd 3906). The first matter to be established under the article is that the claimant is outside the country of his nationality owing to a well-founded fear of persecution.

[3]     
The petitioner's application for asylum was supported by a statement prepared with the assistance of his representatives. In the statement, the petitioner said that his problems had started on 21 October 1995, when his father had been arrested by the Sudanese security police. His father was thereafter held in custody:

"We managed to get information that my father was accused of being a member of UMMA. (He actually was a member)."

According to the Country Assessment for Sudan prepared by the Home Office's Country Information and Policy Unit, UMMA is a Mahdist political party based on the Koran and Islamic traditions. It is one of Sudan's main opposition political parties. It signed a peace accord with the Sudanese Government in November 1999, following which its leaders returned to Sudan from exile.

[4]     
In the statement, the petitioner also said that security men had come to his house, in Kosti, about 20 days after his father's arrest, wanting his father's documents. From then on, security men came to the house about twice a month. They would threaten the petitioner and his mother. These visits continued while the petitioner was doing his military service.

[5]     
In the statement, the petitioner also said that he had started compulsory military service in August 1997. After physical training, he was informed that he was to commence weapons training on 3 October 1997 at an establishment on the outskirts of Khartoum. A convoy of buses, each containing conscripts and armed officers, went instead to Khartoum airport. The conscripts then realised that they were to be flown to the southern Sudan, to fight in the civil war against the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Many of the conscripts then tried to escape. The officers were overpowered. Seven conscripts escaped. The petitioner climbed the airport wall and made his way back to his home. On 11 October 1997, with the assistance of his uncle, he was taken on board a ship leaving Sudan, and left the country. He did not have family anywhere except Kosti.

[6]     
The petitioner's application for asylum was also supported by a letter from the Scottish Refugee Council dated 30 August 2000. The writer stated that he had discussed matters with the petitioner, and that the petitioner had suggested some amendments to his earlier statement. In particular, the letter stated:

"Subsequent to the submission of Mr El Abas' [statement] it has been established that his father was not a member of the UMMA party but a paramilitary force which was sympathetic to the aims of the SPLA. This was established in discussion with his maternal uncle. Little more about the nature [of] this organization has been revealed to Mr El Abas. This has been established in discussion with his uncle following the drafting of the initial statement."

The letter also stated that the petitioner did not wish to serve in the civil war. The writer contended that the petitioner's refusal to serve in the war justified a claim for asylum, on the basis that his refusal was motivated by an implied political opinion (namely, a rejection of the legitimacy of the conflict in south Sudan), and he faced a possible death sentence as a punishment for his desertion.

[7]     
The petitioner was interviewed by an immigration officer, with the assistance of an interpreter, on 24 October 2000. The material questions and answers are recorded as follows:

"Q4. Why didn't you want to go to the south?

A. I don't believe in the trouble in the south. This is my father's philosophy. My father believes it is not right for the northern people to go and fight the southern people.

Q5. Who lives in the south?

A. I am from Kosti town which is not far from the south.

...

Q7. Why did you leave Sudan?

A. A few security officers came to my house. They keep asking about my father.

Q8. Why did you leave Sudan?

A. The pressure is too much for me. The pressure of investigating the issue of my father.

...

Q10. What do you fear in Sudan?

A. I was scared my family could be threatened.

Q.11. Why would they be threatened?

A. The pressure about documents.

Q12. Why would they be threatened?

A. When my father mentioned documents in his son's hands.

...

Q15. What do you fear should you return?

A. Anything could happen. I could be put in jail or tortured. Because there was an outstanding charge [of] the possession of my father's documents.

Q16. Why would they only now act regarding documents?

A. Because my father told security officers about these documents that I had in 1997.

Q17. What date?

A. I can't remember. The beginning of 1997.

Q18. Why did security forces do nothing between beginning '97 and time you left?

A. The truth is my father didn't tell the security officers that I keep these documents. It was only fabrication by security officers.

Q19. Why do you fear they would do something?

A. These visits became active and they keep questioning my family about me.

...

Q21. What are they asking your family?

A. They believe that I have these documents.

Q22. What are these documents?

A. Leaflets. About SPLA. They were frightened that these documents could be distributed in the country.

Q23. Why did they arrest your father?

A. They accused him of being involved with SPLA.

Q24. Was he in SPLA?

A. I don't know."

[8]     
The Secretary of State's letter refusing the application for asylum stated inter alia:

"4. You have claimed that you are a deserter from the army because you did not want to fight Christians in the South. The Secretary of State notes that you have given no ideological basis to explain your unwillingness to undertake military service and, on the evidence available, he does not consider that your unwillingness to do military service arose from a genuine political, religious or moral conviction... You have stated that you fear imprisonment or torture if you return to Sudan because you are a deserter, however the Secretary of State is aware that, in practice, army deserters and military service draft evaders are re-drafted into the army... [T]he Secretary of State is of the opinion that you would not be at risk of persecution if you were returned to Sudan. He considers that you have not provided any evidence to suggest that you would suffer a disproportionate punishment for desertion or draft evasion for one of the reasons stated in the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. He considers that your claim to fear persecution based on your draft evasion lacks credibility.

5. The Secretary of State has taken into account your claim that the security forces arrested your father because he was a member of the UMMA party on 21 October 1995. You claimed that they came to your house 20 days after his arrest wanting documents that they claimed he had given you. You claimed that they regularly visited your house twice a month threatening to beat you if you did not give them the alleged documents. You then started your military training on 10 August 1997 and finally left Sudan on 15 October 1997. When interviewed on 24 October 2000, you stated that the reason you left Sudan was because the security officers came to your house asking about your father in later 1997 (question 7 refers). You also claimed that the security forces knew of the alleged document in early 1997, however they did not come to question you until later in 1997. The Secretary of State has noted the discrepancy between your original statement when you claimed they questioned you twice a month from November 1995 until you left in October 1997 and the account you gave during your asylum interview when you stated they questioned you in late 1997. He believes that these inconsistencies cast doubt on the credibility of your claim...

