OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
[2007] CSOH 46
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P1392/06
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OPINION OF LORD UIST
in the Petition of
TWIMUKYE MUSHAKA
(AP)
Petitioner
against
THE SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
ญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญ________________
|
Petitioner: Forrest;
Drummond Miller WS
Respondent: A.F. Stewart;
C Mullen, OSAG
28 February 2007
[1] The
petitioner is a national of Uganda
who was born on 18 December 1965. She entered the United
Kingdom on or about 23 January 2001 with her four children and
applied for asylum for herself and the children. She also claimed that her return to Uganda
would result in a violation by the United Kingdom of Article 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR").
Shortly after her arrival she was diagnosed as being HIV positive. On 4 March
2001 the respondent refused her asylum claim and her human rights
claim. On appeal to an adjudicator she
did not insist upon her asylum claim but insisted on her human rights
claim. The adjudicator allowed her
appeal on the basis that her removal to Uganda
would infringe her rights under Article 3 of the ECHR. The Secretary of State appealed against the
adjudicator's decision and in a determination notified on 24 January 2003
the Immigration Appeal Tribunal ("IAT") allowed the Secretary of State's appeal
on the basis of the decision of the Court of Appeal in K v Secretary of State for
the Home Department [2001] Imm A.R. 11, which held that as treatment for
AIDS was available in Uganda removal to that country would not amount to
inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR on the ground
that the appellant might not be able to afford all the treatment that he might
require. Having allowed the Secretary of
State's appeal, the IAT in the last two paragraphs of its determination went on
to state as follows:
"7. However, in our opinion there are
exceptional circumstances in this case and we strongly recommend that before
removal is considered the Secretary of State reviews all the facts afresh. We find that the claimant is the head of a
family, which includes one child who is already suffering AIDS and three others
who might too be vulnerable. Also the
claimant, it would seem, has no immediate family in Uganda
and she herself last lived there seven years ago. Given her medical condition it is not
unreasonable to assume that her ability to obtain appropriate treatment and to
provide for her family in Uganda
would be extremely limited. We have no
real reason to doubt her claim that she would have no support of any kind -
emotional, moral or physical - in Uganda.
8. The appeal is allowed but we recommend
a sympathetic reconsideration of all relevant facts."
[2] On
20 October 2003 the Glasgow
solicitors for the petitioner wrote to the respondent in the following terms:
"We note that the Immigration
Appeal Tribunal whilst reluctantly allowing the Secretary of State's appeal in
this matter recommended a sympathetic reconsideration of all the relevant
facts, as they have stated in paragraph 8 of that determination. We wonder if you can confirm that such a
reconsideration is taking place.
Further, we wonder if you could confirm what further documentation and
information you require to allow you to come to a positive decision in favour
of our client. We look forward to
hearing from you as soon as is possible."
On 7 April 2004 they again wrote to the respondent in
the following terms:
"We note there has been no
response to any correspondence from either ourselves or our client's former
solicitors ... in respect of the reconsideration of this case as discussed in the
Tribunal determination. Mr Drabu
(the chairman of the IAT) recommended a sympathetic consideration of all the
relevant facts in this case. We would be
grateful if you could confirm that such a reconsideration is taking place and
would urge that some form of status, be it humanitarian protection or
discretionary leave, be granted to our client and her dependants.
In addition to the matters raised
by the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, we would ask that you consider the five
references attached hereto. Our client,
we would suggest, on the basis of the evidence and the references, is an
individual who has a positive contribution to make to UK
and in particular Scottish society. She
appears to be a selfless, generous individual who has touched the lives of a
great number of people. One only needs
to read the enclosed references to see that our client is someone who wishes to
use what time she has left to alleviate the suffering of others. She is a religious woman who has used her own
experiences in order to attempt to educate individuals and organisations on the
issues and problems surrounding HIV sufferers.
She has assisted with the Glasgow Women's Library, Barnardo's and Body
Positive. She was also involved in the
African choir as noted in Father Chemello's missive.
