|
OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
[2006] CSOH 59
|
|
P305/03
|
OPINION OF LORD KINGARTH
in the Petition of
MAHMOOD AHMED BUTT,
(A.P.)
Petitioner;
against
THE SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent:
ญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญ________________
|
Petitioner: Blair; Drummond Miller, W.S.
Respondent: Stewart; Office of the Solicitor General for Scotland
5 April 2006
[1] The
petitioner is a citizen of Pakistan. He entered the UK
on 12 March 2000 and
claimed asylum on 30 March 2000. His claim was refused by letter of the
respondent dated 8 October 2001. He appealed to the adjudicator. Before the adjudicator, he also claimed to be
entitled to the protection of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights ("ECHR"). His appeal was refused
by determination of the adjudicator dated 8 April 2002. He
applied for leave to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, which leave was
refused by determination dated 13 May
2002. In the present
petition - which was sisted for a substantial period to await determination of
a matter relating to the jurisdiction of the Court of Session - the petitioner
seeks reduction both of the determination of the adjudicator and of the
determination of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. Before me, however, it was agreed that what
the petitioner seeks, and all he needed to seek, was reduction of the
determination of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal.
[2] It
was agreed that in relation to his claim for asylum the appellant required to
show that owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, he was outside the country of his nationality and was unable or, owing
to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country. He required to
demonstrate that there were substantial grounds for believing that he
faced a real risk of being persecuted for a 1951 Convention reason if he
returned to his own country. In relation
to his claim under the ECHR, he required to demonstrate that there were
substantial grounds for believing that he faced a real risk of relevant ill
treatment (i.e. torture or inhuman or degrading treatment). The burden of proof was upon the appellant in
respect of both claims. It was agreed
that, in the circumstances of the case, no material distinction fell to be
drawn between his claim for asylum and that under Article 3 of the ECHR.
[3] Before
the adjudicator the respondent was not represented. The appellant gave evidence on his own behalf,
confirming that he wished to rely upon a statement which he had lodged as his
evidence in the case. The statement was
summarised by the adjudicator in paragraph 11 of his determination. The appellant was married with six children,
five of whom survived. One daughter,
Taiba, died on 24 May 1999
at the age of three. In that respect he
had the child's birth certificate, and the death certificate stating that she
was murdered, together with photographs of the dead child. The appellant lived in Rahwali and owned a
grocer shop and then a poultry farm. As
a Sunni Moslem, he joined the SSP in 1990.
He became general secretary of the local branch, organising meetings and
demonstrations. Sometimes the police
would attack them with a view to breaking up processions or
demonstrations. They warned them not to
take any action against the Shias, but the police did
not take any action against the Shias or protect them from them. The appellant attended meetings and spoke out
against the Shia SM movement. On 15 January 1997 he and his brother
were attacked in his shop by armed men.
The appellant was shot in the stomach, which was confirmed by medical
reports produced. He was hospitalised,
taken to the police station for questioning and then hospitalised again. He understood that a first information report
was prepared by the police. He was not
aware, however, whether and, if so, what further action was taken. The men who had attacked him were members of
the SM. For safety reasons, the
appellant sold the shop and bought a poultry farm. On 7 January
1999, there was an attack on the poultry farm in the appellant's
absence. There was damage to property
and about 4,000 hens were stolen. The
appellant reported this matter to the police.
They made certain investigations.
The people they thought responsible were arrested and they were taken to
court. The court case was not yet
complete. The suspects made compensation
for the damage.
[4] On
24 May 1999 the appellant
was taking his daughter to school when he was attacked by four men. One of the men kicked his daughter in the
stomach when she ran to him and she died as a result. The appellant was again attacked on or about 9 November 1999 when he fought
off a number of men who tried to force him into a car. He decided to leave the country and did so
through an agent. Since he had left, his
wife had told him that when he initially left, members of the SM had attended
at his home wanting to know where he was.
She told them he had gone and she did not know where he was. The appellant understood that she still
received phone calls asking about him but there had not been any attack on her
or the other children. He believed he
would be attacked and killed if he returned.
