CHERRY, (FIRST) JOANNA CHERRY QC MP AND OTHERS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW [2019] ScotCS CSOH

BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just ВЈ1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!

	[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	Scottish Court of Session Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> CHERRY, (FIRST) JOANNA CHERRY QC MP AND OTHERS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW [2019] ScotCS CSOH_70 (04 September 2019) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2019/2019_CSOH_70.html Cite as: 2020 SC 13, 2019 SLT 1071, [2019] CSOH 70, [2019] ScotCS CSOH_70, 2019 GWD 28-443

JOANNE SWINSON MP, (FOURTH) IAN MURRAY MP, (FIFTH) GERAINT DAVIES MP,

(SIXTH) HYWEL WILLIAMS MP, (SEVENTH) HEIDI ALLEN MP, (EIGHTH) ANGELA

(TENTH) JENNIFER JONES, THE BARONESS JONES OF MOULESCOOMB, (ELEVENTH)

THE RT HON JANET ROYALL, THE BARONESS ROYALL OF BLAISDON, (TWELFTH)

(TWENTIETH) THE RT HON TOM BRAKE MP, (TWENTY-FIRST) KAREN BUCK MP,

MP, (TWENTY-FOURTH) RONNIE COWAN MP, (TWENTY-FIFTH) NEIL COYLE MP,

(TWENTY-SIXTH) STELLA CREASY MP, (TWENTY-SEVENTH) WAYNE DAVID MP,

(TWENTY-EIGHTH) EMMA DENT COAD MP, (TWENTY-NINTH) STEPHEN DOUGHTY

MP, (THIRTIETH) ROSIE DUFFIELD MP, (THIRTY-FIRST) JONATHAN EDWARDS MP,

(THIRTY-FOURTH) RUTH GEORGE MP, (THIRTY-FIFTH) STEPHEN GETHINS MP,

(THIRTY-SIXTH) PREET KAUR GILL MP, (THIRTY-SEVENTH) PATRICK GRADY MP,

(THIRTY-EIGHTH) KATE GREEN MP, (THIRTY-NINTH) LILIAN GREENWOOD MP,

HODGE MP, (FORTY-FOURTH) DR RUPA HUQ MP, (FORTY-FIFTH) RUTH JONES MP,

(FORTY-SIXTH) GED KILLEN MP, (FORTY-SEVENTH) PETER KYLE MP, (FORTY-

(FIFTIETH) CLIVE LEWIS MP, (FIFTY-FIRST) KERRY MCCARTHY MP, (FIFTY-SECOND)

STUART C MCDONALD MP, (FIFTY-THIRD) ANNA MCMORRIN MP, (FIFTY-FOURTH)

CAROL MONAGHAN MP, (FIFTY-FIFTH) MADELEINE MOON MP, (FIFTY-SIXTH)

LAYLA MORAN MP, (FIFTY-SEVENTH) JESS PHILLIPS MP, (FIFTY-EIGHTH) LLOYD

RUSSELL-MOYLE MP, (FIFTY-NINTH) THE RT HON LIZ SAVILLE ROBERTS MP,

(SIXTIETH) TOMMY SHEPPARD MP, (SIXTY-FIRST) ANDY SLAUGHTER MP, (SIXTY-

SECOND) OWEN SMITH MP, (SIXTY-THIRD) CHRIS STEPHENS MP, (SIXTY-FOURTH)

JO STEVENS MP, (SIXTY-FIFTH) WES STREETING MP, (SIXTY-SIXTH) PAUL SWEENEY

MP, (SIXTY-SEVENTH) GARETH THOMAS MP, (SIXTY-EIGHTH) ALISON THEWLISS

TURLEY MP, (SEVENTY-FIRST) CATHERINE WEST MP, (SEVENTY-SECOND) MATT

WESTERN MP, (SEVENTY-THIRD) MARTIN WHITFIELD MP, (SEVENTY-FOURTH) DR

PHILIPPA WHITFORD MP, (SEVENTY-FIFTH) DR PAUL WILLIAMS MP, (SEVENTY-

(SEVENTY-EIGHTH) ROSENA ALLIN-KHAN, (SEVENTY-NINTH) LUCIANA BERGER

Respondent: Johnston QC, Webster QC, N Taylor, Solicitor to HM Advocate General for Scotland