In summary we would suggest that
there are compassionate and compelling reasons as to why our client should be
granted status along with her dependants outwith the immigration rules.
We would be grateful if
consideration could be given as a matter of some urgency. You will note the Tribunal determination was
promulgated on 24 January 2003. The final decision in this case was on 2 March 2003. We would therefore be grateful, given the
fact that a year has elapsed since that determination, for your immediate
regard being had to this application. We
look forward to hearing from you in early course."
[3] On
22 June 2004 the
respondent wrote to the petitioner's Glasgow
solicitors apologising for the delay in responding and stated as follows:
"Your client's case is being
considered under current policy.
However, in order to progress this case, I require an up-to-date medical
report on both your client and her daughter.
This should include recent details of medication, ongoing treatment and
prognosis in each case."
The petitioner's Glasgow solicitors
subsequently submitted to the respondent a medical report on the petitioner
dated 28 July 2004 from Dr Andrew Winter, Consultant in Genitourinary and
HIV Medicine, and a medical report on the petitioner's daughter who suffers
from AIDS dated 3 September 2003 from Dr Rosie Hague, Consultant in
Paediatric Infectious Diseases and Immunology.
[4] On
1 June 2005 the
respondent replied to the petitioner's Glasgow
solicitors. In paragraph 1 of that
letter he stated as follows:
"Thank you for your letter of 7 April 2004 and subsequent
correspondence in which you have asked for your representations on behalf of
your above named client to be considered as an application for Humanitarian
Protection or Discretionary Leave.
Please accept my apologies for the lengthy delay in replying."
At paragraphs 5 and 6 he
stated as follows:
"5. You have asked that your client's case
be reconsidered following the recommendation of the Immigration Appeal
Tribunal's determination which was promulgated on 24 January 2003.
The Tribunal dismissed your client's Article 3 claim under the
European Convention on Human Rights, but recommended that before removal is
considered a sympathetic reconsideration of all the facts is undertaken. You also ask that we take into consideration
the references from the various charitable organisations who confirm that your
client makes a positive contribution to the United
Kingdom and in particular to Scottish
society.
6. All the points raised in your
submissions were considered when the earlier claim was determined. They were dealt with in the letter giving
reasons for refusal/appeal determination of 24 January 2003.
Although your submissions are not significantly different from the
material that has previously been considered, I have, as the Tribunal
recommended, reconsidered the relevant factors of this case."
In paragraph 7 the respondent
referred to the two medical reports submitted and in paragraph 8 to the
information contained in the latest Home Office Country Information and Policy
Unit (CIPU) report dated October 2004.
He went on to state as follows:
"9. Taking the various aspects of this
report into account, I conclude that your client and her daughter will be able
to continue and manage their treatment on their return to Uganda. I conclude that the most recently obtained
medical reports do not add additional weight to your client's case and do not
create a realistic prospect of success.
10. I have read the supporting letters from
the various organisations praising your client's dedication to her charitable
work. Whilst appreciating that
Mrs Mushaka has been a valued member of the community during her stay in
the United Kingdom,
this does not give rise to granting Leave to Remain in the United
Kingdom.
There is no reason why Mrs Mushaka cannot continue to help others
in Uganda when
she returns. I therefore conclude that
these letters do not create a realistic prospect of success.
11. Having fully reviewed all the factors of
this case, as well as considering the recently obtained medical reports and
supporting letters, I am not prepared to reverse our decision of 4 March 2001.
12. As the Secretary of State has decided not
to reverse the decision on the earlier claim and has determined your
submissions do not amount to a fresh claim, you have no further right of
appeal.
13. The asylum claim has been reconsidered on
all the evidence available, including the further representations, but we are
not prepared to reverse our decision of 4 March
2001 upheld by the Immigration Appeal Tribunal on 24 January 2003.
14. It has been concluded for the reasons
given above that your client does not qualify for humanitarian protection or
for limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom in accordance with
the published Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction on Discretionary Leave."
