FIRST DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
|
Lord President
Lord Kingarth
Lord Clarke
|
[2008] CSIH31
OPINION OF THE LORD PRESIDENT
in
RECLAIMING MOTION
by
ARROW GENERICS LIMITED
Petitioner and Respondent;
against
AKZO NB (Represented in Scotland by ORGANON LABORATORIES
LIMITED
Respondent and Reclaimer:
for
Revocation of claims 1-3
and 5 of European Patent EP 0 389 035
_______
|
Act: Currie, Q.C., Higgins;
Maclay Murray & Spens (Petitioners and Respondents)
Alt: McNeill, Q.C.,
Delibegović-Broome; McClure
Naismith (Respondents and Reclaimer)
20 May 2008
Introduction
[1] In these
proceedings the petitioner (the respondent in the reclaiming motion), which I
shall refer to as "Arrow", seeks revocation of claims 1 to 3 and 5 of European
Patent 0 389 035 ("the patent") granted to the respondent (the reclaimer in
this reclaiming motion), which I shall refer to as "Akzo". Akzo is represented in Scotland by Organon Laboratories
Limited. The patent has as its active
ingredient the steroid known conventionally as tibolone. That compound has been known since the 1960s
and, since about 1988, has in one composition been marketed as Livial. It has combined oestrogenic, progestagenic
and androgenic characteristics. In
tablet form, it is used for treating menopausal complaints, for modulating the
immune system and for combating osteoporosis.
The patent is concerned with tibolone in a high degree of crystalline
purity, that is, with a high degree of one form as against any other form of
the crystals of that compound. The
priority date of the patent is 18 March 1989.
The patent
[2] The claims in
the patent are, in their English language version, in the following terms:
"1. A
pharmaceutical composition which contains a pharmaceutically suitable solid
carrier and the compound having the structure (7ά, 17ά) - 17 - hydroxy-7-methyl-19-nor-17-pregn-5(10)-en-20-yn-3-one,
characterized in that the compound is crystalline pure, which purity is greater
than 90%.
2. The
pharmaceutical composition of claim 1, characterized in that the crystalline
purity is greater than 95%.
3. The
pharmaceutical composition according to claim 1, characterized in that the
crystalline pure compound has the monoclinic P21 form.
4. The
pharmaceutical composition according to claim 1, characterized in that the
crystalline pure compound has the triclinic P1 form.
5. A
method for the preparation of a crystalline pure compound for use in a
pharmaceutical composition accordingly to claim 3, characterized in that the
polymorphous compound is crystallized from mixtures of water and acetone or
ethanol, or from ethyl acetate, acetonitrile, or acetone-hexane mixtures.
6. A
method for the preparation of a crystalline pure compound for use in a
pharmaceutical composition according to claim 4, characterized in that the polymorphous
compound is crystallized from an apolar solvent."
[3] Claims 4 and
6 are not challenged in these proceedings.
Of the challenged claims, claims 1, 2 and 3 are claims to a
product; claim 5 is a claim to a process
(for the preparation of the monoclinic crystalline form).
[4] In the
Description of the patent the patentee narrates that the compound in question,
its chemical and structural formulae being given, is known from two American
patents, which are identified. The
method described in these patents has, it is narrated, led to a compound having
certain characteristics, which have led to its use in medicaments having
gonadomimetic, ovulation-inhibiting or immuno-modulating action.
[5] The
Description continues:
"Surprisingly, it has now been found
that the compound having the formula [in question] prepared in accordance with
the method described in the above-mentioned patents, is polymorphous and
consists of two crystalline pure forms.
It may be expected of polymorphous
compounds that their biological activity is comparable or identical to the
biological activities of the crystalline pure forms of which the polymorphous
compound consists. Nevertheless, if the
polymorphous compound is used as a medicament great drawbacks are associated
therewith compared with its crystalline pure components. The differences in crystal structure can lead
to a difference in physico-chemical parameters such as stability, rate of
dissolution, melting point, analytical data and the like, which frequently are
strongly influenced by the crystal forms in the polymorphous compound. This is all the more obvious since in
practice it is virtually impossible to make each batch of a polymorphous compound
exactly identical in respect of composition.
As a consequence of these differences, it is frequently regarded as
undesirable to incorporate polymorphous compounds in medicaments and it is
sometimes demanded that only one of the crystalline pure components of the
polymorphous compound is used.
The aim of the present invention is,
therefore, to obtain a pharmaceutical composition which contains a crystalline
pure form according to the formula [in question], which is completely or
virtually completely free from the other crystalline form.
The term 'crystalline pure form which
is virtually completely free from the other crystalline form' denotes a form
which contains less than 10% and preferably less than 5% of the other
crystalline form.
It has now been found that by using
specific crystallization techniques two crystalline pure forms, which here are
designated form I and II respectively, can be obtained from the polymorphous
compound [in question].
It has moreover been found that form
I is chemically appreciably more stable than the already known polymorphous
compound [in question]. This improvement
in stability yields great advantages in respect of the shelf-life of the
pharmaceutical product in which form I is incorporated.
The invention therefore relates to a
pharmaceutical composition which contains a pharmaceutically suitable carrier
and the compound having the structure [in question], characterized in that the
said compound is a crystalline pure or virtually pure form which is completely
or virtually completely free from the other crystalline form.
A pharmaceutical composition of this
type has the advantage that the reproducibility is appreciably increased and
that the physical data, within acceptable limits, are always identical.
The pure crystalline compounds, and
in particular the compound with form I, are suitable for treating menopausal
complaints or for modulating the immune system, and also for combating
osteoporosis.
Form I is obtained by crystallizing
the polymorphous compound [in question] from mixtures of water and acetone or
ethanol. A suitable method is to
dissolve the polymorphous compound in acetone or ethanol, after which the
solution is added to water. Conversely,
water can also be added to a solution of the polymorphous compound in acetone
or ethanol. Other suitable solvents are,
for example, ethyl acetate, acetonitrile and acetone/hexane mixtures. Mixtures of methanol and water, from which
only mixtures of the two crystalline forms always crystallize, are unsuitable.
Form II can be obtained by crystallizing
the polymorphous compound from a selection of apolar solvents. Toluene is very suitable, as is also hexane
to which a little ethyl acetate has been added.
Another suitable solvent is trichloroethylene.
The rate of crystallization, which is
influenced most strongly by the crystallization temperature, can also play a
role in obtaining crystalline pure forms.
Thus, in general good results are obtained from anhydrous acetone only
when the crystallization is carried out at a relatively low temperature."
The patentee then explains that forms I and II can readily be
differentiated from one another - in particular by three methods, which are
then described.
[6] The Description
continues:
"Each of the crystalline pure forms
is mixed with a suitable pharmaceutical carrier and administered parenterally
or orally, for example as a solid pharmaceutical administration form, such as a
tablet, pill, capsule or suppository.
The dosage schemes are the same as
described in the abovementioned patents.
An oral daily dose of 1-5 mg is particularly suitable for administration
to humans.
A pharmaceutical composition in which
form I is incorporated is preferred. A
composition of this type has the additional advantage that a much better
stability is obtained, so that the shelf-life, even under changing storage
conditions, is notably improved."
[7] Nine Examples
by way of illustration are then set out.
As certain of these were discussed before us it is convenient to narrate
them at this stage. Since Example 9,
which relates to determination of structural data, is not material, it may be
omitted. The other Examples are as
follows:
"Example 1
4.0
g of the polymorphous compound [in question] were recrystallized under nitrogen
from 20ml of acetone to which a trace of pyridine had been added. During this operation the temperature was
slowly brought from room temperature to - 10 ºC. The crystals were filtered off and washed
with acetone at -20 ºC and dried under vacuum at 40-45 ºC. Yield 3.0g of form I (purity according to
DRIFT 94%, calculated from [a certain relationship]) ... .
Example 2
1
kg of the polymorphous compound [in question] was dissolved at 20-25 ºC in a
mixture of 23 l of acetone and 6 ml of pyridine. The solution was filtered dust-free and the
filter was washed twice with 1 l of acetone.
At a temperature of 15-20 ºC the filtrate was poured as rapidly as
possible, under nitrogen, into 25 l of dust-free distilled water, to which seed
crystals of form I had been added. The
suspension was cooled to 0-5 ºC and stirred for one hour at this
temperature. The crystals were filtered
off, washed with dust-free distilled water and dried under vacuum at 40
ºC. Yield 0.95 kg of form I (purity
according to DRIFT 97.2%).
Example 3
In
a manner comparable to that described in Example 2, four batches of form I were
obtained with a purity of, respectively, 100%, 95.2%, 93.3% and 99.2% (all
determined by means of DRIFT).
Example 4
2.3
kg of the polymorphous compound [in question] were dissolved in a mixture of 63
l of 96% ethanol and 114 ml of pyridine.
This mixture was then poured as rapidly as possible, while stirring
well, into a dust-free mixture of 53.5 l of water and 268 ml of pyridine at
18-20 ºC, to which seed crystals of form I had been added. Rinsing was carried out with 3 l of ethanol
and the mixture was stirred for 15 min at 18-20 ºC. The crystals were filtered off, washed twice
with a mixture of 10 l of dust-free distilled water and 2 ml of pyridine and then
washed three times with 18 l of dust-free distilled water at 50 ºC. The crystals were dried under vacuum at 40
ºC. Yield 2.1 kg of form I (purity
according to DRIFT 94.7%).
Example 5
5.0
g of the polymorphous compound [in question] were dissolved in 50 ml of ethyl
acetate, to which a trace of pyridine had been added, at 40 ºC. 300 ml of hexane at about 35 ºC were added
while stirring vigorously, after which the mixture was cooled to 0 ºC and
stirred for a further 30 min. The
crystals were filtered off and washed with hexane at 0 ºC. Yield 4.25 g of form II (purity according to
DRIFT 100%).
Example 6
A
tablet having the following composition was prepared:
form I (obtained in
accordance with example 2)
|
2.5 mg
|
starch
|
10 mg
|
ascorbyl palmitate
|
0.2 mg
|
magnesium stearate
|
0.5 mg
|
lactose
|
to make up to 100
mg
|
Base
granules were prepared by mixing the lactose with a portion of the starch. The remainder of the starch was mixed to a
slurry with water and added to the mixture.
The whole was granulated and dried.
These base granules were mixed with ascorbyl palmitate and form I,
sieved, finely mixed with magnesium stearate and then tabletted.
Example 7
A
tablet having the same composition as in Example 6 was prepared by first mixing
form I with 10% of the lactose and the ascorbyl palmitate and then mixing this
mixture with the lactose, starch and starch slurry. The mixture was dried, finely mixed with
magnesium stearate and tabletted.
Example 8
A
capsule having the following composition was prepared:
form II (obtained in
accordance with example 5)
|
2.5 mg
|
starch
|
10 mg
|
ascorbyl palmitate
|
0.2 mg
|
magnesium stearate
|
0.5 mg
|
Avicel(r)
|
to make up to 100
mg
|
The
components were mixed with one another in the manner described in Example 6,
granulated and filled into gelatin capsules."
The statutory
provisions
[8] The Patents
Act 1977 (as amended) provides:
"1(1) A
patent may be granted only for an invention in respect of which the following
conditions are satisfied, that is to say -
(a) the
invention is new;
(b) it
involves an inventive step;
...
and references in this Act to a
patentable invention shall be construed accordingly.
...
2(1) An
invention shall be taken to be new if it does not form part of the state of the
art.
(2) The
state of the art in the case of invention shall be taken to comprise all matter
(whether a product, a process, information about either, or anything else)
which has at any time before the priority date of that invention been made
available to the public (whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) by written
or oral description, by use or in any other way.
...
3 An
invention shall be taken to involve an inventive step if it is not obvious to a
person skilled in the art, having regard to any matter which forms part of the
state of the art by virtue only of section 2(2) above ...
...
72 Subject
to the following provisions of this Act, the court ... may by order revoke a
patent for an invention on the application of any person (including the
proprietor of the patent) on (but only on) any of the following grounds, that
is to say -
(a) the
invention is not a patentable invention;
...
125(1) For the purposes of this Act an invention for a patent ... for which
a patent has been granted shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be
taken to be that specified in a claim of the specification of the ... patent ... as
interpreted by the description and any drawings contained in that
specification, and the extent of the protection conferred by a patent ... shall
be determined accordingly.
...
(3) The
Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the European Patent Convention
(which Article contains a provision corresponding to subsection (1) above)
shall, as for the time being in force, apply for the purposes of subsection (1)
above as it applies for the purposes of that Article."
The power in this court to revoke a patent for an invention
which is not a patentable invention extends to a European Patent (see section
77).
The Convention and the
Protocol on its Interpretation
[9] Article 69 of
the European Patent Convention provides:
"(1) The
extent of the protection conferred by a European Patent ... shall be determined
by the terms of the claims.
Nevertheless, the description and drawings shall be used to interpret
the claims.
... ".
The Protocol
on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the Convention provides:
"Article 69 should not be interpreted
in the sense that the extent of the protection conferred by a European Patent
is to be understood as that defined by the strict, literal meaning of the
wording used in the claims, the description and drawings being employed only
for the purpose of resolving an ambiguity found in the claims. Neither should it be interpreted in the sense
that the claims serve only as a guideline and that the actual protection
conferred may extend to what, from a consideration of the description and
drawings by a person skilled in the art, the patentee has contemplated. On the contrary, it is to be interpreted as
defining a position between these extremes which combines a fair protection for
the patentee with a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties."
The challenges
[10] Arrow challenges
the validity of the patent on grounds both of anticipation and of
obviousness. The Lord Ordinary upheld
that challenge on the basis of anticipation but rejected it on the ground of
obviousness. Akzo has reclaimed against
the Lord Ordinary's interlocutor. It
contends that, properly construed, the patent was not anticipated by any
relevant prior art. Arrow resists that
contention and further cross-appeals, contending that the Lord Ordinary erred
in holding that the invention was not obvious.
The prior art
[11] The prior art
upon which Arrow primarily, but not exclusively, relies is an article published
in May 1984 in the Annual of the Royal Netherlands Chemical Society. The title of the article is in the following
terms:
"Conformational analysis of 3-oxo
5(10)-unsaturated steroids.
Single-crystal X-ray structure
analysis of
17-hydroxy-7ά-methyl-19-nor-17ά-pregn-5(10)-en-20-yn-3-one
(Org OD 14)".
Its authors were J.-P. Declercq and M. Van Meerssche,
apparently academic scientists at the University of Louvain, and a third person,
F.J. Zeelen, described in the heading as of "Organon Scientific Development
Group, 5340 BH Oss, The Netherlands". A
note advises that Mr. Zeelen is the author to whom correspondence should be
addressed. The abstract of the article
narrates:
"Two crystallographically independent
molecules with differing half-chair conformations of ring A were found in the
analysis of Org OD 14. These results are
compared with published X-ray structure analyses and Westheimer-type calculations of related steroids. It is concluded that the energy differences
between the half-chair and envelope conformations of ring A of 3-oxo
5(10)-unsaturated steroids are small."
Org OD 14 would appear to denote a compound by then
identified by Organon as of interest for the purposes of pharmaceutical
development. The authors introduce their
article and continue:
"We now report a single-crystal X-ray
analysis of another representative of [the steroid class in question]: 17-hydroxy-7ά-methyl-19-nor-17ά-pregn-5(10)-en-20-yn-3-one
(Org OD 14)."
A footnote to this sentence is in the following terms:
"Org OD 14 is a compound of interest
for the treatment of menopausal complaints."
Certain references are then given. Under the heading 'Experimental" the authors
give the experimental parameters within which the analysed single crystal was
obtained. These include the following:
"
|
Crystallisation medium
|
Acetone
|
|
...
|
|
|
System
|
monoclinic
|
|
... ".
|
|
It is not disputed that the "system" described in these
parameters as "monoclinic" is the monoclinic P21 form referred to in
claim 3 of the patent.
[12] Under the
heading "Results" the authors state:
"Two independent molecules were found
and their coordinates are given in Table II.
The two structures found show many of the features often observed in
steroids such as the 13β-envelope conformations of the D-ring and the
chair conformations of the C-ring. The
B-rings in both conformations are half-chair with the 7ά-methyl group in an
axial position."
The coordinates in Table II are (subject to errors of
calculation) consistent with that described in the patent.
[13] The authors
then discuss these results; but that
discussion is not germane to the issues arising in this litigation. For convenience I shall refer to this article
as "Declercq".
[14] Other
documentary material comprised in the prior art - though more relevant to
obviousness than to novelty - includes (1) US Patent No. 3,340,279, with a
priority date of 5 September 1967, which claims steroids of a described
formula, tibolone, though not named as such, being among the compounds
disclosed by way of example ("patent 279") and (2) UK Patent No. 1,117,845,
with a priority date of 13 June 1967, which again disclosed the compound
tibolone, the crude product being, in one of the examples, recrystallised from
acetone with one drop of pyridine ("patent 845").
The expert testimony
and matters agreed therein
[15] The Lord
Ordinary heard evidence from two expert witnesses, Dr. Newton (led by Arrow)
and Professor Bernstein (led by Akzo).
Each had prepared reports which were before the court. The Lord Ordinary found both these witnesses
to be impressive, with impressive credentials, although their respective
backgrounds and experiences differed.
The Lord Ordinary summarised these differences as follows:
"Dr. Newton has recently retired as
resident medicinal chemist in the chemistry department of the University of Cambridge, a position he held since 1996, and
he is visiting professor at the University of Sussex.
He holds a number of posts with various scientific companies and,
possibly most relevant to the present proceedings, was employed by Glaxo from
1971 to 1996, originally as a senior research chemist and subsequently as
director of various research projects.
Professor Bernstein is and has been since 1971 professor of chemistry at
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beersheva, Israel.
He teaches courses in general chemistry, crystallography and organic
state chemistry, including polymorphism and crystallisation. He has specialised and built an international
reputation in the field of crystallography and has participated in a large
number of conferences on the subject.
Indeed, Dr. Newton was willing to defer to Professor Bernstein on
matters of pure crystallography."
[16] There was, the
Lord Ordinary found, little or no difference between these experts on the
identity for present purposes of "the skilled man". Adopting Professor Bernstein's description,
with which Dr. Newton broadly agreed, the skilled man here was the composite,
namely, "a process research chemist working with an analytical chemist in the
pharmaceutical industry" having a bachelor's degree in chemistry and about 2-3
years experience (perhaps more) in the industry, and having some familiarity
and experience in dealing with solids and the analytical techniques used to
characterise and distinguish the two forms of tibolone under discussion. Before us it was accepted that the skilled
man was as so described.
[17] The Lord
Ordinary also found that there was nothing between the experts on the question
whether tibolone of the purity and form claimed in claims 1 to 3 of the patent
was revealed in Declercq. It was agreed
between them that the data recorded in Table 1 of Declercq showed that the
compound under discussion there was the monoclinic form of tibolone i.e. form
I. It was also agreed that, the analysis
being of a single crystal, the analysed subject was by definition 100% pure.