[5] The adjudicator also had before him
certain objective evidence relating to the situation in Pakistan. In particular, he had a Canadian report of
July 1999, a Home Office report of 2001 and a US
report dated 4 March 2002. On the basis of that objective evidence, the
adjudicator drew certain conclusions. He
noted inter alia that the government
of Benazir Bhutto was dismissed in 1997 and new elections held. Nawaz Sharif came to power. After further political and constitutional
trouble, however, he was deposed on 12
October 1999 by a military coup led by General Pervez Musharraf.
The SSP was noted to be an extremist Sunni organisation and said to be
responsible for many acts of violence.
It was outlawed by General Musharraf in August 2001, as was the SM,
a Shia militant organisation formed as a reaction to Sunni violence.
[6] The adjudicator further found:
"26. In early September 2001 police
arrested about fifty people suspected of sectarian violence in Karachi,
allegedly belonging to the LJ and SM militant groups.
27. Earlier, it was reported in
September 1997 that following the introduction of the Anti-Terrorism Act,
sectarian killings and gun battles in Karachi
and in Punjab significantly receded. Life was said to be returning to normal in Lahore
and other Punjab cities since the security forces had
been given sweeping powers under the new law.
28. After incidents of
February/March 2001, the government announced plans to tackle sectarian
violence, with calls on the provincial governments to take action against those
making provocative speeches or publishing inflammatory literature.
29. Unrest and massacres have
continued, with most victims being Shias.
30. It is misleading and inconsistent
for the CIPU report to state at 5.3.57 that: "The Pakistani Government has been
quick to respond to outbursts of sectarian violence although their action has
not effectively curtailed sectarian murders."
If one looks at the footnotes, one finds that this was information
gleaned from the US State Department in 1996 and the BBC in 1997. It takes no account of the effect of the
introduction of the Anti-Terrorism Act, nor of the crackdown by the military
regime on religious extremists in August 2001, nor the advice to provincial
governments.
31. The Canadian report of July
1999 observes that while high profile members of the respective communities
were formerly targeted, there had been a switch to indiscriminate reprisal
killings. Despite the age of the report,
that is consistent with what is known of the situation to date. Its view, as stated, is that sectarian
violence in one part of the country could lead to reprisals in another
part. This is discussed in the context
of internal flight, below."
[7] The
essence of the adjudicator's determination is to be found at paragraphs 32‑34. These are in the following terms:
"32. I consider the appellant to be
credible and reliable as to his personal history. He presented himself for cross-examination,
and the Home Office failed to take advantage of that opportunity. His account was consistent with the
background evidence. His solicitor was
not suggesting that, as a member of the Sunni majority, he was at risk merely
for that reason. He was, as I accept, a
member of the SSP, a militant Sunni group.
He has lost a child in tragic circumstances, and has been attacked by
persons belonging to the local SM, a rival militant group. The degree of risk on return is, however, a
matter for me.
33. In assessing the risk to the
appellant, it is relevant to note that the tendency is towards indiscriminate
attacks, mostly by Sunnis on Shias rather than the other way round. The government does not tolerate religious
violence and has taken steps to counter it.
There is no reason to believe that the police would not protect the
appellant, and his lack of fear of the authorities can be seen in his obtaining
official documents, and his willingness to approach them to lay FIRs. A new regime, less tolerant of religious violence,
has come to power since the appellant left.
The focus has turned away from individuals to indiscriminate
attacks. Even accepting a failure of
State protection in the past, I do not consider that there is a real
possibility that on return, he would be targeted for attack, or if he were,
that there would be a failure of State protection, given the current attitude
of the authorities. In short, I do not
consider that, taking his account pro
veritate, he has shown a real risk of future persecution. Nor, on this analysis, has he shown any real
risk of treatment exceeding the minimum threshold for the purposes of Article 3. If I were wrong on that, there would still be
the question of internal flight.
34. The alleged inapplicability of
the internal flight alternative in this case depended, in submissions, on a
sentence in the Canadian report which reads: "Sectarian violence in one part of
the country can lead to reprisals in another."
However, the possibility of tit for tat violence elsewhere is not the
same as saying that there is any real likelihood that this individual would be
pursued to the furthest reaches of that vast and populous country. He has no problems with the authorities. I consider that if the appellant did not
return to his own area, then as a member of the majority Sunni population he
could go virtually anywhere else. There
was no evidence from which I could reasonably conclude that it would be unduly
harsh for him to do so."