Lord Advocate (intervening party, written submissions only): Mure QC; Scottish Government

[1] By an Order in Council made on 28 August 2019 at the Court at Balmoral Her

Majesty the Queen ordered that Parliament be prorogued on a day no earlier than Monday

9 September 2019 and no later than 12 September 2019, until Monday 14 October 2019. This

petition for judicial review challenges (i) the lawfulness of the Order; and (ii) the lawfulness

of the advice to prorogue which was given to Her Majesty by the Prime Minister. It is

common ground that in making the Order Her Majesty accepted that advice.

[2] I shall not rehearse the earlier history of the proceedings. For that, reference can be

made to my Opinion of 30 August 2019 (Petition of Cherry & Others for Judicial Review [2019]

[3] On 2 September 2019 two applications for leave to intervene were lodged, the first by

the Lord Advocate and the second by Mr Graham Senior-Milne. At the outset of the

substantive hearing on 3 September 2019 I invited observations from the parties on each of

the applications. Mr O’Neill supported the proposed intervention by the Lord Advocate,

but he resisted the application by Mr Senior-Milne. Mr Johnston adopted a neutral position

in relation to both applications. Having considered the terms of both applications I was

satisfied that the Lord Advocate’s application was relevant and was likely to assist the court,

and that the other requirements of rule of court 58.19 (4) were met. I granted the

application. However, I was not satisfied that the propositions to be advanced in Mr Senior-

Milne’s application were relevant to the proceedings or that they were likely to assist the

[4] Given the desirability of the court reaching a speedy decision, I do not propose to

rehearse the arguments at length, nor do I propose to mention all of the authorities which

were referred to. I shall confine myself to setting out the gist of the parties’ positions.

[5] The executive is accountable to Parliament. The effect of the prorogation is to

insulate it entirely from accountability during the period of prorogation. The relevant

context is (i) that the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union will end (unless

the period is extended by agreement between the Government and the EU) some eight

weeks after the date on which prorogation takes effect and less than three weeks after the

prorogation ends; (ii) the Government continues to negotiate with the European Union in

connection with a proposed withdrawal agreement to take effect immediately after exit day;

(iii) the Prime Minister has declared himself content to see the United Kingdom leave the

European Union without having concluded such a withdrawal agreement; (iv) the Prime

Minister’s policy approach to withdrawal from the EU without a withdrawal agreement

being in place is markedly different from that of his predecessor; (v) a majority of members

of the House of Commons has expressed its opposition to that course; (vi) preparations are

being made and will continue to require to be made in anticipation of the withdrawal of the

UK from the EU on 31 October 2019; (vii) those preparations include both administrative

arrangements in anticipation of withdrawal without a withdrawal agreement being in place,

and legislative measures to prepare the statute book for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU;

(viii) Parliament has been engaged in ongoing scrutiny of the arrangements being made by

the Government in anticipation of withdrawal from the EU; (ix) elected representatives in

both the Scottish and UK Parliaments require to participate in the preparation of the statute

book for exit day; and (x) the present administration is a minority Government whose ability

to command the confidence of the House of Commons has not yet been tested. In the

particular context, for the Prime Minister to advise and procure the prorogation of

Parliament for five weeks may properly be characterised as an unlawful abuse of executive

power which calls for the intervention of the Court. The abuse of power lies in the timing

and duration of the prorogation; its effect on accountable government; and the marked

absence of any compelling justification offered in that regard by the Prime Minister for that

timing and length. It may be inferred that a purpose of the decision under review is to

insulate the executive from Parliamentary scrutiny, for what (in the context of the

anticipated withdrawal of the UK from the EU on 31 October 2019) is a significant period of

time. In any event, the decision under review has a disproportionate impact on the principle

of responsible government, where there is no compelling justification for that impact. A

prorogation of five weeks is disproportionate to a purpose of bringing the current session of