[5] On
14 June 2005 the petitioner's Glasgow solicitors wrote to the respondent noting
his position in respect of the Article 3 matter and stated that, standing
the very recent decision of the House of Lords in N v Secretary of State for
the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 296, it appeared that "in terms of the law,
our client is in somewhat of a difficult situation". The letter then went on to state that one
matter which did not appear to have been considered by the respondent was that of
Article 8 of the ECHR, and continued as follows:
"We note that in
paragraph 10 of the aforementioned letter you have read the supporting
letters from the various organisations praising our client's charitable
work. We note that you appreciate that
Mrs Mushaka has been a valued member of the community during her stay in
the United Kingdom. What we would have to take issue with is your
assertion that Mrs Mushaka would be able to continue her good work for
others should she be returned to Uganda. It is our position that our client's
charitable work and her contacts and liaisons and assistance provided to others
in the totality of the work she does for the variety of charities establishes
that Mrs Mushaka has a private life in the United
Kingdom.
As you will be aware private and family life are to be treated under
separate heads.
It is our client's position that
removal from the United Kingdom
would entirely disrupt that private life.
Should our client be returned to Uganda
she believes there is no way she would actually be able to access medication for
her and her daughter. Such is the
current employment position in Uganda
that our client believes there is absolutely no prospect that she will be able
to be engaged in employment. She has no
family in Uganda. She grew up as an orphan and other relatives
have died.
Whilst our client is well enough
now to continue with her work she does not believe that she would be able to
access sufficient medication to allow her to care for her children.
In summation of the above we
would therefore submit to you that removal from the United
Kingdom would completely disrupt our
client's private life. We would also
refer you to the decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal of 24 January 2003 at
paragraph 7. You will note that the
Tribunal has already decided that there are exceptional circumstances in this
case. We would therefore suggest to you
that removal of our client in completely disrupting her private life would
therefore necessarily be disproportionate in terms of the currently settled
case law as in the House of Lords decision in Razgar and the Court of Appeal in Huang.
We would therefore be grateful if
you could confirm that you would be in a position to grant leave to remain to
our client on the basis of her private life and that removal would be disproportionate
to the UK's
legitimate aims.
One other matter, which did not
appear to have formed part of your consideration, is the potential breach of
Article 3 occasioned to our client by having to watch her daughter suffer
should she be returned to Uganda."
On 27 June 2005 the petitioner's Glasgow
solicitors wrote to the respondent enclosing a letter of support for her
application from a lecturer in International Health at Queen
Margaret University
College, Edinburgh
and stating:
"We would suggest to you that
there is every possibility that our client would suffer a breach of
Article 3 whilst watching her daughter die."
[6] On
23 March 2006 the
respondent replied to the petitioner personally. At paragraphs 5 to 10 he stated as
follows:
"5. Some points raised in your submissions
were considered when the earlier claim was determined. They were dealt with in your appeal
determination dated 24 January
2003 and the refusal of further representations letter of 2 June 2005.
6. The remaining points raised in your
submissions, taken together with the material previously considered in the
letter, would not have created a realistic prospect of success.
7. In their letters of 14 June and 27 June 2005 your representatives
have stated that you would be unable to access medical treatment for yourself
and your daughter if you were to return to Uganda. However, this aspect of your claim was
considered at your appeal of 23 January
2003 and in the refusal letter of 2 June 2005 when it was concluded that you and your
daughter would be able to continue and manage your treatment on return to Uganda
as the medical treatment for HIV/AIDS there was more than adequate.
8. Your representatives have also stated
that your rights under Article 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (sic) would be breached should you be
returned to Uganda
as there is a possibility that you would have to watch your daughter die. However, as stated above, in our letter of 2 June 2005 we indicated that
there was indeed medical treatment available to yourself and your daughter in Uganda
and in this respect it is not accepted that your daughter would have to suffer
to the extent that your representatives are stating. It is therefore not accepted that your rights
under Article 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (sic) would be breached as you claim.
9. Your representatives have further
stated that your removal to Uganda
would affect your wellbeing as you would not be able to find employment. However, it is considered that your claims
that you would be unable to find employment are entirely speculative. Nevertheless, being unable to find employment
is the position many people in the world unfortunately find themselves in and
it is not sufficiently compelling or compassionate to warrant a grant of leave
outside the Immigration Rules.
