THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PUBLIC LTD COMPANY AGAINST (FIRST) ALISON DONNELLY AND ANOTHER [2020] ScotCS CSOH

BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!

	[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	Scottish Court of Session Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PUBLIC LTD COMPANY AGAINST (FIRST) ALISON DONNELLY AND ANOTHER [2020] ScotCS CSOH_106 (16 December 2020) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2020/2020_CSOH_106.html Cite as: [2020] CSOH 106, [2020] ScotCS CSOH_106, 2021 GWD 3-41

[1] In this case, which is not the first litigation concerning the parties, the pursuer seeks

reduction (in whole or in part, as afterwards noted) of inter alia the discharge of the first

defender (“the debtor”) following her grant of a trust deed (“the Trust Deed”) and which

became a protected trust deed. The second defender, who was the last trustee under the

debtor’s Trust Deed (“the trustee”), did not enter the process. No reduction is sought of the

discharge of the trustee. The purpose of the reduction is to enable the pursuer to set -off its

now-admitted liability to compensate the debtor for mis-selling payment protection

1) In the first place, she argues that even if reduction were granted, there is no

concursus debiti et crediti, meaning that the pursuer and debtor are not each a creditor

and debtor (in its or her own right) in respect of the other; and which is a

prerequisite for set off. The factual bases for this line of defence are that:

(i) notwithstanding the transfer of business under a ring-fenced transfer

scheme, the pursuer is not a creditor of the debtor in respect of her pre-

(ii) separately, any right against the debtor in respect of her pre- discharge

indebtedness was assigned to Max Recovery Limited (“MRL”); and

(iii) in any event, it was an entity other than the pursuer which had

compromised the debtor’s PPI claim. More specifically, the debtor’s

position is that it was Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc (company no

SCO4551) (“Group”)) who dealt with and ultimately compromised her

PPI claim (“the agency issue”). This gives rise to several subsidiary

If the debtor succeeded on one or more of these lines, which are presented in the

alternative and are not interdependent, then the pursuer had no title to sue and its

2) The debtor also maintains that the pursuer has not pled a relevant ground of

reduction. This was advanced on two broad fronts: a challenge to the ground of error

(which was the pursuer’s primary ground) and a challenge to the pursuer’s reliance

on a rule of English trust law derived from In re Hastings-Bass (deceased) [1975] Ch

i) The debtor’s challenge to the relevancy of error as a ground of reduction

ii) Further, it was argued that the grounds of challenge to the act of a

trustee were circumscribed, and doubly so, in respect of the acts of a

trustee of an insolvency process. In respect of a trustee, the only ground

of reduction was a want of deliberation, which the pursuer had not

pled, and reduction of the discharge of a trustee of an insolvency

iii) As a further fall-back, it was contended that partial reduction of the

3) Even if the pursuer has title to sue and has pled a relevant ground of reduction,

the debtor argued that the pursuer is precluded from maintaining its claim on the

4) Lastly, the debtor argued that even if a ground of reduction were established,

in the whole circumstances of this case it was inequitable to grant reduction.

Distinguishing between the pursuer and the entity formerly known as “Royal Bank of

[3] In light of the title to sue issue it is important to distinguish between the pursuer

(with registered number SC083026) and its corporate predecessor, formerly known as “The

Royal Bank of Scotland plc” and registered under company number SC090312 (“RBS”). The

pursuer’s position, which the debtor does not accept, is that it succeeded to the rights and

liabilities of RBS (and to any pending action by or against RBS) by virtue of an arrangement

in the form of a ring-fenced transfer scheme (“the RFTS”) under Part VII of the Financial

Services Markets Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”) sanctioned by this Court on 22 March 2018 (“the

corporate successor issue”). The debtor does not advance a positive case that contradicts the

documentation or court order giving effect to the RFTS on which the pursuer relies . The

debtor’s position is to put the pursuer to proof on the corporate successor issue. (I deal with

this issue below.) There are other companies and brands within the RBS group of

companies. I shall refer to these collectively as “the RBS Group”. The ultimate parent

[4] The debtor borrowed sums from RBS between 1997 and 2003. In due course, being

unable to repay these sums, the debtor granted the Trust Deed on 29 August 2006. A trust

deed is a form of personal insolvency first provided for in statutory form under Schedule 5

of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 (“the 1985 Act”, “Schedule 5” and the “Trust Deed

process”, as the context requires). While the 1985 Act was subsequently amended, the

provisions as originally enacted applied to the debtor’s Trust Deed. RBS made three claims

in the Trust Deed process, totalling £31,992.84. The Trust Deed became a “protected” Trust

Deed (“the PTD”) on 24 October 2006. (One of the many issues is whether that Trust Deed

was caught by an assignation by RBS of all accounts subject to protected trust deeds made

between 8 November 2001 and 11 October 2006 in favour of MRL (“the assignation issue”).)

[5] RBS was the only creditor who submitted a claim to the trustee in the Trust Deed

process, a point that was not fully appreciated until the proof in this action. As will be seen,

this may affect the scope of the reduction sought (in the belief that there were other

creditors, the pursuer initially sought reduction of inter alia the discharge of the debtor, but

“only in so far as it affects the interests of the” pursuer), and whether the reduction sought is

(as the debtor contends) an impermissible recasting of the insolvency regime. The trustee

granted the debtor’s discharge on 11 December 2013 and she paid a first and final dividend

on 31 December 2013, of approximately 20.8 p in the £. Accordingly, the dividend paid to

RBS was £6,654.03. The amount unpaid, and in respect of which the debtor was discharged,

was £25,343.81 (“the unpaid balance”). The effect of the debtor’s discharge is not to

extinguish the liability for the unpaid balance, but it does preclude the creditor (RBS and, if

the successor issue is determined in favour of the pursuer, the pursuer) from asserting set off

[6] Within 6 weeks of the payment of the final dividend, the debtor made a claim

(through a claims company) that she had been mis-sold payment protection insurance by

RBS (“the debtor’s PPI claim”). (While each instance of mis-selling was treated as a separate

claim, it is not necessary to distinguish between these.) After sundry correspondence with

Group between February and April 2014 the debtor accepted an offer of compensation made

by Group of £11,927.39 to settle her PPI claim (“the settlement sum”). The interposition of

Group gives rise to the agency issue: the pursuer maintains that Group was acting as the

agent of RBS, whereas the debtor disputes that proposition. It is in this context that the

agency issue and corporate successor issues arise: at the time of compromising the debtor’s

PPI claim, was Group acting as the agent of RBS and did the pursuer succeed to RBS’s rights

[7] It is important to note that the debtor’s PPI claim arose out of dealings pre-dating her

discharge. In other words, the debtor’s PPI claim (made against “Royal Bank of Scotland”),

was an asset that might have been ingathered in the Trust Deed process (eg by a claim

against RBS). It is a matter of agreement that at no time during the currency of the Trust

Deed process was the debtor aware she had claims for mis-selling of PPI. It was also

common ground that following the debtor’s discharge, she was free to pursue her PPI claim.

It is implicit within that common position that the debtor’s PPI claim was re-vested in her

upon her discharge. I proceed on the basis that the debtor’s PPI claims “re-vested” in her,

[8] While a part-payment of £1,111.63 was made to the debtor in respect of the

settlement of her PPI claim on 2 April 2014, no further payments were made. As a

consequence, the debtor was obliged to raise an action against Group for payment of the

balance of the settlement sum (“the outstanding settlement sum”), which she did in August

2014 (“the payment action”). The payment action has had a protracted history. After legal

debate (heard in June 2015), the sheriff at first instance found against the pursuer in that

action (whom I have defined as the debtor) in February 2016. However, the pursuer in that

action successfully appealed to the Sheriff Appeal Court (which decided in her favour in

January 2017). The subsequent appeal by the defender in that action (ie by Group) was

refused by the Inner House in November 2019. The defender in the payment action applied

for permission to appeal (“PTA”) to the Supreme Court in early March 2020. As noted

below (ar para [98]]), the PTA in the payment action was refused shortly before this opinion

[9] The Inner House in the payment action determined that the debtor had been

discharged in respect of the unpaid balance and which sum, therefore, could not be set off

against the outstanding settlement sum due by Group in respect of the PPI settlement. It

will be noted that at that point in time, it was Group’s position that it was the counterparty

and principal obligant in respect of the settlement sum. The agency issue had not yet been

The pursuer’s rationale in seeking reduction of the discharge in this action

[10] The pursuer’s commercial rationale for seeking reduction in these proceedings of the

debtor’s discharge is to overcome the adverse decision of the Inner House in the payment

action. The pursuer’s Senior Counsel, Mr McBrearty QC, acknowledged that the availability

of set off (or of “balancing of accounts in bankruptcy”, as it is described in Scots law) was

only relatively lately appreciated and for which reduction of the debtor’s discharge was now

necessary, following the adverse decision of the Inner House in the payment action.

Mr McBrearty was equally frank in acknowledging that the impetus for this action were the

comments made by Lord Reed in the postscript to Dooneen Ltd v Mond issued by the

Supreme Court on 31 October 2018 ((Dooneen Ltd v Mond [2018] UKSC 54, 2018 SLT 1255)

[11] The issues in Dooneen were regarded as sufficiently related to the issues in the

payment action for the Inner House to sist the latter pending the Supreme Court’s

determination of the appeal in Dooneen. As in this case, the debtor in Dooneen made a claim

for PPI mis-selling which related to events pre-dating her Trust Deed but which was not

ingathered or otherwise resolved in the Trust Deed process. Lord Reed’s postscript in

22. This is scarcely a satisfactory outcome. An asset which vested in the trustee

for the benefit of the creditors and ought to have been applied to payment of the

debts due to them, will instead be paid to the debtor, merely because the trust was

administered in ignorance of its existence. One might question whether the law is

23. Prior to the hearing of the appeal, the court informed the parties that it

would be assisted by discussion of the legal consequences of a mistake in this

context: in particular, whether the relevant acts of the trustee might be reduced if

they were the result of an error as to the extent of the trust estate. In posing that

question, the court had it in mind that on the construction of the Trust Deed which it

has now upheld, the acceding creditors effectively conferred on the trustee a power

to extinguish their rights as against the debtor by determining that a dividend should

be a final distribution; and that the determination in the present case had been made

in ignorance of a relevant - indeed, critical - consideration. It also had it in mind that

reduction is a discretionary remedy, which may be granted on terms, or withheld,

where that is appropriate to protect the rights of third parties. The court drew the

attention of the parties to the Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper on

Supplementary and Miscellaneous Issues relating to Trust Law (2011) (No 148),

Chapter 14, ‘Error and other defects in trustees’ exercise of discretionary powers’,

and the Scottish Law Commission Report on Trust Law (2014) (Scot Law Com No

239), Chapter 19, ‘Defects in the exercise of trustees’ powers’, where relevant

authorities are discussed. Those authorities include the decisions of the House of

Lords in Dundee General Hospitals Board of Management v Bell’s Trustees 1952 SC (HL)

78; [1952] 1 All ER 896 and Hunter v Bradford Property Trust Ltd 1970 SLT 173, to

which one might add the case of Whyte v Knox (1858) 20 D 970. In the event, the

parties declined to make submissions on these matters. In those circumstances, it

would be inappropriate for the court to consider them further on this occasion.”

[12] The background just noted gives rise to a number of issues. In addition to the

standard pleas (as to the relevancy of the pursuer’s case or of it being unfounded in fact), the

debtor asserts that the pursuer has no title to sue (first plea); that the action is incompetent

(second plea); that reduction is inequitable (eighth plea); that the deed or deeds under

challenge were not granted under any relevant error or with any lack of due deliberation

(ninth plea), and that the pursuer is otherwise preclu ded from maintaining this action (eg

because barred by mora, taciturnity and acquiescence (fifth plea) or personal bar (sixth plea)

[13] Parties produced a joint statement of 13 issues. These may be condensed into four

1. Whether there is the requisite consursus debiti et crediti between the pursuer and

debtor (which is the essen tial basis of the debtor’s plea of no title to sue) such as

to enable the outstanding settlement sum to be retained by the pursuer and used

to set off and extinguish the unpaid balance to that extent. This encompasses the

successor issue, the agency issue and the interpretation and effect of the RFTS .