6 Furthermore, your statement claimed that your father was a member of the UMMA party, however the Scottish Refugee Council's letter dated 30 August 2000 claimed that this was an error and your father was actually a member of a paramilitary force sympathetic to the aims of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). When interviewed on 24 October 2000, you were asked whether your father was in the SPLA and you replied 'I don't know' (question 24 refers). The Secretary of State has taken this inconsistency into account and considers that as you did not appear to know which political party your father was a member of, the credibility of your claim is further damaged."

[9]     
At the hearing before the adjudicator, the petitioner was represented by solicitors and counsel. The petitioner gave evidence. A further statement by the petitioner was produced and was adopted as his evidence in chief. In it, the petitioner said that his father had often been absent from the house:

"Eventually, when I was about 19 I confronted him and asked him what he was doing. He sat down with me and explained that he was a member of the SPLA. He showed me the leaflets that he distributed and we spoke about it. I went off and read the leaflets and I could understand why my father was involved with this organisation...my father's people live in the heart of the troubles.

...

As far as I was aware, my dad was the main member in Kosti. He would distribute the leaflets and organise meetings..."

The petitioner reiterated that his father had been arrested on 21 October 1995 and detained "because of his membership of the SPLA". About five weeks later the security services returned to the house:

"They said that my father had told them that I had an envelope and they asked if I could have it... they kept coming back, maybe about twice a month...".

The security service men kept coming when the petitioner was on military service in 1997. The petitioner repeated his earlier account of his desertion and escape. He explained the reasons for his desertion:

"I could not have gone to fight in the south. My father is a member of SPLA. I would be fighting against my father's people... The people in the south are innocent, they are my people and I would not kill them... I did not want to fight against my own people."

The petitioner also said, in response to paragraph 6 of the Secretary of State's letter:

"At no point did I say that my father was a member of the UMMA party. My father was a member of the SPLA. The translator had difficulty translating SPLA because the translator was not Sudanese. In the interview, the interviewer talked about the UMMA party saying my father was a member of the UMMA party and then they went on immediately to talk of the SPLA. I did not know which party they were referring to when they asked me this question."

This passage is somewhat confusing. Paragraph 6 of the letter had pointed out that the petitioner had given different accounts of his father's political affiliations:

(1) In his first statement, the petitioner said that his father was a member of UMMA (see para.3).

(2) In the letter prepared by the Scottish Refugee Council, it was stated that the petitioner had learned from his uncle, subsequent to the drafting of the first statement, that his father was not a member of UMMA but of a paramilitary force which was sympathetic to the aims of the SPLA (see para.6).

(3) When interviewed, the petitioner had replied to the question whether his father was in the SPLA, "I don't know" (see para.7).

The second statement itself provided a fourth account: that the petitioner had learned from his father when he (the petitioner) was 19 that his father was a member of the SPLA. The passage quoted above did not explain why the first statement had said that the petitioner's father was a member of UMMA, but claimed that confusion had arisen during the interview by the immigration officer because the interpreter was not Sudanese.

[10]     
In addition to the second statement, adopted as his evidence in chief, the petitioner was asked a few supplementary questions by his counsel, and was cross-examined. In his determination, the adjudicator summarised the petitioner's evidence as including the following points:

"9. In summary, the appellant's evidence was that he had lived in a place called Kosti with his parents and younger brother... When the appellant was about 19 his father had told him of his membership of the SPLA... He thought his father was the main member in Kosti, later amended in oral evidence to being one of the main members. Although an Arabic speaking Muslim, his father's family lived in the south.

Although the transcript of the interview mentioned the UMMA party, the appellant blamed that on the interpreter, who was not Sudanese. He had said SPLA... He feared being tortured or killed if returned. He would defend his country from foreign attack but did not want to fight other Sudanese. In cross-examination he insisted that his father had told him he was a main member. At [Q.24] of the interview, it is recorded that the appellant did not know if his father was a member of the SPLA. He blamed that on interpreter error and said that the question was whether his father was a member of both parties or only one of them so he said he did not know. It was an Iraqi interpreter. He confirmed that the error was also in the statement taken by his solicitor. He confirmed having discussed the matter with his previous representative before the letter [from the Scottish Refugee Council] was written. His uncle had basically said what he knew to be true, that his father was in the SPLA not UMMA... After his father's arrest security officers had come to the house regularly, once or twice a week for months. He denied having specified twice a month in his statement."

The passage may be an accurate summary of the petitioner's evidence, but it contains an error: the transcript of the interview had not mentioned the UMMA party, but had stated that the petitioner did not know whether his father was in the SPLA. This error appears to reflect the confusion in the petitioner's second statement, which was seemingly prepared on the (erroneous) basis that the statement about UMMA was contained in the transcript of the interview (see para.9).

[11]     
The accuracy of the Home Office's assessment of Sudan was accepted before the adjudicator. He noted:

"19. The Republic of Sudan is a large Islamic state... Sudan has a population of about 27.5 million with differing ethnic origins within it. Arab culture and language predominate in the north where the majority of the population are Muslims. There was a coup in 1989 which led to a military government, with the power resting with the National Islamic Front (NIF), which became the National Congress (NC) in November 1998...