The issues before the
Lord Ordinary and his disposal of them
[18] These agreed
matters, the Lord Ordinary observed, enabled "Arrow to say, simply, that
clauses 1-3 were anticipated by Declercq".
The Lord Ordinary then proceeded to consider and reject various
arguments advanced by Akzo to counter that inference of anticipation. One of these arguments (based upon an analogy
with the first (English) Queen Elizabeth being referred to as Queen Elizabeth I
only after Queen Elizabeth II ascended the throne) was not insisted on before
us. As will appear, other arguments
(though, it seems, expressed somewhat differently before us) were then
considered and rejected by the Lord Ordinary.
[19] The Lord
Ordinary then considered submissions advanced by parties in relation to the
anticipation/novelty of claim 5. This
issue, as will appear, involves issues of interpretation of the claim and of
the general law, to which I shall return.
It also involves some consideration of the evidence and the Lord
Ordinary's conclusions on this topic.
The Lord Ordinary held that claim 5 had been anticipated by Declercq.
Accordingly, the Lord Ordinary held that all the claims in
issue had been anticipated and on that basis revoked the patent in its
entirety.
[20] Although
unnecessary for his decision, the Lord Ordinary then addressed Akzo's challenge
based on obviousness. For reasons which
he gave, he rejected that challenge. By
cross-appeal Arrow renews that attack.
Submissions by junior
counsel for Akzo
[21] Mrs Delibegović-Broome
submitted that, properly construed, each of claims
1-3 involved the integers (i) a pharmaceutical
composition; (ii) containing a
pharmaceutically suitable solid carrier;
(iii) where the active ingredient was crystalline pure tibolone to at
least 90%. Each concerned a crystalline
pure pill. Claim 5 was a method of
producing such a pill. Arrow's challenge
of lack of novelty was based on Declercq.
That paper was of interest as much for what it did not contain, as for
what it did: it did not suggest that
tibolone was polymorphous; it did not
disclose how one would obtain a product in a form suitable as a pill; and there was no detailed information about
the crystallisation process. The issue
of construction was for the court alone, it having been instructed as to the
notional skilled addressee's knowledge (Terrell
on the Law of Patents, 16th Edition, paragraphs 6-103 to 6-106). Expert evidence in relation to critical
issues was admissible though it did not have to be accepted by the court, which
must look to the reasoning behind such evidence (Technip France SA's Patent [2004] RPC 46, per Jacob LJ at pages 927-8). Obviousness being a matter of fact, an appeal
court should be reluctant to intervene unless there was a matter of legal
principle (Biogen v Medeva [1997] RPC 1 at page 45; Saint-Gobain
v Fusion Provida [2005] EWCA Civ 117 (CA)). This did not necessarily apply to
the question of novelty (Technip France,
per Jacob LJ at pages 958-9). The
question of what could be taken from the prior art was one of fact for the
judge (Merck & Co. Inc.'s Patents
[2004] FSR 330, per Vice-Chancellor Sir Andrew Morritt, at page 345). In the present case, leaving aside the
question of obviousness, there were no significant differences between the
experts as to what Declercq demonstrated, and no substantial challenge to the
Lord Ordinary's findings-in-fact. This
court was in as good a position as the Lord Ordinary to assess the question of
novelty.
[22] As he did not
address construction as a separate exercise, it was necessary to consider the
Lord Ordinary's reasoning regarding novelty in order to understand how he had
construed the claims. In his reasoning,
he had referred to Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v H.N. Norton
& Company Ltd. [1996] RPC 76, in which it had been held that the
novelty of an invention must be coextensive with its monopoly, and that a claim
to a compound per se lacks novelty
where it is already in the state of the art (per Lord Hoffmann at pages
82-3). However, it had also been made
clear that, prior to considering novelty, one must be clear about what the
invention was. The Lord Ordinary had
found that claim 3 was to the monoclinic form of tibolone, per se. In effect he had
treated claims 1 and 2 in the same way.
That approach ignored the integers of the claim. The correct approach required a "purposive"
construction of the claims (Kirin-Amgen
Inc. v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd.
[2005] RPC 169 per Lord Hoffmann at paras 18 ff). There was a distinction between a pharmaceutical
composition containing a product, and that product as such, in whatever form it
is found (Generics (UK) Ltd. v H Lundbeck A/S [2007] RPC 729 per
Kitchin J at paras. 61-2). The
claims here were to pharmaceutical compositions, which was a different monopoly
from that of products per se. Monoclinic tibolone, when created, would not
necessarily infringe the patent. This
was clear from the language of the claims, and the specification of the patent. On a purposive approach, the only reasonable
construction of each of claims 1 to 3 was that they concerned a dosage form,
comprising crystalline pure tibolone and a pharmaceutically solid carrier.
[23] Akzo had
included an obviously deliberate limitation in its claims. That limitation must have a meaning. (Kirin-Amgen
at para. 34; Halliburton Energy Services Inc. v Smith International (North Sea) Ltd. [2006] RPC 25, per
Pumfrey J at paras. 68-9; and Palmaz's European Patents (UK) [1999] RPC 47, at page 77). It was unfair to
construe the claims beyond what was intended, as to do so might make the patent
invalid (Wheatley v Drillsafe Ltd. [2001] RPC 7, per Aldous
LJ at paras. 20-2; and Kirin-Amgen, at para. 47). The Lord Ordinary seemed to suggest that the
integers relating to a pharmaceutical composition made no difference to the
inventive concept. Even if this were
true, which was not accepted, they should not have been ignored for the
purposes of construction. Every part of
the claim mattered (Société Technique de
Pulverisation STEP v Emson Europe Ltd
("STEP") [1993] RPC 513, per Hoffmann
LJ, at page 522). One should not
re-write the claim from a pharmaceutical composition with a number of features,
to a claim to just one of those features (Terrell,
para. 6-68).
[24] Another error
of construction concerned the "single crystal" argument. Properly construed, claims 1-3 concerned a
pharmaceutical composition; by
implication, a single crystal was not sufficient. The Lord Ordinary rejected this argument, saying
that it confused the claim to the method with the product claims. However, disclosure also encompassed the
concept of enablement. Method was
important if the product claimed was to be enabled by the prior art. Akzo also challenged the Lord Ordinary's
conclusion that the claims were not limited by some quantitative criteria; they required crystalline purity of greater
than 90 or 95% in the pharmaceutical composition. Purity was measured on a weight percentage
basis. A single crystal, by definition
100% pure, would, if it sufficed, render references to 90 and 95% crystalline
purity in the claims otiose. This could
not be correct. Examples 6, 7 and 8 in
the patent also made it clear that the claim was not to a single crystal. It was a principle of construction that a
foolish result, if avoidable, should be rejected (Terrell, para. 6-59). It
would be foolish to suggest that a single crystal would suffice for a
pill. It had never been so suggested in
evidence.
[25] The fact that
the claims involved a pill with greater than 90% purity of a particular
crystalline form was important. While
the Lord Ordinary set out the benefits of using a crystalline pure compound in
medicine, he failed to consider the relevance of this in relation to
construction. The patent claimed a
practical application of the discovery that tibolone was polymorphous. Polymorphism was at the heart of the patent.
[26] The Lord
Ordinary also erred in construing claim 5.
He again ignored the integers of this claim. Claim 5 was to (a) a method for the
preparation of a crystalline pure compound for use in a pharmaceutical
composition of claim 3: characterised in
that (b) the compound was crystallised from, inter alia, mixtures of water and acetone. The Lord Ordinary found that it claimed a
monopoly over "every process of crystallising the polymorphous compound
using acetone". However, the phrase
"mixture of water and acetone" had a meaning, which had to be given
effect. It could not simply be construed
as acetone diluted by water (bench acetone).
Two separate liquids were involved as part of a specific process. Dr Newton accepted that the process described
in the prior art was not the same as claim 5.
Example 1 in the specification did not involve the use of water, but it
was not part of the process claimed. The
Lord Ordinary's construction was inconsistent with his finding that not every
crystallisation using acetone necessarily produced monoclinic tibolone. Later, he formulated the question as being
whether using acetone as a solvent would normally result in form I. However, claim 5 incorporated a reference to
claim 3. The method had to produce form
I with a crystalline purity of greater than 90%. A process which failed to achieve this
objective would not infringe the claim.
[27] Novelty
involved two concepts, namely disclosure and enablement, which were distinct
and subject to their own rules.
Disclosure meant that the prior art must disclose subject-matter which,
if performed, would necessarily infringe the patent. This might be because the prior art disclosed
the same invention, or because it contained information which, if performed,
would infringe the patent (SmithKline
Beecham plc's (Paroxetine Methanesulfonate) Patent [2006] RPC 323, per Lord
Hoffmann at para. 20 ff, referring to the cases of Hill v Evans (1862) 31 LJ
Ch (NS) 457 and General Tire and Rubber
Co. v Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co.
Ltd. [1972] RPC 457). Enablement
meant that an ordinary skilled man could perform the invention by using the
disclosed material and common general knowledge (SmithKline Beecham per Lord Hoffmann at para. 14; Asahi
Kasei Kogyo KK's Application (1991) RPC 485, per Lord Oliver of Aylmerton
at pages 531-2 and Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle at pages 551-2). To constitute anticipation the same
subject-matter must be disclosed and enabled in the prior art as was disclosed
and enabled in the patent. The prior art
must contain all the elements of the claims;
one could not "mosaic" using different sources (ITP SA v Coflexip Stena
Offshore Limited 2003 SLT 1197, at para. [44]; and General
Tire).
[28] Anticipation
concerned prior art which disclosed subject matter which, if performed, would
necessarily result in an infringement of the patent (SmithKline Beecham at para. 22) or must inevitably yield identical
products (per Lord Hoffmann at page 90 of Merrell
Dow). A disclosure which was
"capable" of being carried out in a manner which did not fall within the claim
did not anticipate it (Inhale Therapeutic
Systems Inc. v Quadrant Healthcare
plc [2002] RPC 419, per Laddie J at para. 45). It was not enough that it allowed a skilled
man, without undue burden, to come up with an invention which infringed the
patent. Reference was made to SmithKline Beecham, per Lord Hoffmann
and Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, passim.
[29] Declercq was
not sufficient on a proper construction of the claims to found
anticipation. The European Patents
Office had considered it before granting the patent; it was cited on the front of the patent in
suit. There was no disclosure, express
or implicit, let alone an enabling disclosure, of anything which would
necessarily infringe the patent. It
merely disclosed the conformation of a single crystal of monoclinic tibolone,
and that the crystal came from a batch which was crystallised from
acetone. To infringe claims 1 to 3 the
directions given in Declercq must inevitably provide a pill which comprised a
pharmaceutically suitable solid carrier and tibolone of a crystalline purity in
excess of 90%. That meant that the
inevitable result of crystallisation from acetone had to be greater than 90% of
form I. If the only evidence before the
Lord Ordinary was Declercq, that would not be sufficient to satisfy that
test. Moreover, on the evidence, the
Lord Ordinary had found that not every use of acetone would inevitably give form
I. It was not necessary to make any
further findings-in-fact.
[30] As regards
claim 5, Declercq did not disclose any process whereby monoclinic tibolone of
the requisite purity could be achieved.
The Lord Ordinary had referred to Professor Bernstein's evidence that
one would expect to get form I when crystallising from acetone. This was said in the context of the skilled
man seeing Declercq in 1984, when it was not known that tibolone was
polymorphous. Declercq did not disclose
a method of producing a crystalline pure pill.
While it did indicate that the crystal analysed had been obtained using
acetone, there was no evidence about whether other crystal forms were
obtained. Moreover, there was no
information about the correct conditions of temperature and so on. Similarly, it did not disclose that tibolone
was polymorphous. Polymorphism was
unpredictable. It was not enough that the
skilled man might have known that steroids were often polymorphous; he would not have known how to identify and
isolate the polymorphs, and why one would want to obtain them. Arrow had not put forward any experiments
proving the inevitable result which followed from the disclosures in the prior
art (cf. Inhale Therapeutic Systems, at paras. 44 and 45). There was no enabling disclosure.
[31] The reclaiming
motion should be allowed and the prayer of the petition refused.
Submissions by junior
counsel for Arrow
[32] Miss Higgins
submitted that, as regards claims 1 to 3, Declercq anticipated the patent in
that it disclosed (i) the monoclinic form of tibolone; (ii) at the level of purity set out in the
claims; and (iii) for use as a
pharmaceutical product. As regards claim
5, Declercq anticipated the patent in that it disclosed (i) the method of
crystallising from acetone to provide the monoclinic form of tibolone; and (ii) its use as a pharmaceutical
product. The respondents supported the
findings-in-fact of the Lord Ordinary regarding novelty and construction, with
one exception. The integers
"pharmaceutical composition which contains a pharmaceutically suitable solid
carrier" should not have been read out.
This caused no difficulty to Arrow's case, given the Lord Ordinary's
finding that tibolone had been used in pharmaceutical compositions for many
years. He correctly read Declercq as
disclosing that tibolone was used as a pharmaceutical composition.
[33] While Declercq
had been considered by the European Patents Office, it worked on a challenge
procedure; searches undertaken by it
were not always extensive. Patent 279,
contained a reference to the chemical name for tibolone and to its use as a
pharmaceutical dosage. Patent 845, also
made reference to the chemical name for tibolone, and its oestrogenic,
progestational and ovulation-inhibiting properties. It also described a method of making tibolone
which corresponded to the first example in the patent in suit. The witness Vrighof indicated that tibolone
was first marketed in 1988.
[34] Akzo's counsel
had fundamentally misconstrued Lord Hoffmann's reasoning in SmithKline Beecham. She had mixed up the concepts of (i)
"necessarily infringed" and (ii) "inevitable result". Properly understood, the test for
anticipation had been met in the present case.
A patent was anticipated if (i) the prior art contained a clear
description of, or clear instructions to do or make, something that would
infringe the claim, or (ii) the carrying out of directions in the prior art
would inevitably result in something being made or done which would infringe
the claim (Lord Hoffmann at paras. 19 to 24).
Either route was sufficient.
Arrow relied on the first formulation of the test of anticipation: the prior art itself disclosed something
which would breach the patent. Declercq
had "planted his flat" at the end point of the invention prior to Akzo. The second test, involving inevitable result,
only applied if the prior art did not specifically disclose the patented
product.
[35] The argument
that a single crystal in a pharmaceutical composition was not sufficient to
anticipate the patent was not accepted by Arrow. There was no dispute that Declercq disclosed
a crystal of monoclinic tibolone, which, by definition, was 100% pure. A single crystal came within the scope of the
claims (Inhale Therapeutics, per
Laddie J., at para. 43). There was
nothing in the language of the claims which would support the limitation relied
on by Akzo. While claims had to be read
in the context of the patent as a whole, it was not pertinent to put a gloss on
them by reference to words contained in the specification (Conoco Speciality Products (Inc.) v Merpro Montassa Ltd. 1992 SLT 444 at page 448). Even if it were, it was not clear what part
of the specification was relevant.
Reliance had been placed on examples 6, 7 and 8. These referred to 2.5mg of tibolone in a
tablet, but Akzo had never submitted that this was an appropriate limit. The specification referred to a normal daily dosage
of 1 - 5mg, suggesting that less than 2.5mg was a possible dose. There had been no evidence about the quantity
of tibolone used in a pill, nor about the size of crystal used in a
pharmaceutical composition. No attempt
was made to contextualise the phrase "pharmaceutical composition"; it did not permit the inference sought. Claims must delineate the limits of the patent,
to allow third parties to know the areas on which they must not trespass. In any event, if Arrow was correct in its
formulation of the construction of the claims, it only had to say that Declercq
anticipated form I for use as a pharmaceutical.
[36] The argument
that Declercq could not anticipate the patent, since it did not disclose
polymorphism in tibolone, was rejected.
A product, or invention, did not have to be described in exactly the
same terms as the patent in order to anticipate it, as long as both products or
inventions were the same (Merrell Dow,
per Lord Hoffmann at pages 87-9).
Declercq identified monoclinic tibolone.
It did not need to show that this form was one of two polymorphs. While it did not disclose any advantage in
the use of the monoclinic form, no advantage formed part of the claims. It was merely commented upon within the
specification of the patent. Generics (UK) Ltd did not cause
difficulties for Arrow. It concerned
prior art which had not specifically disclosed an isolated product. Declercq disclosed monoclinic tibolone in its
isolated form. Akzo sought to read a
special factor into the discovery of polymorphism in tibolone. However, an invention was a practical product
or process, not information about the natural world (Kirin-Amgen per Lord Hoffmann, at paras. 76-7).
[37] The argument
that Declercq did not disclose the use of tibolone as a pharmaceutical was also
challenged. The footnote in Declercq
indicated that tibolone was of interest in the treatment of menopausal
complaints. The crystal examined had
been sent for analysis by Organon, a pharmaceutical company, for whom one of
the co-authors worked in the scientific development group. A continuing theme emerged in the evidence,
particularly from Dr Newton, that the crystal had been taken for conformational
analysis because a drug was being developed by Organon. More particularly, Declercq disclosed the
monoclinic form as being of interest for pharmaceutical purposes. It was implicit that the reason that particular
crystal had been sent for analysis was that this crystalline form was under
development. As at 1984, there was no
knowledge of any other form of tibolone.
There would be no question of any other polymorph being of use. Moreover, the substance analysed in Declercq
contained a reference number prefixed by the letters "Org", suggesting that
Organon had identified this particular structure as being of interest.
[38] While the
footnote only indicated that tibolone was "of interest" in the treatment of
menopausal complaints, it contained sufficient direction that it was to be used
in a pharmaceutical context. An
indication of "potential use" for clinical applications still constituted a
clear and unmistakeable direction (Merck
& Co. Inc.'s Patents, per Vice-Chancellor Sir Andrew Morritt at para. 28). It was not necessary for the prior art specifically
to disclose the compound within a pharmaceutical composition for the argument on
anticipation to be successful. The
integers of a pharmaceutically suitable solid carrier in a pharmaceutical
composition were the plain consequences of the use of tibolone as a drug. The skilled man would take from Declercq that
this compound with this structure was a drug under development by Organon.
[39] The concepts
of disclosure and enablement were distinct:
"inevitable result" was not the test to be applied for the purposes of
enablement. For the purposes of
enablement, some trial and error was permitted (SmithKline Beecham, per Lord Hoffmann at para. 30). The hypothetical addressee must be prepared
to address errors in the specification if means to do so were readily
available. It was sufficient that, if
crystallising using acetone, the skilled man would expect at least some
monoclinic tibolone. It was not necessary
to show that that would be the inevitable exclusive result. In the examples, form I had been obtained
from acetone. At least in relation to
Example 1, this had been acetone alone.
According to Dr Newton, the skilled man would be aware of polymorphism
and would therefore have a reason to check for such a crystal within a
sample. He would be able to tell the
difference between crystals under the microscope and look to see whether he had
achieved the crystal disclosed in Declercq.
Declercq satisfied the test of enablement for the purposes of
anticipation.