All of these issues must be determined in favour of the pursuer, for the purposes

of its proposed set off of the outstanding settlement sum against the unpaid

2. Whether error or ignorance of the trustee or creditors is a relevant ground for the

reduction of the discharge of a debtor from the Trust Deed, and if that is the case

in respect of error or ignorance in general, whether that applies where it is either

(a) error about or ignorance of the existence of an obligation of the creditor who

(or whose successor) seeks reduction, or (b) error or ignorance which the trustee

4. Whether the pursuer is precluded from seeking reduction by mora, taciturnity

and acquiescence, or whether it has waived any right to seek reduction. (The

debtor’s plea of personal bar was not maintained in submissions.)

[14] As noted above, it was assumed that RBS was one of several creditors in the Trust

Deed process. It was for that reason that the pursuer sought partial reduction ( in the terms

set out in para [5], above). However, once it was appreciated that RBS was the only creditor

who submitted a claim in the debtor’s Trust Deed process, the pursuer moved to amend its

summons to remove all references to creditors in the plural. The debtor resisted this,

essentially on the bases (i) that it would introduce an inconsistency between the pursuer’s

position in this litigation and in the payment action, and, under reference to my comments

in Auctaric v Glasgow Stage Crew Ltd [2019] CSOH 111, [2020] SLT 331, (ii) that so late an

amendment was not commensurate with the practice of the commercial court. In my view,

it would be artificial in the extreme to hold a party to a certain factual position, now known

to be incorrect, in circumstances where the factual matter, which was straightforward and

easily verifiable, was on an ancillary matter. While the introduction of the correct factual

position (that RBS was the only creditor) affected one of the debtor’s arguments ( that partial

reduction of the discharge amounted to an impermissible refashioning of the insolvency

regime to the detriment of other creditors), that was a relatively minor plank of the debtor’s

case. The debtor otherwise identified no prejudice flowing from the amendment . I allowed

[15] A number of documents were put to more than one witness and it is therefore

[16] The debtor signed the Trust Deed on 29 August 2006. Its declared purpose was “to

transfer” to her trustee “as trustee for my creditors as at the date” of the signing of the Trust

Deed, “the rights and assets which would have vested in a permanent trustee in terms of

section 31, 32 and 33” of the 1985 Act (which was defined as the debtor’s “Estate”). It is clear

that the intention was a universal transfer of her whole estate for the behoof of her creditors.

The trustee’s powers under the Trust Deed included the usual powers to defend or bring

any court action or other proceedings (power (v)) and to compromise claims enforceable by

or against the trustee or the Estate (power (vi)). I find that in light of this language it would

have been open to the trustee to advance the debtor’s PPI claim with a view to recovering

sums for the benefit of her creditors. Parties also referred to the terms of the Trust Deed

governing the debtor’s discharge (“This Trust Deed is granted by me on condition that the

creditors acceding to the Trust Deed shall discharge me of all my debts due to them on

termination of this Trust Deed…”) in the context of their competing submissions as to

whether the grant of the debtor’s discharge was a unilateral or gratuitous deed.

[17] Under cover of her letter of 7 January 2014 the then trustee (who had succeeded the

original trustee named in the Trust Deed, and who was called as the second defender in this

action) submitted the Form 11 (statement of realisation and distr ibution of an estate under a

protected trust deed), together with copies of the Minutes and Report of the final meeting of

creditors and the scheme of division/summary of adjudication on creditors’ claims (“the

scheme of division”). The scheme of division recorded the three agreed or accepted claims

the trustee accepted from RBS, and the dividend of 20.8p in the £ payable in respect of those

claims. As noted above, RBS was the only creditor. A blank Form 5 (letter of discharge of

debtor) under schedule 5 of the 1985 Act was also appended to that letter. The Accountant

in Bankruptcy acknowledged this correspondence by return and noted that the trustee’s

[18] RBS, National Westminster Bank plc (“NatWest”) and Group entered into an

agreement dated 30 June 2000 (“the General Agency Agreement”). By this time NatWest

and RBS were both wholly-owned subsidiaries of Group. The recitals narrated that RBS

wished to enable NatWest to carry out certain activities on behalf of it (“the RBS Activities”),

that NatWest wished to enable RBS to carry out certain activities on behalf of it (“the

NatWest Activities”), and that each of RBS and NatWest wished to arrange for Group to

perform on their respective behalf “certain activities relating to the management, control

and supervision of their respective businesses (collectively “the Group Activities”) . (There

[19] The General Agency Agreement was divided into three parts consistent with the

three grants of agency just described. It suffices to note that in Part III, each of RBS and

NatWest appointed Group “as their agent to perform, in their respective names, the Group

Activities on behalf of and for the account of… RBS”: clause 3.1. Part III also provided for

Group to enter into any form of commitment or undertaking on behalf of inter alia RBS in

respect of any Group Activities (clause 3.3) and Group was obliged (by clause 3.4) “at all

times to disclose to customers that it was acting as agent of… RBS prior to entering into any

commitment in such capacity”. The consequences of non-compliance with clause 34 are not

[20] The pursuer produced a pro forma checklist, described as a “Loanguard Checklist”

dating from July 2002 (“the Checklist”), and which it was said would have been completed

by the debtor. The pursuer’s purpose is to rely on the statement printed at the foot, stating

“Agency agreements exist between members of The Royal Bank of Scotland Group. ” It is a

matter of agreement that the debtor has no recollection of completing a Checklist and no

[21] Among the productions was a “To Whom it May Concern” letter dated 8 December

2006 on Group-headed notepaper (“the Notice of Assignation”). Under the heading,

“Notice of Assignment/Assignation of Insolvent Accounts”, it provided:

“Please take notice that on 8 December 2006 The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (“RBS”)

1. All known accounts which are subject to an existing Bankruptcy Order or

Sequestration Order made between 8 November 2001 and 11 October 2006

2. All known accounts which are subject to an existing interim order and/or

approved Individual Voluntary Arrangement or Protected Trust Deed made

between 8 November 2001 and 11 October 2006 where RBS is entitled to

Please note that due to the nature of the business and services provided by RBS they

may be identified as a Creditor in respect of these accounts under various different

corporate identities. Details of these identities are set out at the end of this letter .

This document serves as a Note of Assignment/Assignation of the accounts to Max

and where the Debtor is resident in England and Wales constitutes a notice of

Any future dividends and correspondence in respect of these accounts must

therefore be sent to Max at MRL, PO Box 6302, Bournemouth, Dorset, BH1 9DY.

In order to facilitate the process of assignment, we confirm that you are authorised to

provide Eversheds LLP a full list of those accounts you are administering which

[22] The pursuer relies on the transfer to it of the relevant assets and liabilities of RBS and

effected by the RFTS. In particular, the pursuer’s position is that the debtor’s obligation

under the loans (owed to RBS) and RBS’s liability to the debtor in respect of compensation

for PPI mis-selling were both transferred to it and, accordingly, there was the requisite

concursis crediti et debiti to permit these counter-obligations to be set off against each other .

[23] The RFTS is a complex scheme. So far as material to the issues in this case, it suffices

to note that it sought to transfer certain RBS assets and liabilities (defined as the “Adam

Destination Business”) to Adam & Company plc (company number SC083026) (“Adam &

Co”) as at the Effective Date (defined as 30 April 2018) and thereafter to rename Adam & Co

as “the Royal Bank of Scotland plc”. That entity is the pursuer in this action. The RFTS

sought to effect a like transfer of certain non-retail banking activities of RBS (eg the Covered

Bonds Business) to NatWest, but the dealings between RBS and the debtor fell outwith this

kind of specialised commercial banking. For completeness, I note that RBS was to be

renamed NatWest Markets Plc (see definition of “RBS plc”) with effect from the Effective

[24] As provided for in the RFTS, on the Effective Date the personal and business banking

carried on by RBS (including business carried on under certain brand names not here

relevant) (defined as the “PBB Business” in Part F of the RFTS) was transferred to Adam &

Co. The definition of PBB Business (in Part F) included “the provision to personal …

Counterparties … of current accounts, loans…, arranging insurance…” and where the

Assets and Liabilities “is, has been, or would be recorded or at tributable to the PBB

Segment”. The PBB Segment is defined as including “UK Personal and Business Banking”,

as referred to in Group’s 2016 Annual Accounts (see para [25], below). The operative

provisions effecting the transfer (comprehensively defined as the “Adam Destination

Business”) are in Part B (“The Transfer”), clause 6.1 and 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. Clause 6.1 provided

“‘Each Transferring Business’, the definition of which included the Adam

Destination Business, ‘(including the Transferring Assets and the Transferring

Liabilities in each Transferring Business) shall be transferred to and vested in each

Relevant Transferee in accordance with, and subject to, the terms of this Scheme’.”

The Transferring Liabilities included the liabilities of RBS in the conduct of the PBB Business

(reading the definitions of “Transferring Liabilities”, “Adam Destination Liabilities” and

“Adam Destination Business” together). In my view, these provisions are habile to cover

any RBS liability for PPI mis-selling to personal customers, ie such as the debtor’s PPI claim.

The Transferring Assets included the obligations of personal customers under inter alia loan

agreements owed to RBS (again, reading together the definitions of “Transferring Assets”,

“Adam Destination Assets”, “Adam Definition Arrangements” and “Adam Destination

Business”). In my view, these provisions are habile to include any obligation owed by a

personal customer of the RBS in respect of a loan or credit card debt, ie such as the

indebtedness the debtor incurred to RBS. Clauses 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 provided for the transfer

and vesting of the Adam Destination Assets and the Adam Destination Liabilities,

respectively, with effect from the Effective Time, and that without further act or instrument;

and that these assets and liabilities ceased to be th ose of RBS.

[25] The interlocutor of this Court giving effect to the RFTS was produced.

[26] The Group’s Annual Accounts for 2016 were lodged at the start of the proof,

essentially for its definition, found in the body of the Directors’ Report (at p 115), of

“Personal & Business Banking” (ie “PBB”) as comprising two reportable segments, of UK

Productions relating to the compromise of the debtor’s PPI claim

[27] As noted above, the debtor was paid around £1,100 toward the settlement sum

agreed in settlement of her PPI claim. Five cheques were produced, drawn on the pursuer

(not Group) on an account described as “PPI Refunds Account”. By contrast, the

correspondence with the debtor and her then agents in respect of her PPI claim was on

Group letter-headed paper, and had the sub-designation PPI Customer Concerns Team,

Retail Products. There is no express statement in any of that correspondence that it is acting

[28] I allowed the pursuer’s motion for a proof, as this had the merit of resolving all

issues in one hearing and its estimate was only a day longer than for the alternative proposal

of a debate. The evidence comprised one day and submissions the remaining three days.