21. There has been a civil war for more than twenty years. The conflict centres around rebels in the south who wish to secede from the north. The population in the south is mostly animist or Christian. The government is presently engaged in conflict with a faction of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) led by Colonel John Garang and mostly belonging to the Dinka ethnic group. Other factions have signed the peace accord of April 1997. The UMMA party is a Mahdist party based on a Muslim sect. Its leader returned to Sudan in November 2000 after being in exile."

[12]     
The adjudicator did not accept the petitioner's evidence as credible or reliable. He stated:

"25. I did not find the appellant to be credible or his evidence to be reliable. He was vague and inconsistent as to the party to which his father allegedly belonged. He stated that it was UMMA not only at interview but also in the statement prepared with his own representatives. It was not credible to blame the Home Office interpreter where he has also said that plainly in a document submitted on his own behalf. In addition, the SRC letter ... indicates that the alleged fact that his father was in a paramilitary force sympathetic to the aims of the SPLA was something revealed by his uncle rather than the appellant. His insistence that his uncle had told him something he already knew, which he made in oral evidence, is not in the circumstances credible. The suggestion that his father was a member of the UMMA party plainly came from the appellant himself and it is not the case that it was an assertion by the Home Office as claimed by the appellant in his original grounds of appeal. The appellant said that his father's 'people' came from the south, yet elsewhere said that he had no relatives other than in the north. It is simply not plausible that an Arabic speaking northerner of the Muslim faith would be involved with the SPLA in the south. A glance at any map would show that the town of Kosti is in the north, nearer to Khartoum than the south. It is not plausible that security forces would repeatedly visit the appellant to get documents when quite plainly anyone in possession of documents would dispose of them after the first visit. These alleged visits, and the appellant was not consistent about how often they occurred, were not severe enough to amount to persecution. If they were, the appellant has no reasonable explanation as to why he did not leave immediately. The appellant was not a member of a political party and there is no reason why the government would be apprehensive that he would join the SPLA. On the appellant's account his troubles really started with his desertion. Deserters are not a social group. If the appellant had any moral objection to war then I do not consider that he would have joined the army in the first place. The Sudanese army is engaged in civil war and that would have been obvious to anyone on entering it. Such objective information as I have indicates that the appellant would be redrafted if he returned, if I accept that he escaped or deserted at all. The manner of his desertion is so implausible as to be completely unbelievable. In the circumstances I do not consider that the appellant has made out his claim under the 1951 Convention or the ECHR."

[13]     
As I have mentioned, the petitioner sought leave to appeal against the adjudicator's determination. Rule 18(4) of the Immigration Asylum Appeals (Procedure) Rules 2000 required the petitioner's application for leave to appeal to identify the alleged errors of fact or of law in the adjudicator's determination which would have made a material difference to the outcome, together with all the grounds relied on for the appeal. The petitioner's application, which was prepared by the solicitors and counsel who had represented him before the adjudicator, submitted that the adjudicator's conclusion as to the credibility of the petitioner had been unreasonable. In particular, the adjudicator was criticised for stating that the petitioner "was vague and inconsistent as to the party to which his father belonged":

"No rational inference can be drawn from the fact that the appellant was vague and inconsistent about the party to which his father belonged. The appellant gave evidence which suggested that his knowledge of his father's political involvement was incomplete and second hand."

The adjudicator was also criticised for stating that the petitioner "said that his father's people came from the south, yet elsewhere said he had no relatives other than in the north":

"There is no necessary inconsistency in the appellant saying that his father's people came from the south, but that he had no relatives other than in the north. It is perfectly possible that the appellant's father had roots in the south, but no longer had any connections there."

The adjudicator was also criticised for stating, in relation to the petitioner's father, that it was "simply not plausible that an Arabic speaking northerner of the Muslim faith would be involved with the SPLA in the south":

"The SPLA is a paramilitary opposition force. The appellant did not claim to be associated with them... In any event, there is no reason to suspect that a northerner would not join the SPLA. No objective evidence was led in this regard."

The adjudicator was also criticised for failing to give adequate reasons for concluding "that it is implausible that it is quite plain that anyone in the possession of such documents would dispose of them after the first visit" (sic). It was also submitted, under reference to paragraph 55 of the UNHCR Handbook on the Criteria for the Determination of Refugee Status, that the adjudicator had erred in law in holding that the visits to the petitioner could not amount to persecution. Finally (so far as material), the adjudicator was criticised for failing to have regard to all relevant considerations:

"At no point did the adjudicator make any finding in fact as to whether the conflict in south Sudan was condemned by the international community as contrary to the basic rules of human conduct."

It is not apparent that there was any evidence to this effect before the adjudicator. There was general evidence as to the poor human rights record of the Sudanese Government and its involvement in torture, disappearances and extra-judicial killings. The adjudicator made findings reflecting that evidence.

[14]     
Rule 18(7) provides:

"Leave to appeal shall be granted only where:

(a) the Tribunal is satisfied that the appeal would have a real prospect of success; or

(b) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard."

[15]     
In accordance with rule 18(8), the application for leave was decided by a legally qualified member of the tribunal without a hearing. In its decision, the tribunal stated:

"After hearing oral evidence from the applicant the Adjudicator did not find his evidence reliable and set out reasons for that conclusion. On the issue on the manner of his desertion he was found completely unbelievable. This Tribunal is loath to interfere in conclusions relating to credibility when an Adjudicator has had the opportunity to hear oral evidence and cross-examination and balance that against relevant country information. On the totality of the evidence I am satisfied that the grounds of appeal do not indicate an arguable basis for an appeal to this Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of Rule 18(7) of the Immigration and Asylum Appeals (Procedure) Rules 2000."