[40] Arrow
supported the Lord Ordinary's construction of claim 5 as being a monopoly over
every process of crystallising monoclinic tibolone using acetone. Dr Newton's position was that none of
the examples given in the patent specifically included adding water to the
acetone solvent. From the information
provided in the examples, the acetone used was "bench acetone", which would
contain some water. Since water was a
polar solvent, its presence in the acetone would increase the polarity,
favouring the formation of monoclinic tibolone.
Despite the terms of the specification and the claim itself suggesting a
mixture, the expert evidence allowed the Lord Ordinary to put himself in the
position of a skilled man. The correct
construction was that the phrase "mixture of acetone and water" included bench
acetone. There was no evidence from the
experts that ran contrary to that interpretation. Akzo's submission that Example 1 did not fall
within claim 5 was unusual. If that were
Akzo's position, one might have expected it to have been put to the expert
witnesses. Immediately prior to Example
1 the specification stated that "The invention is illustrated with the aid of
the following examples". This all suggested
an "ex post facto" attempt to deal
with Example 1, when submitting that claim 5 did not cover crystallisation from
acetone.
[41] Arrow's
position as regards enablement for claim 5 was essentially the same as for
claims 1 to 3. There was no need for
Arrow to establish by evidence that crystallisation from acetone inevitably
gave monoclinic tibolone, only that the skilled man would be able to get
some. The respondents again relied on
the first of the two possible paths of disclosure, the descriptive route. Declercq showed that one can produce form I
tibolone at the required level of crystalline purity by crystallising from
acetone, and that this was for use as a pharmaceutical.
[42] Arrow accepted
that an issue of novelty might be opened up more readily by an appellate court than
an issue of obviousness, but only where a question of principle arose (Technip France per Jacob LJ at paras.
71-4). If the matter concerned evidence
of what was disclosed by the prior art, or what was meant by technical terms,
one should adopt the Biogen approach
and be slow to interfere with the findings of the judge at first instance (SmithKline Beecham plc v Apotex Europe Ltd. [2005] FSR 524, per
Jacob LJ at para. 36). That principle
applied where there was a conflict of expert testimony, or, as here, where only
one expert had given evidence on the meaning of a technical term. The reclaiming motion should be refused.
[43] As to
obviousness, the Lord Ordinary had erred in law in holding that the invention
in claims 1 to 3, and 5, was not obvious, having regard to the state of the
art. The correct approach to obviousness
on appeal was that expressed by Lord Hoffmann in Biogen at page 45 (see also Pozzoli
SPA v BDMO SA [1007] FSR 872, per
Jacob LJ at para.13). Arrow challenged
the findings that there was no reason why the skilled man would want to look
for a pure polymorphic form of tibolone at the priority date, and that he would
not have had the motive or the means to develop such a form. It also challenged the Lord Ordinary's
approach to the "Windsurfing" test (Windsurfing International v Tabur Marine (G.B.) Ltd. [1985] RPC
59). The findings that the skilled
addressee would have known of tibolone and that steroids were likely to be
polymorphous was not challenged per se,
but the manner in which the findings had been applied was in issue.
[44] We were
referred to various authorities, from which Arrow took five principles of
general application (Section 3, as read with section 2(2), of the Patents Act
1977; Pfizer Ltd's Patent [2001] FSR 201, per Laddie J at para. 62; ITP SA,
per Lord Nimmo Smith at paras. [61]-[66]).
First, the test for obviousness was wholly objective, being whether the
inventive step was obvious to a person skilled in the art, having regard to any
matter forming part of the state of the art.
Secondly, the skilled man was to be considered as lacking inventive
capacity. Thirdly, the skilled man was
deemed to have read all the prior art.
Fourthly, unlike novelty, when considering obviousness, one could
consider more than one document (or "mosaic").
Finally, the question was whether the inventive step was objectively
obvious, rather than commercially obvious.
[45] There were
three possible approaches to the issue of obviousness. The first two involved the application of the
Windsurfing steps, the third was
independent of it. The court should
consider the inventive concept of each claim distinctly; the Lord Ordinary had considered the patent
as a whole (cf. Pozzoli, per Jacob LJ at para. 17, referring to
his earlier decision in Unilever plc v
Chefaro Proprietaries Ltd. [1994] RPC
567 at page 580). On the first approach,
the inventive concepts would be: in
claim 1, tibolone with a crystal purity of greater than 90%; in claim 2, tibolone with a crystal purity of
greater than 95%; in claim 3, form I
tibolone with a purity of greater than 90%;
and in claim 5, certain methods, including crystallisation from acetone,
for the preparation of form I tibolone with a crystal purity of greater than
90%.
[46] The phrase
"pharmaceutical composition" and "pharmaceutically suitable solid carrier"
could not form part of the inventive concept.
Tibolone had been on the market since 1988, a year before the priority
date. The lack of significance in the
term "pharmaceutical composition" was seen in the specification of the patent,
which claimed the application of the discovery that tibolone was polymorphous
as the aim of the invention. It also
referred to patent 279, which outlined the pharmaceutical use of tibolone. Thus, at the priority date, there was nothing
inventive about using tibolone as a pharmaceutical. Arrow did not challenge the Lord Ordinary's
formulation of the skilled addressee as "a process research chemist working
with an analytical chemist in the pharmaceutical industry". Neither did it challenge the Lord Ordinary's
answer to the second Windsurfing
question, although it ought to have been addressed separately as regards each
claim.
[47] The Lord
Ordinary's approach to the third step was challenged. Again, he had failed to ask this question in
relation to each of the claims. He had held
that the difference between the state of the art and the inventive step was the
"discovery of polymorphism in tibolone and the identification of the method of
producing one of the two different polymorphic forms". This finding was one that no reasonable judge
could have made, and proceeded on a misconstruction of the invention
claimed. It contradicted his earlier
finding that Declercq disclosed pure form tibolone and a method of making it. It was not possible to identify any
difference between the inventive concept of the claims and the information in
Declercq. The answer to the question
posed at the fourth step was "Yes".
[48] The second
approach presumed that there was something inventive in the incorporation of
monoclinic tibolone in a pharmaceutical composition. On this hypothesis, the inventive concept for
each of the claims was as outlined in the first approach, with the additional
component of a "pharmaceutical composition".
The difference, if any, for the third step of the Windsurfing test was that Declercq showed 100% pure form I tibolone
for use as a pharmaceutical, whereas the present invention showed the form and
purity outlined in the first approach in a pharmaceutical composition. As regards claim 5, the difference was that
Declercq showed a method, using acetone, for the preparation of 100% pure form
I tibolone for use as a pharmaceutical, whereas the present invention described
a method using, inter alia, acetone
for the preparation of form I tibolone with a crystalline purity of greater
than 90% for use in a pharmaceutical composition.
[49] On this
approach, the fourth step was to ask whether it would have been obvious to use
monoclinic tibolone as a pharmaceutical in a pharmaceutical composition. On the basis of the evidence, and the prior
art (Declercq, the 845 patent and the marketing of Livial), it would have
been. The Lord Ordinary's finding that
the incorporation of tibolone into a pharmaceutical composition could not be
inventive was not challenged by Arrow, had been expressly accepted by Akzo at
the proof, and was noted in Akzo's written submissions which had been produced
at that proof regarding the other patent then in suit. Therefore, claims 1 to 3, and 5, fell to be
revoked for lack of inventive step.
[50] The third
approach proceeded on the "simple" case of obviousness set out in the evidence
and in Dr Newton's report. The test was
that outlined in section 3 of the Patents Act.
Windsurfing (which had been
referred to with approval in the House of Lords - Sabaf v MFI [2005] RPC
209) was only of relevance where it was of specific assistance. A skilled man wishing to develop tibolone as
a pharmaceutical product would need to identify a robust and repeatable
process. Patent 279 provided the
synthetic route to tibolone. The skilled
man would be aware that most steroids exhibit polymorphism. He would want to define a single polymorph,
since he would know that different steroidal polymorphs had different
properties. He would be aware that
Declercq defined a crystal of tibolone analytically. By crystallising from acetone, as taught by
Declercq, he would have a method of preparing pure monoclinic tibolone. Claims 1 to 3 of the patent were obvious. Claim 5 was also obvious because Declercq
described crystallisation from acetone, rather than from anhydrous acetone, and
one would expect the former solvent to contain some water.
[51] The Lord
Ordinary had highlighted the difference between knowing about polymorphism as a
phenomenon, and the ability to apply that knowledge. Arrow did not challenge these comments per se;
however, the argument set out by Dr Newton was not predicated on the
fact that the skilled man might be looking for polymorphism in tibolone. Rather, he would know that steroids were likely
to be polymorphous, and a paper identifying one crystalline form of a
particular steroid would be of interest to him.
For the purposes of obviousness, one was placing oneself in the position
of the skilled man looking at the prior art.
As indicated, different steroidal polymorphs may have importantly
different properties. The skilled man
would want to define a single polymorph having a suitable physical and
bio-availability profile. He would be
interested as he would be aware of the likelihood of polymorphism within such a
steroid.
[52] The skilled
person in question was defined as having an interest in pharmaceutical products
and the properties a potential polymorph would have in the pharmaceutical
world. The burden was not on the party
claiming obviousness to show why the skilled man's interest would be
aroused. One could not assume he was
uninterested. He was taken to appreciate
and understand the prior art, and to consider, in light of his knowledge and
experience, whether and how it would work (Windsurfing
per Oliver LJ at pages 71-4). It was not
arguable that it would not have been obvious to put a particular isolated
crystalline form into a pharmaceutical composition. As indicated, Declercq related to one such
form. That was what the skilled man must
be taken to have seen. In failing to
make a finding of obviousness on this "simple" basis, the Lord Ordinary did not
deal with part of the evidence led at proof.
He had made findings-in-fact regarding obviousness that no reasonable
judge would have made.
[53] The finding
that a skilled man would not have the means of achieving a pure polymorphic
form of tibolone was one which no reasonable judge could have made. It was accepted that Declercq disclosed a
method of producing pure monoclinic tibolone.
The Lord Ordinary's finding in this regard was not that one would not be
able to get a batch of form I; it was
that one would not be able to obtain solely form I. The evidence of both experts was that one
crystal is a pure crystalline form. The
Lord Ordinary himself stated that Declercq disclosed a means of producing
monoclinic tibolone.
[54] As regards
motivation, Dr Newton was clear that Declercq identified a method which was
good enough to commercialise.
Alternatively, on the basis of the Lord Ordinary's own assumptions, the
motive was that the skilled man would be aware that tibolone was a steroid and
therefore likely to be polymorphous. As
indicated, according to Dr Newton, he would want to define a single form. The finding of no motivation ran wholly
contrary to the evidence presented at proof.
In any event, the Lord Ordinary erred in law in holding that the lack of
motivation was a bar to a finding of obviousness. Motivation, while relevant, was not a prerequisite
for a conclusion of obviousness (Pharmacia
Corp. v Merck & Co. Inc.
[2002] RPC 775, per Aldous LJ at para. 124).
The question was whether the claimed technical step would be obvious to
a skilled man.
[55] On that basis,
the cross-appeal should be allowed and claims 1 to 3, and 5, of the patent
found to be invalid for lack of inventive step.
Response by senior
counsel for Akzo
[56] Mr McNeill
submitted that Arrow's arguments on anticipation were notable for what they did
not say. No submissions had been made as
to the proper construction of the patent.
It had been suggested on more than one occasion in argument that the
patent was for monoclinic tibolone. This
led to the structure of Arrow's arguments, which did not respond to specific
submissions made by Akzo. The only
reasonable construction of the patent was that the claims were not to
monoclinic tibolone per se; they concerned a pharmaceutical (as against,
say, a cosmetic) composition involving a suitable solid (as against, say, a
liquid) carrier. Adopting this approach,
it became evident that Arrow's arguments sought to impose on the patentee
something which was not claimed by it.
[57] There was no
evidence supporting the contention that a single crystal could be used as a
pharmaceutical, or that a skilled person would read the patent as being a pill
with a single crystal contained therein.
The onus was on Arrow to establish this.
The reference to crystalline purity of 90 to 95% by weight suggested, prima facie, a multiplicity of crystals
within a compound. Another, smaller,
contra-indication was the reference to the need for a microscope to distinguish
between crystalline forms. One was
entitled to look at the specification in construing the claims. This outlined the aim of the invention as
involving a plurality of forms. Akzo's
construction of the patent was that it concerned batches of tibolone adequate
for effective pharmaceutical use, being greater than 90 to 95% pure, of a
particular form, according to the claim.
[58] There was in
fact information, not referred to at proof, which could have rebutted the
"single crystal" argument. Professor
Bernstein's report referred to a paper by Schouten and Kanters, which provided
the dimensions of a single crystal of the triclinic form of tibolone. It suggested a weight of 0.0334mg. This would need to be multiplied by a factor
of 30 in order to gain 1mg, and by a factor of about 150 in order to gain 5mg,
these being the daily dosages referred to in the patent. Upon the assumption that the Declercq crystal
had the same rough size, a single crystal could not suffice for a
pharmaceutical dosage. There was no
reasoned basis on which the court could hold that a skilled person would read
the claims as including a single crystal of the active ingredient.
[59] Arrow had
submitted that there might be circumstances where it was not necessary to show
that the prior art necessarily infringed the patent. However, while there were two ways to
approach anticipation, the underlying principle was that of necessary
infringement or inevitable result. (SmithKline Beecham, per Lord Hoffmann at
paras. 22 to 33). One had to distinguish
between disclosure and enablement.
However, the importance of keeping the two distinct could vary with the
complexity of the invention. There might
be something so obvious that little skill at all is involved in realising how
to make it (SmithKline Beecham, per
Lord Walker at paras. 62-4).
[60] It was clear
that the footnote in Declercq only identified the compound tibolone as being of
interest in the treatment of menopausal complaints, not its monoclinic
form; the case of Merck, relied on by Arrow, could be distinguished. There was no suggestion of any prior use of
the monoclinic form for therapeutic purposes.
It was not a plain consequence of Declercq that the monoclinic form was
useful for pharmaceutical purposes. As
compared to claims 1 to 3, Declercq did not disclose: how to make tibolone, far less anything
else; a robust and reliable method for
obtaining tibolone in crystalline form, as desiderated by Dr Newton; the creation of a crystalline pure pill; the use of monoclinic tibolone as a
pharmaceutical; or the fact that
tibolone was polymorphic. The Lord
Ordinary found that not every crystallisation from acetone would give form I
tibolone. Any direction in Declercq was
at least as likely to not infringe the patent as it was to infringe it (cf. SmithKline Beecham and General Tire).
[61] The fact that
there was no direction to obtain crystalline pure monoclinic tibolone in
Declercq was relevant to the matter of enablement. As a matter of commonsense, without the
discovery of polymorphism, one would not expect Declercq to teach the skilled
man how to distinguish the monoclinic form from any other form. The evidence of Dr Newton relied on by Arrow
(report para. 7.8) in this regard was dealing with obviousness, not novelty,
and referred to patent 279 as well as Declercq.
A patent specification was not part of the common general knowledge unless
this was proved as such (General Tire
at page 482). Moreover, one could not
mosaic for the purposes of novelty; the
prior art was thus Declercq alone.
Dr Newton identified the importance of a robust and reliable method
of producing a particular form for industrial purposes. This could not be encompassed by an academic
exercise producing a single crystal. The
Examples in the patent involved substantial amounts of tibolone. The specification spoke of "batches". The phrase "pharmaceutical composition"
involved an amount of crystalline pure tibolone adequate for effective
pharmaceutical use. The claims referred
to a pill which could be used as a pharmaceutical as the result of a large
scale commercial process.
[62] Arrow had no
pleadings challenging claim 5 as lacking in novelty and no submissions had been
made to the Lord Ordinary in that regard.
It was not suggested in evidence that a skilled person would read out
water from the mixture described in the patent.
The evidence of Dr Newton relied on by the respondents related to
obviousness, the state of the art, and what could be taken from Declercq. Other passages of his evidence undermined
such a claim. He described the solvent
as "acetone water", and indicated that "in the patent they actually dissolve in
acetone and then add water". Professor
Bernstein's evidence made it clear that Examples 2 and 3 involved the use of
water. There was no support for the Lord
Ordinary's construction that claim 5 included every crystallisation from
acetone. It sat uneasily with his
acceptance that not every use of acetone would inevitably give form I.
[63] The word
"mixture" could mean a number of things, but the Examples gave an indication of
the process. One could identify, for the
purposes of enablement, what had been done.
Acetone had been used first and the resultant solution had then been
added to water, which acted as an anti-solvent, not merely as a dilutant of the
acetone. Crystallisation took place from
the mixtures of water and acetone. The
matter was one of construction. The
claims included a reference to water.
The patentee had the right not to claim everything disclosed, or
enabled, in the specification (Kirin-Amgen,
per Lord Hoffmann at para. 33). Example
1 could be excluded from the claim. The
method outlined in Example 1 was different as regards the temperature,
process and yield. That Example might be
a special method for producing seed crystals.
[64] As to
enablement in respect of claim 5, the Lord Ordinary had not specifically
addressed this. Declercq did not give a
method for making tibolone; it did not
disclose a particular method of crystallising from acetone; and it contained no suggestion that one
should crystallise using water and acetone.
Dr Newton's evidence that one would necessarily get form I from
acetone, but might need to re-crystallise to improve purity, was based on his method
of crystallisation. This was different
from that outlined in claim 5. There was
no reference to the use of water specifically as an anti-solvent to increase
precipitation, or specifically to the use of acetone in the crystallisation
process. It was different from the
robust technique which was being taught by the patent. While Windsurfing
indicated that the skilled person was not looking for commercialisation, it did
suggest that one had to look at the nature of the relevant skilled person. Here, he was a person working for a
pharmaceutical company and looking for a robust, reliable, process which was
capable of commercialisation. That was
the aim of the patent. A method which
merely gave the possible expectation of some form I did not bring one within
the framework of the claim.
[65] As regards
obviousness, Akzo accepted that one must normally identify the inventive
concept in relation to each claim distinctly.
However, there might be patents where the claims were so interlinked
that there was little purpose to be served by seeking to find a different
inventive concept in each claim. The
Lord Ordinary's definition of the inventive concept was the identification of a
crystalline pure form of tibolone and a method for producing it. Even if he had set out to deal with each
claim separately, he would have been likely to answer the first question of the
Windsurfing test in the same way for
each claim. While technically he may
have been in error, his conclusions were sound and were supported by Akzo. A distinction was to be drawn between the
addressee identifying something which could be improved, and the addressee
being inventive. Polymorphic screening
of pharmaceuticals was standard practice at the priority date for substances
known to be polymorphic. However, the
Lord Ordinary found that a skilled addressee would not know in advance how to
obtain knowledge of polymorphism in any particular material. Therefore, it would not be obvious to
ascertain if polymorphic forms were present.