Parliament to an end and paving the way for a Queen’s speech at the opening of the new

session. There is a significant distinction between such a recess (which is voted upon by

each House and is no more than a periodic adjournment) and prorogation. During such a

recess: (a) either House may be recalled; (b) ongoing Parliamentary business does not fall; (c)

Parliamentary committees may continue to sit and to scrutinise the executive; and (d)

Members of Parliament may continue to table questions to the executive. None of these is

possible during prorogation. In all the circumstances, and in the absence of any other

explanation for the duration of the prorogation, the court may infer that a purpose of the

decision under review is to curtail significantly the opportunity for Parliament to scrutinise

the policies and actions of the executive at this time, and to insulate it entirely from

Parliamentary scrutiny throughout the period of the prorogation. That would not be a

proper purpose of prorogation. The effect which prorogation will have on the principle of

responsible government for five weeks at this time calls for close scrutiny of the justification

which is advanced. Given the particular context, there is a burden on the executive to

provide a clear and compelling justification for a decision to deprive the sovereign UK

Parliament of the ability to sit for a period of five weeks. No such compelling justification

has been advanced. The impact on the principle of representative government is wholly

disproportionate to such justification as has been advanced by the executive. In all these

circumstances the intervener considers that the Court should reduce the Order in Council

(1) to pronounce a declarator that it is ultra vires et separatim unconstitutional for

any Minister of the Crown, including the Prime Minister, with the intention

and aim of denying before exit day sufficient time for proper parliamentary

consideration of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European

Union, to purport to advise the Queen to prorogue the Union Parliament;

(2) to order reduction of the Order in Council of 28 August 2019:

(3) to interdict Ministers of the Crown in right of the United Kingdom from

acting upon the Order in Council of 28 August 2019 proroguing the Union

He submitted that Parliamentary sovereignty is a fundamental principle of the UK

constitution. The executive must act within the powers permitted it by Parliament, and

must exercise those powers for the purposes for which they were left with it by Parliament.

The prerogative is a source of power which is only available for a case not covered by

statute. The executive’s prerogative power cannot be used to defeat or frustrate domestic

rights which have been created by Parliament. This includes rights under EU law (R (Miller)

v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 [2018] AC 61, at paras 44-5).

The executive is politically accountable to Parliament for its exercise of its powers. If and

insofar as the executive would use the power of prorogation of Parliament to avoid its

political accountability to Parliament, or to impede Parliament from exercising its control

over the executive, the executive is acting unlawfully. Reference was made to Moohan v Lord

Advocate [2014] UKSC 67, 2015 SC (UKSC) 1, per Lord Hodge at para 35. The executive’s

political accountability to Parliament and its legal accountability to the courts are not

mutually exclusive, but complementary constitutional checks on the power of the executive.

They may overlap (R (Barclay) v Lord Chancellor (No 2) [2014] UKSC 41 [2015] AC 276, per

Baroness Hale at para 57). It is for the court to ensure the rule of law by providing an

effective remedy against any constitutional violations (Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor

[7] The Claim of Right Act 1689 regulates and constrains the executive’s power to

prorogue Parliament. It outlaws any abusive use by the executive of the power of

prorogation to avoid, impede or restrain Parliament from carrying out its constitutional

function of addressing and redressing grievances and amending, strengthening and

preserving the law. Therefore the exercise of the executive’s power to prorogue Parliament

is a matter which is justiciable before the courts and is reviewable on the grounds of

irrationality or breach of other judicial review principles (Cf R (Sandiford) v Foreign Secretary

[2014] UKSC 44, [2014] 1 WLR 2697, per the joint judgment of Lord Carnwath and

[8] The executive’s exercise of the power of prorogation of Parliament can only be

exercised for a proper purpose. The exercise of the power, even for a proper purpose, is

subject to review on ordinary principles of legality, rationality and procedural impropriety

in the same way as any other executive action (R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and

Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61 [2009] 1 AC 453, per Lord Hoffmann at para 35,

[9] The executive is subject in the present case to the obligation owed to the court by a

public authority facing a challenge to its decision “to co-operate and to make candid

disclosure, by way of affidavit, of the relevant facts and (so far as they are not apparent from

contemporaneous documents which have been disclosed) the reasoning behind the decision

challenged in the judicial review proceedings” (Belize Alliance of Conservation v Department of

Environment [2004] UKPC 6, [2004] Env LR 38, per Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe at para 86).

