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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Lands Valuation Appeal v Monti Marino (Glasgow) Ltd [2012] ScotCS CSIH_55 (26 June 2012) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2012/2012CSIH55.html Cite as: 2013 SC 124, 2013 SLT 53, 2012 GWD 22-450, [2012] CSIH 55, [2012] ScotCS CSIH_55, [2012] RA 405 |
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LANDS VALUATION APPEAL COURT, COURT OF SESSION
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Lord Justice ClerkLord HardieLord Hodge
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[2012] CSIH 55XA62/12 OPINION OF THE LORD JUSTICE CLERK
in the Appeal by Stated Case by
GLASGOW CITY ASSESSOR Appellant;
against
MONTI MARINO (GLASGOW) LIMITED Respondent: ______
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For the appellant: Cleland; Simpson and Marwick
For the respondent: MacIver; Brodies
26 June 2012
Introduction
[1] This is an appeal by the assessor against
the decision of the Glasgow Valuation Appeal Committee (the Committee) dated 28
June 2011 on an appeal by the respondent relating to the entry in the Roll at
the 2010 Revaluation for Unit 51 at the Silverburn Shopping Centre,
Glasgow (Silverburn). The assessor entered the subjects as a shop at a net
annual value/rateable value of £159,000. The respondent contended that the
subjects should be entered as a café or restaurant at a value of £87,000. The
Committee allowed the appeal and applied the respondent's valuation.
[2] The subjects are a unit in a mall at
Silverburn in which the respondent runs a franchise of Coffee Republic. The respondent contends that the
subjects should be valued in their actual state and according to their actual
use (Ass for Stirlingshire v Myles and Binnie, 1962 SC 530; Ass for
Moray and Nairn v Elgin High Church 1962 SC 524); that food outlets
ought not to be equated with shops (Spudulike Group Ltd v Ass for
Tayside VJB, [2002] RA 91); and that restaurants at Silverburn have
been valued at a lower rate than shops (Texstyle World v Ass for
Strathclyde 1995 SC 588). The respondent contends that a comparison of the
subjects with other cafés or restaurants indicates that the subjects should be
valued at £500 psm.
[3] The assessor considers that the appeal
subjects should be valued as a shop (Wood v Aberdeenshire Ass
[1963] RA 101). They can easily be altered from restaurant use to shop use.
They are not licensed. They are immediately adjacent to shops. They are to be
distinguished from the licensed restaurants at Silverburn, which are valued by
a specific valuation scheme. The assessor contends that the decision of the
Lands Tribunal in Spudulike Group Ltd v Ass for Tayside VJB (supra),
on which the respondent relies, is unsound. The assessor values the subjects
on a zoning basis at a Zone A rate of £1250 psm. This is the rate that he has
applied to all standard-size shops in the main mall.
The decision appealed against
The Committee's findings in fact
[4] The
Committee found that Silverburn has a wide range of cafés, restaurants and
coffee shops.
[5] The subjects have a seating and table area,
drink and food preparation and sales areas and a food storage area. There are
customer toilets and a staff room. There is also seating outside.
[6] The lease provides that the only permitted
use is use as a coffee shop, which includes the sale of hot and cold drinks,
food products and merchandise, or such other uses as are within Class 3 of the
Schedule to the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) (Scotland) Order 1997,
that is to say use for the sale of food and drink on the premises.
[7] The respondent provides delicatessen food
and coffee. More than 50% of the turnover comes from the sale of food. In
other high street coffee outlets food sales account for less than 20%. By
contrast with many other coffee shops, food is made to order and there is a
table service. Although some takeaway food is provided, most customers eat in
the premises.
[8] The subjects are similar in character to
other food units at Silverburn such as Frankie and Benny's, La Tasca and
Prezzo, which are fitted out as restaurants or cafes and not as shops. All
three are valued on the basis of the assessor's scheme for licensed premises.
Nandos, Pizza Hut, Wagamamas and Home Made Burger Company are also valued as
licensed restaurants. Costa Coffee and O'Brien's are valued as mall kiosks.