[16]     
At the first hearing of the application for judicial review, counsel for the petitioner (who had also represented the petitioner before the adjudicator and had drafted the application to the tribunal) began his submissions by citing well-known passages from R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] 1 AC 514 and R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [1996] QB 517. These were said to support the proposition that the court must restrict itself to considering the reasons given by the adjudicator at paragraph 25 of his determination: the court could not look at the earlier part of the determination in order to establish what the adjudicator meant. What counsel referred to as "the decision in Sivakumaran" (presumably that of the House of Lords in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Sivakumaran [1988] AC 958) was said to imply that while it was permissible to conjecture in favour of the petitioner, it was not permissible to conjecture against him, unless there was a strong justification for so long. In paragraph 25 of the determination, the adjudicator said that the petitioner had stated at interview that his father belong to the UMMA party. The petitioner had not said that during the interview: he had only said that in his first statement. The adjudicator had correctly identified that there were discrepancies between the petitioner's different accounts of his father's applications, but the adjudicator had nevertheless made an error of fact as to whether the petitioner had referred to UMMA during his interview. It was not for the court to speculate on the weight which the adjudicator might have attributed to that. The adjudicator had taken into account an irrelevant consideration. An error of fact was an error of law. It was not clear why the petitioner's insistence, in his oral evidence, that what his uncle had told him was something he already knew, was "not in the circumstances credible". The petitioner's statement that his father's people came from the south was not necessarily inconsistent with his statement that he had no relatives other than in the north. In relation to the adjudicator's findings that it was not plausible that an Arabic speaking northerner of the Muslim faith would be involved with the SPLA, or that the security forces would repeatedly visit the petitioner to get documents, counsel cited the decision of Lee J, of the Federal Court of Australia, in W64/01A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 970, and the judgment of the same judge (which I note was a dissenting judgment) in W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 679. I was also given the citation of Karamakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] ImmAR 271. These authorities were said to support the proposition that a bare assertion that something was implausible should not be made. The fact that the town of Kosti, where the petitioner and his family lived, was in the north of Sudan, did not bear on the issue one way or the other. It was not open to an adjudicator to conclude that something was incredible simply because he thought it could not have happened. That proposition was said to be supported by the decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal in Kasolo, Appeal No.13190, of which I was provided with a photocopy (presumably so that I could read it after the hearing), the judgment of Hugessen J in Samani v Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immigration) (FCTD) (IMM-4271-97; August 18, 1998), of which I was provided with the citation (presumably so that I might track down the report after the hearing), the judgment of Martineau J in Lubana v Canada (Minister for Citzenship and Immigration) 2003 FCT 116 (of which I was again provided with the citation), and the Opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals in Mosa v Rogers, 89 F. 3d 601 (9th Cir. 1996). The adjudicator had erred in law in holding that the visits were not severe enough to amount to persecution. Paragraph 55 of the UNHCR Handbook stated that where measures of discrimination were, in themselves, not of a serious character, they might nevertheless give rise to a reasonable fear of persecution. The treatment of a deserter could constitute discrimination if it was by reason of imputed political opinions. In that connection I was provided with a copy of the decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal in Lucreteanu, Appeal No.12126. In circumstances where a number of reasons were given, it must be assumed that each reason given was material to the conclusion, unless the contrary could be shown. If any of the reasons was shown to be an error, the whole decision therefore fell. This approach was said to be supported by De Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th ed., para.6-086 (which is concerned with the exercise of a discretionary power on irrelevant grounds), and by the Opinion of the Lord Ordinary in Asif v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 1999 SLT 890. The judgment in R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shokrollahy [2000] Imm.A.R. 580 did not follow the proper approach. The various errors made by the adjudicator could be categorised either as errors of fact or as errors of law. They went to a value judgment, a discretionary judgment, about credibility. There was no basis for the adjudicator's finding that the petitioner's account of his desertion was implausible. It was accepted that the only problem the petitioner would face, if he returned to the Sudan, would be that he would be re-drafted into the army. That would however amount to persecution: paragraph 170 of the UNHCR Handbook stated that there were cases where the necessity to perform military service might be the sole ground for a claim to refugee status; and paragraph 171 stated that where the type of military action, with which an individual did not wish to be associated, was condemned by the international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct, punishment for desertion could, in the light of all other requirements of the definition, in itself be regarded as persecution. Reference was made to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Sepet v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] Imm AR 452 (which I note was affirmed by the House of Lords: [2003] UKHL 15, [2003] 1 WLR 856).

[17]      In reply, counsel for the respondent began by submitting that the correct approach, in proceedings of the present kind, was in general to ask whether there were grounds for quashing the decision of the tribunal (as to which nothing had been said by counsel for the petitioner). Where a statutory appeal procedure was provided, it was for the petitioner to avail himself of that procedure; and the focus of the court's supervisory jurisdiction would ordinarily be upon the decision of the appellate body. Reference was made to the Opinion of the Lord Ordinary in Irzekevikius v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 14 July 1999, unreported; to R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Said [1989] Imm.A.R. 372; and to R (Ganidagli) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2001] EWHC Admin 70, [2001] INLR 479. The court should therefore focus on the tribunal's decision and ask whether it had reasonably concluded that the appeal did not have a real prospect of success, as required by rule 18(7). The court should consider the grounds upon which leave to appeal had been sought (as to which nothing had been said by counsel for the petitioner). Several of the matters raised by counsel for the petitioner in his submissions had not been raised before the tribunal: these included the complaint concerning the adjudicator's statement that the petitioner had said at interview that his father belonged to the UMMA party; the complaint concerning the adjudicator's finding that the petitioner's evidence, that what his uncle had told him was something he already knew, was not in the circumstances credible; the complaint concerning the adjudicator's observation that Kosti was in the north of Sudan; and the complaint concerning the adjudicator's finding that the petitioner's account of his desertion was implausible. All but the first of these points were not even raised in the petition for judicial review. None of the points raised in the grounds of appeal had had a real prospect of success. The additional points now raised were not before the tribunal; they were not so readily discernible that the tribunal ought in any event to have considered them; and they would have had no real prospect of success in any event. Reference was made to R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Robinson [1998] QB 929 and to R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Kolcak [2001] Imm.A.R. 666. The adjudicator's decision had been based on his finding as to credibility. As the tribunal noted, the adjudicator had seen and heard the petitioner give evidence. He listed a number of factors in support of his finding as to credibility.