The Prime Minister has declined to lodge an affidavit. Accordingly, the court should subject

the reasons given to anxious scrutiny. The executive ought to be required to demonstrate

that the most compelling of justifications exist for the exercise of the prorogation power in

this way and at this time because the manner in which the power is being exercised affects

individuals’ fundamental rights and has profoundly intrusive and distortive effects on the

constitution (R v Ministry of Defence, Ex p Smith [1996] QB 517, per Sir Thomas Bingham

[10] It is clear that the executive’s exercise of the power of prorogation in the present case

involves the improper exercise of this power ‘‘for an alien purpose or in a wholly

unreasonable manner’’, namely: to prevent or impede Parliament from holding the

executive politically to account in the run up to Exit Day; to prevent or impede Parliament

from legislating on the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union; to allow the

executive, notwithstanding that it has no Parliamentary mandate to do so, to pursue a policy

of a no deal Brexit without further Parliamentary interference. The executive has purported

to use the power of prorogation as a pre-emptive strike intending to silence and disempower

Parliament for the crucial period in the immediate run up to Exit Day.

[11] Further, the executive’s exercise of the power of prorogation in the present case is

unlawful because it runs contrary to the intention of Parliament by rendering futile, inter

alia, the provisions of Sections 9 and 13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 which

clearly provide that Parliament should have proper time and opportunity to give full

consideration to and, if approved, legislate to give full effect to the terms of any withdrawal

of the United Kingdom from the European Union, with or without a deal. When and if

Parliament passes the necessary statute, then and only then does the executive have

authority to effect the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU in accordance with

[12] The executive’s exercise of the power of prorogation in the present case is vitiated by

error in law, because it is wrongly predicated on the idea that it has the authority to cause or

allow the United Kingdom to leave the EU on the basis of no deal. Primary legislation is

required from Parliament to conclude the Article 50 TEU process by authorising the

executive to end the United Kingdom’s membership of the EU, whether on the basis of the

terms of a concluded deal or on the basis that no agreement on the terms of withdrawal

could ultimately be reached. The executive has not been given the necessary express

statutory authority by Parliament to allow it to pursue a policy of no deal Brexit. Given that

the exercise of the power of prorogation at issue is aimed, at least in part, to facilitate the

achievement, if so advised, of an executive policy (“no deal Brexit”) which is unlawful in the

absence of express statutory authorisation, the exercise of prorogation in this way is itself

[13] Mr Johnston submitted that there are important differences between statutory and

prerogative powers. The exercise of some prerogative powers is justiciable, but the exercise

of others is not. The court's role in relation to prerogative powers is dependent on the

nature and the subject matter of the power or its exercise, particularly on whether the subject

matter is justiciable (R (Sandiford) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

[2014] 1 WLR 2697, per the joint judgement of Lord Carnwath and Lord Mance at paras 52,

60 and 61). Whether the exercise of a prerogative power is reviewable depends on the

subject-matter and the context of the power and of the challenge. Some functions exercised

or decisions taken are non-justiciable. Among them are matters of high policy. The courts

will not seek to impose legal controls on such matters. Here the claim is non-justiciable.

There is no statute or source of law that regulates prorogation or the advice given to the

Queen in relation to prorogation. The advice involved high policy and political judgement,

not law. The court does not have the tools or standards to assess the legality of political

advice. This is political territory and decision-making which cannot be measured against

legal standards, but rather only by political judgments. The law does not superimpose on

political considerations additional legal standards. That would make the political process

unworkable. Reference was made to Shergill v Kaira [2015] AC 359, per the joint judgment of

Lords Neuberger, Sumption and Hodge at para 40; Council of the Civil Service Unions v

Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, per Lord Roskill at p 411D-F; A v Secretary of State

for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68, per Lord Bingham at para 29; Wheeler v Secretary of

State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC 1409 (Admin), at para 34; McClean v First