[66] When asked for
Akzo's formulation of the inventive concept in claim 1, Mr McNeill
submitted that it was the identification of polymorphism in tibolone and the isolation
of a crystalline pure form for pharmaceutical purposes. He accepted the Lord Ordinary's formulation
at para. [45] of the inventive concept.
This did not refer to a pharmaceutical composition but did refer to a
crystalline pure form. Given what was
said elsewhere by the Lord Ordinary about the issue being whether knowledge
pointed a way to discovery of polymorphism in any particular case, the
inventive concept predicated the discovery of polymorphism in tibolone. That was a prerequisite of the isolation of a
crystalline pure form. What had been
invented was a "non-polymorphic" pill, that is, one of sufficient purity to
have advantageous properties. The aim of
the invention, set out in the specification, related to a pharmaceutical
composition containing pure form I tibolone.
[67] As regards the
third Windsurfing stage, Arrow had
suggested that there was an inherent contradiction in the Lord Ordinary's
approach. However, there was a
distinction in the approach taken by the Lord Ordinary to the issues of novelty
and obviousness. In relation to novelty,
he was constrained by his belief that the product claims were to form I
tibolone itself. A single crystal would
on that approach have been sufficient for anticipation. When considering obviousness, he had
correctly identified the difference between what was known by a skilled person
and what was disclosed by the patent as being the application of the discovery
of polymorphism in tibolone to produce one of two different forms in a
crystalline pure form.
[68] One should
approach obviousness in light of the proper construction of the claims,
including the concept of a pharmaceutical composition and all that
entailed. In correcting the Lord
Ordinary's thinking on novelty, one was not making any change to the essential
reasoning he employed for the purposes of obviousness, where he identified a
particular inventive concept as the essence of the invention. However, even if this was wrong, Akzo could
still rely on the concept not being obvious;
a non-polymorphic pill was not obvious.
[69] As to the
"simple" case of obviousness, Dr Newton's evidence was habile to support a
number of findings. In Arrow's favour,
it supported the fact that polymorphism, as a concept likely to appear in
steroids, would have been known to the skilled addressee at the relevant
time. In Akzo's favour, the nature of
polymorphism, and the extent of its understanding, was not such as to make it
easy for the skilled person to identify a particular polymorph, or to establish
what its properties would be. What was
important was the guarantee of stability provided by the pure crystalline
form. When one considered the evidence
and the reports of Dr Newton, there was evidence to support the Lord Ordinary's
findings-in-fact.
[70] It was not
clear that the skilled man would have known that tibolone was probably
polymorphous, or that the Declercq Paper would have given him information
allowing him to make at least some form I.
In evidence, Dr Newton moved somewhat away from para. 7.7 of his report,
indicating that the skilled man would want a robust method of producing a
particular polymorph. Moreover,
Professor Bernstein was much less willing to accept that a skilled man would
have known about polymorphism to the extent outlined by Dr Newton. The simple argument of obviousness relied
upon by Arrow was merely the anticipation argument recast. Once a discovery and its practical
application had been identified the question, under the statute, or the Windsurfing test, was whether the difference
between the patent and the prior art was one without inventive step. The Lord Ordinary was entitled to ask not
only whether there was an awareness of the likelihood of polymorphism in
tibolone, but also whether Declercq and the common general knowledge "pointed the
way" to polymorphism in the particular case.
[71] There was no
indication as to what it was in Declercq that would take the skilled man into
the realms of a guaranteed crystalline pure amount of tibolone for use in a
pharmaceutical. There was not even
anything directing the skilled man to a method of producing a single crystal of
form I. There was no actual knowledge of
polymorphism in tibolone at the time of Declercq, so there was no teaching in
relation to how to obtain a single crystalline form and therefore no guarantee
that the crystals obtained would be form I or form II, or a mixture of the
two. The skilled man would not have the
means of discovering polymorphism per se. As regards motive there had to be a real
likelihood of something being in the mind of the skilled addressee. In the present case there was no likelihood
that such a skilled addressee would look for polymorphism and attempt to screen
out various crystals.
Submissions by senior
counsel on behalf of Arrow
[72] Mr Currie
accepted that construction of the claims was central to the issues in the case. Akzo's first argument regarding the "single
crystal" issue suggested "pharmaceutical composition" implied pharmaceutical
efficacy. However, on a proper
construction of claims 1 to 3, there was no lower limit to the amount of
monoclinic tibolone in the pharmaceutical composition. Arrow was not embarrassed by the absence of
evidence that a single crystal would be pharmaceutically effective. It was clear from Dr. Newton's report
that Arrow relied on the single crystal disclosed in Declercq for the purposes of anticipation. Akzo's attempts to specify or identify a
lower limit had failed to produce anything specific enough to be expressed or
implied in the claim of a patent. The
function of the claims was to define clearly and with precision the monopoly
claimed, in order that others might know the boundaries within which they would
be trespassers (Conoco, per Lord
Sutherland at pages 447D to 448C, quoting from Electric and Musical Industries Ltd v Lissen Ltd. [1939] RPC 23 per Lord Russell of Killowen at page 39).
[73] It was not in
dispute that any pill containing a single crystal of tibolone would have a
purity of greater than 90 or 95%. Prima facie, this would come within the
definition of the pharmaceutical compound described in claim1. Akzo had not drawn the line between what was
pharmaceutically efficacious and what was pharmaceutically inefficacious. The problem did not lie, as had been
submitted by Mr McNeill, in the lack of evidence from Arrow, but in the
language which Akzo had chosen to define its monopoly. If it wanted to avoid the plain language used
in the claims, and exclude a single crystal as being sufficient, it ought to
have led evidence in that regard. The
word "pharmaceutical" did not itself imply some form of efficacy. It merely meant that the substance was found
in a pill. Before the Lord Ordinary Akzo
had not attempted to argue that a purposive construction would exclude a single
crystal [see Lord Ordinary at para. [27]].
[74] Akzo's second
argument suggested that the claims concerned crystalline purity within a
particular percentage range, which implied a mixture. However, "crystalline pure" was defined as
being "greater than 90%". This did not exclude
a compound of 100% pure crystalline tibolone.
The specification referred to the aim of obtaining a pill which was
"completely or virtually completely free from the other crystalline form". Examples 3 and 5, included an experiment
resulting in 100% yield. Akzo
deliberately wanted to claim 100% purity.
As a matter of construction, the language in the patent failed, by
either of the routes suggested, to exclude a pharmaceutical composition
including a single crystal.
[75] As regards the
construction of claim 5, Arrow accepted that there were arguments in favour of
both parties, particularly with regard to the phrase "mixtures of water and
acetone". However, a fundamental problem
for the reclaimers was that this phrase was capable of embracing bench acetone
alone, as that had both substances in it.
Moreover, Example 1 in the specification did not involve the use of
water. Nothing in the specification
suggested Example 1 was excluded from the monopoly claimed. Therefore, the proper construction of claim 5
included the use of bench acetone as a re-crystallisation medium.
[76] Mr Currie
submitted that, if we accepted Arrow's contentions as to the proper
construction of claims 1 to 3 and rejected attempts to exclude a single
crystal, there was an irresistible argument for Arrow on the question of
obviousness. The issue of construction
ought not to be confused with that of the inventive concept (Pozzoli, per Jacob LJ at paras.
14-21). Akzo tended to conflate the two
issues. The inclusion of the words "pharmaceutical
composition which contains a pharmaceutically suitable solid carrier" in the
claims did not make them part of the inventive concept. Mr McNeill seemed to accept initially the
definition of the inventive concept adopted by the Lord Ordinary, but then
suggested that some interpretation of that finding was required. When the specification was considered Arrow's
characterisation of the inventive concept was clearly the correct one. The discovery of the polymorphism of tibolone
could not be an inventive step; it was a
discovery about the natural world. The
inventive step which had been identified by the patentee was obtaining the
crystalline purity of the active ingredient.
There was no difference between the inventive step, as properly identified,
and the prior art, as read by the skilled man.
[77] On Arrow's
second approach to obviousness, it would have been obvious to use only the pure
crystalline form in a pill and to crystallise from acetone in order to get this
form. It was the very thing which the
prior art was instructing you to do. It
was permissible to mosaic for the purposes of the third Windsurfing step. The prior
art showed that tibolone, as a compound, had been known about since the 1960s
(patent 279); that a skilled man
would understand that tibolone was being developed as a drug by Organon, a
pharmaceutical company; that it was of
interest for menopausal complaints; that
its crystalline structure had been disclosed in monoclinic form
(Declercq); and that in 1988 tibolone had
been put on the market as a pill (Mr Vrijhof).
The evidence suggested you would get at least some monoclinic tibolone
by crystallising from acetone. In any
event, it was not necessary for Arrow to demonstrate enablement for the
purposes of obviousness.
[78] The suggestion
that the skilled man could not find out if there was a second polymorph at the
priority date missed the point. A
skilled man, aware that tibolone might be polymorphous, would recognise the
advantage of obtaining a pure form. This
was shown by the exercise Organon carried out in identifying the structure of
the crystal, despite not being aware of any other form. If Declercq did not disclose that the
monoclinic form had any particular advantage, nowhere in the law of obviousness
did it state that any such advantage was required. In any event, the skilled man would associate
the form disclosed in Declercq with the drug which was under development by
Organon. Declercq took place in a "mono-morphic world"; form II was not discovered. The evidence of Dr Newton suggested that a
skilled man could identify the monoclinic crystalline structure in a
sample. This undermined any suggestion
that what was inventive was the discrimination between forms.
[79] Arrow's third
approach to obviousness suggested it was instructive simply to apply the
statutory test (Terrell, para.
7-53). What was disclosed by the patent
could hardly be seen as inventive. One
could not say that the clock stopped when Declercq was printed; it would be obvious for the skilled man to
move forward with the information disclosed within it. Looking at the matter in broader terms, the
only inventive step which could be identified was that which related to the
monopoly claimed for form II tibolone.
Importantly, even though Declercq disclosed the monoclinic form, Akzo
did not simply claim a monopoly in relation to form II, but tried to patent
that which was already known.
[80] On
anticipation, Arrow's position was that the first route to demonstrate lack of
novelty was to show that the prior art actually disclosed the invention. The second was to show that the prior art
provided a method which inevitably produced that invention. For present purposes Arrow had relied on the
first route: Declercq disclosed every
element of the invention. Whatever route
was chosen, what was disclosed in the prior art must necessarily infringe the
patent. Akzo repeatedly confused the
terms "necessarily infringe" and "inevitable result". An inevitable result was only relevant for
the second route. Again, enablement did
not require an inevitable result. Trial
and error was permitted. Arrow had to
show that performing (in the sense of making) the invention would necessarily
infringe the patent. That was different
from the concept of "inevitable result" which concerned the process involved.
[81] Declercq
disclosed monoclinic pure tibolone in the context of the development of a drug
known to be of interest for the treatment of menopausal complaints. Merck
suggested that reference to the "potential use" of a substance in a
pharmaceutical composition did not detract from what was a clear and
unmistakable direction to use it as an active ingredient in the production of a
pharmaceutical (paras. 15-19, 21-22 and 27-28 per Vice-Chancellor Sir Andrew Morritt). The distinction which Akzo sought to draw
between the circumstances in that case and those in the case in suit was not
valid. The skilled man would understand
from Declercq that monoclinic tibolone was being developed as a drug for the
treatment of menopausal complaints, since it was under development by a
pharmaceutical company. Similarly, the
use of a pharmaceutical carrier could not be considered novel. It was a plain consequence of the teaching to
use tibolone as a pharmaceutical (Merck,
per the Vice-Chancellor at para. 22).
Declercq carried the implication that one would use such a carrier.
[82] On enablement,
Declercq taught crystallisation from acetone, from which the skilled man would
expect to get at least some form I. He
could identify that form using a microscope, according to Dr Newton. For the purposes of enablement it was not
necessary to show that crystallisation from acetone would have the "inevitable
result" of a batch exclusively of form I, or even that form I tibolone would be
obtained on every occasion. Declercq was
an enabling disclosure.
[83] Mr Currie
adopted, in their entirety, the submissions of Miss Higgins. He moved us to uphold the Lord Ordinary's
decision that the claims were invalid for want of novelty and to refuse the
reclaiming motion. In addition, or
alternatively, he moved us to grant Arrow's cross-appeal.
Discussion
The role of an
appellate court
[84] The approach
which an appellate court should adopt in patent cases has been considered both
as regards novelty and obviousness. In Biogen v Medeva at page 45 Lord Hoffmann
said:
"The question of whether an invention
was obvious had been called 'a kind of jury question' ... and should be treated
with appropriate respect by an appellate court ... Where the application of a
legal standard such as negligence or obviousness involves no question of
principle but is simply a matter of degree, an appellate court should be very
cautious in differing from the judge's evaluation."
In Buchanan v Alba Diagnostics Ltd. 2004 SC (HL) 9 Lord Hoffmann at para. [31] agreed with an observation made by Lord Clarke
(sitting in the First Division) to the effect that an appellate court should
not substitute its opinion for that of the judge of first instance unless it
considers that he has made some error of principle (see 2001 SCLR 307 at para. [34]).
Lord Hoffmann added that the question in that case (whether a particular
invention was an "improvement" over an earlier one) was in that respect:
"similar to that as to whether an
invention is obvious (Biogen Inc v Medeva at page 45) or whether a
substantial part of a copyright work has been copied (Designers Guild Ltd. v Russell
Williams (Textiles) Ltd.)"
The other members of the Appellate Committee agreed with Lord
Hoffmann. In the last-mentioned case
(reported at [2000] 1 WLR 2416) Lord Hoffmann had said at page 2423:
"Secondly, because the decision
involves the application of a not altogether precise legal standard to a
combination of features of varying importance, I think that this falls within
the class of case in which an appellate court should not reverse a judge's
decision unless he has erred in principle."
[85] In Technip France Jacob, L.J. distinguished
an appeal court's function in relation to a question of novelty. At para. 74 he said:
"I do not think the question of
novelty involves the application of a 'not altogether precise legal
standard'. It involves a precise
standard. Nor is it applied to a
'combination of features of varying importance'. On the contrary one must look for every claim
element to see whether it is fully disclosed in the prior art. It may be that in some cases, Biogen-type principles may come into the
question at an earlier stage. I have in
mind, for instance, where the court has to evaluate evidence as to what a
particular prior use actually was and whether it was enabling or where there is
an evaluation of what is exactly disclosed by something like a photograph ... ,
or even, perhaps, the meaning of a technical term or phrase where experts have
disagreed. But in a case such as this,
where the issue is simply what does the prior art describe and does it fall
within the claim, the Biogen
principle does not apply."
Mummery and Pill L.Js agreed.
[86] In Merck the Court of Appeal had earlier
emphasised that an appellate court should in patent appeals (generally)
interfere with the view of the trial judge only if he could be shown to have
erred "in principle" - see, in particular, per the Vice-Chancellor (Sir Andrew
Morritt) at para. 61 and per Buxton L.J. at para. 64. In Smithkline
Beecham plc v Apotex Europe Ltd.
[2005] FSR 524 Jacob L.J. said at para. 36 (under reference to the approach on
appeal to questions of novelty and obviousness):
"These I restated in Technip France SA's Patent ... at paras.
[71] - [74]. In brief, the Biogen appeal principle ... applies to
obviousness but not to novelty, save in special cases, for instance where there
is a conflict of expert testimony on the meaning of a technical term or as to
what exactly is disclosed by the prior art.
The Biogen appeal principle
itself is, in short, that an appellate court must exercise caution in differing
from the trial judge's evaluation of the facts unless he has erred in
principle."
[87] Although there
may be some difference, on the matter of review of an issue of novelty, between
the views expressed in the Court of Appeal in Merck and those subsequently expressed in Technip France and SmithKline
Beecham, it is, in my view, unnecessary in this case to resolve any such
difference. The parties before us were
not seriously in dispute about the appropriate approach. As I shall explain, whichever approach is
taken, this court requires to look again at each of the issues of novelty and
obviousness.
Novelty
[88] On any issue
of novelty the first question to be addressed is the construction of the patent
in suit - and in particular the pertinent claims of that patent (Patents Act
1977, section 125; Article 69 of the
European Patent Convention). The
requisite canon of construction has been said to be one between the extremes of
strict and literal meaning on the one hand and a guideline approach on the
other, which canon "combines a fair protection for the patentee with a
reasonable degree of certainty for third parties" (Protocol on The
Interpretation of Article 69 of the Convention). In Kirin-Amgen
at para. 25 Lord Hoffmann observed:
"It is often said, on the basis of
the words 'a position between these extremes', that the Protocol represents a
compromise between two different approaches to the interpretation of
claims. But that is not quite
accurate. It is a protocol on the
interpretation of art. 69, not a protocol on the interpretation of claims. The first sentence does deal with
interpretation of the claims and, to understand it, one needs to know something
about the rules which English courts used to apply, or impose on themselves,
when construing not merely patents but documents in general. The second sentence does not deal with the
interpretation of claims. Instead, it
makes it clear that one cannot go beyond the claims to what, on the basis of
the specification as a whole, it appears that 'the patentee has
contemplated'. But the last sentence
indicates that, in determining the extent of protection according to the
content of the claims but avoiding literalism, the courts of the Contracting
States should combine 'a fair protection for the patentee with a reasonable
degree of certainty for third parties'."
Lord Hoffmann then explained the principles upon which, at
common law, the English courts had traditionally approached the issue of
construction. He continued:
"32. Construction,
whether of a patent or any other document, is of course not directly concerned
with what the author meant to say. There
is no window into the mind of the patentee or the author of any other
document. Construction is objective in
the sense that it is concerned with what a reasonable person to whom the
utterance was addressed would have understood the author to be using the words
to mean. Notice, however, that it is not,
as is sometimes said, 'the meaning of the words the author used', but rather
what the notional addressee would have understood the author to mean by using
those words. The meaning of words is a
matter of convention, governed by rules, which can be found in dictionaries and
grammars. What the author would have
been understood to mean by using those words is not simply a matter of
rules. It is highly sensitive to the
context of, and background to, the particular utterance. It depends not only upon the words the author
has chosen but also upon the identity of the audience he is taken to have been
addressing and the knowledge and assumptions which one attributes to that
audience ...
33. In
the case of a patent specification, the notional addressee is the person
skilled in the art. He (or, I say once
and for all, she) comes to a reading of the specification with common general
knowledge of the art. And he reads the
specification on the assumption that its purpose is both to describe and to
demarcate an invention - a practical idea which the patentee has had for a new
product or process - and not to be a textbook in mathematics or chemistry or a
shopping list of chemicals or hardware.
It is this insight which lies at the heart of 'purposive construction'. ...
34. 'Purposive
construction' does not mean that one is extending or going beyond the
definition of the technical matter for which the patentee seeks protection in
the claims. The question is always what
the person skilled in the art would have understood the patentee to be using
the language of the claim to mean. And
for this purpose, the language he has chosen is usually of critical
importance. The conventions of word
meaning and syntax enable us to express our meanings with great accuracy and
subtlety and the skilled man will ordinarily assume that the patentee has
chosen his language accordingly. As a
number of judges have pointed out, the specification is a unilateral document
in words of the patentee's own choosing.