The evidence was that their valuations are based on rent. The zoning method used
in the valuation of shops was not used for any of these food units.
[9] The appeal subjects were leased by the
previous tenant at an annual rental of £120,000 pa with effect from 16 June 2008. There was a six months
rent-free period. The tenant's business did not prosper. It was taken over by
the respondent. The respondent pays a rent of £90,000 pa subject to a
top-up when turnover exceeds £692,000. The turnover at the date of the hearing
was £480,000.
[10] The only other food and drink outlet at Silverburn
that has been valued as a shop is Starbucks. It is situated in the centre of
the mall. It trades on two floors. It has a considerable balcony area. It is
about twice the size of the appeal subjects and is in a more attractive
position. Starbucks has been assessed at a net annual value of £117,000. The
rent passing is £110,000.
[11] The Committee found that restaurant use was
not a sub-division of shop use. It constituted a separate general category for
valuation purposes. From evidence from other restaurants and cafes at
Silverburn, the Committee thought it fair and reasonable to apply to the appeal
subjects an overall rate of around £500 psm. This gave a net annual value/rateable
value of £87,000.
The Committee's reasons
[12] The
Committee considered that the subjects were more properly described as a
restaurant. They were used predominantly by sit-in customers. They should be
valued by comparison with other food and drink outlets at Silverburn rather
than by comparison with shops. The Committee recognised that the premises were
not licensed, but it considered that that did not affect their categorisation.
[13] The principal considerations that weighed
with the Committee were that (a) the property should be valued in its actual state;
(b) the issue in dispute had been resolved in Spudulike Group Ltd v
Ass for Tayside VJB (supra); (c) food sales constituted 50% of
the turnover of the subjects; (d) the unit was restricted to Class 3
planning purposes, and (e) the Marks and Spencer's kiosk and certain other
comparable subjects had not been entered in the Roll as shops.
Spudulike Group Ltd v Ass for Tayside VJB (supra)
[14] The subjects in that case were a fast food
restaurant operating in a shop unit in a shopping centre. The unit was
permanently open to the mall in order to create an atmosphere of an open café
or food court. To return the premises to use as a shop would cost around
£10,000, although work of a similar cost would often be done by a new
occupier. The Tribunal held that the subjects were not appropriately
categorised as a shop, even if they might sometimes have the same value as
shops or be physically proximate to them. Cafes and restaurants were in a
different category. The premises were a restaurant rather than a café because
there was substantial preparation and cooking of food on the premises, although
with fast food. The dividing line was a fine one. Because there was some
similarity with restaurants, a certain regard should be had to rental evidence
relating to cafés.
[15] Since the premises could be adapted to shop
use with only minor adjustments, they could be compared with shops unless it
was shown that restaurants commanded a different order of rent. They attracted
a substantially lower rental compared with five other proximate units of
similar size, using the zoning method of comparison, whether or not adjustments
were made for inducements. The lease was subject to a rent review cap so long
as the subjects were used as a restaurant. As the premises were similar to
cafés, it was legitimate, in the absence of comparable restaurants within the
shopping centre, to have regard to the values of cafés in the centre. Cafés
appeared to attract substantially lower rentals than shop units. In the
absence of a direct comparison, the rent passing was the best indicator of
value.
[16] The ratepayer's valuer assessed the value on
the basis that the premises were not a shop. He valued them as a café on an
overall rate per square metre derived from the rateable value of another café
in the Centre that had a similar floor area. The Tribunal concluded that the
correct description of the subjects for valuation purposes was as a restaurant
and not a shop. It valued the appeal subjects on a zoning basis at a discount
of 15% to the prevailing Zone A rate.
Valuation principles
[17] It has been established for half a century
that lands and heritages must be valued according to their actual physical
state and according to the use to which they are presently devoted, without
regard to the potential for physical adaptation, provided that such use is
beneficial and is not subject to arbitrary restrictions (Ass for Moray and
Nairn v Elgin High Church, supra). For example, shop
premises in use as office and storage space must be valued according to the
rent that premises used for offices and storage would attract (Ass for
County of Stirling v Myles and Binnie, supra).