Parties agreed certain matters in two Joint Minutes. I had the benefit of written submissions

and a Joint Bundle and Supplementary Bundle of Authorities (totalling 71 cases and other

texts) arranged by subject matter (title and interest to sue, general principles of set off,

disclosure of agency/concursus debiti et crediti, general principles of reduction, grounds for

reduction, trustee’s duties and creditors’ remedies against trustees, and on mora, personal

bar and waiver). Consistent with commercial practice, written statements (and in some

cases, supplementary statements) from each witness were lodged and adopted by witnesses

as their evidence in chief. I have had regard to all these materials. I do not propose to

[29] The pursuer’s first witness was Beverley Crawley, who had been employed by the

pursuer as a Senior Manager in Resilience Risk Oversight since November 2018. Prior to

that time, she was employed as a Remediation Policy/Risk Manager with the pursuer from

2011 to 2017. Her evidence covered the processing by Group of PPI complaints, the use of

Group letterhead in that context and whether it could have proactively identified if an

insolvent borrower had a possible PPI claim against any entity in the RBS group. The latter

topic was prompted by an argument advanced by the debtor, to the effect that the pursuer

was the author of its own misfortune in failing to appreciate that the debtor might have had

a claim against it for PPI mis-selling and, had the pursuer proactively elicited this, set off

could have been effected during the Trust Deed process. This witness also spoke to the

accumulation of indebtedness on the part of the debtor and the claims RBS submitted in the

Trust Deed process (which was uncontroversial), and the statement contained in the

footnote to a pro forma checklist (“Agency agreements exist between members of The Royal

Bank of Scotland Group”) the pursuer says would have been completed at the time (which

was controversial). None of the original paperwork relating to the loans to the debtor (with

[30] The witness explained that complaints relating to PP I mis-selling were managed

centrally by a dedicated team, whose numbers varied between 1,200 and 2,500 staff at any

one time. A centralised approach was adopted because complaints were made in respect of

a wide variety of companies or brands within the RBS Group (including RBS, Nat West,

Mint Limited, Style Card, Direct Line, Trust House Forte and Churchill, among others), not

all of which were extant. A centralised approach ensured the best means of training and

monitoring the team responding to PPI claims; it ensured consistency of treatment of all PPI

complaints and it was more efficient when, as was often the case, a complaint was received

which was not directed to a specific entity but simply against “the Royal Bank of Scotland”

or against “any and all of the policies across any Group brand”. She understood that Group

[31] The witness explained that Group letter-headed paper was used when

communicating to PPI claimants, in part because some brands no longer existed and,

operationally, it was simpler to send one letter (ie covering all brands or entities within the

RBS Group) to each customer than one from each of these brands or entities. This approach

had also been tested via customer feedback and was adopted with the knowledge of the

[32] In relation to proactive redress, as suggested by the debtor, this would have

required a team about four times the size of the existing team. The effort involved would

have been huge and disproportionate. These were some of the factors that led the regulator

not to require this approach. In any event, sample testing of a proactive approach with a

small number of potential claimants was shown not to be particularly effective. Multiple

letters were often required to elicit a response; not all PPI policies were mis-sold and some

customers who had a potential complaint nonetheless preferred to retain the cover the PPI

policy afforded. Overall, the highest complaint percentage of those proactively approached

was, at 55%, not significantly higher than the overall percentage of those who claimed (at

[33] To put this in perspective, the witness explained that the entities within the RBS

Group sold approximately 7.2 million PPI policies. Some of these had been sold before

records were computerised. Manual searches would therefore be required of all papers held

in branch basements or other archive facilities. Once a potentially relevant customer had

been identified, it would then be necessary to ascertain if this customer had already made a

claim; whether the customer remained a customer and (for the purposes of the debtor’s

argument) their insolvency status and, if insolvent, whether an insolvency practitioner could

be identified. Of the 7.2 million policies referred to, there was no, or incomplete, details for

around 70% of this cohort. At one point, she likened such a search to that of a “needle in a

haystack”. Even if an insolvent customer who had been sold a PPI policy was identified, a

customer could not be forced to make a claim for PPI. At a later point in her evidence, she

also confirmed that no investigation could be made into a customer’s potential PPI claim

without their consent, or even searches against their names and addresses, as this was

[34] In his cross-examination of this witness, the debtor’s senior counsel, Mr Webster QC,

asked her if sums paid out as compensation for PPI mis-selling were re-allocated among the

Group’s companies (she surmised that this might be the case for extant brands, but she

couldn’t speak to the details of this other than that this was dealt with by the finance

department); from what point in time the debtor’s loan documentation was missing (she

rejected the suggestion that it had only been lost in the last year; it had been identified as

missing by the point of the debtor’s PPI claim back in 2014); and the average length to

resolve a PPI claim ( it could take between 6 to 12 weeks, but usually 8 weeks) . These latter

figures were on the footing that a customer and a related PPI policy could be identified. She

was pressed to accept the proposition that it would have been feasible for Group to identify

insolvent customers as a sub-group and then to investigate whether they might have

potential PPI claims. While she acknowledged that in theory that might sound reasonable,

she referred to the difficulties she had already referred to which precluded investigating

claims pro-actively. More fundamentally, the management of insolvent customers was

undertaken by a completely separate department. The oversight of customers’ insolvency

process was a very specialised field. Even if the insolvency side could produce a list, or if

insolvency practitioners could be persuaded to notify insolvencies to the Gr oup for this

purpose, that would not make it any easier for Group to identify if any of those individuals

had PPI claims. She maintained that it would still be like looking for a needle in a haystack.

Furthermore, the FCA did not require this approach of the banks. The witness could not

comment on the proposition that the Group could put pressure on trustees to secure

discharges of any liability of the Group to pay PPI compensation.

[35] The pursuer’s second witness was Carol Paton, Head of Litigation & Investigations

at NatWest since 2018. Prior to that, she had been employed by the pursuer as Head of

Litigation & Investigations (2016 to 2018), Head of Litigation, Personal & Business Banking

(from 2015 to 2016) and Head of Litigation, Retail and Insurance (2010 to 2015) and in a

variety of other roles in the Royal Bank’s legal department (1997 to 2010). She spoke to the

General Agency Agreement put in place in June 2000 (noted above, at para [17]), which she

understood the pursuer, Group and NatWest to act on behalf of each other in the course of

their respective businesses, and to the RFTS (noted above, at paras [21] to [23]). In relation

to the RFTS, she confirmed that the debtor was undoubtedly a personal customer of the RBS

and therefore fell within the definition of “Personal & Business Banking”, as referred to in

[36] In cross-examination, Mr Webster explored with the witness her use of the word

“understood” in the passage of her witness statement where she described G roup (via the

PPI team) settling PPI complaints from customers of the different RBS group companies.

She explained that this was done under the General Agency Agreement. She had worked

closely with the PPI team since 2008; she remembered discussions with that team about

how best to correspond with customers and, given the sheer range of products alongside

which entities and brands within the RBS group sold PPI, the use of a single-branded

letterhead (of Group) was agreed. She confirmed that the agency was on behalf of NatWest

and RBS, as they were the two main subsidiaries and held banking licences. There were

[37] The witness was challenged that her understanding of the General Agency

Agreement, to enable each party to it to act on behalf of another, was incorrect. She clarified

her understanding: so far as she recalled, RBS and NatWest appointed each other as agents

and that both appointed Group to act for them but she would need to check the terms of the

General Agency Agreement. After its provisions were put to her, she confirmed her

understanding (just noted). She accepted that under the General Agency Agreement Group

did not appoint anyone as an agent on its behalf, but she observed that Group was the

parent company of the RBS Group. The General Agency Agreement was, as she put it, an

agreement that “went sideways and upwards”. Group did not appoint any agency

“downwards” under the General Agency Agreement, meaning that it did not appoint

[38] The topic of the degree of co-ordination required in settling the many claims was also

explored. She agreed that, given the multiplicity of trading entities, a degree of coordination

by the Group was required to make offers on behalf of others. This would be in terms of

record-keeping and details of loans paid down . Most complaints related to wholly-owned

subsidiaries that “sat within the Group” and the “vast majority of these were RBS loan s”.

When pressed for more details of the written instructions governing this, she explained that

this level of detail was below her level of responsibility. She accepted that there would be

some collation of customer details and that these would most likely be in writing.

[39] At this point Mr Webster took an objection to the evidence he had just elicited, as

contrary to the “best evidence” rule. In particular, so far as I understood the objection, it

was that the witness had confirmed that there was other documentation –specifically,

written instructions within the RBS Group relative to the handling of PPI claims. He

queried whether these documents might provide for Group to act in respect of PPI claims on

behalf of RBS. In the absence of these documents her evidence was, he submitted, secondary

and so fell to be excluded. The reply by Senior Counsel for the pursuer was that this

witness’ evidence was wholly consistent with that of Beverley Crawley – and which was

wholly unchallenged – that Group settled claims as agent for RBS. All that this witness had

done was to identify the document by which the legal agency was established, namely the

General Agency Agreement. However, there had also already been parole evidence from

this witness that Group acted on behalf of RBS in settlement of PPI claims and that this was

based on the General Agency Agreement. That agreement predated the onset of PPI claims.

The only question was one of interpretation of the General Agency Agreement. It was not a

[40] In re-examination, Carol Paton confirmed that PPI was a significant episode for the

RBS Group. However, the genesis of the General Agency Agreement had been RBS’s earlier

acquisition of NatWest and, rather than merge the two entities, it was simpler to have the

General Agency Agreement so that each could act for the other and to facilitate customer

engagement across the brands of the two main banks. She was asked, under objection, to

give an example of the kind of activities that might fall within “management and control” by

Group on behalf of the subsidiaries. She surmised that this would include contact with the

[41] The pursuer’s final witness was Michael Cooper, the pursuer’s Senior Legal Counsel

since 2014. He spoke to the assignation of certain rights to MRL by virtue of the assignation

(Notice of which was provided by the Notice of Assignation, quoted above, at

paragraph [21]) of all protected trust deeds made between 8 November 2001 and 11 October

2006 where RBS were entitled to prove as a creditor. He noted that the debtor’s Trust Deed

did not become a protected trust deed until 24 October 2006. He explained that this issue

had been raised in the context of the payment action in 2016 and he had undertaken

investigations at that time. The package of debt sold to MRL comprised only accounts from

the business of RBS known as “Direct Finance”, which were consumer operations carried

out by Churchill and Lombard Direct. The debtor did not hold any Direct Finance products

and so her debts would not have formed part of the debt package sold to MRL. In any

event, he found no evidence that the assignation had ever been intimated to the debtor or

her agents or trustee. A colleague had also contacted MRL’s solicitors at that time, who

confirmed that there was no evidence that MRL acquired the debtor’s debt and she was not

recorded in their systems. In short, he had found nothing in the investigations in 2016, or

since, to suggest that RBS had sold, assigned or otherwise transferred the debtor’s account to

[42] In cross-examination, senior counsel explored what the witness had meant by the

word “published” used in conjunction with the assignation. The witness revised his

language to “issued”. He was not sure how this was done. He was not surprised that it was

a “To Whom it may concern” letter, rather than individually addressed. He was not entirely

sure to whom it would have been issued but, from the language ( eg the references to the

payment of dividends), he surmised it as sent to insolvency practitioners.

[43] At the close of his proof, Senior Counsel for the pursuer indicat ed that he had no

need to cross-examine the debtor (the first defender). Accordingly, her witness statement

was agreed to be her evidence in chief. The form of her witness statement is a little

unsatisfactory in that it appears that certain questions or passages of documents were put to

her, but these are often not noted. An answer is simply recorded which doesn’t appear to

relate to the preceding or following paragraph. So, for example, the sentence “I don’t know

anything about what is said here” is a free-standing paragraph and, to say the least,

uninformative. Often, she is endeavouring to speak to events years ago (eg loans taken out

more than twenty years ago). Understandably, given the passage of time, the debtor had no

clear recall of the amounts of the loans, the Trust Deed process (except that it went on for a

period of years while she paid a monthly figure of between £200 and £600), or how she

acquired any PPI product. She could not recall ever being told of any agency arrangement

or with whom she contracted. She was aware that Group had declined to pay the balance of

the settlement sum (of c £10,000). She would not be able to repay the amount already paid

[44] The debtor’s challenge to the pursuer’s title to sue rested on three discrete bases:

(1) Whether the debtor’s Trust Deed was transferred to MRL (which I defined as

(2) Whether the RFTS effected the transfer of the debtor’s liability to RBS, to the

pursuer (which I defined as the corporate successor issue, at para [3], above);

(3) Whether the counterparty in the compromise of the debtor’s PPI claim was

Group, not the pursuer (which I have defined as the agency issue, at para

The first question involves consideration of the meaning of a “protected trust deed” in the

context of the Notice of Assignation; the second question involves a consideration of the

RFTS; and the third question involves a consideration of the several documents relied on by

the pursuer to establish that Group entered into the compromise with the debtor as its agent.