10. Your representatives have further stated
that your removal to Uganda
would affect your wellbeing as you would not have any family to support you
there. However, it is noted that, besides
your dependant children, to our knowledge, you do not have any other family
members to support you here in the UK. In this respect, it is not considered that
your removal to Uganda
is justified."
At paragraphs 11 and 12 the
respondent considered the submissions relating to private and family life under
Article 8 of the ECHR and rejected them.
[7] At
the hearing of this application for judicial review it was accepted by both counsel
that in his letters of 1 June 2005
and 23 March 2006 the
respondent had considered three questions:
(1) Was the petitioner entitled to humanitarian protection? (2) Was the petitioner entitled to
discretionary leave to remain in the United
Kingdom?
(3) Was there a fresh claim? At
the outset of his submissions Mr Forrest for the petitioner made clear
that he was not challenging the decision of the respondent on the issues of
humanitarian protection or fresh claim and that his challenge was restricted to
the respondent's decision not to grant the petitioner discretionary leave to
remain in the United Kingdom. He accepted that Articles 3 and 8 of the
ECHR could not be invoked. His
submission was that the Secretary of State had not properly considered the
facts in order to decide whether they were so compelling as to warrant the
grant of discretionary leave to remain in the United
Kingdom.
[8] Mr Forrest
first submitted that the petitioner had been prejudiced by the delay on the
part of the respondent in reconsidering her case following upon the decision of
the IAT. That decision was dated 24 January 2003 and the first
communication from the respondent thereafter was dated 22 June 2004. The first decision letter was dated 1 June 2005. The petitioner had a legitimate expectation
that her case would be reconsidered in view of what the IAT had stated in
paragraph 8 of its decision and the longer the Secretary of State had
taken to consider the circumstances of her case the more the petitioner had
suffered prejudice. Secondly, he
submitted that the respondent had not taken into account what the IAT had
stated in paragraph 7 of its decision.
He should have addressed his mind to the facts stated therein but he had
failed to do so. His decision should
therefore be reduced so that he could reach a fresh decision based on
reconsideration of those facts.
[9] Mr Stewart
for the respondent submitted that the petitioner could make nothing of the
delay by the respondent in reconsidering this case as any prejudice arising
therefrom was not sufficiently substantial to give rise to a ground of
challenge of the respondent's decision.
In the context of immigration law the delay in this case could not
properly be described as substantial. He
referred to the decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal dated 9 March 2005 in MB v Secretary
of State for the Home Department, in which the Tribunal stated at
paragraph 28:
"Delay in decision-making may
cause an individual to lose specific advantages or opportunities which timeous
decision-making would have conferred ...
But in each case it is the effect of delay which assists the claimant's
proportionality argument. It is very
difficult to envisage a case in which the removal of someone who had no claim
to enter and no claim for international protection would be disproportionate
merely because of a delay in decision-making which had had no disadvantage ... or
which had not led to the creation of circumstances which themselves made
removal disproportionate. It is the
effects of delay to which an adjudicator should look rather than to the fact or
extent of delay itself. Delay by itself
would be not so much really determinative as rarely ever significant."
Reference was also made to the
decision of the Court of Appeal in Strbac
v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2005] EWCA Civ 848 at paras 25-32. In the present case the claim based on
interference with private life was at best tenuous.
[10] In response to the submission that the respondent had not
properly taken into account the content of paragraph 7 of the IAT's
decision Mr Stewart pointed out that the IAT's recommendation in paragraph 8
of a sympathetic reconsideration of all the facts amounted to no more than an
invitation to the Secretary of State and was in effect a plea ad misericordiam. The invitation was that the respondent
should review all the facts afresh and take the factors mentioned by the IAT in
paragraph 7 into account in considering whether to grant discretionary
leave to remain in the United Kingdom. Mr Stewart submitted that the respondent
had properly carried out that task, as was clear from the content of paragraph 6
of his decision letter of 1 June 2005, in which he stated that, although the
petitioner's submissions were not significantly different from the material
that had previously been considered, he had, as the Tribunal recommended,
reconsidered the relevant factors of this case.