[18] The question whether the subjects should
have been entered in the Roll as a shop or as a restaurant or café is, in my
view, pre-eminently a question of fact for the Committee. In recent years this
court has affirmed this approach in several cases; for example, on the question
whether lands and heritages were a hotel or a guest house (Woodrow v
Lothian Region Ass 2002 SC 530) or were a public house or a restaurant (Fishers
Bistro v Lothian Ass 2007 SC 671). The Lands Tribunal took a
similar approach in Spudulike Group Ltd v Ass for Tayside VJB (supra).
[19] The decision of a Committee on a question of
classification is open to review by this court only if the Committee has erred
in law in reaching its conclusion.
Submissions for the assessor
[20] Counsel for the assessor has put forward two
general propositions. The first relates to the question of principle. He
submits that on the evidence led, no reasonable Committee would have reached
the view that the subjects should be valued as a café or restaurant. He says
that however one looks at Coffee Republic, it is not a restaurant. It could certainly be characterised as a café in
normal parlance; but since no such discrete category is recognised in valuation
for rating, the assessor cannot adopt that description.
[21] Counsel's second proposition relates to the
valuation that the Committee has adopted. On the assumption that the subjects
have been rightly classified, he submits that the Committee erred in simply
adopting wholesale the valuation proposed by the respondents. That valuation
was based purely on the rental evidence on which the net annual value for
licensed restaurants and island kiosks was based. For no good reason it
completely ignored the rental evidence for the zoned shops.
[22] In my opinion, both of these propositions
are unsound.
Conclusions
The valuation principle
[23] The first proposition starts with an
acceptance that it was for the Committee to classify the subjects on the
evidence led. Having regard to the findings in fact, I cannot see what is
unreasonable in the Committee's having reached the view that the subjects were
a café or restaurant. At least five considerations pointed to that conclusion,
namely (i) the layout of the premises with tables and chairs for diners and
seats outside; (ii) the extent of food-based spending at the premises by
comparison with food outlets that are valued as shops; (iii) the fact that only
a minority of the trade is take-away; (iv) the fact that food is prepared on
the premises for service at the tables and (v) the availability of customer
toilets. In my opinion, these considerations amply warranted the Committee's
conclusion. The decision therefore discloses no error of law.
[24] Counsel for the appellant, while accepting
that the subjects could be characterised as a café in normal parlance, has
submitted the further argument that no such description is recognised in
valuation for rating. That contention, in my view, is irrelevant. The
categories in which the assessor may describe the subjects in an entry in the
Roll are not a closed list. New classes of subjects emerge from time to time;
for example mobile homes (Ass for Renfrewshire v Mitchell 1965 SC
271), moorings (Forth Yacht Marina Ltd v Ass for Fife 1976 SC
201) and ATM sites (Ass for Lanarkshire VJB v Clydesdale Bank plc 2005
SLT 167). Therefore if café
is not presently recognised as a category of lands and heritages, that is not a
conclusive objection. If it were to be expedient for valuation purposes to
recognise such a category, an assessor would be free to enter appropriate
subjects by such a description in the Roll.
[25] In the present case, the Committee, like the
Lands Tribunal in Spudulike Group Ltd v Ass for Tayside VJB (supra),
thought that restaurant was the appropriate description for subjects of this
kind. That seems to be a reasonable conclusion. In the Spudulike case
the Lands Tribunal was exercised by the distinction that it made between a
restaurant and a café. It is my impression that there may be no need to distinguish
restaurant and café as separate categories for valuation purposes. It may be
that the description "restaurant" is wide enough to include "café." The point
can looked at again if it should be necessary to decide it.