[8] In
refusing leave to appeal the Immigration Appeal Tribunal said inter alia:
"3. The grounds of appeal are
attached.
4. They argue that the
Adjudicator's assessment of risk in paragraph 33 is at odds with his positive
credibility finding in paragraph 32 and was in error. However, the acceptance in paragraph 32 of
the Applicant's credibility, was subject specifically to the proviso that the
degree of risk on return was a matter for the Adjudicator to decide. In making his assessment the Adjudicator took
all the evidence into account and did not consider there was a real possibility
that the Applicant would be targeted for attack. If he were, he found that there would be a
sufficiency of State protection under the new government. The adjudicator was entitled to reach that
latter conclusion on the basis of the background material before him. In any event the Applicant's problems were
local and the Adjudicator found that as a member of the Sunni majority the
Applicant could relocate internally within Pakistan and it would not be unduly
harsh for him to do so. There is no
arguable error in these conclusions.
5. An appeal would have no real
prospect of success. Leave to appeal is
refused."
[9] Counsel
for the petitioner argued that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal erred in
deciding that the appeal would have no real prospect of success.
[10] In the first place, the adjudicator failed to take into account
(or, if he did, failed properly to take into account), the petitioner's own
evidence, not merely as to what had happened to him in the past but which
reasonably indicated that he remained at risk up to the date of the
appeal. Stress in particular was placed
on the petitioner's statement to the effect that, after he had left Pakistan,
his wife had told him that when he initially left members of the SM had attended
at his home wanting to know where he was and that thereafter she continued to
receive phone calls about him. Although
the adjudicator was entitled to reach the conclusion on the objective evidence
that there had been a switch from the targeting of high profile members of the
respective communities and that the tendency was towards indiscriminate
attacks, the adjudicator erred in effectively treating the objective evidence
as definitive.
[11] Secondly, the adjudicator erred in relation to the question of sufficiency
of state protection. In particular, he
erred in appearing to take as his starting point the prospect of the petitioner
being subjected to indiscriminate attacks, whereas, on the evidence, the
petitioner's concern was that he would be subjected to targeted attacks. Even if that was wrong, no reasonable
adjudicator could, having regard to the petitioner's own evidence as to what
had happened to him in the past and the apparent continuing interest in him,
have found that sufficient protection would be afforded. As to the tests to be applied, reference was
made to Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2001 1 AC 489, (and, in the Court of Appeal, 2000 Imm. AR 205); R v Secretary
of State for the Home Department ex parte Bagdanavicius &c 2005 2 WLR 1359; Secretary of State for the Home Department
v Kacaj
2002 Imm. AR 213; Dhima v Immigration Appeal Tribunal 2002 EWHC 80 (Admin); Brown v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2003 EWHC 2045 (Admin);
and Kinuthia v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2002 INLR 133.
[12] Thirdly, the adjudicator erred in his decision that internal
flight was available. Again, he appeared
to proceed on the basis that the petitioner could be at risk of indiscriminate
reprisal attacks, which was not his concern.
In any event, no reasonable adjudicator could have reached the view
which he did. There was nothing in the
evidence to suggest that those interested in the petitioner would confine their
interest in him to a particular area of Pakistan. Even within that area, it appeared that they
had followed him after he had bought the poultry farm.
[13] Counsel for the respondent submitted that the petition should
be dismissed. It could not be said that
the Immigration Appeal Tribunal had erred in deciding that an appeal would have
no real prospect of success (the test which they required to apply in terms of
Rule 18(7)(a) of the Immigration and Asylum Appeals
(Procedure) Rules 2000).
[14] In the first place, it could not be said that the adjudicator
had failed to take account of the petitioner's evidence. Although a badge of credibility was given to
the appellant as to his "personal history" (at paragraph 32), it was also clear
from paragraph 11 that he had taken account of that part of the petitioner's
statement which referred to apparent events since he had left Pakistan. It was not necessary for the adjudicator to
deal specifically with every piece of evidence.
Reference was made to Singh v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2000
SC 219. It was not possible to say that
he erred in deciding that he did not consider that there was a real possibility
that on return the petitioner would be targeted for attack. It could not, in particular, be said that
this was a conclusion which no reasonable adjudicator could have reached on the
evidence. Whatever may have been the
position earlier, there was clear evidence, which the adjudicator was entitled to
accept, of a crackdown against members of extremist groups in 2001. Reference in particular was made to the US
report, at page 33 of 68. It was not
clear what could be made of the reference to telephone calls to the
petitioner's wife.