[18]      Addressing counsel for the petitioner's submissions in respect of the adjudicator's determination on the assumption (which was disputed) that they were material, counsel for the respondent submitted that the adjudicator's decision had to be considered as a whole: Singh v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2000 SC 219. The question was whether the view at which the adjudicator arrived was one which a reasonable adjudicator could reach on the material before him, applying the proper tests in the proper way: Asif v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2002 SC 182. Although the adjudicator had made a mistake over whether the statement about UMMA had been made during the interview, he was justified in concluding that the petitioner had been vague and inconsistent as to the party to which his father allegedly belonged. He had noted the different accounts which had been given on different occasions, he had had regard to the answer given at interview that the petitioner did not know whether his father was in the SPLA (which was noted by the adjudicator at paragraph 10 of his determination), and he had considered the argument that the interpreter had been responsible for the inconsistency. The mistake had not in any event been raised before the tribunal, and the tribunal was not required to engage in a search for new points, especially when the petitioner was represented by solicitors and counsel. The adjudicator had correctly noted the difference between the petitioner's first statement ("I do not have family anywhere except in Kusti [sic]") and his second statement ("my father's people live in the heart of the troubles"). The adjudicator was entitled to consider it implausible that an Arabic speaker northerner of the Muslim faith would be involved with the SPLA. He had found, on the basis of the Country Information and Policy Unit assessment, that the SPLA wished to secede from the north, where the majority of the population were Arab Muslims, whereas the population in the south were mostly animists or Christians from black African ethnic groups. Most of the members of the SPLA, in particular, belonged to a particular black African ethnic group, namely the Dinka. The petitioner and his family were Arab Muslims from the north. The relevance of the adjudicator's observation that Kosti was in the north of Sudan was that the petitioner had said during his interview, in answer to the question, "Who lives in the south?", that "I am from Kosti which is not far from the south" (see para.7). The adjudicator was entitled to find that the alleged visits did not amount to persecution. The onus was on the petitioner to establish that he had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The visits had not involved detention or arrest or anything else which was capable of being regarded as a serious violation of human rights. Reference was made to paragraph 51 of the UNHCR Handbook. Although the treatment of a deserter who had deserted because of his convictions might in some circumstances amount to persecution, the adjudicator had found the petitioner's account of his desertion to be completely unbelievable. That finding had not been challenged at any stage prior to the first hearing of the application for judicial review. Since the adjudicator had not found it established that the petitioner was a deserter, the reasons for his supposed desertion were immaterial. Furthermore, the application to the tribunal had not suggested that the adjudicator ought to have found that the petitioner had deserted because of his convictions.

[19]     
Counsel for the petitioner was given an opportunity to respond to these submissions insofar as they raised issues which he had not previously addressed. He submitted first that the tribunal ought to have detected the adjudicator's mistake as to whether the petitioner had said at interview that his father belong to UMMA, even though the matter had not been raised in the application for leave which counsel himself had drafted. The tribunal had the transcript of the interview amongst its papers. It should have considered that it was its duty to read all the material. The tribunal knew that applications had to be drafted at the last minute. In relation to Irzekevikius, counsel said that the Lord Ordinary had "recanted on his decision" during the hearing of another case (not yet completed, and not identified by counsel) before the Inner House. The approach adopted in Irzekevikius was inconsistent with Tehrani (no citation was given, but I understood counsel to be referring to Tehrani v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2004 SLT 461). The Inner House had, in counsel's words, "side-stepped the issue" of whether Irzekevikius was correct, in Mfumu v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 27 April 2004, unreported. Counsel initially submitted that Irzekevikius and Said were inconsistent with the decision of the House of Lords in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Abdi [1996] 1 WLR 298, and referred me to the speech of Lord Slynn of Hadley in the latter case. Lord Slynn's was a dissenting speech. When counsel's attention was directed to the speeches of the majority of the Appellate Committee, he conceded that the decision was not in point. Counsel also cited R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Ssenyongi [1994] Imm.A.R. as demonstrating that the court could, in exceptional circumstances, allow the original decision to be challenged under judicial review procedure, without the appellate decision being challenged; but counsel conceded that he could not argue that the present case disclosed exceptional circumstances. Counsel submitted that there were authorities dealing with the circumstances in which judicial review might be allowed where a person had lost the opportunity to put his case through the omission of his legal representatives. Counsel recited a list of authorities said to be relevant: J & C Black (Haulage) Ltd v Alltransport International Group Ltd, 1980 SC 57; Kirkwood v Glasgow District Council, 1988 SC 169; Alagon v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 1995 SLT 381; Sangha v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 1997 SLT 545; Bain v Hugh L.S. McConnell Ltd, 1991 SLT 691; Johnstone & Clark (Engineers) Ltd v Lockhart, 1995 SLT 440; Ingle v Ingle's Trustee, 1997 SLT 160; and Zannetos v Glenford Investment Holdings Ltd, 1982 SLT 453. Counsel did not however invite the court to look at any of these cases. Counsel said that some of these authorities were in his favour and others were against him, but that the majority were in his favour. The court was apparently expected to resolve any conflict between the authorities on the basis of a headcount, in much the same way as was at one time required by the Law of Citations of Theodosius II. Counsel submitted that the adjudicator and the tribunal had each made an error of fact which warranted the quashing of their decision. Reference was made to the speech of Lord Slynn of Hadley in R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte A [1999] 2 AC 330; to the speeches of Lord Slynn and Lord Clyde in R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment [2001] UKHL 23, [2003] 2 AC 295; and to E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49.