Furthermore, the words will usually have been chosen upon skilled
advice. A specification is not a
document inter rusticos for which
broad allowances must be made. On the
other hand, it must be recognised that the patentee is trying to describe
something which, at any rate in his opinion, is new; which has not existed before and of which
there may be no generally accepted definition.
There will be occasions upon which it will be obvious to the skilled man
that the patentee must in some respects have departed from conventional use of
language or included in his description of the invention some element which he
did not mean to be essential, but one would not expect that to happen very
often."
At paragraph 47 Lord Hoffmann added:
"The Protocol, as I have said, is a
Protocol for the construction of art. 69 and does not expressly lay down any
principle for the construction of claims.
It does say what principles should not be followed, namely the old
English literalism, but otherwise it says only that one should not go outside
the claims. It does however say that the
object is to combine a fair protection for the patentee with a reasonable
degree of certainty for third parties.
How is this to be achieved? The
claims must be construed in a way which attempts, so far as is possible in an imperfect
world, not to disappoint the reasonable expectations of either side. What principle of interpretation would give
fair protection to the patentee? Surely,
a principle which would give him the full extent of the monopoly which the
person skilled in the art would think he was intending to claim. And what principle would provide a reasonable
degree of protection for third parties?
Surely again a principle which would not give the patentee more than the
full extent of the monopoly which the person skilled in their art would think
that he was intending to claim. Indeed,
any other principle would also be unfair to the patentee, because it would
unreasonably expose the patent to claims of invalidity on grounds of
anticipation or insufficiency."
The other members of the Appellate Committee agreed with Lord
Hoffmann.
[89] In STEP 513 Hoffmann L.J. (as he then was) said
at page 522 (in the context of discussion of a patent for an atomiser where the
claim included the integer "conduit means extending upwardly within the
cylinder to define therewith a pump chamber"):
"The well known principle that patent
claims are given a purposive construction does not mean that an integer can be
treated as struck out if it does not appear to make any difference to the inventive
concept. It may have some other purpose
buried in the prior art and even if this is not discernible, the patentee may
have had some reason of his own for introducing it. In my judgment therefore the claim requires
that something which can fairly be described as a conduit must extend upwards
within the cylinder and its outer surface must, together with the walls of the
cylinder, define the pump chamber."
[90] In Wheatley Aldous L.J., having referred
with approval to Hoffmann L.J's dictum just cited, added at para. 22:
"The object of interpretation is to
ascertain the intention of the author, in this case the patentee. This involves examining the words of the
claim through the eyes of a person to whom the specification is directed, in
the context of the specification as a whole.
If the reader skilled in the art would have understood that the patentee
intended that the claim should have a particular ambit, then to construe it as
not confined to that ambit, by either strict or liberal construction, would be
unfair to the patentee. It is the
patentee that chooses the words and to widen the ambit contrary to his
intention would invalidate the patent and to restrict the ambit could allow use
of the invention without payment."
[91] Applications
of these principles can be found in Generics
(UK) and Halliburton.
[92] The Lord
Ordinary does not directly address the question of construction of claims 1-3 -
and in particular the need to have regard to the whole integers of these
claims. At one point (para. [23] of his
Opinion) he says:
" ... claim 3 is a claim to a
particular product, namely tibolone of a particular crystalline structure".
That statement was challenged by Akzo on the ground that it
posited that the claim was to a compound of a particular crystalline structure
without regard to the integer(s) "A pharmaceutical composition which contains a
pharmaceutically suitable solid carrier and ... ". Reference to construction of claims 1-3 is
made by the Lord Ordinary also at para. [24] where he says:
"Akzo's second argument was that the
fact that Declercq revealed a single crystal of Form I, which was by definition
100% pure, was irrelevant on a proper construction of claims 1-3. The claims in the patent were to a
'pharmaceutical composition' containing the compound, i.e. tibolone. That must involve a recognition that a
crystal is not sufficient; a
pharmaceutical compound clearly cannot be made of a single crystal."
That reference, however, is made only in the context of the
"single crystal" argument (to which I shall return), not in the context of
construing the whole integers of the claim.
In para. [28] the Lord Ordinary records an argument that
" ... any challenge to claims 1-3 on
grounds of lack of novelty would have to demonstrate not just that the form and
purity of the crystal were anticipated but also that the incorporation of the
tibolone of the requisite form and purity into the pharmaceutical composition
similarly lacked novelty".
The argument, as recorded, then continued:
"The incorporation of the tibolone
into a pharmaceutical composition was not anticipated in Declercq. A challenge
to the whole of claims 1-3, properly construed, would, [counsel] submitted,
involve Arrow in 'mosaicing', i.e. building a case on anticipation by putting
together a mosaic of different sources of prior disclosure".
In response to this argument the Lord Ordinary at para. [29]
said:
"It cannot be, and was not, suggested
that there is anything novel about the making of pharmaceutical composition
incorporating tibolone." (emphasis added).
That sentence may in terms be accurate, though as I shall
explain the de quo is not whether
there was anything novel about the making of a pharmaceutical composition
incorporating tibolone but whether there was anything novel in making a pharmaceutical
composition which contained (a pharmaceutically suitable solid carrier and)
tibolone with a certain minimum crystalline purity. The Lord Ordinary added towards the end of
that paragraph:
"I consider that the addressee of the
patent would not understand the incorporation of the compound into the
pharmaceutical composition to be part of the invention claimed by the
patent. Nor is this a realistic
interpretation of the claims read in context, even if construed by the Court
without looking through the eyes of the notional addressee."
These propositions were not supported by Arrow in seeking to
maintain the Lord Ordinary's conclusion on anticipation. They are plainly, as a matter of
construction, wrong.
[93] The
construction of claims is a matter for the court (General Tire at page 485).
If a judge of first instance has failed to construe the claims or has
misinterpreted them, that is an error "in principle" which is open to review by
an appeal court. In the absence of any
clear indication that the Lord Ordinary took into account the whole integers of
claims 1-3, his interlocutor is, in my view, open to review by this court.
[94] Before
returning to the question of general construction, it is convenient to deal
with certain other arguments advanced by Akzo.
[95] It was
contended that claims 1-3 had not been anticipated by Declercq because a
pharmaceutical composition could not have as its active ingredient a single
crystal; the prior art (Declercq) had
disclosed only a single crystal. The
prior description of a single crystal (ex
hypothesi 100% pure and thus having a purity "greater than 95%") was
accordingly, so ran the argument, not "something falling within [the claims']
scope" - see Inhale Therapeutic Systems,
per Laddie J. at para. 43.
[96] In my opinion,
this argument fails for want of any evidence that a pharmaceutical composition
could not be constituted by a pharmaceutically suitable solid carrier and a
single crystal. A pharmaceutically
suitable carrier, as envisaged in the patent, includes material to make up a
tablet, pill, capsule or suppository; it
may be administered either parenterally (that is, not via the digestive tract)
or orally (see patent, page 3, lines 29-31).
While one's initial reaction is to suppose that crystals of tibolone are
likely to be small in size (there was some evidence that different forms of
crystals might be distinguished under a microscope), there was no evidence that
all solid forms of administration inevitably included a plurality of crystals. There was no evidence directed to whether the
relative addressee (the skilled man) would understand the patentee as including
or excluding from his claim a composition of which a single crystal of tibolone
was the active ingredient. Although the
onus of proving lack of novelty rested on Arrow, in my view it succeeds on this
issue on the language of the claim as drafted.
These claims might have been construed otherwise if there had been
contextual material that a plurality of crystals in any composition was
inevitable. It is true that in the
Examples every reference is to "crystals" (in the plural) but these exercises
are inevitably concerned with batches of materials, presumably designed for
manufacturing a multiplicity of doses.
So far as I can find, there is no reference to crystals (or to crystal)
in the Description itself. The language
of the patent as a whole accordingly does not assist Akzo on this
argument. I bear in mind that the claims
require to be construed purposively i.e. "to describe and to demarcate an
invention" (Kirin-Amgen, per Lord Hoffmann
at para. 33) but am of opinion that there is no demarcation in these claims
which excludes a single crystal of crystalline pure tibolone as the active ingredient
in a single pharmaceutical composition. The
patentee may have had good reason for drawing the patent sufficiently
comprehensively to encompass a single crystal in an administrative unit. I should add in this regard that Mr. McNeill
sought to persuade us of the minuteness of the relevant crystals by a calculation
based on material referred to in Professor Bernstein's report about the volume,
density and weight of the triclinic form and an assumption that monoclinic
crystals were of the same order. But
this calculation was not put in evidence and I am unable to place any reliance
upon it.
[97] A related
argument advanced on behalf of Akzo was that the references in claims 1 and 2
(and by incorporation in claim 3) to crystalline purity "greater than
90%"/"greater than 95%" imported a plurality of crystals in any
composition. The percentages related to
percentages by weight. But it seems
plain that, while the claims embrace mixtures of form and thus more than one
crystal, they are wide enough to include tibolone of 100% crystalline
purity. Apart from the language of the
claims, the description in the specification makes it clear that the aim of the
invention is to obtain a pharmaceutical composition which contains a
crystalline pure form of tibolone which is "completely (emphasis added)
or virtually completely free from the other crystalline form". The examples given include some at 100%
purity. A single crystal of tibolone is
(as was accepted in evidence) tibolone of 100% crystalline purity.
[98] Akzo also
argued that the reference to "pharmaceutical composition" implicitly imported
that the amount of the pure crystalline form was adequate in amount to be of
"effective pharmaceutical" use. But even
if "pharmaceutical composition" implies some minimal therapeutic or other
pharmaceutical effectiveness (which I doubt), there is no evidence before the
court by which such effectiveness could be measured relative to the size of a
crystal. In any event, as Mr. Currie
contended, the notion of effectiveness in this context is so vague that nothing
could be implied of sufficient precision to support the claimed monopoly. As the Lord Ordinary said at para [27]:
"it would have been open to Akzo to
limit claims 1-4 by reference to some quantitive criteria but, for whatever
reason, they have not done so. It was
not suggested that, even adopting a purposive construction, those claims should
be read as incorporating some such criteria capable of being expressed with
sufficient precision."
[99] There remains,
however, the wider question whether Declercq discloses
"a pharmaceutical composition which
contains a pharmaceutically suitable solid carrier and the compound having the
structure [specified], characterised in that the compound is crystalline pure,
which purity is greater than [90 or 95%]",
such that it could be said to have anticipated claims 1 or 2,
or such a composition where the crystalline pure compound has the monoclinic
form, such that it could be said to have anticipated claim 3. Taking account of the whole integers, that
imports, in my view, a combination of a pharmaceutically suitable solid carrier
with tibolone in a crystalline purity of more than the stated percentages and,
so far as claim 3 is concerned, of a particular crystalline form. The issue is whether that combination was
anticipated by Declercq.
[100] To answer that
question it is necessary for the court to put itself in the position of the
relative skilled man reading that paper and possessed of the relevant common
general knowledge as at its date (May 1984).
The skilled man would, it seems clear, view this paper as a report of
the findings on analysis of the molecular conformation of a single crystal
selected for examination. The single crystal was of the monoclinic
form. He would, from the co-authorship of
Mr. Zeelen, apparently an employee in the Organon Scientific Development
Group, presumably a pharmaceutically related body, and the circumstances that
tibolone had been given a reference ("Org OD 14") apparently by that body,
conclude that a pharmaceutical enterprise was at that time interested in the
possible development of tibolone for pharmaceutical purposes. He would know (or at least be so instructed
by footnote 5) that tibolone was a compound of interest for the treatment of
menopausal complaints. He would know, as
part of the common general knowledge at that time, that tibolone was a steroid
and that steroids were commonly but not universally polymorphous. He would not have known that tibolone was in
fact polymorphous. So far as then known,
tibolone might in fact be monomorphous, that is found only in the monoclinic
form. He would not know that in a pure
or virtually pure crystalline form tibolone had advantages, in terms of
consistency of medicament or of storage longevity, over tibolone not in such
form. Declercq does not identify any
advantages of crystalline purity; it was
not the function of its authors to do so.
[101] Miss Higgins
submitted, on the basis of evidence given by Dr. Newton, that it was the
crystalline form of tibolone identified and described in Declercq, which was of
interest for the treatment of menopausal complaints. No evidence was led from any of the authors
of Declercq. The Lord Ordinary made no
findings in relation to events surrounding the instruction and completion of
this analysis. Dr. Newton gave some
evidence about his understanding, from the terms of the paper, of what had
promoted it. Much of that evidence was
necessarily speculative. In my view all
that can be taken by way of inference from Declercq is that a pharmaceutical
organisation, which had an interest in tibolone as a medicament for the
treatment of menopausal complaints, instructed an analysis by academic experts
of the structure of a crystal of that compound as part of its development
research. How and by whom the single
crystal was selected is not known. Nor
is the crystalline composition of the sample from which it was selected
disclosed or known. The skilled man
would not, in my view, have taken from Declercq any suggestion that the
monoclinic crystal described there had, as a crystal, any advantages for
pharmaceutical purposes. The paper does
not commend the use for such purposes of the crystalline form analysed in it. It does not in any way suggest that a single
crystal on its own would be suitable for such use. Nor does it in any way disclose the use of
any particular percentage of one form of crystal in a pharmaceutical
composition. Nor will it do to suggest
(as it was late in the argument) that it did disclose use of 100% monoclinic form
tibolone in a pharmaceutical - even if the sample from which the crystal was
taken was not 100% pure - because the reader was ignorant of its
polymorphism. If that were sound any
previous reference to tibolone for pharmaceutical use could be said to anticipate
claims 1 and 2 which even Arrow do not seek to argue. The circumstances, in so far as known to the
skilled man, fell well short of the circumstances in Merk's Patent, where the document constituting the prior art (a
patent application by Blum) had contained an express statement that the product
discussed was suitable for use for pharmaceutical purposes.
[102] In these
circumstances the prior art, as interpreted by the skilled man, did not, in my
view, disclose the invention claimed in claims 1-3 viz.
"a pharmaceutical composition which
contains ... the compound [tibolone] characterised in that the compound is
crystalline pure, which purity is greater than [90 or 95% or, as regards claim
3, in the monoclinic form]".
I leave out of account for present purposes the integer of "a
pharmaceutically suitable solid carrier" because, if I had been persuaded that
Declercq did disclose the use of tibolone of the requisite crystalline purity
for pharmaceutical purposes, the possibility of its combination with a suitable
solid carrier would not to the skilled man, in my view, have been novel.
[103] For a
disclosure to constitute anticipation it must be an "enabling disclosure" (Asehi Kasei Kogyo KK's Application, per
Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle at p. 543).
This gave rise to an argument by Akzo that Declercq was not, in any
event, "enabling". Although I have found
for the reasons given above that claims 1-3 were not anticipated by the prior
art, it is appropriate, having regard to the attention paid to it before us,
that I express my views on that argument.
[104] A party seeking
revocation of a patent on the ground that it has been anticipated by the prior
art has to satisfy the court on two points, namely, whether the prior art
disclosed the invention which had been patented ("disclosure") and whether an
ordinary skilled man would be able to perform the disclosed invention if he
attempted to do so using the disclosed matter and common general knowledge
("enablement") - see Smithkline Beecham,
per Lord Hoffmann at para. 14. These two
concepts are distinct and are separately dealt with by Lord Hoffmann - paras.
20- 25 and 26 - 27; the importance of
keeping them distinct is emphasised at paras. 28 - 33. In my view a failure by Akzo to keep these
concepts distinct led its counsel at times to misconstrue what Lord Hoffmann
had said, in the context of disclosure, when discussing and summarising two
earlier judgments, including a well-known passage from the judgment of the
Court of Appeal in General Tire. As Arrow contended, a distinction falls to be
made between enablement of a patent on the one hand and on the other a
situation where performance of the directions contained in the prior art will
"necessarily result" in the infringement of the patent (one of the ways in
which the patent may by prior disclosure have been anticipated, the other being
by direct comparison of the prior art with the patent). For the purposes of enablement the carrying
out of the directions in the prior art need not, in my view, inevitably result
in the obtaining (in the case of a product patent) of that product. As Buckley L.J. said in Valensi v British Radio Corp [1973]
RPC 337 at page 377 (an observation cited with approval by Lord Hoffmann in Smithkline at para. 27):
" ... [The effect of the cited cases as
a whole is to show that] the hypothetical addressee is not a person of
exceptional skill and knowledge, that he is not to be expected to exercise any
invention nor any prolonged research, enquiry or experiment. He must, however, be prepared to display a
reasonable degree of skill and common knowledge of the art in making trials and
to correct obvious errors in the specification if a means of correcting them
can readily be found."
[105] Accordingly, it
is unnecessary for the purposes of valid enablement that the addressee of Declercq
should, if following the experimental parameters described in that paper, have
always got crystals which were exclusively of the monoclinic form. The Lord Ordinary found on the evidence that,
by following the experimental parameters in Declercq of using acetone as the
medium, one would expect to get form I tibolone (see paras. [33] -
[34]). That finding followed upon a
conclusion that on the evidence it had not been demonstrated to the Lord
Ordinary's satisfaction "that every crystallisation using acetone will
necessarily produce Form I tibolone" and an acceptance by him of evidence from
Professor Bernstein that "It cannot be inferred from the materials before the
court that any use of acetone will inevitably give Form I" (the
Lord Ordinary's emphasis). The Lord
Ordinary added that the:
"amount of water and the temperature
and rate of the crystallisation may impact upon the result and the
serendipitous nature of the discovery of different polomorphic forms means that
one can, in any event, never have absolute certainty in this field".
If the Lord Ordinary's findings are read in context, his
conclusion was, in my view, to the effect that, using acetone, that is,
following the procedure envisaged in the prior art, the skilled person would
ordinarily obtain crystals, some at least of which were monoclinic. That conclusion is consistent with the
experimental examples given in the patent which envisage polar solvents
(including acetone and water) producing a high percentage of the monoclinic
form.
[106] However, the
circumstance that following the experimental parameters described in Declercq
the skilled person would ordinarily obtain crystals, some at least of which
were monoclinic, does not entail that "the invention" would thereby be
performed. The invention, properly
understood, was constituted by a pharmaceutical composition having a high
degree of crystalline purity in the active ingredient. While the skilled person, following Declercq,
might be expected to obtain a mixture of crystalline forms (including some
monoclinic), from which a particular crystal might by some process under the
laboratory microscope have been isolated, Declercq did not teach how to obtain
a product of high crystalline purity for pharmaceutical use - even if the
skilled person for some reason was alert to the need to isolate a particular
form, notwithstanding his ignorance of polymorphism in tibolone.
[107] In these
circumstances, while Declercq enabled the skilled person to take certain steps,
it did not enable him "to perform the invention".