[15] Secondly, it could not be said that the adjudicator erred in
his assessment of the sufficiency of protection. It was plain from paragraph 33 that he well
understood that the concern of the petitioner was that he would be a target for
attacks. It could not be said that no
reasonable adjudicator could have reached the conclusion he did. The test was not whether the state could
afford a guarantee of protection but, on the principle of surrogacy, whether
there existed criminal law making violent attacks of the type feared punishable,
and a reasonable willingness by the law enforcement agencies to detect,
prosecute and punish offenders. Reference
was made in particular to Horvath v Secretary of State for Home Department. In reaching his conclusion, the adjudicator
was entitled to take into account from the petitioner's own history that a first
information report had been prepared by the police following the first attack
in January 1997 and that the people responsible for the January 1999 attack
were arrested and taken to court, with the petitioner being paid
compensation. Further, he was entitled
to take into account the evidence of a significant crackdown after the
petitioner had left Pakistan.
[16] Thirdly, it could not be said that the adjudicator erred in
relation to the question of internal flight.
It was plain that he had proceeded on the basis that the petitioner's concern
was that he would be targeted (as opposed to being a victim of indiscriminate
attack). The onus was on the petitioner,
and there was no evidence before the adjudicator to indicate that the
petitioner would be pursued to other parts of Pakistan. Instead, the Home Office report of October
2001, dealing with internal flight, indicated at paragraph 5.4.38:
"Groups with a
limited internal flight alternative are women and mixed (inter-religious and
inter-caste) couples. Many flee from
rural areas to the cities if their economic circumstances permit, but even
there they may not be safe from their families or religious extremists. For Ahmadis and Christians (including
converts) there is also a high likelihood that an internal flight alternative
may also be ruled out. Political
activists, however, usually do have the option of moving to another part of the
country, unless they are of high prominence."
It could not be said that the
petitioner was of high prominence.
[17] For the petitioner to succeed, I would require to be persuaded by
all three broad arguments which were advanced on his behalf. Having carefully considered the matter, I
have come to the view that, on the contrary, the submissions of the respondent
are to be preferred, particularly in respect of the second and third arguments
advanced.
[18] In relation to the petitioner's first argument, it cannot, in
my view, be said that the adjudicator failed altogether to take account of the
evidence particularly founded upon - namely the statement as to what had
apparently happened after his departure from Pakistan. Although it would appear that no specific
reference was made to this evidence at paragraph 32, it was specifically
included in the adjudicator's summary at paragraph 11. I agree with counsel for the petitioner that
there is nothing to suggest that insofar as he considered it, the adjudicator found
it any less credible or reliable than the rest of the petitioner's evidence, and
it was no doubt reasonably strongly arguable on his behalf that, taking
specific account of it, it could be said that there was a real possibility that,
on return, he would be targeted for attack.
On the other hand, I am not persuaded that it could be said that no
reasonable adjudicator could have reached a different view. It has to be borne in mind that the
adjudicator found (and it was not argued that he was not entitled to find) that
there had been a crackdown by the military regime on religious extremists since
August 2001, and that insofar as violence remained the tendency was away from
targeted attacks. In addition, the
petitioner's evidence about his wife receiving phone calls could be regarded as
somewhat unspecific and equivocal.
[19] As regards the question of sufficiency of protection it is not,
in my view, arguable that the adjudicator proceeded wrongly on an assumption
that the petitioner's fear was of indiscriminate attack. On the contrary, the adjudicator said
specifically (in paragraph 33):
"Even accepting
a failure of State protection in the past, I do not consider there is a real
possibility that on return he would be targeted for attack, or if he were, that
there would be a failure of State protection, given the current attitude of the
authorities."
The question thus comes to be
whether the adjudicator, applying the appropriate test, could not reasonably
have reached the conclusion he did.
