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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Wyman-Gordon Ltd v. Proclad International Ltd [2005] ScotCS CSOH_177 (29 December 2005) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2005/CSOH_177.html Cite as: [2005] ScotCS CSOH_177, [2005] CSOH 177 |
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Wyman-Gordon Ltd v. Proclad International Ltd [2005] ScotCS CSOH_177 (29 December 2005)
OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION [2005] CSOH 177 |
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CA151/04
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OPINION OF LORD DRUMMOND YOUNG in the cause WYMAN-GORDON LIMITED Pursuers; against PROCLAD INTERNATIONAL LIMITED Defenders:
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Act: Paterson, Solicitor; Tods Murray W.S.
Alt: Robertson; Young & Partners
29 December 2005
[1] The pursuers specialize in, among other areas, the extrusion of pipes. The defenders are engaged in the design of pipeline components, and supply and manufacture pipes for such pipelines. They have developed a patented process for the manufacture of clad co-extruded pipe; this is known as Proclad Wex pipe (weld extruded pipe). The outside part of Wex pipe is manufactured from carbon steel, as in an ordinary extruded pipe, but bonded to the inside surface of the carbon steel is a cladding material known as Inconel. The pipe used in oil and gas pipelines tends to corrode, and the advantage of the process is that it enables an extruded pipe to be produced with cladding on the inside surface to protect against such corrosion. The pursuers also manufacture ordinary extruded pipe, which is generally known as Ex pipe. This is manufactured from carbon steel, and does not have any cladding on the inside surface."The test I have to apply at this stage must be to ask myself if the question of law which is raised (the only question being one of law) admits of a clear and obvious answer in the pursuers' favour".
In P. & M. Sinclair v The Bamber Gray Partnership, 1987 SC 23, the defenders contended that they had entered into a contract as agents for an undisclosed but unidentified principal, and indicated that they were willing to make a case that the pursuers were aware of the principal's identity. Lord Prosser stated (at 206)
"Even with a closed record, I have come to the conclusion that neither side's pleadings clearly focus what the position was as to the pursuers' or the defenders' views as to who would be the parties to the contract. It appears to me that where that is so I cannot achieve the near certainty as to an absence of a defence which would justify granting summary decree. Indeed it appears to me quite probable that the circumstances when more fully pled, or when taken to proof, would reveal that there is a genuine issue as to whether the pursuers had an identifiable or identified principal in their minds".
It is clear from those statements of the law that the test that must be satisfied in a motion for summary decree sets a high standard. Any question of law must admit of "a clear and obvious answer", and when questions of fact are involved there must be "near certainty" as to the absence of a defence.
[13] I have come to the conclusion that I cannot hold with confidence at this stage of the action that the pipe was not supplied under a single contract. I reach this conclusion for the following reasons. First, the terms of the parties' contract or contracts are an issue in the proof that is currently taking place. The main focus of that issue is whether the defenders' standard terms and conditions were incorporated into the parties contract or contracts, but that in turn may raise wider issues about the precise nature of their contractual relations. I have not heard any evidence from the defenders on the matter. I accordingly think it premature to express any concluded view as to the nature of the parties' contractual relations; until I have heard evidence from both sides, I am hesitant hold that there is "near certainty" as to the absence of a defence. [16] Even if a single contract was concluded, that is not conclusive, because in some cases obligations contained in a single contract may not be interdependent, with the result that performance of one obligation cannot be withheld as a result of a failure to perform the other obligation. The solicitor for the pursuers submitted that, even if the parties' relationship were seen as consisting of a single contract for the Thunderhorse project, the supply of pipe and the supply of Wex pipe should be regarded as separate and distinct matters which were not interdependent. The difficulty with this approach is that there is a clear presumption for interdependence of obligations that are contained in a single contract: Turnbull v McLean & Co., 1874, 1 R 730; Gloag, Contract, 595-596. That presumption must be considered in the light of the test for summary decree, that there should be a "near certainty" as to the pursuer's entitlement, or that the legal question of mutuality should admits of "a clear and obvious answer" in the pursuer's favour. I do not consider it possible to hold at the present stage in the action that it is sufficiently clear that the presumption is rebutted. The presumption is founded on obvious good sense. The contractual right of retention is of great practical importance in Scots law because it is normally the only security that one party to a contract has for performance of the other's obligations. In other systems, quasi-proprietary rights such as the English equitable interest may arise under a contract, providing a party to the contract with a different form of security. Scots law does not recognize any such rights, however, with the result that the right of retention assumes particular importance. That is very clear from the opinions delivered in Turnbull v McLean & Co., supra.