Claim 5
[108] Although a
challenge to claim 5 was not made in Arrow's pleadings, such a challenge was
advanced before the Lord Ordinary, who upheld it. Before us Miss Higgins advanced submissions
in support of it. Mr. Currie did not depart
from these, while recognising that, on the matter of interpretation of that
claim, "there were arguments in favour of both constructions".
[109] Among the modes
by which the crystalline pure compound tibolone may, in accordance with claim
5, be prepared for use in a pharmaceutical composition is crystallisation "from
mixtures of water and acetone or ethanol ... ".
In Declercq the medium by which the analysed crystal was obtained was
"acetone". Dr. Newton understood that
reference was to bench acetone (see e.g. pages 370 and 390). Patent 845, with a priority date in June 1967,
described the compound tibolone (though not named as such) as "recrystallised
from acetone with one drop of pyridine".
The Lord Ordinary (having regard to the specification as a whole, and in
particular the specific reference to anhydrous acetone (at page 3 lines 6-7) read
references in the patent to "acetone" as being references to "bench acetone",
that is, absolute acetone with such water in it as is conventionally found on a
laboratory bench. I would also so read
the references to "acetone" in Declercq and in the 845 patent.
[110] The first issue
(which does not appear to have been raised before the Lord Ordinary) is whether
the skilled addressee would regard the reference in claim 5 to a "mixture[s] of
water and acetone" as a reference simply to bench acetone or to some process of
mixing water with bench acetone. Some
assistance on that matter of construction may be obtained from the Description
and from the Examples. At page 2 lines
53-57 of the patent, after a reference to "mixtures of water and acetone or
ethanol", it is stated:
"A suitable method is to dissolve the
polymorphous compound in acetone or ethanol, after which the solution is added
to water. Conversely, water can also be
added to a solution of the polymorphous compound in acetone or ethanol."
It is not clear to me what is the difference between these
methods - we were not enlightened on this - but each appears to envisage a step
whereby the compound dissolved in acetone is added to water (or vice versa). This would be consistent with evidence from
Professor Bernstein (at para. 75 of his report, which was accepted by Dr.
Newton at page 389) that water so added acts as an anti-solvent giving rise to
precipitation of the crystals. Examples
2 and 4 appear to envisage a similar procedure.
[111] A difficulty is
caused to Akzo by the terms of Example 1, which illustrates the invention
by a procedure which involves the use of acetone but does not refer to any
mixture of it with water (a purity of 94% being obtained). An answer to this difficulty may be that the
procedure for obtaining the crystals illustrated in Example 1 is not a method
covered by claim 5 of the patent. A
patent may, for one reason or another, claim less than it teaches (Kirin-Amgen, per Lord Hoffmann at para.
33). However that may be, the terms of
the claim, as read in the general context of the Description, point, in my
view, to "mixture[s] of water and acetone" involving more than the use simply
of bench acetone. Neither Declercq nor patent
845 "teaches" anything beyond the use of bench acetone. Dr. Newton did not seek to suggest that claim
5 was anticipated by reference to crystallisation with acetone in
Declercq. Rather he acknowledged the
method disclosed in Declercq was "similar but not the same process that was
used in the patent for obtaining the monoclinic form. In the patent they actually dissolve in
acetone then add water." (pp. 57 and 58).
In these circumstances claim 5 is not, in my view, anticipated by these
publications. In so far as the Lord
Ordinary construed claim 5 as claiming "a monopoly over every process of
crystallising the compound using acetone" (page 34) this cannot be supported.
[112] But, even if I
am wrong in that conclusion, it is necessary in construing claim 5 to have
regard to what is incorporated in it by reference. Claim 5 is to a method "for the preparation
of a crystalline pure compound for use in a pharmaceutical composition
according to claim 3 ... ". Claim 3 in
turn incorporates claim 1. So, what is
in effect claimed by claim 5 is a method for preparing monoclinic crystalline
pure tibolone (with a purity greater than 90%) for use in a pharmaceutical
composition. As with claims 1-3 in
relation to a product, Declercq does not, in my view, teach anything about the
use of crystalline pure monoclinic tibolone for use in a pharmaceutical
composition. Nor does patent 845. Accordingly, for this additional reason claim
5 was not, in my view, anticipated by either of these publications.
Obviousness
[113] As Lord Hoffmann
observed in Biogen v Medeva at page 45:
"Where the application of a legal
standard such as negligence or obviousness involves no question of principle
but is simply a matter of degree, an appellate court should be very cautious in
differing from the judge's evaluation."
The corollary of that proposition is that, where the judge of
first instance has erred upon a matter of principle, his decision is open to
review by an appellate court.
[114] In addressing
the issue of obviousness the Lord Ordinary adopted and sought to apply the
four-stage test expressed in Windsurfing
International v Tabur Marine Limited,
a test approved in the House of Lords - see Sabaf
v MFI at para. 27. In applying the Windsurfing approach the Lord Ordinary at para [45] of his
Opinion identified the relevant four stages as follows:
"(i)
the inventive concept in the patent is the identification of a
crystalline pure form of tibolone and a method of producing it; (ii) the
skilled addressee would have known of tibolone and would have knowledge that
steroids are likely, though not certain, to be polymorphous; (iii) the
difference is the discovery of polymorphism in tibolone and the identification
of the method of producing one of the two different polymorphic forms. Stage (iv) requires one to ask whether the
steps required to achieve this would have been obvious to the skilled man."
He answered the question posed in the last stage with a clear
"No".
[115] The Lord
Ordinary, in seeking to apply the approved test, adopted a comprehensive view
of the claims in question. He spoke of
the inventive concept "in the patent".
However, in Unilever Jacob J.
(as he then was) observed at page 580:
"It is the inventive concept of the
claim in question which must be considered, not some generalised concept to be
derived from the specification as a whole.
Different claims can, and generally will, have different inventive
concepts. The first stage of
identification of the concept is likely to be a question of construction: what does the claim mean? It might be thought there is no second stage
- the concept is what the claim covers and that is that. But that is too wooden and not what courts,
applying Windsurfing stage one, have
done. It is too wooden because if one
merely construes the claim one does not distinguish between portions which
matter and portions which, although limitations on the ambit of the claim, do
not. One is trying to identify the
essence of the claim in this exercise."
That passage was cited with approval by Jacob L.J. in Pozzoli SPA v BDMSO SA at paras. 17-18; in
the latter paragraph he added:
"So what one is seeking to do is to
strip out unnecessary verbiage, to do what Mummery L.J. described as make a
précis."
Mummery and Keene LJs agreed.
Neither of these cases appears to have been cited to the Lord Ordinary -
the latter was, of course, issued after his decision. The import of them appears to be that it
will, at least commonly, be important in seeking to identify any inventive
concept to have regard to the claims discretely. The Lord Ordinary did not undertake such an
exercise. His failure to do so might be
regarded as an error in principle, though in the circumstances of this case,
where claims 2 and 3 are so closely related to claim 1, I doubt whether, as
regards these claims, the absence of a discrete treatment was a fundamental
flaw. It may be otherwise as regards
claim 5, which is a process rather than a product claim.
[116] More
importantly, in my view, the Lord Ordinary's treatment of obviousness is flawed
by his failure to bring into account, in dealing with that chapter, the
significance of claims 1-3 being to pharmaceutical compositions comprised of
two elements (carrier and active ingredient) rather than simply to tibolone at
particular crystalline purities; and of
claim 5 being a method of producing one of these specific compositions. That flaw may stem from the way in which
parties' cases were argued in the Outer House.
Additionally, the Lord Ordinary fell into error, in my view, in
describing at step (iii) the difference, so far as concerned claims 1-3, as
being "the discovery of polymorphism in tibolone". A discovery, such as that of polymorphism in
tibolone, is the acquisition of knowledge about the real world. What is required for step (iii) is the
identification of some practical difference or differences between the patented
claim and the prior art (such as the shape of the sail in the Windsurfing case), which differences can
then be judged (at stage (iv)) as to whether they involve a degree of
invention. I shall return in due course,
to identify what is, in respect of each claim, the practical application in the
present case.
[117] In these
circumstances the Lord Ordinary's treatment of obviousness is, in my view, open
to review by this court. That is not to
say, however, that all his findings of fact in this chapter are open to
successful challenge.
[118] In Pozzoli SPA at para. 15 Jacob L.J.
suggested that stages (i) and (ii) as described in Windsurfing should be inverted, that is, the first step was for the
court to assume the mantle of the normally skilled but unimaginative addressee
in the art at the priority date and to impute to him what was, at that date,
the common general knowledge in the art in question. I am content to follow that order.
[119] In the present
case the skilled man would be attired with knowledge of a number of
matters. He would be familiar with the
845 and the 279 patents, each of which told him that tibolone as a compound had
been synthesised and that that compound had medicinal advantages. These patents would have told him nothing
about the number or characteristics of any crystalline forms of tibolone. He would know that tibolone was a steroid and
that steroids were commonly, but not universally, polymorphous. He would know from Declercq that a single
crystal of tibolone, obtained by a process of crystallisation through acetone,
had been examined, its (monoclinic) structure disclosed and its molecular
conformation reported on. He would not
know whether the monoclinic form was or was not the only crystalline form of
tibolone - there might be one or more other forms. He would know, again from Declercq, that a
pharmaceutical company, with awareness of certain therapeutic advantages of
tibolone, was sufficiently interested to instruct a conformational analysis of
a single crystal of that compound and had obtained the results of that
analysis. He would know that tibolone,
without so far as he was aware any attention having been given to its
crystalline purity, had been marketed under the name Livial.
[120] Laddie J. in Pfizer Limited's Patent at para. 62
described the skilled but non-inventive man as follows:
"This is not a real person. He is a legal creation. He is supposed to offer an objective test of
whether a particular development can be protected by a patent. He is deemed to have looked at and read
publicly available documents and to know of public uses in the prior art. He understands all languages and dialects. He never misses the obvious nor stumbles on
the inventive. He has no private
idiosyncratic preferences or dislikes.
He never thinks laterally. He
differs from all real people in one or more of these characteristics."
No quarrel was taken with that description and I am content
to adopt it.
[121] I turn then to
identify the inventive concept(s) in the patent. That should, strictly, be done, as I have
said, by identifying the inventive concept in each claim. That involves seeking to identify the essence
of each claim. I accordingly begin with
claim 1. The inventive concept in that
claim is, in my view, a product, being a pharmaceutical composition which
contains (in addition to a carrier) tibolone with a high degree of crystalline
purity. The inventive concept in claim 2
is likewise a product, a pharmaceutical composition of the same kind but with a
yet higher degree of crystalline purity.
The inventive concept in claim 3 is likewise a product, a pharmaceutical
composition of the same degree of crystalline purity as in claim 1 but
where the purity lies in a high degree of the monoclinic form. For present purposes I leave aside the
identification of the inventive concept in claim 5.
[122] The third of
the four stages of the Windsurfing
approach requires the identification of the differences, if any, between "the
state of the art" and the alleged invention (Pozzoli SPA, para. 22). In
respect of claim 1 the essential difference, in my view, is that, while in the
prior art tibolone as a compound had been recognised as of medicinal importance
and while a crystalline form of that compound (as it happened the monoclinic
form) had been isolated and analysed for its conformation, the claim for the
first time identified the use of tibolone to a high degree of crystalline
purity as the active ingredient in a pharmaceutical composition. In respect of claim 2, the essential
difference is the use of tibolone to a yet higher degree of crystalline purity
as the active ingredient in a pharmaceutical composition. In respect of claim 3, the essential
difference is the use of tibolone to a high degree of crystalline purity where
that purity is in the monoclinic form as the active ingredient in a
pharmaceutical composition.
[123] The final stage
involves the court, with such assistance as it may obtain from experts in the
field, putting itself in the position of the skilled but unimaginative man, seised
of comprehensive knowledge of the prior art but with no knowledge of the
alleged invention, and asking, in respect of each claim, the question whether
the difference identified at the third stage, constituted a step which was
obvious. The answer to each question is
a matter of fact and the court would expect to hear appropriately qualified
evidence upon it.
[124] Dr. Newton addressed
the matter in paragraphs 7.6 to 7.10 of his initial report and he was examined
by Arrow's counsel upon it. The Lord
Ordinary sets out the relative passages at paragraph [40] of his Opinion. I repeat them here, omitting for the present
the references to claim 5:
"7.6 A
skilled man wishing to develop Tibolone as a pharmaceutical product would need
to identify a robust and repeatable process for making a well defined stable
form of the drug.
7.7 The
synthetic route to the compound is described in the 279 [patent]. ... The skilled
man would be well aware of the fact that most steroids exhibit polymorphism
(see references to common general knowledge at paragraph 5.1.9). Since he would have known that different
steroidal polymorphs may have different melting points, densities,
spectroscopic properties, bioavailabilities and stabilities ... he would want to
define a single polymorph having suitable physical and bioavailability
profiles.
7.8 The
skilled man would have been aware of the prior art and of the 1984 [Declercq] Paper. The latter would have been a very important
document since it teaches how to make a pure polymorph and defines it
analytically. Thus, by following the
teaching of the 279 to make the compound and then recrystallising it from
acetone as taught by the 1984 [Declercq]
Paper the skilled man would have a method of preparing pure Form I
polymorph.
7.9 For
these reasons I think that claims 1 and 2 of the Patent are obvious since the
1984 [Declercq] Paper already
described Form I Tibolone. Claim 3 is
likewise obvious since the 1984 [Declercq]
Paper precisely describes the crystal structure referred to in the Patent as
monoclinic P21 form ...
7.10 In
my opinion it would have been obvious at the priority date of the Patent to
obtain and use the polymorph claimed at claims 1-3 in its pure crystalline form
... ".
[125] So far as I
have been able to discover - and we were not referred to any relevant passage
in the transcript - Dr. Newton was not directly cross-examined by Akzo's
counsel on the views expressed by him in these paragraphs. However, Professor Bernstein's views were
extensively put to Dr. Newton in cross-examination for his comment. With some of these Dr. Newton
agreed; with others he disagreed. At paragraph 84 of his report Professor
Bernstein discusses inter alia
para.7.7 of Dr Newton's report. He
disagrees with the observations made there.
Professor Bernstein adhered to that view in evidence. In cross-examination he expressly disagreed
with the proposition that a person skilled in the art would, on the basis of
information contained in Declercq, be able to get a robust, repeatable
synthesis. Dr. Newton's recited views cannot
therefore be said to have gone unchallenged or
uncontradicted. The Lord Ordinary,
having narrated Dr Newton's views, continues (para. [41]) - "Professor
Bernstein took a different view". He
added that, as he understood the evidence, the difference between Professor
Bernstein and Dr. Newton lay in the former's assessment of the level of common
awareness of polymorphism and the uncertainties in that aspect of the
science. Having summarised Professor
Bernstein's views on that matter, the Lord Ordinary said (at para. [42]):
"Despite Professor Bernstein's
undoubted eminence in his field, I prefer the evidence of Dr. Newton to the
effect that by the late 1980s polymorphism as a phenomenon would have been
well-known to a process research chemist working in the pharmaceutical
industry; and they would have known that
it was widespread in pharmaceuticals, particularly steroids."
That is a finding of fact by the Lord Ordinary. Neither side before us sought to challenge
it. At paragraph [43] the Lord Ordinary
continued:
"But there is a difference between,
on the one hand, knowing of polymorphism as a phenomenon, or even knowing that
it is likely to be found in steroids;
and, on the other hand, being able to use or apply that knowledge. The point Professor Bernstein was making, for
example in para. 12 of his Report, was that polymorphism in any particular
compound was usually discovered by serendipity rather than by systematic
research. The important conclusion from
this was that set out at para. 56 of that Report, that: ' ... even the skilled person could not know in
advance that any steroid might be polymorphic.
He certainly would not know in advance how to obtain it, or what its
properties might be.' Despite the
existence of polymorphic screening - which was less common in the 1980s than it
is today - I did not understand Dr. Newton to disagree strongly with this opinion; and, in any event, I accept it as correct."
Again, that is a finding of fact, in this instance accepting
as well-founded the quoted passage.
Again, neither side before us sought to challenge it, though there was
some discussion about the first sentence - its import it was suggested, was
that "even the skilled person could not know in advance that any [particular]
steroid [was] polymorphic".
[126] The Lord
Ordinary concluded that there did not seem to be as much between
Dr. Newton and Professor Bernstein (on this matter) as at first
appeared. He then said:
"The relevant issue is not so much
whether there was an awareness of polymorphism amongst the relevant people at
the relevant time, but whether that knowledge pointed the way to a discovery of
polymorphism in any particular case."
I shall return to that sentence in due course.
[127] In a critical
passage (para. [44]) the Lord Ordinary continued:
"The obviousness attack on the claims
in the patent has to be considered against this background. Let it be assumed that the skilled but
unimaginative addressee of the patent knows of tibolone, and knows that there
is a likelihood that tibolone, being a steroid, is polymorphous. Without the benefit of hindsight, I do not
see why he would want to look for a pure polymorphic form of tibolone. After all, tibolone had been known from the
1960s, and there was no evidence of any concerted effort to find out if it was
polymorphous. Nor do I see how he would
go about finding a new polymorphic form.
He might know of the Declercq paper, which would tell him about what is
now called Form I, and about the use of acetone, but not about tibolone being
polymorphic. If he carried out a
crystallisation using acetone, he would probably have produced what we now know
as Form I tibolone. But that would
support Arrow's argument on anticipation rather than obviousness (see para. 34
above). It seems to me that the
'obviousness' line of attack, as distinct from that based on anticipation,
assumes that the skilled but unimaginative addressee of the patent would be
looking to develop a pure polymorphic form of tibolone and would have had the
knowledge of how to achieve it. Without
the benefit of knowing (with hindsight) that such a form had been found, I do
not consider that he would have had either the motivation or the means."
[128] Arrow, in
furtherance of its cross-appeal, challenged the soundness of two sentences in
that paragraph, namely - (1) "Without the benefit of hindsight, I do not see
why he would want to look for a pure polymorphic form of tibolone." and (2) "It
seems to me that the 'obviousness' line of attack, as distinct from that based
on anticipation, assumes that the skilled but unimaginative addressee of the
patent would be looking to develop a pure polymorphic form of tibolone and
would have had the knowledge of how to achieve it." It also consequentially challenged the final
sentence of that paragraph in which the Lord Ordinary concluded that the
skilled but unimaginative man would not "have had either the motivation or the
means".
[129] On the matter
of motivation (the first sentence challenged) it was submitted that the Lord
Ordinary had failed to have regard to clear evidence from Dr. Newton that
Declercq identified a method of producing a composition which was good enough
to commercialise. Alternatively, it was
argued, the finding of an absence of motivation ran wholly contrary to the
evidence. In any event the Lord Ordinary
had erred in law in that motivation, while relevant, was not an essential
requirement for obviousness (Pharmacia
Corp v Merck & Co. Inc., per
Aldous L.J. at paras. 122-4). On the
matter of means, (essentially the latter part of the second sentence
challenged), it was submitted that no reasonable judge could have made such a
finding given that the Lord Ordinary had already found that Declercq provided a
method for producing (at least some) crystalline pure tibolone.