[20] As to the test, there was no dispute between counsel. In respect of asylum claims, the leading authority
where the risk is said to arise from the actings of
non-state agents remains Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department. In it, Lord Hope of Craighead emphasised that the underlying relevant purpose
of the Convention was to be found in the principle of surrogacy; the general
purpose of the Convention being to enable a person who no longer had the
benefit of protection against persecution for a Convention reason in his own
country to turn for protection to the international community (page 495). He emphasised that the obligation to afford
refugee status arose only if the person's own state was unable or unwilling to
discharge its own duty to protect its own nationals. As he said at page 499:
"The applicant
may have a well-founded fear of ... ill-treatment for a Convention reason which may
be perpetrated against him. But the
risk, however severe, and the fear, however well-founded, do not entitle him to
the status of a refugee. The Convention
has a more limited objective, the limits of which are identified by the list of
Convention reasons and by the principle of surrogacy."
Later at page 500, he said:
"The primary
duty to provide the protection lies with the home state. It is its duty to establish and to operate a
system of protection against the persecution of its own nationals. If that system is lacking the protection of
the international community is available as a substitute. But the application of the surrogacy
principle rests upon the assumption that, just as the subordinate cannot
achieve complete protection against isolated and random attacks, so also
complete protection against such attacks is not to be expected of the home state. The standard to be applied is therefore not
that which would eliminate all risk and would thus amount to a guarantee of
protection in the home state. Rather it
is a practical standard which takes proper account of the duty which the state
owes to all its own nationals. As Ward
LJ said ... it is axiomatic that we live in an imperfect world. Certain levels of ill-treatment may still
occur even if steps to prevent this are taken by the State to which we look for
our protection."
[21] In the same case Lord Clyde said, at page 510:
"I do not
believe that any complete or comprehensive exposition can be devised which
would precisely and comprehensively define the relevant level of
protection. Use of words like
"sufficiency" or "effectiveness" both of which may be seen as relative, does
not provide a precise solution. Certainly,
no-one would be entitled to an absolutely guaranteed immunity. That would be beyond any realistic practical
expectation. Moreover, it is relevant to
note that in Osman
v The United Kingdom 1998 29 EHRR 245, the European Court of Human Rights recognised that account should be taken
of the operational responsibilities and the constraints on the provision of
police protection and accordingly the obligation to protect must not be so
interpreted as to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden upon the
authorities. ... There must be in place a system of domestic
protection machinery for the detection, prosecution and punishment of actings
contrary to the purposes which the Convention requires to have protected. More importantly, there must be an ability
and a readiness to operate that machinery.
But precisely where the line is drawn beyond that generality is
necessarily a matter of circumstances of each particular case."
He went on to commend a formulation
by Stuart-Smith LJ, in the Court of Appeal, as a useful description of what is
intended, viz:
"In my judgment
there must be in force in the country in question a criminal law which makes
the violent attacks by the persecutors punishable by sentences commensurate
with the gravity of the crimes. Victims
as a class must not be exempt from the protection of the law. There must be a reasonable willingness by
the law enforcement agencies, that is to say the police and courts, to detect,
prosecute and punish offenders."
[22] The leading authority in respect of EHCR claims where the risk
is said to come from non-state agents is R
v Secretary of State for the Home
Department ex parte Bagdanavicius. In the leading speech, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
said (at paragraph 11):
"The issue may
be formulated as follows: to avoid
expulsion on Article 3 grounds must the applicant establish only that in the
receiving country he would be at real risk of suffering serious harm from non-state
agents or must he go further and establish too that the receiving country does
not provide for those within its territory a reasonable level of protection against
such harm? Mr Nicol, QC for the appellants, a
Lithuanian couple with a young child, submits that they need establish only a
real risk of harm on return. For the
Secretary of State, Miss Carss-Frisk
QC's principal submission is that the appellants
must also establish that the receiving country would fail to discharge the
positive obligation inherent in Article 3 to provide a reasonable level of
protection."
In the following paragraph he said:
"It is of course
implicit in the formulation of the issue in this way that a real risk of injury
may remain despite the state's provision of a reasonable level of protection
against it and such, indeed, I understand to be the agreed position in the
facts of this very case. The Secretary
of State concedes (certainly for the purposes of this litigation) that on
return to Lithuania
the appellants would be at real risk of serious injury by non-state agents; Mr Nicol for his part concedes that Lithuania
provides a reasonable level of protection against violence of the sort
threatened here. That, indeed, is why
the stated issue is properly described as critical: its outcome is determinative
of this appeal."