[45] It must first be noted that the only document produced was the Notice of

Assignation and not the terms of the assignation itself. The Notice of Assignation refers to

the transfer of insolvent accounts. Having regard to the references to “Bankruptcy Order”,

“sequestration”, “Individual Voluntary Arrangements” and “Protected Trust Deeds”, it is

clear that the assignation concerned only those accounts subject to the specified insolvency

procedures, and which correspond with the personal insolvency regimes in England and

Scotland. The question in this case is whether the debtor’s Trust Deed fell within the phrase

“accounts … subject to … a Protected Trust Deed made between 8 November 2001 and

11 October 2006“ (emphasis added). In considering the interpretation and application of

those words, it is necessary first to consider trust deeds as a form of personal insolvency in

Scotland, and the creation of a statutory form of trust deed (including a “protected” trust

[46] Prior to the 1985 Act, trust deeds were a voluntary non-statutory means by which an

insolvent debtor (which could include a partnership) could settle the claims of the debtor’s

creditors. A debtor could do so by granting a trust deed for the behoof of his creditors,

usually in the form of an irrevocable conveyance of his whole estate to his trustee for

realisation and division among his creditors, and in return for which a debtor could expect a

discharge of the creditors who acceded to the trust deed. The advantage was that if the

trustee completed title or took possession of a debtor’s estate this had the practical effect of

excluding certain forms of diligence (eg arrestment was not competent in the hands of the

trustee, because he held the insolvent’s estate as agent for the creditors and for their benefit).

A trust deed was, in effect, a mutual contract. However, as a voluntary deed, the trust deed

only bound those creditors who acceded to it and a creditor who was unwilling to agree to

its terms (a non-acceding creditor) could disregard it and either seek to constitute his claim

in an action against the insolvent or his trustee, or he could sequestrate the insolvent (the

effect of which would be to defeat the whole arrangement). A further disadvantage was that

any discharge of the debtor extended only to the debts owed to the acceding creditors.

Statutory trust deeds and protected trust deeds under the 1985 Act

[47] The 1985 Act introduced a statutory form of trust deed (provided for in Schedule 5)

which was intended to address the unsatisfactory aspects of common law trust deeds. It did

so by creating a “protected” trust deed (governed by paras 5 to 10 of Schedule 5), whose

advantages were two-fold: (i) to create a means by which creditors could (absent actual

consent) be deemed to consent to the trust deed, and thereby be bound by it; and (ii) to

restrict the rights of non-acceding creditors (eg by precluding diligence or resort to

sequestration during the currency of the protected trust deed): see paragraphs 6 and 7 of

Schedule 5 to the 1985 Act and paras 24.32 and 24.33 of the 1982 Report on Bankruptcy and

Related Aspects of Insolvency and Liquidation of the Scottish Law Commission (Scot. Law

Comm. No. 68) (“the SLC Report”). (While these paragraphs in Schedule 5 of the 1985 Act

have been repealed or replaced by other provisions consequent on the Bankruptcy and

Diligence etc (Scotland) Act 2007 (“the 2007 Act”), the debtor’s PTD fell within the

provisions as originally enacted.) A trust deed becomes a protected trust deed only if (i) the

trustee has not received written notification of objection from a specified number of

creditors (a majority by number or not less than one-third in value) within five weeks from

the date of publication of the Gazette notice of the grant of the trust deed and (ii) the trustee

complies with the other procedural requirements (see para 5(1)(d) and (e) o f Schedule 5). A

trust deed that complies with paragraphs 6 and 7 of Schedule 5 is referred to as a “protected

[48] While I have not had the benefit of submissions on the terms of Schedule 5, it is clear

that not all statutory trust deeds acquire the status of being a “protected” trust deed. That

status is acquired only upon satisfaction of the statutory criteria just noted. The acquisition

of the status of a protected trust deed is not a matter of form. It is only upon a trust deed

becoming protected that the rights of non-acceding creditors are constrained. From a

commercial perspective, the effect of a trust deed becoming “protected” brings a significant

degree of certainty that the debtor’s assets will be applied in an orderly fashion toward

repayment of the debts of creditors and, if the debtor’s assets and liabilities are known, a

reasonable estimate can be made of the likely realisation of the creditor s’ claims from the

[49] There was nothing in the terms of Schedule 5 which applied to the debtor’s Trust

Deed to suggest that the effect of becoming protected was backdated to the date when the

Trust Deed was first granted. The language of the provision suggests that the protective

efforts of a trust deed are prospective: paragraph 6 provides that “[w]here the provisions of

paragraph 5 of this Schedule have been fulfilled, then …” (emphasis added). See the careful

and thorough analysis of the trust deed regime in chapter 22 of Bankruptcy by Donna

[50] Returning to the language of the Notice (quoted at the end of para [45], above) , the

debtor’s position was in effect that it was enough if the Trust Deed had been granted within

the time-frame in the Notice, whereas the pursuer’s position was that it had not become

protected within that same time-frame. In my view, the debtor’s approach does not respect

the language of the Notice. The Notice of Assignation did not refer to the “grant” of a trust

deed. It may be presumed that the use of the phrase “protected trust deeds” within the

Notice was used as a term of art (ie as created by Schedule 5), and was intended to exclude

any deed which had not acquired that status within the time-frame stipulated in that Notice.

Considering those words in the commercial context, the potential uncertainties associated

with unprotected trust deeds (ie where it was not yet known if, or when, they would become

“protected”) would be an obvious reason to ex clude them from the assignation in favour of

MRL. Applying the foregoing analysis to the language of the Notice of Assignation, a

protected trust deed is “made” when it acquires that status, but not before. On the facts, I

find that the debtor’s PTD was “made” on 24 October 2006 and, for the purposes of the

Notice of Assignation, the debtor’s PTD fell outwith the indicated time-frame. This

[51] For completeness, I note that this conclusion is consistent with the evidence from the

solicitors to the assignee, MRL, that they had nothing in their files to support the contention

that the debtor’s PTD had been assigned to MRL. Finally, even if the Notice of Assignation

had been habile to include the debtor’s PTD, there was no evidence to show that the debtor

had notice of the assignation at the material time. Indeed, Mr Webster’s cross-examination

of Michael Cooper on the point of “publish” or “issue” tended to illustrate the contrary

[52] I have set out the relative terms of the RFTS, above. In submissions, Mr McBrearty

took the Court through these carefully and in detail. Mr Webster made no submission on

the RFTS. Nor did he suggest that Mr McBrearty’s submission was wrong in any respect.

Having considered the operative terms (which are straightforward), as applied to the

interlinking defined terms (which are complex, but not unduly so for a scheme such as this),

and the terms of this Court’s interlocutor, I am satisfied that the RFTS had the effect of

transferring the debtor’s obligations to RBS and RBS’s correlative rights, to the pursuer.

[53] As noted above, the settlement of the debtor’s PPI claim was negotiated ostensibly by

Group (eg from the use of its letter-headed paper). The debtor takes the point that, as any

indebtedness she had was to RBS (and not to Group), there can be no set-off by the pursuer

(even assuming it is the successor to RBS as the debtor’s creditor) because there is no

concursus crediti et debiti. In seeking to establish that Group acted as agent for RBS when

settling the debtor’s PPI claims, the pursuer relies principally on (i) the General Agency

Agreement and (ii) the Checklist. It referred to other adminicles of evidence supportive of

its position that RBS was the principal (eg the cheques paying the first tranche of the

settlement sums were drawn on RBS, and the reference at the foot of the Checklist that

agency agreements might exist). While I was advised that the agency issue has a long

history, the debtor having first raised it in 2016, that is of no consequence. There has been

[54] I consider first the General Agency Agreement, whose terms I have set out above.

The General Agency Agreement is a general agency drawn in the broadest of terms to

facilitate one member of a corporate group to act on behalf of another consistent with its

terms. While in cross-examination of Carol Paton, Mr Webster laid stress on the words

“certain activities” in the preambles, and that he noted this phrase was not otherwise

defined, that phrase was simply a portmanteau phrase to cover those activities, among “all

forms of banking business RBS carries out and which RBS wishes NatWest to perform on its

behalf.”. In relation to the grant of agency by RBS in favour of Group, the scope of the

potential agency Group was to perform on behalf of inter alia RBS and for its account, was

“certain activities relating to the management, control and supervision of their respective

businesses” and which was defined as “the Group Activities”.

[55] In considering the terms of the General Agency Agreement it is relevant to note, as

stated in Preamble A, that RBS and NatWest are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Group. That

is the context in which to construe the General Agency Agreement, which is to facilitate the

operations of the RBS Group, including conferring on Group authority to act as RBS’s agent

in respect of “certain activities”. That phrase is qualified only by the stipulation that they

relate “to the management, control and supervision” of RBS’s business. It matters not, in my

view, that the General Agency Agreement subsisted long before PPI claims emerged. In my

view, the General Agency Agreement was sufficiently broad to cover Group’s co-ordination

[56] While Mr Webster noted en passant the terms of clause 3.4 (requiring Group to

disclose to customers at all times that it is acting for RBS), he did not develop his assertion

that this was a condition precedent. Having considered the terms of the General Agency

Agreement, there is in my view nothing in its terms to support that contention. There is no

express provision which stipulates that this (or indeed any provision) is a condition

precedent; nor is there any term that stipulates a penalty or a want of power if a specific

provision is breached. Having regard to the terms of the General Agency Agreement, the

Court should, in my view, be slow to read in restrictions that are inimical to the spirit of a

commercial agreement drawn in broad enabling terms, among entities which are part of the

same corporate family. Likewise, while Mr Webster made brief reference to the Company,

Limited Liability Partnership & Business (Names & Trading Disclosures) Regulations 2015

(the 2015 Regulations”), this was a non-point, as it was not suggested that any

non-compliance affected the capacity or power of a corporate entity in breach of the 2015

Regulations of affected the validity of any contract. I am persuaded that the General Agency

Agreement is in sufficiently broad terms to cover the activities of Group in co -ordinating

and resolving the many PPI claims made against the different companies within the RBS

[57] I next address Mr Webster’s objection that the pursuer has failed to provide other

documentation relative to the PPI claims (see para [39], above). In my view, that objection

does not engage with the witness’ evidence and it is misconceived. Carol Paton, who has

been with RBS as well as other entities within the RBS Group since 1997, was well placed to

speak to the General Agency Agreement. She remembered it being put in place. She had an

intimate knowledge of the structure of the RBS Group and its operation, and, in her many

senior legal positions, she had experience of the operation of the General Agency Agreement

to activities of members of the RBS Group over the years. In relation to the management of

the PPI claims, she spoke to the desire for a co-ordinated response across the RBS Group (the

risk management reasons for which are obvious) as well as the practical necessity to do so

(eg because some brands no longer existed). This evidence, and on which she was not

challenged in chief or in cross, suffices to prove that Group had the authority to, and did act

on behalf of, RBS in the settlement of PPI claims made against RBS. To the extent that she

referred to other documentation which had not been produced, on a fair reading of her

evidence, it was clear that she was referring to more specific protocols or arrangements but

which related to matters below her level of responsibility. It is important to note that by the

time of the objection Carol Paton had already given her evidence that the PPI claims were

coordinated by Group. This evidence was elicited without challenge. So far as I understood

Mr Webster’s objection, it relates to the failure to produce that lower-level documentation.