Secretary of State [2017] EWHC 3174 (Admin)(DC), per Sales LJ at paras 21-22; and Robinson v

Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32, per Lord Bingham at para 12 and Lord

Hoffmann at para 33. The petitioners seek to rely on a denial of “sufficient” time for

“proper” consideration of the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. There are no judicial or

manageable standards by reference to which the court could determine that claim. The

courts are not the right place for matters of high policy and political judgement to be sorted

out. Accountability for such matters is to Parliament and the electorate. The very fact that

the court is faced with trying to weigh political judgments and the reasons for which they

were reached suggests that the claim here is outside the territory where legal standards can

[14] A more specific point which follows on from that is that Parliament has recently, in

the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act 2019, s 3, made its own clear and express

provision about when it wishes to sit. It provides in the period covered by that Act (which

goes to the end of this calendar year) that Parliament may be prorogued at some point; and

it makes provision for it to be recalled if that is necessary for a report to be laid about

progress in formation of the Northern Ireland Executive. Where Parliament wishes to lay

down the law about when it should be in session and not prorogued, it has a means of doing

that, and it has recently used that means. Parliament has occupied this area for itself.

[15] Wider constitutional considerations also confirm that decisions about prorogation or

[16] Parliament is the master of its own proceedings, rules and privileges and has

exclusive control over its own affairs. The separation of powers entails that the courts will

not interfere. It is for Parliament to decide when it will sit and it routinely does so. It is not

for the courts to devise further restraints on prorogation which go beyond the limits which

[17] The exercise by the Sovereign of the power to prorogue upon receipt of advice from

the prime Minister is governed by constitutional convention alone. The courts cannot

enforce a political convention. The sanction for non-observance of a convention is political,

[18] There is no material difference between Scots law and English law as regards any of

the issues in the case. The petitioners do not actually identify anything that points to a

difference in result or approach between Scots law and English law.

[19] Second, the claim is academic. The complaint is that Parliament is going to be

denied the opportunity to sit and to call the executive to account. However, provision has

already been made to enable Parliament to sit for certain periods up to the end of October -

in the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act 2019, s 3 and in the Order in Council.

That being so, Parliament will be sitting. That renders the claim an academic one.

[20] Third, the claim that the Claim of Right Act 1689 is breached by the Order in Council

is non-justiciable. The words "Parliaments be frequently called and allowed to sit" provides

no legal limit or standard by which the court can judge the legality of any prorogation. Even

if there were some legal standard, there is nothing to support any breach of this provision,

because the words "Parliaments be frequently called and allowed to sit" contemplate

Parliament being adjourned, prorogued, dissolved - certainly not sitting in permanent

session. Any prorogation before the end of October must comply with section 3 of the

Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act 2019. Any prorogation that cut across the

[21] Prorogation does not frustrate the will of Parliament as expressed in the primary

legislation relied upon by the petitioners. It is not the purpose of prorogation to frustrate

s 13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. In any case, s 13 doesn’t apply to exit

without a deal. Neither does prorogation cut across s 20, or the provisions of s 3 of the

[22] The application is not concerned with the legal requirements of exiting the EU under

Art 50 of the Treaty on European Union. It is concerned with prorogation of Parliament.

The fact Parliament may not be sitting for five weeks does not of itself have any direct effect

on individuals' EU law rights. It is not correct to say that it is unlawful for the United

Kingdom to leave the EU with no deal unless there is further legislation. Section 1(1) of the

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 provided the requisite legislative

authority for the Prime Minister to notify the intention of the UK to withdraw from the EU

under Article 50(2). On 29 March 2017 the Prime Minister formally notified the EU of the

UK’s intention to withdraw under Article 50(2), and the European Council accepted that

notification. Withdrawal from the EU has therefore been approved by Parliament in the

unconditional form of the 2017 Act, enacted in the knowledge and understanding of the

meaning and effect of Article 50 TEU, that with or without an agreement the UK would exit

the EU upon the expiry of the Article 50 period. Withdrawal from the EU without an

agreement would not, in those circumstances, be contrary to Miller and would not, as the

[23] While in accordance with the duty of candour the respondent had disclosed

the documents showing reasons for the advice, the respondent's position is that

the advice is non-justiciable and the courts should not enquire into the reasons

or scrutinise their adequacy. However, the reasons are lawful, relevant and legitimate.