The issue was answered in favour of
the Secretary of State. What was said to
engage the UK's
obligation under Article 3 was not the risk merely of harm but the risk of proscribed
treatment. As his Lordship said, at
paragraph 24:
"Non-state
agents do not subject people to torture or other proscribed forms of ill-treatment,
however violently they may treat them: what, however, would transform such
violence into Article 3 ill-treatment would be the state's failure to provide
reasonable protection against it."
After noticing the guidance
provided for asylum cases by Horvath v
Secretary of State for the Home Department,
it was said that a broadly similar approach fell to be adopted under the
EHCR. It was said inter alia: "Certainly your
Lordships should state for the guidance of practitioners and tribunals
generally, that in the great majority of cases an Article 3 claim to avoid
expulsion will add little if anything to an asylum claim."
[23] In addition, it has been said that the relevant state system
should carry with it a willingness to do as much as can reasonably be expected
to provide protection in the circumstances (Secretary
of State for the Home Department v Kacha, approved in Dhima
v Immigration Appeal Tribunal). Much will, no doubt, depend upon the nature
of the risk. This was recognised, for
example, in Brown v Secretary of State for the Home Department,
where the claimant under EHCR was a witness to a murder committed by a leading
member of a powerful gang in Kingston, Jamaica,
and who was, it was said, liable to targeted attack for that reason as an
informer. It was accepted (at paragraph
21) that such attacks could give rise to different considerations from the kind
of attacks considered in Horvath
(being isolated random attacks on an unpopular minority). Nevertheless it was also said (at paragraph
22): "However, plainly, a state cannot
guarantee safety to informers, and in certain ways the difficulty of
guaranteeing such safety to informers, or suspected informers, may be greater
than in preventing random attacks on a unpopular minority." In the Court of Appeal in Horvath it was acknowledged that: "In
some cases, where individuals are targeted by terrorists or dissidents it may
be possible for the state to provide special police protection, for example by
an armed guard or the provision of a new identity in a different part of the
territory", (Stuart‑Smith LJ at page 222). No doubt as Lord Clyde stressed in the
House of Lords, the level of protection which would be expected to be afforded
must be a matter of circumstances in each case.
[24] In the present case, the petitioner's own history indicated an
apparent readiness of the authorities to intervene to try to help in relation
to the incidents of 15 January
1997 and 7 January 1999. Much more significantly, however, the
adjudicator found not merely a crackdown by the military regime on religious
extremists in August 2001, but also a tendency apparently away from targeted
attacks, and that the new regime in place since the petitioner left Pakistan
did not tolerate religious violence and had taken steps to counter it. In these circumstances, I do not think it is
arguable that, insofar as the adjudicator did not consider that there would be
a failure of state protection, this was a conclusion
which no reasonable adjudicator could have reached.
[25] Thirdly, in relation to the question of internal flight, it is,
in my view, not arguable that the adjudicator proceeded wrongly on the view
that the petitioner was concerned about potential indiscriminate attack. He records at paragraph 13 that the argument
on behalf of the petitioner before him was that there was no internal flight
alternative "under reference to the Canadian report". This, it appears, (from the adjudicator's first
sentence in paragraph 34) referred to a sentence in the Canadian report which
read "Sectarian violence in one part of the country can lead to reprisals in
another." In dismissing that argument
(by saying that "the possibility of tit for tat violence elsewhere is not the
same as saying that there is any real likelihood that this individual would be
pursued to the furthest reaches of that vast and populous country"), the
adjudicator made it perfectly plain that he understood that the petitioner's
apparent concern was that he would be the subject of targeted violence. Further, it could not, in my view, be said that
he was not entitled to find that, whatever might be the case in his own area,
as a member of the majority Sunni population the petitioner could go virtually
anywhere else. The onus was on the
petitioner. I was not referred to any
evidence before the adjudicator which would have suggested that those
responsible for the petitioner's problems in his own area would pursue him to
any other areas of Pakistan. On the contrary, there was evidence in the
Home Office report which suggested that political activists usually did have
the option of moving to another part of the country. It could not readily be said of the
petitioner that he, a general secretary of a local branch, was of "high
prominence".
[26] In these circumstances, the petition falls to be dismissed.