[58] Leaving aside the doubts I have about the competency of counsel objecting to

evidence he himself has elicited, and which questioning gave the impression of trying to

generate a “best evidence” point (the questions were directed solely to the existence of

protocols, not as to their scope or terms), this does not , with respect, appear to me raise a

question of the “best evidence”. The critical question is whether the pursuer has proved that

RBS appointed Group to coordinate and settle PPI claims against it . The evidence of Carol

Paton and Beverley Crawley to that effect is unchallenged. It is difficult to see the relevance

of more specific protocols carrying out that agency arrangement . More fundamentally, the

pursuer is not seeking to prove the terms of those lower -level protocols. The mere fact that

other documentation may exist does not bring the “best evidence” rule into play in respect

of the anterior matter: namely, the agreement that Group act on behalf of the other entities

within the RBS Group and to which Carol Paton (and Beverley Crawley) spoke. It was

Carol Paton’s understanding that the General Agency Agreement was the basis for that

[59] In any event, in my view this objection is mis-conceived. The best evidence rule is,

generally, that the best evidence of the terms of a document is the document itself: see Lord

Drummond Young in Peacock Group Plc v Railston Ltd I [2006] CSOH 26; 2007 SC 269 at

paragraph 10, citing Lord President Emslie in Scottish Universal Newspapers Ltd v Ghersons’s

Trustees 1987 SC 27 at p 47. I did not understand it to be any part of the pursuer’s case to

prove the detail or operation of the agency arrangement between Group and RBS at lower

levels of implementation. In those circumstances, the best evidence rule has no operation

and I repel the objection . I do so against the background where the debtor does not attempt

to lead evidence to prove the contrary position. So, for example, there was no challenge to

the fact that the settlement cheques were drawn on an RBS account and which was

consistent with Carol Paton’s (unchallenged) evidence that there was an accounting or

[60] As I have already determined the agency issue in favour of the pursuer, I need only

observe that had the Checklist been the sole source of evidence of agency I would have been

disinclined to find that this was sufficient- not least because it has not been proved that the

pursuer ever completed such a document and because its terms do not obviously extend to

Group’s coordination of PPI claims. However, the sentence at the foot of the checklist does

reinforce the evidence as to the operation of the General Agency Agreement.

[61] This was addressed principally in submissions, as apart perhaps from the Checklist,

the pursuer did not rely on any other evidence to prove that Group acted as a disclosed

principal in respect of settlement of the debtor’s PPI claim. While I find that Group were

acting as the agent of RBS in the settlement of the debtor’s PPI claim, on the evidence, Group

The debtor’s reliance on the failure to disclose Group was acting as agent

[62] Even if the pursuer establishes that Group acted as the pursuer’s agent, the debtor

argues that the pursuer’s intention to assert set-off, as an undisclosed principal, is

impermissibly prejudicial to the debtor. Extensive reference was made to authority (not all

of which I need record) to vouch the proposition that the disclosure and acts of a hitherto

undisclosed principal may not prejudice the rights of the third party with whom an agent

“where A ostensibly contracts with B as a principal, A ought not to be prejudiced by

B’s subsequent disclosure that it was actually acting as an agent for C, e.g. pleading

of a set off of a debt owed by A to C as a defence to the enforcement of the rights

In this example, A is the debtor and B and C are, respectively, the pursuer (as the successor

to RBS, by virtue the RFTS) and Group. So, for example, the debtor cited Greer v Downs

Supply Co [1927] 2KB 28 for the observation of Bankes LJ (at p 33) that disclosure of the

agency should not defeat the rights of the third party (ie the agent’s counterparty) against

the agent. She quoted Bowstead & Reynolds, Agency, (21st ed) (“Bowstead”) at para 8-069 to

like effect (“a third party cannot be prevented by the intervention of the principal from

exercising his rights against the agent”), and at para 9-012 for the proposition that “nothing

must prejudice the right of the third party to sue the agent if he so wishes”. Under reference

to Montgomerie v United Kingdom Mutual Steamship Association [1891] 1 QB 370, Siu Yin Kwan

v Eastern Insurance Ltd [1994] 2 AC 199 and Bowstead at para 8-098, it was submitted that the

measure of the third party’s rights is the contract made with the agent and which cannot be

subsequently altered or prejudiced by the intervention or disclosure of the principal. Nor

can the interests of the principal, once disclosed, “qualify or cut down” the rights of the third

[63] In my view, what the pursuer is proposing to do does not contravene any rule

derived from the cases cited by the debtor. The import of these cases is to protect the third

party’s exercise of a right, whether that be a right to payment (asserted against the agent or

the principal) or a right of set off. In this case, there is no modification or loss of any right the

debtor acquired from her compromise with Group of her PPI claim. She is not asserting a

right of set off, but a right to payment. However, she has not been prevented from asserting

her claim for payment against the agent (ie Group). Indeed, she has already asserted that

claim against Group in the payment action. If the assertion of her right to payment of the

compensation were a sword, the debtor has wielded that sword. All that the pursuer seeks

to do is to use set off as a shield to meet that claim. In my view, that is permissible. None of

the cases the debtor cited precludes the exercise of a right of set off by the agent (here,

Group) or by the principal (here, the pursuer), once its existence is disclosed, against a claim

asserted by the third party (here, the debtor). This is also consistent with the very full and

careful treatment of the subject by Prof Mcgregor in chapter 12 of The Law of Agency in

[64] It is common ground that the trustee was unaware of the debtor’s PPI claim at the

time she granted the debtor’s discharge. I shall refer to this as “the trustee’s mistake”. (I

consider below whether that constitutes an “error” in a relevant sense.) In those

1) the trustee’s payment of the final dividend and grant of the discharge in

ignorance of the existence of the debtor’s PPI claims, which discharge is said to

be gratuitous, was a unilateral error (which failing, a mutual error), and,

2) separately, the trustee’s mistake fell within the English rule in Hastings-Bass

and which the Court should assimilate as part of the law of Scotland.

[65] The pursuer’s primary position was that the trustee’s mistake was an error and that

the discharge was a gratuitous deed. Under reference to the observations of Lord Reid and

Lord Keith of Avonholm in Hunter v Bradford Property Trust Limited 1970 SLT 173 (“Hunter”),

at pages 186 and 191 respectively, the pursuer submitted that a gratuitous obligation entered

into in error on the part of the granter was itself sufficient to found reduction. While

Mr McBrearty acknowledged that there was a difference between the grant of a gratuitous

deed and the exercise of a power by a trustee, he submitted that the fiduciary nature of

trustee’s exercise of power simply strengthened the case for interference by the Court in the

[66] In the pursuer’s submission, the trustee’s mistake was a relevant error: the trustee

had performed a voluntary act when deciding to pay a final dividend and, having done so,

when granting the debtor’s discharge. At that point in time the trustee had not appreciated

that there was a further asset in the form of the debtor’s PPI claim. Mr McBrearty

acknowledged that, given that the trust deed was granted in the expectation that there

would be a discharge (the relative term is quoted above, at para [16]), one would not

normally characterise as “gratuitous” the grant of a discharge of a debtor under a trust deed.

However, in the present case, the trustee’s decision to pay a final dividend and to discharge

the debtor was made in ignorance of the debtor’s PPI claim, which was substantial.

Accordingly, he argued, the effect of granting a discharge in these circumstances was to

grant the debtor a valuable asset which she would not otherwise have obtained, in return for

no consideration. In short, the trustee’s mistake was a gratuitous error in the relevant sense.

[67] The debtor’s position is that the pursuer has failed to plead or prove a relevant case

of error, not least because the pursuer does not aver that any error was essential, induced by

the debtor, to have been known or taken advantage of by the debtor or impetrated by fraud.

Nor did the pursuer aver that the trustee had acted ultra vires or in breach of fiduciary duty.

She submitted that bare error, which was all that the pursuer contended for, did not suffice.

[68] Separately, the debtor argued that the grounds for reduction of a discharge granted

in the context of an insolvency process were extremely limited and exceptionally rare, the

most recent precedent being Baillie v Young (1837) 15 S 893 (report of the jury trial) (“Baillie”)

and (1837) 16 S 294 (the court’s application of the jury’s verdict) (“Baillie No 2”).

[69] The debtor focused on the character of the trust deed as a form of contract . This itself

was uncontroversial: see Dooneen para 42, and Lord Trayner in Kinmond Luke, & Co v James

Finlay & Co, (1904) 6 F 564, quoted with approval by the Inner House and Supreme Court in

Dooneen Ltd v Mond at, respectively, [2016] CSIH 59, at para 18 and [2018] UKSC 54, per Lord

Reed at para 10. She submitted that error as a ground of reduction generally arose in the

creation of the contract. There was no such error in the formation of the Trust Deed alleged

here and, in any event, a contract is not voidable on the ground of an error by one party

which was not known to or taken advantage of by the other: Scott v Craig (1897) 24 R. 462

(“Craig”); Angus v Bryden 1992 S.L.T. 884 (“Angus”). Angus was authority for the proposition

that even if there were an essential error in intention, this cannot found an action of

reduction if not induced by the other party (per Lord Cameron at 437A-D, approving Gloag

on Contract at p 440). Here, only the debtor could be the other party and it was submitted

that there was no question of the trustee’s error having been induced by the debtor. She

submitted that necessary conditions for reduction should not be lower, if th e error arises in

[70] The debtor rejected the pursuer’s fall-back characterisation of the error as “mutual”:

the discharge was not a mutual deed of the debtor and the trustee. It was the unilateral

deed of the trustee. In any event, there has been no “error” of the debtor that could have

rendered this a mutual error. The debtor had no rôle or involvement in the granting of the

discharge and she played no part in the timing or decision to grant it. The debtor was not

asked whether or when or in what terms, or by reference to what considerations, the

discharge should be granted. It follows that the deed is not the result of any error by the

debtor. Further, the discharge could not be vitiated by any error of a person who was not a

party to it. It mattered not that the debtor benefitted from the trustee’s mistake; others did

too, to the extent that they could count on the certainty the discharge affor ded. Finally, the

debtor rejected the pursuer’s characterisation of the trustee’s mistake as “going to the root

and destroying the contract”, or as akin to a “mistake as to the identity of the subject sold”,

[71] The debtor also challenged the pursuer’s characterisation of the discharge as

“gratuitous”. This was a “gross error”. She submitted that the pursuer’s reliance on Hunter

was misconceived and, being a case that concerned a unilateral error in the formation of a

contract, was readily distinguishable. Nor was the discharge “voluntary”, as the pursuer

had submitted. The trustee acted in fulfilment of a fiduciary duty. Under reference to the

observations of the Scottish Law Commission (“the SLC”) in their Report (No 239) on Trust

Law (“SLC Report on Trust Law”), at paras 19.23 and 19.24, the debtor submitted that the

trustee’s grant of a discharge was not the same as the grant of a unilateral deed. The trustee

acts in fulfilment of a fiduciary duty or power granted by a third party (the truster). The

debtor infers from the SLC’s recommen dation that there should be a statutory innovation,

that there was at present no common law basis for challenging the deeds of trustees.