[130] It is clear
that an appellate court must be very cautious in differing from the judge of
first instance on a matter of obviousness, where that involves simply a matter
of degree (Biogen, per Lord Hoffmann
at page 45). In Merck & Co. Inc's Patents
Buxton L.J., having expressed at para. 64, the opinion that an appeal court
should interfere with the view of the trial judge only if he can be shown to
have erred "in principle", added:
"In particular, it is likely to be
very difficult to establish that such matters of principle are involved in
decision made by the judge in assessing technical evidence and its bearing on
the issues that he has to decide."
[131] Thus, in
challenging, in a matter of obviousness, either the primary findings of the
trial judge on the technical evidence or his secondary findings by way of
inference from them, an appellant faces a formidable task. I am not persuaded that Arrow has
demonstrated that the Lord Ordinary was not entitled to make the findings
challenged. On the matter of means,
Declercq, while giving the experimental parameters within which, by crystallisation
through acetone, the single examined crystal had been obtained, did not purport
to lay down a method of robustly and repeatably producing crystalline pure
tibolone (such as Dr. Newton said a skilled person would wish to identify), far
less such tibolone for use in a pharmaceutical composition. On the evidence it did not, contrary to Dr.
Newton's cited report, "teach how to make a pure polymorph". So far as appears, a robust and repeatable
method emerged only with the publication of claim 5 of the patent. The Lord Ordinary, accepting Professor
Bernstein's evidence, had already held that the skilled but unimaginative
addressee "certainly would not know how to obtain [a crystalline pure
form]". On the matter of motive, I do
not read the Lord Ordinary as proceeding on the basis that motive was
necessary; rather that it was, as the
cited authority demonstrates, relevant.
The Lord Ordinary, for the purpose of his finding in the first sentence
challenged, was prepared to assume that the skilled but unimaginative addressee
knew that there was a likelihood that tibolone, being a steroid, was
polymorphous. That assumption - in
Arrow's favour - goes somewhat beyond what the Lord Ordinary was prepared to
find as a fact, namely, that, while polymorphism was widespread in
pharmaceuticals, particularly steroids, the skilled person would not know in
advance of the discovery of more than one form whether or not a particular
steroid, such as tibolone, was in fact polymorphous. But that assumption, which was carried
forward by the Lord Ordinary into his answer to the second Windsurfing question, I am also prepared to make. However,
even on that assumption, the Lord Ordinary was entitled, in my view, to
question why the skilled person would, in the relevant state of the art, want
to look for a pure polymorphic form of tibolone. He was entitled to reject, as his finding
implicitly does, Dr. Newton's evidence that the skilled man "would want to
define a single polymorph having suitable physical and bioavailability
profiles" (Dr. Newton's Report para. 7.7) - at least for pharmaceutical
purposes. As the Lord Ordinary said at
para. [44] - "After all tibolone had been known from the 1960s and there was no
evidence of any concerted effort to find out if it was polymorphous." Contrary to the submission made to us, Dr.
Newton did not (at page 95) testify that Declercq identified a method of
producing a composition good enough to commercialise. It plainly did nothing of the sort. All that Dr. Newton was able to say, as a
matter of generality, was unsurprisingly that commercial pharmaceutical
companies would be "looking for something that is good enough to
commercialise". For these reasons
Arrow's challenge to these findings of fact relative to the matter of
obviousness, in my opinion, fails. If
these findings cannot properly be disturbed, Arrow's challenge to the Lord
Ordinary's conclusion on obviousness must, in my view, fail.
[132] I now consider,
in relation to claim 1, the fourth stage of the Windsurfing approach. On
this matter I arrive at the same answer as the Lord Ordinary but by a slightly
different route. The use of tibolone to
a high degree of crystalline purity as the active ingredient in a
pharmaceutical composition was, in my opinion, not, on the basis of the Lord
Ordinary's factual conclusions - unchallenged or not successfully challenged -
obvious. Preliminary to that inventive
step was the discovery by Akzo (not, of course, itself an invention) that
tibolone was in fact polymorphous, with at least two crystalline forms. That discovery led in turn to the practical
identification of the product, involving use in a pharmaceutical composition of
crystalline pure tibolone having distinct
advantages over a general mixture of forms, these advantages being stability and reproducibility. The skilled but unimaginative man, having the
attributes so strikingly described by Laddie J. in Pfizer Ltd's Patent, would not, having regard to the Lord
Ordinary's findings in relation to motivation and means, have taken these steps
or any of them.
[133] I should add
that I disagree with the Lord Ordinary in his identification (at the end of
para. [43]) of the relevant issue as being "whether that knowledge pointed the
way to the discovery of polymorphism in any particular case". The issue rather, in my view, is whether that
knowledge pointed the way to the practical identification of the product,
involving use in a pharmaceutical composition of crystalline pure tibolone with
its attendant advantages. The discovery
of polymorphism in tibolone was but a step on that journey.
[134] An identical
answer falls, in my view, to be given at the fourth stage in respect of claims
2 and 3 to that in respect of claim 1.
The contention that these claims are invalid by reason of lack of
inventive step falls, in my opinion, to be rejected.
[135] The Lord
Ordinary was also correct, in my view, in rejecting the challenge to claim 5 on
the ground of obviousness. While
Declercq provided the skilled man with the information that the single crystal
there analysed had been obtained by crystallisation in acetone, that paper did
not seek to lay down a method for preparing crystalline pure tibolone for use
in a pharmaceutical composition. The
difference (stage 3 of the Windsurfing
test) was the subsequent admixture of water with a compound dissolved in bench
acetone. The polar characteristics of
water had, it seems, the effect of reliable crystallisation to a high degree
(by weight) of monoclinic crystals.
Indeed it was accepted by Arrow that if claim 5 fell to be construed as
involving the use of (bench) acetone and water they would not seek to challenge
the Lord Ordinary's decision on obviousness so far as that claim is concerned.
[136] Arrow also
presented, under reference to SmithKline
Beecham plc v Apotex, an argument
on obviousness, in respect of claims 1-3, which was independent of the Windsurfing approach. That argument involved taking a simple and
straightforward approach to the statutory criterion of inventive step (section
3 of the Patents Act 1977). But that
argument, attractive as it was, proceeded on the basis that Declercq had
disclosed tibolone at the levels of purity within claims 1-3 of the patent for
use as a pharmaceutical, as well as a method of producing it using
acetone. It also brought into account
that as at the priority date tibolone (as Livial) had been marketed as a
pharmaceutical. But there was no
evidence to suggest that Livial involved any crystalline purity (in the sense
discussed) of tibolone; and Declercq,
although identifying and analysing a single crystal of tibolone and being work
instructed by a pharmaceutical entity, did not disclose tibolone at the levels
of purity within claims 1-3 for pharmaceutical purposes. In these circumstances this argument also
falls, in my view, to be rejected.
[137] In the whole
circumstances I move your Lordships to allow the reclaiming motion, to recall
the Lord Ordinary's interlocutors of 11 and 25 October 2006, to refuse the
cross-appeal, to sustain Akzo's third plea-in-law and to refuse the prayer of
the petition.
FIRST DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
|
Lord President
Lord Kingarth
Lord Clarke
|
[2008] CSIH31
OPINION OF LORD KINGARTH
in
RECLAIMING MOTION
by
ARROW GENERICS LIMITED
Petitioner and Respondent;
against
AKZO NB (Represented in Scotland by ORGANON LABORATORIES
LIMITED
Respondent and Reclaimer:
for
Revocation of Claims 1-3
and 5 of European Patent EP 0 389 035
_______
|
Act: Currie, Q.C., Higgins;
Maclay Murray & Spens (Petitioners and Respondents)
Alt: McNeill, Q.C.,
Delibegović-Broome; McClure
Naismith (Respondents and Reclaimer)
20 May 2008
[138] I have had the
advantage of reading in advance the Opinion in draft of your Lordship in the
chair, and I agree that the reclaiming motion should, for the reasons given, be
disposed of in the way therein proposed.
I would only seek to offer, in addition, a few comments to emphasise
certain matters which appear to me to be of significance.
[139] The most
difficult issue raised by the reclaiming motion relates to the question of the
obviousness of claims 1-3. Despite the
attractive simplicity of the position advanced by Arrow, I, like your Lordship
in the chair, am not persuaded that it has been demonstrated that the Lord
Ordinary was not entitled to make the underlying findings in fact which were
challenged - in particular perhaps in relation to whether the notional skilled
man could be said to have had the means to develop a pure polymorphic form of
tibolone (of the purity described in the patent) for use in a pharmaceutical
composition.
[140] Although Arrow
sought to rely on Dr. Newton's evidence, in particular as summarised in
paragraphs 7.6 to 7.10 of his report, referred to by the Lord Ordinary at
paragraph [40] of his Opinion, it is, in my view, important to notice that the
witness's starting point was that a skilled man wishing to develop tibolone as
a pharmaceutical product would need to identify a robust and repeatable process
for making a well defined stable form of the drug. Despite the witness's claim, at para.7.8 of
the report, that the Declercq paper taught how to make a pure polymorph (by
re-crystallisation from acetone), the Lord Ordinary not only rejected his
evidence that it was likely that the whole sample from which the single crystal
referred to in Declercq was selected consisted of crystals of the monoclinic
form, but was, on the evidence, as your Lordship in the chair has noted, able
to conclude only that, following the procedure envisaged in the prior art, the skilled
person would ordinarily obtain crystals some at least of which were
monoclinic. It was consistently accepted
by all counsel before this court that, on the evidence, no more could be said
(or indeed was found by the Lord Ordinary) than that. So far as appears, agreeing with your
Lordship in the chair, a robust and repeatable method of producing tibolone
completely or virtually completely free of crystals other than monoclinic
crystals emerged only with the publication of claim 5 of the patent. That claim could not, Arrow themselves
accept, be said to be obvious on the construction of it favoured by all the
members of this court. Moreover, we were
not, it appeared to me, referred to any clear evidence from which it could be
said that the notional skilled man, having obtained tibolone consisting of a
polymorphous mixture of crystals from crystallisation with acetone, would have
been able readily to detect and isolate (not least on any robust and repeatable
basis) some particular crystal or crystals for pharmaceutical use - even if he
was motivated to do so, notwithstanding his accepted ignorance of the fact that
tibolone was polymorphic.
[141] Further -
although this would address, as I understood it, only part of the argument
advanced by Arrow - while the Lord Ordinary, and the members of this court have
held that the relevant claims of the patent are capable, as a matter of
construction, of including a pharmaceutical composition with a single crystal
of tibolone as the active ingredient, the question of whether it would be
obvious to the notional skilled person to make such a product is, it seems to
me, quite different. And we were not, I
think, referred to any evidence to suggest that that would have been obvious,
even using a single crystal of the form described in Declercq.
FIRST DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
|
Lord President
Lord Kingarth
Lord Clarke
|
[2008] CSIH31
OPINION OF LORD CLARKE
in
RECLAIMING MOTION
by
ARROW GENERICS LIMITED
Petitioner and Respondent;
against
AKZO NB (Represented in Scotland by ORGANON LABORATORIES
LIMITED
Respondent and Reclaimer:
for
Revocation of Claims 1-3
and 5 of European Patent EP 0 389 035
_______
|
Act: Currie, Q.C., Higgins; Maclay
Murray & Spens (Petitioners and Respondents)
Alt: McNeill, Q.C.,
Delibegović-Broome; McClure
Naismith (Respondents and Reclaimer)
20 May 2008
[142] I am grateful
to your Lordship in the chair for setting out the context in which this dispute
arises and the relevant material placed before the court. I agree with your Lordship in the chair that
the approach taken by the Lord Ordinary to the task of construction of the
patent was misconceived for the reasons given by your Lordship and that that
matter is now open for this court to decide.
[143] The proper
construction of the patent, of course, impacts on the two questions of
controversy before this court, namely, novelty and obviousness.
Construction of the
Patent
[144] This issue was,
in my judgement, left to be determined in a less than satisfactory basis,
having regard to the state of the evidence before the Lord Ordinary. By that I mean that a good deal of discussion
before this court revolved round the question as to whether or not claims 1-3
are capable of being properly construed as embracing a pharmaceutical
composition containing one crystal of tibolone.
That was a matter which, I suggest, could have been readily addressed in
evidence before the Lord Ordinary. Given
the apparent significance of this question - a question of fact - it is wholly
unsatisfactory, in my judgement, that it was left to be determined ultimately
by reference to counter-assertions from each side before us. For myself, therefore, I am left with a very
distinct feeling of uneasiness as to whether this court has before it a
complete and satisfactory basis for approaching the task of construction in
respect of claims 1-3.
[145] Before the Lord
Ordinary the "single crystal" issue was left by Akzo, the reclaimers, it seems,
on the basis of a contention, recorded by the Lord Ordinary, at para [24] of
his Opinion, in the following terms:
"The claims in the patent were to a
'pharmaceutical composition' containing the compound, i.e. tibolone. That must involve a recognition that a single
crystal is not sufficient: a
pharmaceutical compound clearly cannot be made of a single crystal" (my
emphasis).
The Lord Ordinary's response to that argument, in part, is
recorded at para. [27] of his Opinion where he states:
" ... it would have been open to Akzo
to attempt to limit claims 1-4 by reference to some quantitative criteria. But, for whatever reason, they have not done
so. It was not suggested that, even adopting
a purposive construction, those claims should be read as incorporating some
such criteria capable of being expressed with sufficient precision. Even if it had been so argued, I would have
felt unable to construe the relevant claims as being restricted to pure Form 1
tibolone in some quantity greater than a single crystal. On that basis, the prior disclosure in Declercq of a single crystal of what we now know
to be Form 1 tibolone and which, being a single crystal, is by definition 100%
pure, is sufficient to invalidate claims 1-3".
As your Lordship in the chair has observed, this court has
not been invited to make any new findings-in-fact. Whether or not claims 1-3 are capable of
embracing a single crystal in a pill, capsule or tablet is left, therefore, to
be determined by construing the words of the patent itself, without the
assistance of any findings-in-fact based on the evidence of any skilled person
or persons as to this issue.
[146] Senior counsel
for Akzo, perhaps belatedly recognising the difficulty that the lack of
relevant evidence on this point presented the court with, sought to support
their contention as to the construction of claims 1-3 in this respect by
carrying out certain calculations under reference, inter alia, to certain materials in Professor Bernstein's report,
but these calculations were never put before the court below, far less as
evidence before that court. They must,
therefore, be disregarded.
[147] This case, to
my mind, provides a salutary lesson for those who practice in this specialised
area of the law of the very great need to explore, in evidence, questions of
fact germane to the questions at issue, however obvious their answers may
appear to them and their clients, so that the appropriate findings may be made
by the court of first instance.
[148] In the
foregoing state of affairs this court now has to interpret the words of claims
1-3, as they appear, applying the authoritative guidance provided in the cases
referred to by your Lordship in the chair which require that a purposive
approach be adopted in carrying out that task.
As a matter of language, I am satisfied that the wording of these claims
is capable of embracing a pharmaceutical composition containing a single
crystal of tibolone. I think that Akzo
themselves probably accepted this to be the case. Nevertheless they contended that, by adopting
a purposive construction to the claims, under reference to the Description, a
different conclusion should be arrived at.
My consideration of the Description, however, does not lead me to put a
qualification on the plain wording of claims 1-3 to exclude the possibility of
a pharmaceutical composition containing a single crystal of tibolone. I have regard, in particular, to the
statement in the Description at lines 45-48, page 2, which is to the
following effect:
"The invention therefore relates to a
pharmaceutical composition which contains a pharmaceutically suitable carrier
and the compound having the structure (7ά, 17ά) - 17
hydroxy-7-methyl-19-nor-17-pregn-5(10)-en-20-yn-3-one, characterized in that
the said compound is a crystalline pure or virtually pure form which is
completely or virtually completely free from the other crystalline form".
That statement does not exclude the possibility of such a
composition comprising a single crystal of tibolone which would, ex hypothesi, be 100% pure. I have to remind myself that the notional
addressee of this patent is the person skilled in the art and that I am not
such a person. While a person skilled in
the art may have said that a pharmaceutical composition consisting of a single
crystal of tibolone would be regarded by someone like himself as either a
nonsense or, alternatively, at least that it would be inherently improbable
that it would be viable as an effective drug, no evidence to that effect was
provided to the court below, and the position remains the same before this
court. It would therefore be, in my
view, quite illegitimate, in that state of affairs, for this court to speculate
on such questions, far less to reach any conclusion by acting as if it were the
skilled addressee. The court's task is
one of construction of the words employed by the patentee. A purposive approach to the construction of
those words does not, it seems to me, render it legitimate either to cut down
or extend the clear meaning of the language of a claim, in the absence of
relevant evidence pointing in that direction.
Put another way, construction of the language must not lead to the court
crossing into the forbidden territory of re-wording or amending the claim in
the guise of construing it.
[149] For the
foregoing reasons, I consider Akzo were inviting the court to trespass into
that forbidden territory in suggesting that claims 1-3 did not include a claim
of a monopoly in a pharmaceutical composition containing single crystal
tibolone. It is, I think, of some interest
to recall that Akzo contended that the references in claims 1-3 to
"pharmaceutical composition" containing the compound tibolone involved a
recognition that a single crystal was not sufficient. That contention seems to me to contain
something of a non sequitur. As the Declercq paper itself states tibolone in a single crystal form is,
scientifically speaking, a compound. The
fact that the compound tibolone is to be contained in a pharmaceutical
composition does not tell us anything about the quantity of the compound
to be contained in the pharmaceutical composition and, accordingly, absent any
other guidance from the language of the claims themselves and the Description,
I reach the conclusion that claims 1-3 have to be read as embracing a pharmaceutical
composition containing a single crystal of tibolone.
[150] That conclusion
has, in my judgement, an important consequence when the question of obviousness
falls to be addressed in due course.
Novelty
[151] Having reached
the conclusion I have in relation to this issue then, along with your Lordship
in the chair, I do not, however, accept the position of Arrow, otherwise, in
relation to the question of novelty. I
am not persuaded that the skilled addressee reading the Declercq paper, having
regard to its scope and function, would have considered that it was addressing
the advantages of having tibolone in a crystalline pure, or virtually pure,
form for incorporation into a pharmaceutical composition. The Declercq paper, in my opinion, was
designed simply to do what it says it was doing, namely to produce a structural
analysis of the single crystal of tibolone presented to the writers of the
paper for analysis. In a nut-shell, it
seems to me, that Declercq did not disclose a pharmaceutical composition containing
a pharmaceutical solid carrier and containing the compound tibolone in a
crystalline pure form or virtually pure form.
Nor did it disclose, in my view, a method for the preparation of such
crystalline pure tibolone for use in pharmaceutical compositions according to
claim 3, as claimed in claim 5. Arrow
sought to bolster their case by emphasising that the scientific exercise
carried out, upon which Declercq reported, was instigated by Organon themselves
and that a member of Organon's scientific team, it seems, Dr. Van Zelen was
involved in that exercise. To that
matter should be added, it was said, the reference to be found in footnote 5 on
the second page of the paper to the effect that tibolone was of interest for
the treatment of menopausal complaints.