[26] The only general principle that matters on
this aspect of the case is that unnecessary subdivisions of general categories are
to be avoided. The examples of such subdivisions given by Lord Patrick in Alexander
Wood and Son v Aberdeenshire Ass ([1963] RA 101, at p 103) are the
subdivision of shops according to the goods sold; or of factories according to
the goods produced. The rule is that subjects falling within a subdivision of
a general category of lands and heritages can be given a separate description
in the roll if they command rents of a different order from the other lands and
heritages that fall within that general category (ibid).
[27] Counsel for the assessor also submitted that
similar subjects operated under Coffee Republic franchises in other valuation areas were valued as shops. That argument
is meaningless in the face of the clear findings in fact in this case. In any
event, the example that counsel cited, the Coffee Republic site at Perth, is entered on the Tayside Valuation
Roll as a café.
The valuation adopted by the
Committee
[28] The
second proposition for the assessor is, in my view, illogical. There was
evidence from the respondent's valuer that set out his valuation and the
evidence and reasoning on which it was based. The Committee was entitled to
adopt that valuation which it considered to be supported by the evidence
relating to other food outlets at the Centre. Since the Committee regarded the
subjects as a restaurant, it was entitled to reject the values taken by the
assessor from shops in the mall.
[29] I cannot understand why the Lands Tribunal
in Spudulike Group Ltd v Ass for Tayside VJB (supra),
having decided that the subjects could not correctly be described as a shop,
rejected valuation evidence based on an overall rate per square metre and
valued the subjects by the zoning method. The zoning method is the
quintessential method for valuing shops. The underlying theory of it, in my
opinion, has no application to subjects such as restaurants (cf Glasgow Ass v Schuh Ltd [2012] CSIH 40, at para [2]). In my view the valuation method accepted by the
Committee in this case was one on which it was entitled to rely.
[30] This case is another example of what can
happen when the assessor presents an all-or-nothing defence to a ratepayer's
appeal (eg as in Woodrow v Lothian Region Ass, supra).
The result in this case was that if the Committee decided on the facts that the
subjects were a restaurant, the assessor had no alternative value to put
forward on that basis. If the assessor had also mounted an esto case,
it is possible that he might have been able to argue for a higher overall rate per
square metre, based perhaps on comparisons other than those cited for the
ratepayer. The assessor was of the view that if the appeal subjects were to be
described as a restaurant, licensed restaurants would be irrelevant to the
valuation. In taking that view, in my opinion, he in effect committed himself
to the illogical position that if a restaurant situated in a mall unit happened
to be unlicensed, it could be valued only as if it were a shop.
Disposal
[31] In the normal case this appeal would fall to
be refused. But it appears that in valuing the subjects the assessor did not
take into account the outside seating area. It is not clear what implications
that omission has in relation to the valuation substituted by the Committee. I
propose therefore that if your Lordships agree that the appeal should be
refused, we should continue consideration of it to give the parties an
opportunity to resolve this difficulty. I propose that if no agreement can be
reached within four weeks, we should put the case out by order for further
procedure.
LANDS VALUATION APPEAL COURT, COURT OF SESSION
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Lord Justice ClerkLord HardieLord Hodge
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[2012] CSIH 55XA62/12 OPINION OF LORD HARDIE
in the Appeal by Stated Case by
GLASGOW CITY ASSESSOR Appellant;
against
MONTI MARINO (GLASGOW) LIMITED Respondent: ______
|
For the appellant: Cleland; Simpson & Marwick
For the respondent: MacIver; Brodies
26 June 2012
[32] For the reasons given by your Lordship in
the chair I agree that the appeal should be refused. I also agree with your
Lordship's proposal as to future procedure.
LANDS VALUATION APPEAL COURT, COURT OF SESSION
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Lord Justice ClerkLord HardieLord Hodge
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[2012] CSIH 55XA62/12 OPINION OF LORD HODGE
in the Appeal by Stated Case by
GLASGOW CITY ASSESSOR Appellant;
against
MONTI MARINO (GLASGOW) LIMITED Respondent: ______
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For the appellant: Cleland; Simpson & Marwick
For the respondent: MacIver; Brodies
26 June 2012
[33] I agree with your Lordship in the chair and
have nothing to add.