Further, the discharge was part and parcel of the trust. The trust deed was granted in

expectation of a discharge and in exchange for which the debtor had transferred her whole

[72] The debtor also noted that in respect of an intra vires transactions of a trustee, the

minimum required for reduction of the same was proof of breach of trust such as a proof of

breach of fiduciary duty: In re Beloved Wilkes’s Charity, (1851) 3 Mac & G 440, per Lord Truro

LC at 448; Dundee General Hospitals, per Lord Normand at pp 85 and 87-88; Pitt v Holt (2013)

2 AC 108, per Lord Walker at paras 73, 88 and 93. Error itself is not a ground of challenge.

[73] The debtor advances a further line of defence, arising from the peculiarity of an

insolvency trust. In short, it was submitted that even if the pursuer could make out grounds

of challenge that might be relevant in the context oftrust law generally(which the debtor

disputed), thereis no justification in either precedent, principle or policy for then seeking to

transpose such an approach to insolvency law and insolvency trusts. She referred to

Goudy’s enumeration of relevant grounds ofchallengeto insolvency trustee’s deliverances.

[74] The circumstances of this case appear unusual or are such as not frequently to occur

in the reported cases. In this case, the pursuer seeks reduction of the debtor’s discharge, the

existence of the which otherwise precludes the pursuer’s claim (Whyte v Knox (1858) 20 D

970; Dooneen, cit supra). It does so in order to set off the unpaid balance of the debtor’s PPI

claim against the unpaid balance of its own claim which it had submitted in the debtor’s

Trust Deed process. The kind of error at issue in this case does not fall within the categories

identified by Prof McBryde (see para 15-01, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3rd ed (“McBryde

on Contract”)). The pursuer does not argue that it was taken advantage of or that the error

was induced by any party; nor does it rely on any misrepresentation or fraud. It does not

argue that the error arose in the formation of a contract. It is not suggested that the discharge

was ultra vires the trustee. The debtor’s criticisms of the pursuer’s failure to invoke one or

more of these grounds is therefore without force. The pursuer’s case is that the discharge

was a gratuitous deed which is reducible on the grounds of error on the part of the granter.

The most authoritative and recent case the pursuer cited to the Court in support of its

[75] In Hunter the House of Lords affirmed the proposition that a gratuitous deed is

reducible on the grounds of essential error on the part of the granter (per Lord Reid at p 186).

Under reference to McCaig’s Trustees v the University Court of the University of Glasgow (1904)

6 F 918, Lord Reid regarded it as reasonable and in accordance with Scots law that “a person

should not be entitled to retain a gratuitous benefit given under essential error on the part of

the person conferring the benefit” (ibid). Lord Keith also regarded that proposition as settled

law and he figured as examples “essential error as to the nature of the obligation

undertaken” and a “material error with regard to some extrinsic deed or circumstance” (ibid

at p 191). Fairly construed, that passage does not suggest that those examples were

exhaustive of the particular kinds of essential or material errors that might found a

reduction; nor does it suggest any particular form of wording was required to plead such a

Exclusion of compromises as a class from gratuitous error as a ground of reduction

[76] In considering whether a case falls within the class of cases governed by Hunter it is

necessary, in my view, to consider (i) the quality or nature of the error, and (ii) whether the

deed was gratuitous. Given the debtor’s reliance on Scott v Craig (1897) 24 R 462 (“Scott”), it

is also appropriate to consider the nature of the deed under reduction. I begin with this

latter factor. This is because, leaving aside potential grounds of reduction generally, the

courts have consistently set their face against challenges which seek to open up

compromises or settlements of claims (see McBryde on Contract at para 15-24 and his

reference to the policy considerations for this rule, at footnote 49), even in the case of

unilateral or mutual error (per Gloag On Contract at 456) or fraud (ibid at 479-480). It

respectfully seems to me that the case of Scott, cited by the debtor, falls within that class of

case. In any event, the discussion of error in that case was obiter, as the ground of that

decision was the want of title to sue by a single trustee. There was no suggestion in that the

discharge under challenge in this case was of the character of a compromise. In my view,

that is correct. Accordingly, cases relating to compromises, such as Scott, are of no

[77] I next consider the nature of the trustee’s mistake. The debtor takes the point that the

pursuer has not averred that the error was “essential”. Beyond that observation, I did not

have the benefit of submissions on the necessity of pleading “essential error” or what that

phrase might encompass. I am bound to note that the meaning of “essential error” has been

described in one of the leading text books as “one of the most complex, and confusing, areas

of Scots common law” (per McBryde on Contract at para 15-04). In the next passage of that

text, Professor McBryde regrets the uncertainty created by the use of phrases such as

“essential error”, “error in the essentials” or “substantial” error. He offered the view that, at

“the meaning of ‘essential error’ was not settled, but it was probably no more than an

attempt to distinguish between substantial and insubstantial errors. No amount of

semantic discussion will enable a definite line to be drawn between those two types

I also note that Gloag considered that a discharge was reducible on the ground of mutual

error and “taken under a material error as to the nature or extent of the right in question”

(emphasis added): On Contract at p 454. I bear those comments in mind in my consideration

of this issue. The starting point to note is that, if the debtor’s PPI claim had been realised

during the currency of the Trust Deed process, it would have increased the debtor’s assets

available for distribution by a third and would have yielded a similar uplift in the return to

the pursuer as the debtor’s sole creditor. In my view, the omission to ingather this asset may

be described as a “substantial” or “material” error. On any view, it was not an insubstantial

[78] It is here convenient to deal with the debtor’s argument that the absence of evidence

from the trustee is fatal to the pursuer’s case. I do not accept that submission. The trustee

under the debtor’s Trust Deed was under a fiduciary duty to ingather the debtor’s estate.

Given that, on the evidence, the debtor’s PPI claim was a significant asset with low

realisation costs, and given the relatively short timescale within which the pursuer received

and compromised the debtor’s PPI claims, it is difficult to envisage a scenario in which the

trustee, had she known of the potential for PPI claims, would have declined to ingather this.

Rather, those circumstances support the inference that, had the trustee known of the PPI

claims she would have pursued them for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors. In my view,

the trustee’s failure to ingather the PPI claims may be described as a “material” error, it is

one capable of founding an action of reduction. Testing this another way, had the trustee

known of the PPI claim, it is inconceivable that she would have granted the debtor’s

discharge until that claim was realised as an asset for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors.

[79] The next matter to consider is whether the grant of the discharge was “gratuitous”.

It is of course correct, as the debtor notes, that the grant of the Trust Deed is made in

contemplation that at the conclusion of that process the debtor will be granted her discharge

and, further, that it may be said that the trustee is under a “duty” to grant the discharge (as

the debtor argued). However, in my view, those features do not determine whether the

discharge was gratuitous, particularly if it transpires that t he discharge was granted in error

or at a material undervalue, as is the case here. Three cases were cited to me in which the

Inner House considered whether a discharge was “gratuitous”: Ross v Mackenzie (1842) 5 D

151 (“Ross”) (Second Division), Dickson v Halbert (1854) 16 D 586 (“Dickson”) ( First Division)

[80] In Ross, the pursuer sought reduction of a discharge granted by the trustee under a

trust deed granted by her husband for the behoof of his creditors, and which purported to

discharge any claim for legitim she had against her brother (Thomas Mackenzie) as the

executor of their father’s estate. The deceased had granted a trust settlement which settled

£3000 on each of his sons and settled £500 on the pursuer, in each case declaring that these

provisions were in full payment and satisfaction of his children’s claims for legitim. Upon

their father’s death the pursuer’s two brothers accepted the testamentary provisions in their

favour. The pursuer’s husband became insolvent. In the belief that the pursuer was only

entitled to one-half of the fund and that her brother, the executor, was entitled to the other

one-half in satisfaction of their respective claims for legitim, the trustee granted the ex ecutor

a discharge. However, having accepted the testamentary provision in his favour, the

executor was not in fact entitled to retain one-half of the sum concerned. The pursuer

rejected the testamentary provision in her favour and advanced a claim for legitim. She

sought reduction of the discharge of the trustee, on the footing that it was obtained by

fraudulent misrepresentation or it had been executed under error in substantialibus, and an

[81] Leaving aside the separate provision of £500 payable to the pursuer under her

parents’ marriage contract (and which the court held did not constitute a payment in respect

of legitim), the court found that the executor was not entitled to the one-half sum he retained

as legitim (pursuant to the settlement and discharge). The Lord Ordinary, Lord Moncrieff,

found that the discharge had been granted on the footing that the pursuer had been entitled

to only one-half of the sum, but that this was erroneous and she was en titled to the whole

sum representing legitim. In analysing the nature of the error, he considered and rejected the

application of the doctrine of condictio indebiti (the executor had not paid any sum in error;

he had simply not paid enough). In his interlocutor, he recorded that the trustee who had

granted the discharge (being the trustee of the pursuer’s husband, on whom power of

“had not power, as trustee, to grant a discharge of any lawful and subsisting debt of

the truster’s [ie the pursuer’s father, as administered by his executor, her brother],

either without value or on payment of half the sum due by law; and that, in the

circumstances of the case, the discharge so granted, while it professed to proceed not

on any compromise of a doubtful claim, but for the full amount of the debt due, was,

to the extent of one-half of the debt, granted without any value whatever, and was

therefore, to that extent, altogether null and ineffectual.” (Emphasis added).

Although Lord Moncrieff did not use the phrase, it is clear from the terms of his interlocutor

that in his view the trustee’s discharge had been granted sine causa in respect of the

executor’s purported retention of one-half of the sum to which, in law, the pursuer was

[82] In the case of Dickson, decided 12 years later, the Court again considered the grant of

a discharge by a beneficiary under a testamentary provision “in full satisfaction of all sums

due or claims competent to me [under the testamentary provision]” but which, in truth, had

been granted in error, without value and while the granter of the discharge was in ignorance

of her rights. In terms of a mutual disposition and settlement between spouses, the siblings

of the wife would in certain circumstances become entitled (collectively) to a sum equal to

one-half of the sums received from the estate of the uncle of the wife and her siblings which

(included the purser). Those circumstances came to pass. Notwithstanding that the pursuer

was entitled to a one-half share from her uncle’s estate, the pursuer called upon her brother-

in-law, the survivor under the mutual disposition and settlement, to pay her a sum

representing only a one-quarter share. He did so and she granted a discharge “in full

satisfaction of all sums due”. The pursuer’s request at that time was based on a certain

interpretation of the mutual disposition and settlement, but which was erroneous. On a

proper interpretation, the pursuer was entitled to a further £600.

[83] Several years later, and after taking a different view as to the terms of the mutual

disposition, the pursuer sued her brother-in-law for payment. He resisted that action and

founded on the discharge she had granted. The pursuer thereafter raised an action for

reduction of the discharge. While the Lord Ordinary found in her favour as to the proper

interpretation of the mutual disposition (with the effect that she was due a further £600), he

refused to grant reduction. He did so, essentially on the basis that the error was one of law

and, as the law then stood, an error of law did not support the condictio indebiti. The First

Division allowed the pursuer’s reclaiming motion. In a careful and (for those times) full

opinion, the Lord President, Lord McNeil, considered th e cases, including those of the

House of Lords which were said to preclude the condictio indebiti in cases arising from an

error of law. Having reviewed the House of Lords cases referred to in the opinion of the

Lord Ordinary and “searching our own authorities, so far as we have authority on the

subject” (at p 594), Lord President McNeil was not able to find it “finally decided, that in no

case, and under no circumstances can an error in point of law be held as ground for a

condictio indebiti”. He continued: “But with these opinions on record, I should not certainly

be disposed to counter them, if that had been the point here” (emphasis added). He

explicitly declined to extend that tract of authority to the facts of the case before him:

“But then I do not feel that I am at all bound to carry the doctrine any farther, and to

hold that it excluded redress in the case of a party who has given a discharge, as if

he had full satisfaction of all that in law he was entitled to, when it is admitted that

he had not obtained satisfaction, and when his not obtaining it was not a mere error

of law. I am not for pushing the doctrine so far. I can conceive cases in which error in

law would not entitle the party to repetition. There are some errors in law that you

cannot listen to a party pleading ignorance of, but there are other matters of a totally

different kind. In our institutional writers I find that the doctrine laid down is, that

if a discharge be granted in ignorance of the legal rights of a party, it may be

opened up. It is a principle with us, that if a discharge be granted sine causa, it

may be reduced; and however the reasoning may be extended, so as to embrace

many views of the doctrine, yet it would be strong to make it a strict rule that a party

cannot get redress against a discharge granted sine causa. I do not find any case in

which the doctrine has been carried so far, and it cannot be; and it would not do to

press as abstract law the doctrine laid down in the House of Lords, on a point which

was not truly in the case then for decision.” (Emphasis added.)