The remainder of the letter indicated that he had indeed considered all
the relevant factors, including taking into account an up-dated CIPU
report. His conclusion in
paragraph 9 of that decision letter could not be faulted. There had therefore been no ground
demonstrated by the petitioner for interfering with the respondent's exercise
of his discretion. Reference was made to
Macdonald's Immigration Law and Practice
(6th Ed, 2005) at p 825, para 12.174, headed "Humanitarian
Protection and Discretionary Leave", wherein it is stated as follows:
"Where humanitarian protection is
not warranted, caseworkers must consider whether a grant of discretionary leave
is appropriate. Humanitarian protection
is not afforded to those whose claim rests on the severity of a medical
condition, who may instead be eligible for discretionary leave. A person who would be excluded under 1F(b) of
the Refugee Convention will similarly be excluded from humanitarian protection,
but would qualify for a grant of discretionary leave if his or her removal
would breach the ECHR. Discretionary
leave is granted where removal would involve a direct breach of Article 8
ECHR ..., and is also appropriate in medical or other humanitarian cases where
return would breach Article 3(or 8) ECHR, and for unaccompanied children
who qualify for neither asylum nor humanitarian protection but for whom there
are not adequate reception arrangements available in their own country. Other cases which could warrant the grant of
discretionary leave for unsuccessful asylum seekers would require facts 'so
compelling that it is considered appropriate to grant some form of leave'."
The quotation at the end of the
above passage is from the Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction on Discretionary
Leave. So far as medical cases are
concerned, para 2.3 of that Instruction (quoted in footnote 8 at
p 826 of Macdonald) states that
"the United Kingdom's obligations would only be engaged where (a) the United
Kingdom can be regarded as having assumed responsibility for the individual's
care; (b) there is credible evidence
that return, due to complete absence of medical treatment in the country
concerned, would significantly reduce the applicant's life expectancy; and (c) return would subject them to acute
physical and mental suffering". Those
conditions, said Mr Stewart, had not been satisfied in the present case.
[11] In my opinion the submissions for the respondent are
correct. I do not think it can be said
that the delay by the respondent in reconsidering the petitioner's case caused
her prejudice of sufficient substance as to give rise to a ground of challenge
of his decision. I accept that, although
the period of delay was clearly undesirable, it was not, in the context of
immigration law, substantial. No doubt
in any case of this nature delay in reaching a decision means that the
applicant becomes more settled in this country, but it is clear that that in
itself is insufficient to vitiate the decision ultimately reached. The delay has to have been of such a nature
as to have caused substantial prejudice to the applicant. I conclude that the delay in this case was
not of such a nature.
[12] Further, I am of the opinion that there is no merit in the
submission that the respondent failed properly to consider the factors
mentioned in paragraph 7 of the IAT's decision of 24 January 2003.
In paragraph 6 of his decision letter of 1 June 2005 the respondent expressly stated
that he had "as the Tribunal recommended, reconsidered the relevant factors of
this case". Moreover, it is clear from
the content of that decision letter, and indeed the content of his subsequent
decision letter dated 23 March
2006, that he closely reconsidered the merits of the petitioner's
case. No reported case was cited in the
course of the hearing in which a court had on judicial review overturned a
decision of the Secretary of State refusing to grant discretionary leave to
remain in the United Kingdom. In my opinion it would require to be shown
that the Secretary of State had acted irrationally in refusing to grant
discretionary leave before a court on judicial review could overturn his
decision. It is clear that the Secretary
of State has a policy for consideration of the grant of discretionary leave,
including a specific policy for medical cases, which in my view he properly
applied to the circumstances of the petitioner.
In the present case there is no basis for interfering with the decision
of the Secretary of State to refuse to grant discretionary leave to remain on
reconsideration of the factors referred to in paragraph 7 of the IAT's
decision.
[13] For the above reasons I shall dismiss the petition.