Those features do not, in my view, go far enough to establish that the
paper was disclosing the invention which has been patented. The nature and function of the Declercq paper
is, for example, to be distinguished from the patent application by Blum in the
Merk & Co. Inc's Patents 2004 7
FSR 16. I remind myself of the
well-known dictum of Sachs LJ in the General
Tire & Rubber Co. case where his Lordship said:
"To determine whether a patentees'
claim has been anticipated by an earlier publication it is necessary to compare
the earlier publication with the patentee's claim. The earlier publication must, for this
purpose, be interpreted as at the date of its publication, having regard to the
surrounding circumstances which then existed, and without regard to subsequent
events. ... If the earlier publication, so construed, discloses the same device
as the device which the patentee by his claim, so construed, asserts that he
has invented, the patentee's claim has been anticipated, but not otherwise".
On the basis of what Declercq itself said, and the particular
context in which he had said it, I consider that it did not disclose what the
patentee asserts he has invented in claims 1-3 and 5. I do not read any of the evidence in this
case as justifying the opposite conclusion.
For these reasons I consider that Arrow's attack on the novelty of
claims 1-3 and 5 fail.
[152] On the view
that I have reached regarding novelty it is strictly not necessary to address
the question of enablement. I would
merely add that I agree with what your Lordship in the chair has to say about
this matter.
Obviousness
[153] I now turn to
consider the question of obviousness. On
this topic I find myself in disagreement with your Lordship in the chair and
Lord Kingarth. I agree with your
Lordship in the chair that on this branch of the case the Lord Ordinary, for
the reasons given by your Lordship, also materially misdirected himself. It, therefore, falls upon this court to look
at this matter afresh. I do this, of
course, in the context of my conclusion that claims 1-3 require to be construed
as covering a pharmaceutical composition containing a single crystal of
tibolone which is ex hypothesi pure.
[154] It appears to
me that this chapter of the case has been somewhat obscured by the issue of
when, and how, the polymorphous character of tibolone could have been
discovered and was discovered. I note,
in this connection, that the evidence of Akzo's expert, Professor Bernstein,
was to a very large extent focused on that issue. Having regard to his relevant expertise and
that of Dr. Newton, I note that Professor Bernstein is a general chemist with a
particular interest in polymorphism and crystallisation and that Dr. Newton was
willing to defer to Professor Bernstein on matters of pure
crystallography. Dr. Newton, on the
other hand, is a medical chemist who has worked with scientific companies,
including Glaxo. What the skilled
addressee would have known at the priority date, and what he would have taken
from that knowledge, is something that Dr. Newton's evidence addressed in a way
which was not subject to serious challenge.
[155] The court must
approach the question of obviousness, in the first place, by identifying what
is the inventive concept in each claim - see Pozzoli Spa v VBD MO SA
[2007] FSR 37 per Jacob LJ at paras. [14]-[18].
It has to be kept in mind, too, that since a discovery cannot be an
inventive step any inventive step identified in the claims cannot embrace the
discovery of the polymorphous character of tibolone. The mistake of including a discovery in the
reading of claims, in cases like the present, was highlighted by Lord Hoffmann
in Kirin-Amgem Inc. v Hoecst Marion Roussel [2005] RPC 169 at
195 where his Lordship said this:
"I think that the Court of Appeal was
right in saying that Table VI could not have been the invention. Standing alone, it was a 'discovery ... as
such' within the meaning of section 1(2) of the Act see Genentech Inc's Patent [1989] RPC 147, per Purchas LJ at page 204
and per Dillon LJ at page 237.
On the other hand, as Whitford J said
in the Genentech case [1987] RPC 553,
556:
'It is trite law that you cannot
patent a discovery, but if on the basis of that discovery you can tell people
how it can be usefully employed, then a patentable invention may result. This in my view would be the case, even
though once you have made the discovery, the way in which it can be usefully
employed is obvious enough.'
In such a case, while it may be true
to say, as the Court of Appeal did ([2003] RPC 3) that Table VI lay 'at the
heart of the invention', it was not the invention. An invention is a practical product or
process, not information about the natural world. That seems to me to accord with the social
contract between the State and the inventor which underlines patent law. The state gives the inventor a monopoly in
return for an immediate disclosure of all the information necessary to enable
performance of the invention. That
disclosure is not only to enable other people to perform the invention after
the patent has expired. If that were
all, the inventor might as well be allowed to keep it secret during the life of
the patent. It is also to enable anyone
to make immediate use of the information for any purpose which does not
infringe the claims. The specification
of valid and subsisting patents are an important source of information for
further research, as is abundantly shown by a reading of the sources cited in
the specification for the patent in suit.
Of course a patentee may, in some cases, be able to frame his claim to a
product or process so broadly that in practice it will be impossible to use the
information he has disclosed, even to develop important improvements, in a way
which does not infringe. But it cannot
be right to give him a monopoly of the use of the information as such."
[156] Accordingly, in
the present case, the patentee has no monopoly in the discovery of the
polymorphous character of tibolone.
Counsel for Arrow paraphrased Lord Hoffmann's dictum by saying that even
if polymorphism lies at the heart of the patent in suit, it cannot be the
inventive step for the purposes of determining the question of
obviousness. To use Lord Hoffmann's
words, the "practical product" was crystalline pure or practically pure
tibolone (in claims 1 and 2) and (in claim 3) crystalline pure monoclinic
tibolone.
[157] Counsel for
Arrow submitted that if the court accepted their submission that it was
necessary to construe the patent to the effect that in claims 1-3 a single
crystal was sufficient to meet the compositional element of the claim, then the
conclusion inevitably had to be arrived at that what was being claimed in
claims 1-3 was obvious. That conclusion
would be arrived at by appreciating that, when one came to the third Windsurfing question, there was no
difference between the inventive step and the prior art. Counsel said, that being so, the question
fell to be asked as to what was the role of obviousness in this discussion. The response to that question, it was said,
was that the role for obviousness came into play because the inventive concept
was not coextensive with the matters claimed, for the purposes of
anticipation. The evidence of Dr. Newton
was that the pharmaceutical company which did not know that tibolone was
actually polymorphous would nevertheless want to define the crystalline
structure of that compound. That was
supported by what Dr. Newton said at para. 7.7 of his report. If the court took the view that Declercq did
not describe the use of pure crystalline tibolone in a pharmaceutical
composition, contrary Arrow's primary submission, it should still find against
Akzo on the question of obviousness because at stage 3 of the Windsurfing approach, in determining the
difference between the inventive concept and the prior art, it was permissible
to "mosaic". What did the evidence show
was the prior art the skilled man would be aware of at the priority date? In the first place tibolone was a compound
known since the early 1960s. Secondly,
from the time of the Declercq paper the skilled man would have known that
tibolone was being developed by a drug company and was of particular interest
with regard to the treatment of menopausal complaints. Thirdly, its crystalline structure had been
discovered as monoclinic form. Fourthly,
by 1988, tibolone had been placed on the market in pill form, under the name
Livial. Against that background, in
relation to claims 1-3 the first question, it was said, was would it have been
obvious to use Form 1 tibolone in a pill?
The evidence of Dr. Newton supported the proposition that that question
fell to be answered in the affirmative.
The evidence of Dr. Newton was that a skilled man would also know that
tibolone was a steroid and therefore possibly polymorphous. He would recognise the advantages of using a
pure form. The exercise instructed by Oregon which resulted in the Declercq paper
and its finding was reflective of such interest. Even in a situation where it was not known
that there was more than one form of tibolone, the skilled man would want to
know the crystalline structure of tibolone.
[158] It may be noted
that the established science with which the present case is concerned was
clearly described by Lord Hoffmann in the case of SmithKline Beecham plc's (Paroxetine Methanesulfonat) Patent [2006]
RPC 323 at 329 where his Lordship stated as follows:
"The notion of crystalline form may
require some explanation. The same
substance may exist in different solid forms, depending upon the arrangement of
its molecules. In crystalline form the
molecules arrange themselves in an organised pattern called a lattice which
gives the crystal a distinctive shape.
On the other hand, in an amorphous form or an oil, the molecules are
randomly distributed in a substance that has no particular shape. Some substances have only one crystalline
form. They are called monomorphic. But others have a variety of patterns into
which the molecules may arrange themselves.
They are polymorphic. Different
crystalline forms can be distinguished by a number of conventional tests. Infra-red ration ('IR') will result in a
spectrum of readings of absorbance which are characteristic of their particular
crystal. X-ray diffraction ('XRD') will
likewise give a characteristic series of readings. The IR and XRD readings are the crystal
fingerprints. Some compounds form one or
more types of crystals which include, as part of their crystalline structure,
molecules of the solvent from which the crystal has been precipitated. They are called solvates or, if the solvent
is water, hydrates".
The evidence of both Dr. Newton and Professor Bernstein, in
the present case, was if you crystallised from acetone you would expect to get
some Form 1 tibolone (see the Lord Ordinary at paragraph [37] of his
Opinion). The conclusion therefore had
to be, it was submitted on behalf of Arrow, that it was not inventive to use
monoclinic tibolone as an ingredient in a pharmaceutical concept. Knowing, as he would, that the tibolone might
be polymorphic the skilled man would be interested in having it in a pure
form. If you are crystallising from
acetone and you are obtaining some Form 1 tibolone then, for the purposes of
the present discussion, it was said, it did not matter that in the course of
that you might also come across some Form 2 tibolone. The basic point was that the placing of pure
form tibolone (which ex hypothesi
would include a single crystal) in a pharmaceutical composition could not be
said to be inventive.
[159] I am bound to
say that I waited, somewhat in vain, to hear from counsel for Akzo for the
answer to these submissions. While
senior counsel for Akzo did accept that the approach of Jacob LJ in the Pozzoli case (supra) was correct, in requiring that, in dealing with the question
of obviousness, the inventive step in each claim had to be addressed, he did go
on to say that this was subject to the proviso that there may be cases where
the claims are so linked that you should treat them as having a single
inventive step. Senior counsel, however,
frankly accepted that he could refer to no authority expressly supporting this
suggestion or illustrating its application.
It did seem to me that in making that submission, senior counsel was, in
effect, seeking to support the Lord Ordinary's approach to the question of obviousness,
which your Lordship in the chair has, in my view, correctly exposed to be
misconceived. What counsel for Akzo
seemed to be doing, it seemed to me, was seeking to introduce, by implication,
the process aspects of the patent into the product aspects which are covered by
claims 1-3.
[160] I have a
further difficulty with Akzo's position in this aspect of the case. As I read Professor Bernstein's report it
does not really address the question of obviousness in relation to what the
inventive steps, properly identified, in the claims are. Dr. Newton's report clearly does. I do not read the passages of evidence from
Professor Bernstein, to which senior counsel for Akzo drew our attention, as
addressing the issue. Professor
Bernstein's main concern was to address the question of polymorphism and if and
when it might have been discovered. It
seems to me that the Lord Ordinary's treatment of the issue was driven by a
concentration on the question of polymorphism, its discovery and how it might
have been addressed. But for the reasons
advanced by counsel for Arrow, I consider that that misses the point. The discovery of polymorphism and processes
designed to deal with it or to employ the knowledge of the discovery are not
embraced in claims 1-3. If one accepts,
as I do, (1) that the inventive concept in claim 1 was tibolone with a
crystalline purity of greater than 90% in a pharmaceutical composition, (2)
that in claim 2 it was tibolone of crystalline purity greater than 95% in a
pharmaceutical composition and (3) in claim 3 Form 1 tibolone with a
crystalline purity greater than 95% in a pharmaceutical composition then,
having regard to the evidence of the prior art and Dr. Newton's evidence as to
the position of the skilled person at the priority date, it cannot be said, in
my view, that there was anything inventive about using tibolone as a
pharmaceutical. The only question then
remains was there anything inventive in putting crystalline pure Form 1
tibolone in a pharmaceutical? I agree
with counsel for Arrow that the Lord Ordinary at paras. [34] and [35] of his
Opinion has held, at least in effect, that Declercq disclosed pure form
tibolone and a method of making it. The
Lord Ordinary also held that as a matter of fact the incorporation of tibolone into
a pharmaceutical composition could not by itself be inventive - see paragraphs
[29] to [33] of his Opinion. On the
unchallenged finding of the Lord Ordinary a skilled person, at the priority
date, knew of tibolone, knew that it was likely to be polymorphic and would be
interested in Declercq, which disclosed a single form of pure tibolone and a
method of producing it. I agree with
counsel for Arrow that the skilled man would be someone interested in useful
developments in the pharmaceutical field, particularly, in the context of this
case, in the field of steroids. What was
seen in Declercq is a crystalline form of tibolone which would have been of
interest to the skilled man to put in a pharmaceutical. On the findings of fact of the Lord Ordinary,
I have been unable to find any basis for rejecting Dr. Newton's evidence given
at paragraphs 7.7 and 7.8 of his report.
It seems to me that counsel for Akzo never produced an answer to the
submissions made on behalf of Arrow to the effect that Declercq disclosed
tibolone in the crystalline structure subsequently known as Form 1 at a
level of purity contained in claims 1-3, with a method to produce it, using
acetone. If full regard had been paid to
these matters and the fact that at the priority date of the patent, tibolone
was already being marketed as a pharmaceutical, the answer to the question as
to whether it would have been obvious to the skilled person to use "Declercq"
tibolone in a pharmaceutical composition would have been in the affirmative.
[161] As was accepted
on both sides of the Bar the question of obviousness is a question of
fact. It has been described as being in
the nature of a jury question. Sometimes
it has been described as involving questions of impression, or feel, based on
the evidence, rather than on any exact definitive analysis. The "Windsurfing"
approach is an attempt to address the question.
It was reformulated, or summarised, by Jacob LJ in SmithKline Beecham plc v Appotex
Europe Limited (2005) FSR 524 at 539 as follows:
"Often the nature of the enquiry is
helped by the well-known Windsurfing
steps, (1984) RPC 59 at page 74. I
summarise:
a) identify
the inventive concept of the claim;
b) identify
the common general knowledge of the skilled man;
c) identify
the difference(s) between the prior art under consideration and
that in the inventive concept of the
claim;
d) ask
whether the difference(s) would have been obvious or require
invention".
His Lordship went on to say
"No one suggests that this is always
the appropriate test. In the end the
enquiry is simply that posed by the statute, as for instance, Sir Donald
Nicholls VC pointed out in Mólnyke v P & G (1994) RPC 49 at pp.
112-3. He went on to say, at p. 113:
'In applying the statutory criterion
(i.e. as to whether an alleged inventive step was obvious) and making these
findings (i.e. as to obviousness) the court will almost invariably require the
assistance of expert evidence. The
primary evidence will be that of properly qualified expert witnesses who will
say whether or not in their opinions the relevant step would have been obvious
to a skilled man having regard to the state of the art.'"
I have already, in another context, expressed some misgivings
about the way in which the evidential basis of the parties' respective
positions in this case were dealt with before the Lord Ordinary. I am of course conscious of the need for an
appellate court to exercise great caution in differing from the trial judge's
evaluation of facts, - see Biogen v Medeva [1997] RPC 1 at page 45. But in a situation like the present, where I
consider that, in relation to the question of obviousness, there has been a
serious misdirection by the court of first instance, I consider that this court
has to do the best with the evidence led and the unchallenged findings-in-fact
of the Lord Ordinary, in reaching its own evaluation. The conclusion on obviousness (a matter of
fact) has to be evidence - based, drawing from witnesses who have the
appropriate experience and qualifications.
It seems to me that the evidence as regards prior art and the evidence
of Dr. Newton, which alone specifically addressed the question of obviousness
in the proper context of the inventive steps embraced in the claim, did provide
adequate support for Arrow's contention that what is embraced in claims 1-3
involves no inventive step for the reasons advanced by them. In my view the only evidence led by Akzo,
which came from Professor Bernstein, did not provide any evidential basis for rebutting
the position advanced by Arrow and in particular contradicting Dr. Newton. Moreover, having regard to the respective
qualifications and experience of these witnesses it seems to me that Dr.
Newton's evidence carried with it greater authority, in any event, in relation
to this chapter of the case than did Professor Bernstein's.
Conclusion
[162] To sum up, upon
discovery of the polymorphous character of tibolone, the patentee, no doubt,
sought to address the consequences of that discovery. In my judgment, however, they did so by
virtue of what is addressed in claims 4, 5 and 6. In claims 1-3, however, as they are worded,
what was being claimed was the incorporation of monoclinic P21 form
tibolone, up to a level of purity greater than 90%, which would include
100%. Claims 1-3 do not address the
means (whether robust or otherwise) whereby a purity of more than 90% of
monoclinic P2 tibolone is to be produced.
They are, as previously noted, product claims, not process claims. They seek a monopoly in the product so
described. My acceptance, shared by all
members of this court, of Arrow's submission that these claims required to be
read as embracing single crystal pharmaceutical compositions has to be kept in
mind. The composition, tibolone, had
been known since the 1960s. I accept
that the skilled man would, at the priority date, have known that it was being
developed by a drug company and was of particular interest in relation to the
treatment of menopausal complaints.
After Declercq, he knew also that the crystalline structure had been
discovered as monoclinic form. Prior to
the priority date tibolone had been put on the market in pill form. The question then comes to be, whether it
would have been an inventive step to do what claims 1-3 embrace. The answer to that question was, on the
evidence, supplied by Dr. Newton at para. 7.8 of his report where he said:
" ... by following the teaching of the
279 to make the compound and then re-crystallising from acetone as taught by
the 1984 (Declercq) Paper the skilled man would have a method of preparing pure
form 1 polymorph".
Dr. Newton then continued at para. 7.9:
"For these reasons I think that
claims 1 and 2 of the Patent are obvious since the 1984 (Declercq) Paper
already described Form 1 Tibolone. Claim
3 is likewise obvious since the 1984 (Declercq) Paper precisely describes the
crystal structure referred to in the Patent as monoclinic P21 form".
I repeat that the knowledge, or otherwise, of the discovery
of the polymorphous character of tibolone seems to me to have bedevilled the
discussion of this question and certainly led, in my view, the Lord Ordinary to
misdirect himself when dealing with the matter.
On this branch of the case, it seems to me that the question is, can it
be said to be inventive to place a single crystal of monoclinic form 1 tibolone
in a pill, tablet or capsule? Judging
matters from the viewpoint of the skilled man who was aware of only Form 1
monoclinic tibolone as at the priority date, I agree with Arrow that, on the
evidence, it cannot.
[163] Lastly, I agree
with your Lordship in the chair for the reasons given by you that claim 5 does
not fail the obviousness test and there is nothing that I can usefully add to
what your Lordship has said on that subject.
[164] In the event,
however, for the reasons given, I conclude that claims 1-3, as drafted, do fail
that test and as Akzo have not sought to amend the patent, it falls to be
revoked for that reason.