In the next passage, Lord President McNeil distinguished between a party making a

payment and a party receiving payment that discharges a claim (see foot of p 595). In the

latter instance, a part payment does not discharge the whole claim otherwise there would be

no consideration quoad the element of the claim which was not paid.

[84] Lord President McNeil also drew a distinction with payments constituting a

transaction, using that term in the sense of wh at would now be described as a

“Wherever there is a transaction, it is for settlement of a dispute for quiet and rest,

and the prevention of farther question, and is final; and even in English law, where

they are so strict about condictio indebiti, that doctrine is clearly admitted”: at p 596.

Having again adverted to the position in English law (“When a party pays in ignorance of

the law, he has no redress; but he will, if the other party receiving payment knew the law,

“… it is better to see whether, under the circumstances in which a party seeks

redress, on the allegation of error of law, she had discharged her rights sine causa.

There is no abstract rule laid down in our law, therefore I do not enquire whether the

other party knew or not. I presume he did not… It only comes to this: there is an

error in accounting substantially; and therefore, in reviewing all these matters, I am

very strongly impressed with the notion that it would be a very hazardous thing,

and for which we have no authority, to enlist into the class of cases of discharge sine

causa all of those views and considerations thrown out by the Lord Chancellor in

these cases of condictio indebiti that have been referred to. And if there be no

absolute rule barring the party from redress, it is clear that every principle must

The other judges in the majority, Lord Ivory and Lord Rutherfurd agreed with the Lord

President and also concurred in the conclusion that the pursuer was not meaning to

“discharge was not granted as the result of any communing between the parties as

to their rights. It was on the understanding that on ‘a fair accounting that was the

Lord Rutherfurd also stated that the discharge was not given as part of a compromise; it

[85] It should be noted that there was no suggestion of fraud, misrepresentation or any

sort of circumvention on the part of the defender in that case. Indeed, the Lord Ordinary

affirmed that there was no responsibility on the part of the defender to have ascertained the

pursuer’s rights. He had paid what she had requested and in return for which he received

[86] I note that the discharges under reduction in Ross and Dickson were both granted by

an executor or testamentary trustee. By contrast, in the third case, of "Macandrew v Gilhooley

1911 SC 448 (“Macandrew”), the document under reduction was a receipt and discharge

granted by a workman for compensation payments he had received from his employer, the

defender. On the facts, the pursuer, described by the Court as illiterate, had received

periodic payments but in due course he signed a receipt for sums received and which

incorporated a discharge that purported to relieve the defender of all future liability in

respect of the pursuer. The case is cited as an example of a gratuitous discharge. The Court

noted that the receipt covered all past payments and that there had been no payment in

respect of any future liability. It had no hesitation in concluding that the discharge was

gratuitous. Lord Ardwall observed that there was “no consideration at all and that the

discharge was purely gratuitous…. the discharge was given for no consideration

whatsoever – it is entirely sine causa….” (p 453) (emphasis added).

[87] These authorities, which are binding on me, establish that a gratuitous deed may be

reduced on the ground of an uninduced error which was causative of, or material to, the

decision to grant the deed under challenge. This conclusion is also consistent with the

statement in Menzies’ The Law of Scotland affecting Trustees ( 3rd ed 1913) (“Menzies”) at p 578,

that a discharge of a trustee granted sine causa was reducible, and that on the ground of

“mere error”. I have no hesitation in holding that the discharge was gratuitous to the extent

it purported to discharge the debtor in respect of the PPI claim she had against RBS. In the

language of Dickson and Macandrew, the discharge was granted sine causa. Subject to the

debtor’s arguments regarding the special character of the granter as a trustee in an

insolvency process, I find that the pursuer has established reduction on the ground of a

substantial error in the grant of the discharge which was, quoad the debtor’s PPI claim,

[88] Is the fact that the discharge in this case was granted by a trustee or one acting in the

context of an insolvency regime relevant, or does it dictate a different result? The debtor

argues that decisions of trustees, and particularly those involved in the administration of

insolvent estates, enjoy a special deference and that, absent a want of due care or a breach of

fiduciary duty, a trustee’s decision was unchallengeable. In my view, this overstates the

degree of circumspection the courts afford to the decisions of trustees. If this were correct,

then the decisions in Ross and Dickson, in which the challenges to the discharges of the

[89] It is of course correct that a trustee is a fiduciary and is subject to certain duties in

that capacity. However, in my view, the characterisation of a trustee as a fiduciary is not

conclusive of the grounds of review of a trustee’s decisions. The scope, purpose and powers

under which a trustee acts are likely to be relevant to this question. The cases disclose a

degree of restraint by the Court to intervene, and the relatively limited grounds on which it

will do so, where the trustee’s decision involves the exercise of a discretion or the

interpretation of a testator’s intentions. In Dickson, the fact that the trust deed conferred on

the trustees a “sole and absolute” discretion necessarily informed the limits of the Court’s

review in that case (on which, see Lord Normand at p 87 and Lord Reid at p 91). That case is

not authority for a more general proposition that the grounds of review of a trustee’s

decision were limited to those canvassed in that case. It is in my view important to

distinguish between distinct kinds of decisions and to which different approaches apply.

On the cases cited, the courts generally adopt a degree of restraint in respect of challenges to

discretionary decisions of trustees, as is illustrated by Dundee General Hospital, and to which,

in England the rule said to derive from Hastings-Bass may apply. None of the authorities

cited to me would support so restricted an approach being applied to what are purely

administrative or executory decisions of trustees, even if taken pursuant to a fiduciary duty.

Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the nature of the discharge granted by the trustee.

[90] In the event that there is no relevant ground of reduction available in Scots law, the

pursuer’s fall-back position is to rely on the English law rule of Hastings Bass, which enables

courts to correct certain erroneous decisions of trustees. The debtor resists this, as an alien

intrusion into Scots law. As noted above, the debtor contended for a very restricted scope

for review by the Court, regardless of the character of the decision under challenge. In my

view, the debtor’s approach involves a conflation of discretionary and administrative

decisions of trustees. The trustee’s decision to grant the discharge did not involve any

qualitative judgement or weighing of alternatives. Once she had ingathered the estate and

had accepted the claim of the single creditor (RBS), she was involved in an essentially

straightforward calculation of the dividend to be paid to that creditor. Having done so, she

was bound to grant the debtor’s discharge and to seek her own. These are in the nature of

executory or administrative decisions, not evaluative ones in the exercise of a discretion.

The grounds for reduction of such decisions are not restricted (as they are for discretionary

decisions), but are those generally available in the common law. This conclusion means that

in this case there is no need or basis to consider the application of Hastings-Bass. It follows

that, interesting though parties’ submissions were as to the possible incorporation of that

rule into Scots law, that issue does not arise in this case, even if I had found against the

The fourth core issue: exercise of the Court’s discretion in consideration of the remedy of

[91] The pursuer has succeeded on all the grounds necessary to enable partial reduction

of the discharge to be granted. In general, it would follow that the remedy sought would be

granted as a matter of course. However, this is an action of reduction. Both parties

proceeded on the basis that, notwithstanding success on the merits, there remained as a

discrete step the exercise by the Court of its discretion to grant or refuse the remedy of

reduction. Both parties appealed to the Court’s discretion. I record in the next two

paragraphs the factors each party founded on as justifying the exercise of the Court’s

discretion in its or her favour, before turning to consider the scope of the discretion available

[92] The pursuer relied on the following factors as justifying the grant of reduction.

1. The pursuer noted that the relationship as between the debtor and RBS was

one of debtor and creditor. Following the conclusion of the debtor’s

2. After her discharge, the debtor sought compensation for her PPI claims.

RBS settled these claims and agreed to the settlement sum. Part of that was

3. Had the trustee known about the debtor’s PPI claim, she would have had

regard to it and its value would have been set off against RBS ‘s claim in the

insolvency (the pursuer asserts that the trustee would have been obliged by

4. The debtor can never have been under the impression that RBS did not

intend to challenge the debtor’s entitlement to be paid the outstanding

settlement sum, for the purpose of set off, because (a) it was never paid and

(b) that is the basis on which the sheriff court action was defended. Any

obligation to pay the debtor’s PPI claim compounded the loss RBS incurred

from the inability to recover the unpaid balance in the debtor’s Trust Deed

5. This action simply seeks to place the parties in the position they would h ave

been in had the trust been administered without error. The pursuer’s case

puts parties in such a position. The pursuer submits that had the debtor’s

PPI claim been known during the course of the insolvency, the debtor would

6. The debtor‘s stance results in the debtor having the benefit of the discharge

but also retaining a “windfall” payment from the very party to whom she

7. The pursuer’s case results in a manifestly fair outcome: the debtor remains

discharged and the creditor is repaid to the extent that would have been

possible if the trustee had not made an error (although still not repaid in

8. The debtor’s case results in a manifestly unfair outcome: the debtor is

discharged from repaying her loan to the creditor but the creditor is

required nonetheless to make over further sums just shy of £11,000 to the

9. There is a manifest inequity in the case proffered by the debtor. Equitable

remedies such as reduction are available to the court in order to reach

equitable outcomes. Lord Reed’s postscript in Dooneen makes it clear that

the result in that case was scarcely satisfactory. The pursuer has shown that

it is open to the Court to find an effective remedy to rectify such an unfair

10. The debtor suggests that a relevant consideration is that RBS did not bring

the PPI claim to the attention of the trustee. The pursuer relied on the

evidence elicited from its witnesses to show that there was no obligation to

search for such claims proactively. In any event, that suggestion does not

change the equitable consideration that the debtor’s stance results in a

11. The debtor also suggests that there is potentially a claim against the trustee.

On the evidence before the Court, no such claim has been established. In

any event, a claim against the trustee may very well result in a subrogated

action by the trustee’s indemnity insurer against the debtor to recover the

12. In all the circumstances, reduction should be granted. Refusing to grant

reduction would, in these circumstances, result in a significantly more

material inequity than would be the case if reduction were to be granted.

[93] For her part, the debtor invoked the following factors as relevant to the exercise of

1. When the discharge was granted, of the three parties (the pursuer’s author,

the debtor and the trustee), the debtor had no knowledge of the PPI claims.

She had no duty to investigate matters. She has done nothing wrong. Yet

reduction, if granted, will, on the pursuer’s case, deprive her of that which

she is entitled in law to receive but for the reduction, namely payment of the

outstanding settlement sum following the compromise of her PPI claim.

2. In contrast, the pursuer’s author had acceded to the appointment of the

trustee as a professional trustee to pursue and protect its interests. In

implement of the trustee’s fiduciary duties to do so, she either made relevant

enquiries but did not act on them, or she made no relevant enquiries. The

3. When the discharge was granted, among the debtor, the trustee and the

pursuer’s author, only the latter had means of knowing that, subject only to a

claim being made, it was liable to compensate the debtor for mis-selling PPI.

It knew or ought to have known that it could protect its interests to draw to

the attention of either insolvency trustees of the possibility of PPI claims, thus

permitting the set off it now pursues, and so avoiding the result which its

successor now seeks to characterise as inequitable: namely an insolvent

customer having right to compensation against which set off cannot be pled.