[24] This part of my opinion is shorter than it would have been had I had the advantage

of greater time to prepare it. Nevertheless, I have endeavored to outline briefly my views on

the material issues. I have sought to explain why it is that the parties have won or lost.

Once again, I am grateful to counsel and those instructing them for all that they have done

to facilitate the presentation of arguments at the hearing yesterday. That has been of

[25] In my opinion the authorities discussed during the submissions vouch the following

propositions. The exercise of some prerogative powers in some circumstances is justiciable,

in other cases it is not. The court's role in relation to prerogative powers is dependent on the

nature and the subject matter of the power or its exercise, particularly on whether the subject

matter is justiciable. Whether the exercise of a prerogative power is reviewable depends on

the subject-matter and the context of the power and of the challenge. Some functions

exercised or decisions taken are non-justiciable. Among them are matters of high policy and

political judgement. The court does not have the tools or standards to assess the legality of

such matters. That is political territory and decision-making which cannot be measured

against legal standards, but rather only by political judgments. The courts will not seek to

superimpose legal controls on such matters. Rather, the accountability for them is to

[26] I am not persuaded that any of the matters relied upon by the petitioners or the Lord

Advocate result in the claim being justiciable. In my view the advice given in relation to the

prorogation decision is a matter involving high policy and political judgement. This is

political territory and decision-making which cannot be measured against legal standards,

but only by political judgements. Accountability for the advice is to Parliament and,

[27] I do not accept the submission that the prorogation contravenes the rule of law, and

that the claim is justiciable because of that. In my opinion there has been no contravention

of the rule of law. The power to prorogue is a prerogative power and the Prime Minister

had the vires to advise the sovereign as to its exercise. The executive is accountable to

[28] Parliament is the master of its own proceedings, rules and privileges and has

exclusive control over its own affairs. The separation of powers entails that the courts will

not interfere. It is for Parliament to decide when it will sit and it routinely does so. It is not

for the courts to devise further restraints on prorogation which go beyond the limits which

Parliament has chosen to provide. Parliament can sit before and after the prorogation. It

has recently, in the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act 2019, s 3, exercised its

legislative power to make provision about periods when it should sit.

[29] That is sufficient to dispose of the petition. However, since the matter may go

further I shall also provide my views on other issues which were raised.

[30] I see some force in Mr Johnston’s submission that the claim that the Claim of Right

Act 1689 is breached by the Order in Council is non-justiciable. However, I prefer to decide

this issue on the more straightforward ground that there is nothing to support any breach of

the provisions of the Act. I accept Mr Johnston’s submissions on that point.

Does prorogation frustrate the will of Parliament by rendering existing legislation futile?

[31] In my opinion Mr Johnston’s legal analysis of the legislative provisions upon which

Mr O’Neill relied is also correct. Prorogation does not render those provisions futile.

[32] Given that the two bulwarks of the petitioners’ argument that prorogation is

unlawful are not made out (ie because it was said to be in breach of the Claim of Right Act

1689 and that it rendered some existing legislation futile), I do not think it necessary to say

much about any of the other matters which were discussed. None of the matters founded

upon by the petitioners or the Lord Advocate cause me to conclude that prorogation is

[33] I am not much attracted to Mr Johnston’s submission that the petitioners’ claim is

academic. However, I am inclined to agree with him that the application is concerned with

prorogation, not with the legal requirements of exiting the EU under Art 50 of the Treaty on

European Union; and that the fact Parliament may not be sitting for five weeks does not of

itself have any direct effect on individuals' EU law rights. I am also inclined to agree with

his analysis of Miller and the consequences of the subsequent legislation.

[34] Finally, I should say something about the reasons for the prorogation given by the

respondent. Even if, contrary to my view, the claim is justiciable, in my opinion the context

in which those reasons would fall to be assessed would be that political judgements may be

relevant and legitimate considerations. On the basis of the material which I have seen I am

[35] I shall refuse the petition.

Scottish Court of Session Decisions