[20]      I have set out in some detail the parties' submissions. In dealing with the issues, I can however be relatively brief. It appears to me to be necessary to distinguish in the first place between those matters which were before the tribunal and those which were not. In relation to the former matters, the primary question for the court is whether the tribunal's decision is invalid and should be quashed. In the event that that question were answered in the affirmative, a secondary question might be whether that remedy was sufficient, or whether it was also appropriate to quash the decision of the adjudicator. In relation to matters which were not before the tribunal, on the other hand, one question for the court is whether it should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction, notwithstanding the failure to pursue those matters by means of a statutory appeal. In the event that that question were answered in the affirmative, a second question would be whether the adjudicator's decision was invalid and should be quashed.

[21]     
At first sight, the only matters which were before the tribunal might be thought to be the matters raised by the petitioner in his grounds of appeal. It was however held by the Court of Appeal in Ex parte Robinson that the tribunal had a wider function, which was explained by Lord Woolf MR (as he then was) at pages 945-946:

"It follows from what we have said that it is the duty of the appellate authorities to apply their knowledge of Convention jurisprudence to the facts as established by them when they determine whether it would be a breach of the Convention to refuse an asylum-seeker leave to enter as a refugee, and they are not limited in their consideration of the facts by the arguments actually advanced by the asylum-seeker or his representative...

It is now, however, necessary for us to identify the circumstances in which it might be appropriate for the tribunal to grant leave to appeal on the basis of an argument not advanced before the special adjudicator...

Because the rules place an onus on the asylum-seeker to state his grounds of appeal, we consider that it would be wrong to say that mere arguability should be the criterion to be applied for the grant of leave in such circumstances. A higher hurdle is required. The appellate authorities should of course focus primarily on the arguments adduced before them, whether these are to be found in the oral argument before the special adjudicator or, so far as the tribunal is concerned, in the written grounds of appeal on which leave to appeal is sought. They are not required to engage in a search for new points. If there is readily discernible an obvious point of Convention law which favours the applicant although he has not taken it, then the special adjudicator should apply it in his favour, but he should feel under no obligation to prolong the hearing by asking the parties for submissions on points which they have not taken but which could be properly categorised as merely 'arguable' as opposed to 'obvious'. Similarly, if when the tribunal reads the special adjudicator's decision there is an obvious point of Convention law favourable to the asylum-seeker which does not appear in the decision, it should grant leave to appeal. If it does not do so, there will be a danger that this country will be in breach of its obligations under the Convention. When we refer to an obvious point we mean a point which has a strong prospect of success if it is argued. Nothing less will do."

It appears from that decision, therefore, that the tribunal is not required to engage in a search for points of law which are not raised in the grounds of appeal. It is on the other hand not limited by the arguments advanced, and should grant leave to appeal if it discerns a point of Convention law which has a strong prospect of success if it is argued.

[22]     
In Ex parte Kolcak it was held that similar principles applied to issues of fact. After citing the passage from Ex parte Robinson which I have quoted, Stanley Burnton J continued (at page 669):

"11. In my judgment similar principles apply to issues of fact which have not been properly taken before the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal is not to be criticised and its decisions are not, in my judgment, to be quashed because it is possible to rake through the material before it and find an error of fact on the part of the adjudicator which has not been brought to the attention of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal and is not one which is, or was, readily discernible.

12. In cases where the parties are legally represented, it seems to me that it is not incumbent on the Tribunal, as I say, to analyse all the material to see whether there is some issue of fact which has not been taken on behalf of the applicant for asylum, and which could have been. On the other hand, if one is readily discernible, that is to say obvious in that sense on reading the material, it is one which the Immigration Appeal Tribunal should bear in mind and take into account in making its decision provided it is one which if taken would have a strong prospect of persuading the Tribunal to grant leave to appeal."

Counsel for the petitioner assumed in his submissions that that passage should be construed as implying that the tribunal is under an obligation to take into account any error of fact which the court considers to be readily discernible on a reading of all the material before the tribunal (and not only the determination itself), and that the tribunal's decision may therefore be open to challenge if it fails to discern such an error. Counsel for the respondent's submissions appeared to proceed on a similar basis, subject to the error being one which, if it had been the subject of a ground of appeal, would have meant that the appeal had a strong prospect of success. In the circumstances of the present case, I am prepared to proceed on that basis, without expressing any opinion as to whether the tribunal is under such a duty.

[23]     
It is however important to bear in mind that obviousness is emphasised in both Ex parte Robinson and Ex parte Kolcak. As Lord Penrose observed in Parminder Singh v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 10 July 1998 (unreported),

"Whatever else this indicates, it is clear that there is and can be no duty to pursue each and every hypothesis that could be postulated in the search for possible grounds for support of an appeal which may have escaped the notice of the appellant's advisers."

In the same case, Lord Penrose also said:

"It seems to me that in considering whether the IAT has erred in relation to matters of fact, or to inferences properly to be drawn from facts and circumstances, one is concerned only with the clear, the obvious, with questions that cry out for answer."

I respectfully agree with those observations, which reflect the limited nature of the court's supervisory jurisdiction over the tribunal. Although counsel for the petitioner in the present case understandably emphasised the need for "anxious scrutiny", it is necessary to remember that the court's jurisdiction to interfere with the decisions of adjudicators or of the tribunal is based on the same fundamental principles as apply in other areas of administrative responsibility. Although the tribunal is not restricted by Wednesbury principles in considering whether to entertain an appeal, the court has to apply those principles in deciding whether to interfere with the tribunal's decision.

[24]     
Considering first, then, the matters which were raised in the grounds of appeal and which were also raised in counsel for the petitioner's submissions in the present proceedings, those can be summarised as follows:

(1) The adjudicator's observation, "The appellant said that his father's 'people' came from the south, yet elsewhere said that he had no relatives other than in the north", was criticised because there was no necessary inconsistency between the two statements.

(2) The adjudicator's statement, "It is simply not plausible that an Arabic speaking northerner of the Muslim faith would be involved with the SPLA in the south", was a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence.

(3) The adjudicator's finding, "It is not plausible that security forces would repeatedly visit the appellant to get documents when quite plainly anyone in possession of documents would dispose of them after the first visit", was a bare assertion.

(4) The adjudicator had erred in law in holding that the visits were not severe enough to amount to persecution.

(5) The adjudicator had failed to make a finding that the conflict in south Sudan was condemned by the international community as contrary to the basic rules of human conduct; had such a finding been made, a deserter facing punishment for his unwillingness to participate in that conflict might be regarded as the victim of persecution.

[25]     
So far as these matters are concerned, there do not appear to me to be any grounds for quashing the tribunal's decision. As explained above (at para.14), the tribunal can grant leave to appeal only if "satisfied that the appeal would have a real prospect of success" (there being no suggestion that rule 18(7)(b) is relevant to the present case). As the tribunal noted, the adjudicator's decision was based on his assessment of the petitioner's credibility, having heard oral evidence and cross-examination. Credibility is a question of fact, which has been entrusted by Parliament to the adjudicator, subject to an appeal to the tribunal in the event of an error of fact or of law. The adjudicator's assessment in the present case was based on a number of factors, many of which were not challenged before the tribunal. On the issue of his desertion, for example, the petitioner was found to be "completely unbelievable"; and that finding was not challenged before the tribunal. Standing the matters which were not challenged, the particular issues raised in points (1), (2) and (3) above were of limited significance. As Stanley Burnton J observed in Ex parte Kolcak (at page 670):

"15. Lastly, it is of course right that in general the Tribunal, the adjudicator and indeed the court, when dealing with questions of fact and, in particular, questions of credibility, must have regard to all of the evidence and weigh it all up. There may be a danger of too formulaic an approach. An appreciation of the correctness of a decision of an adjudicator or a Tribunal must, to some extent, be tailored to the material before the adjudicator and the Tribunal. There may be cases, and indeed I think it is argued that this is one, where there are facts which so strongly indicate either the credibility or the incredibility of the account given by the claimant for asylum (the same must apply to any other kind of adjudication) that a number of other matters become somewhat peripheral and perhaps barely relevant or material.

16. In such cases it seems to me that the court would be slow to interfere with a decision of a Tribunal because it had regarded some matters as not sufficiently material, or indeed immaterial, assuming, of course, that the evidence and considerations which led to the finding of credibility or incredibility, as the case may be, were sufficiently strong in the first place. As I have indicated, such cases must be cases where there is some fact, or some accumulation of facts, which point extremely powerfully one way or the other. However, it does seem to me that this is a case which the adjudicator did approach in that sort of way, as did the Tribunal."

As in the case of any other witness, if the account given by an applicant for asylum is not credible in any material particular, there may (depending on the circumstances) be no obvious reason to accept the remainder of what he says; and if a favourable decision is dependent on the applicant's being accepted as a credible and reliable witness (as is generally the case where a claim for asylum is made), then an adverse finding as to credibility will in itself be fatal to the application. The tribunal in the present case appears to have regarded the adjudicator's finding, that the petitioner's account of his desertion was completely unbelievable, as an especially crucial blow to the petitioner's credibility. The tribunal was entitled to take that view. In those circumstances, the matters raised by counsel for the petitioner in these proceedings appear to me to be of relatively little weight. In any event, the adjudicator was entitled to note the contrast between the two statements noted in point (1); in relation to point (2), he was entitled to have regard to the evidence before him as to the cultural differences between northern Arabic-speaking Muslims, such as the petitioner and his father, and the membership of the SPLA; and in relation to point (3), he was entitled to take account of the apparent pointlessness of repeated searches for the same documents once the petitioner had been made aware of the danger of retaining such documents in his possession. The fact that an account contains a number of matters each of which is, on its face, somewhat curious or surprising, is plainly material to the credibility of that account. In relation to each of those matters, although there might be an explanation, none was before the adjudicator. Another adjudicator might perhaps have made less of some of these points, but that does not indicate that the tribunal's decision to refuse leave to appeal was flawed. In relation to point (4), the tribunal's decision to refuse leave to appeal cannot be criticised, since the argument based on paragraph 55 of the UNHCR Handbook depended on factual circumstances (as to the petitioner's desertion, and the reasons for his supposed desertion) which the adjudicator did not find to be established. In relation to point (5), there does not appear to have been evidence before the adjudicator which would have supported such a finding; and, given that he rejected the petitioner's account of his supposed desertion, and does not appear to have been satisfied that the petitioner had in fact deserted, a finding as to the inhumane conduct of the war would have been immaterial in any event.

[26]     
Considering next the additional matters which were not raised in the grounds of appeal, those can be summarised as follows:

(6) The adjudicator erroneously said that the petitioner had stated at interview that his father belonged to UMMA.

(7) It was not clear why the adjudicator had said of the petitioner, "His insistence that his uncle had told him something he already knew, which he made in oral evidence, is not in the circumstances credible".

(8) There was no basis for the adjudicator's finding that the petitioner's account of his desertion was implausible.

None of those points could in my opinion be characterised as "obvious", in the sense in which that term was used in Ex parte Robinson, in the absence of a ground of appeal identifying and focusing it for the tribunal.

[27]     
As regards point (6), even assuming, in the petitioner's favour, that the error made by the adjudicator ought to have been noticed by the tribunal (notwithstanding that it was not apparent on the face of the adjudicator's decision, and that it was not noticed by the petitioner's representatives, including counsel for the petitioner, when the grounds of appeal were prepared), and that the tribunal omitted to have regard to it (its decision giving no indication whether the point was taken into account, but both counsel's submissions proceeding on the basis that it did not), it was not in my opinion a point which had "a strong prospect of success", in the sense that there was a strong prospect that the tribunal would have granted leave to appeal if it had been aware of the point. The adjudicator's finding that the petitioner was vague and inconsistent as to the party to which his father allegedly belonged was based on a number of differences between the accounts given by the petitioner at different times. The adjudicator correctly found that the petitioner's first statement said that his father belonged to UMMA, whereas in his evidence the petitioner said that his father belonged to the SPLA; and that the Scottish Refugee Council letter said that the petitioner had learned from his uncle of his father's membership of the SPLA after the first statement had been prepared, whereas in his evidence the petitioner said that his father had told him years earlier. The adjudicator was also correct in understanding that the account given by the petitioner at interview was inconsistent with his position on some other occasions, and that the petitioner blamed the inconsistency on the interpreter. The precise nature of the inconsistency - whether the petitioner's account at interview was that he did not know whether his father belonged to the SPLA, or that his father belonged to UMMA - was of little materiality. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the adjudicator's rejection of the petitioner's credibility was based on a number of factors, of which the petitioner's inconsistency as to his father's party was only one, and that other factors (such as his account of his desertion being "completely unbelievable") were not challenged before the tribunal. In those circumstances, even on the assumption that the error mentioned in point (6) was readily discernible by the tribunal, and even making the further assumption that the tribunal did not notice it, that omission would not lead the court to quash the tribunal's decision. So far as the remaining points are concerned, it appears to me to be equally clear that none of them raises what was described in Ex parte Robinson as "a point which has a strong prospect of success if it is argued". As regards point (7), the reason why the adjudicator rejected the petitioner's evidence, that he already knew what his uncle told him, is apparent: that evidence was inconsistent in particular with the account given in the Scottish Refugee Council letter (see para.6). As regards point (8), the adjudicator's finding that that part of the petitioner's evidence was implausible was not manifestly unreasonable, and it was not challenged by the petitioner's legal representatives. In those circumstances, the tribunal was not in my opinion bound to find, ex proprio motu, that a challenge to that finding would have a strong prospect of success.

[28]     
It remains to consider whether, although the tribunal's decision is unassailable, the court should nevertheless entertain a direct challenge to the adjudicator's decision on the basis of the various matters which were not raised before the tribunal (described above as points (6) to (8)). As a general proposition, it may be said that the court will not exercise its supervisory jurisdiction where an alternative means of relief, such as a statutory appeal, is (or was) open to the applicant. That general approach reflects the equitable, and therefore residual, nature of the supervisory jurisdiction. There are however situations where that general approach is not applied: for example, where the administrative body has acted wholly beyond its powers, or where the proceedings before it have been fundamentally null. In the circumstances of the present case, it is unnecessary and inappropriate to embark upon an elaborate discussion of this topic. On any view, the irregularities alleged in the present case would not warrant a departure from the general approach.

[29]     
Finally, in the light of the submissions of counsel for the petitioner in this case (and the submissions of other counsel in other cases), it may be appropriate to add some observations about the citation of authorities. First, the citation of cases is not an end in itself: it is a means to the establishing of legal principle. Insofar as a submission consists of propositions of legal principle, those propositions (unless trite law) require to be supported by a citation of the authority from which each principle is derived. A submission which states the principle involved, then mentions the case from which the principle is derived, is more intelligible than one which merely blurts out one case after another. A case ought not to be mentioned unless counsel is able to explain exactly how it supports the proposition in question. That involves more than reading a dictum without explanation of the context (let alone reading a dictum without explaining that it comes from a minority or dissenting opinion, if that be the case). Unless the case is so well-known that explanation is unnecessary, the court should be told what the case was about, what the issues were, and what the various members of the court (if it is an appellate decision) had to say that is relevant to the point under discussion. A proper analysis of authority cannot usually be done by "looking very briefly" at cases, as counsel in the present case repeatedly assured the court was his intention: it calls for a careful explanation of each case, informed by an understanding of the distinction between the ratio decidendi and what was obiter dictum. Such an analysis should be undertaken as part of the submission: the judge should not be expected to read the case for himself without having counsel's submissions on it, in the hope that he may discover why it is relevant, or whether it should be interpreted as assisting the argument of the counsel who mentioned it. In an area of the law, such as asylum law, in which there is a large quantity of case-law available in reports and on the internet, counsel's researches may turn up numerous authorities which appear to be relevant. In order that proper use be made of court time, it is necessary to sift the grain from the chaff, and to place before the court only that part of the researched material which is required for the resolution of the particular case.

[30]     
In the foregoing circumstances, I shall refuse the petition.

 

 


BAILII:
Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2004/164.html