The pursuer accepts that at the material time, neither the debtor nor the

trustee had any relevant knowledge. In contrast the pursuer’s author had

relevant knowledge. By its silence about the issue during the currency of the

trust over the 7 years from 2006 to 2013, the pursuer’s author is the author of

the pursuer’s claimed misfortune. It would be inequitable to visit a remedy

for that self-inflicted injury on a party whom the pursuer concedes was both

4. The debtor’s plea to the irrelevance of Group’s sole defence to the payment

action in Glasgow Sheriff Commercial Court has been sustained. If PTA to

the Supreme Court is granted and that is reversed, then this action will be

superfluous. If instead PTA is refused - or is granted but the appeal is

refused - then decree for payment must follow, unless Group is granted leave

to amend its currently irrelevant defences. The only basis on which it could

amend would be decree of reduction in this action, where the sole averred

purpose of this action is to allow set off to be pled, which standing the

judicially-declared irrelevance of those defences could only happen were

challenge the discharge and have known since August 2014 that it was relied

on by the first defender for her action against it. In these circumstances, there

is no real prospect of Group not being held by the court seized of the

payment action to have waived any right to challenge the reduction, long

before this action was raised in February 2019 - having by then engaged in

4½ years’ of litigation about the effect of the discharge while failing to state

any challenge to its validity - which (if good) would have rendered those

years of litigation unnecessary. Secondly, in any event, on established

principles in commercial litigation there is no prospect of Group being

granted leave to amend to plead a new basis for its defence after 6 years - as

the Inner House acknowledged by refusing to sist the payment action

pending this action. Thirdly, in its closing submissions the pursuer in this

action has expressly disavowed any need and hence intention to amend its

irrelevant defences in the payment action, so decree against it in that action is

inevitable. It is inequitable to grant a remedy for a purpose which must fail.

5. The pursuer submits that it seeks decree for purposes that are limited in

terms which nevertheless are not stated in its conclusions. The pursuer has

not made a fourth motion to amend its conclusions. In term of its

conclusions, reduction would return the debtor to insolvency, and if

reduction of the trustee’s discharge were also granted, it would necessitate

the re-appointment of the second defender or the appointment of another

person as her trustee. The consequence for the debtor would be to expose her

to the prejudice of insolvency, sequestration of her assets including

acquirenda, the need for remuneration of a trustee, and the right of such a

trustee to proceed against her assets for such remuneration, or repetition of

the compensation which has been paid, or any other emergent creditors’

claims. For 6½ years the debtor has reasonably relied in good faith on her

discharge from her insolvency, and all persons dealing with her having been

entitled also to do so. It would be inequitable to negate that reliance.

6. The pursuer concedes that absent concursus debiti et crediti, the sole purpose of

this action could only be to allow the PPI compensation to be in-gathered

from Group. That could only be done by a re-awakened insolvency trust,

with onward distribution by way of a dividend to the pursuer. That would

necessitate the return of the first defender to insolvency with the practical and

7. Reduction of the debtor’s discharge for reasons (for which she bears no

responsibility) does not justify the consequential loss of finality, and thus

public certainty, that resides in a debtor’s discharge under the law of

insolvency. The trust deed is in standard terms, eg, identical to those in

Dooneen. The pursuer’s argument is that omission to in-gather or deal with

any material asset, combined with absence of any evidence from the trustee,

justifies the inference that there are relevant grounds for reduction: if that

were correct, then the result for all trust deeds in materially similar terms

would be that the validity of the debtor’s discharge would be clouded by the

same uncertainties the importance of avoiding which was identified by

Lord Reed in Dooneen at paragraphs 13-14 as the ratio for the Supreme

[94] Parties were agreed that reduction is an equitable remedy. Given that

characterisation, I understand them to acknowledge that the Court may have regard to other

factors, apart from its determination of the factual and legal merits of the case presented. I

was not referred to authorities describing the range of factors to which the Court may have

regard or otherwise defining the scope of its discretion. It is appropriate that I consider the

scope of the Court’s discretion in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction in a case of

reduction, before considering how to exercise that discretion in the circumstances of this

[95] Reduction is a form of corrective remedy. Among the institutional writers, Erskine,

who described it as a “recissory” action, classified it as one of the “principal actions, which

subsist by themselves”: An Institute of the Law of Scotland, IV.1.18. (The other three principal

actions were declaratory, petitory and possessory actions.) Recissory actions are “those

which our law established for voiding of deeds, services, decree, or other writings…” Stair,

described actions of reduction as a means to declare legal rights “by reducing and annulling

any pretended right”: Institutions, IV.20.2. More modern treatment of the remedy of

reduction distinguishes between reduction as a mode of review (ie of decrees) invoking the

Court’s supervisory jurisdiction, and reduction (eg of a deed) where only the ordinary

jurisdiction of the Court is invoked: see, eg, “Judicial and Other Remedies”, Stair Memorial

Encyclopaedia, Vol 13 at paragraph 44 (examining the Court’s ordinary jurisdiction) and

paragraph 45 (examining the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction). (That distinction was

maintained in the Re-issue of this title (sub. nom. “Remedies”).) A reduction invoking the

Court’s supervisory jurisdiction remains part of the Court of Session’s exclusive jurisdiction,

notwithstanding the extension by section 38 of th e Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 (asp

18) of the sheriff court’s jurisdiction to include reduction. It is typically this first kind of

reduction, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction, which has been described as an

“exceptional” remedy: “it is a remedy which does not exist of right” but “must be most

carefully applied” (per Viscount Dunedin in Adair v David Colville & Sons Ltd 1926 SC(HL) 51

at 55-56; cited with approval by the First Division in Arthur v SMT Sales & Services Co Ltd (no

2) 1999 SLT 783 (“Arthur”) at 787A to B, per Lord Macfadyen giving the opinion of the

[96] In this case, it is the Court’s ordinary jurisdiction which is invoked. Even in the

exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction, however, it would appear that the Court is vested with a

degree of discretion. The best-known statement of the equitable discretion vested in the

Court is found in the speech of Lord Watson in Grahame v Magistrates of Kirkcaldy (1882) 9

“It appears to me that a superior court, having equitable jurisdiction, must also have

a discretion, in certain exceptional cases, to withhold from parties applying for it that

remedy to which, in ordinary circumstances, they would be entitled to as a matter of

course. In order to justify the exercise of such a discretionary power there must be

some very cogent reason for depriving litigants of the ordinary means of enforcing

their legal rights. There are, so far as I know, only three decided cases, in which the

Court of Session, there being no facts sufficient to raise a plea in bar of the action,

nevertheless denied to the pursuer the remedy to which, in strict law, he as entitled.

These authorities seem to establish, if that were necessary, the proposition that the

court has the power of declining, upon equitable grounds, to enforce an admittedly

legal right; but they also shew that the power has been rarely exercised.”

Lord President Rodger (as he then was) cited this passage with approval in Highland and

Universal Properties Ltd v Safeway Properties Ltd 2000 SC 297 (“Highland and Universal”) (at

299A-B), one of the “keep open” cases which affirmed the competency of a decree ad factum

praestandum to compel a commercial tenant to adhere to its contractual obligation to keep the

let premises open and trading during normal business hours. Lord Rodger observed:

“These passages affirm the existence of a discretion in the court, in exceptional cases

to deny to a party the remedy to which the party would otherwise be entitled. It is

important to note, however, that the power is plainly regarded as being wholly

exceptional and is to be invoked only where there is some ‘very cogent reason’ for

doing so. Secondly, the very cogent reason must be one which would make it

‘inconvenient and unjust’ to grant specific implement. Finally, the power is analysed

as being of the nature of a discretion. It must therefore be a discretion which the

court exercises in order to prevent the party from whom performance would be

required from suffering inconvenience and injustice. Since the exercise of the power

is a matter of discretion, this court will be able to interfere with the Lord Ordinary’s

decision to grant or withhold specific implement only where he has erred in law or

reached a decision which no reasonable Lord Ordinary could reach. Cf Benson at pp

In a case decided a year later, William Grant & Sons Ltd v Glen Catrine Ltd 2001 SC 901

(“William Grant”), concerning the grant of interdict in a case of passing off, Lord Rodger

again cited Lord Watson in Grahame to affirm the Court’s discretion, observing (at 930D)

“…did not attach any significance to the fact that the discretion to refuse the remedy

to which the pursuer was entitle din strict law has been exercised only very rarely. A

court will be called upon to exercise that discretion wherever the circumstances make

it appropriate to do so, irrespective of whether such circumstances occur frequently

While William Grant and Grahame both concerned the remedy of interdict, and Highland and

Universal concerned the remedy of specific implement, I can see no reason in principle why

the observations in these cases do not apply to the remedy of reduction sought in the

exercise of the Court’s ordinary jurisdiction. Indeed, the first of the three cases discussed

Grahame was a case in which reduction was refused “having regard to the great

inconvenience that would result” if reduction were granted (Lord Watson’s gloss in Grahame

on the earlier case of Macnair v Cathcart, M. 12,832, at p 92). In Arthur, which concerned the

withholding of the remedy of reduction to reduce an award of sequestration, and so in the

exercise of the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction, Lord Macfadyen, delivering the opinion of

the First Division, observed (at p 787E-F) that “It is clearly established by the authorities ….

that reduction is not a remedy to which a pursuer is entitled as of right on proof of some

invalidity in the deed or decree under challenge” (emphasis added). The phrase “the deed

or decree under challenge” is habile to cover both the ordinary and supervisory jurisdictions

[97] It follows from the foregoing, that even if a party establishes a ground of reduction,

that is not determinative of whether or not the remedy of reduction will be granted. On the

authorities reviewed, a court’s decision to withhold the remedy is wholly exceptional, and is

to be done only where there is some “very cogent reason” for doing so (per Lord Rodger in

Highland and Universal, cit. supra). Secondly, the very cogent reason must be one which

would make it ”inconvenient and unjust” to grant reduction (ibid). Finally, the power is

analysed as being of the nature of a discretion. It must therefore be a discretion which the

Court exercises in order to prevent the party from whom performance would be required

Consideration of the factors informing the Court’s discretion to grant or refuse reduction

[98] I have noted above the variety of factors parties relied on and said to inform the

discretion available to the Court to grant or refuse the remedy of reduction. I propose to

consider these under three broad categories, namely: (i) the conduct and responsibility of

the parties for the omission of the debtor’s PPI claim from the Trust Deed process and the

availability of any alternative avenue of redress against the trustee, (ii) the history of the

dealings and actions of the parties (or the pursuer’s predecessor in title) in respect of the

outstanding settlement sum, and (iii) the consequences for the parties if partial reduction of

[99] In considering the equities in any case, the culpability or responsibility of one or

other party for the state of affairs the Court is being asked to reverse is likely to be a relevant

consideration. It is in this context that the debtor contends that the pursuer (or its

predecessor in title as creditor of the debtor) is the author of its own misfortune. This is

premised on the argument that RBS could have pro-actively investigated whether an

insolvent customer might have any nascent PPI claim, which could then be set off in any

ongoing insolvency process. In light of the evidence I have heard from the pursuer’s

witnesses, I accept that that was not a realistic or reasonable step RBS was required to take. I

decline to infer any fault on the part of RBS, as the debtor urged me to do. In relation to any

responsibility on the part of the debtor, it is accepted that the debtor was in good faith and

that at the time of her discharge she was unaware of the possibility of making a PPI claim

against RBS. It follows that neither party is responsible for the omission of the trustee to

realise the debtor’s PPI claim as an asset in the Trust Deed process. While the debtor also

suggests that the pursuer has an alternative avenue of redress in the form of an action

against the trustee, I am not persuaded that grounds for recovery would be established. At

the very least, as some of the arguments in this case disclose, the grounds of any action

against the trustee may be problematic. In any event, on the evidence, the trustee was n o

more or less at fault than the debtor or RBS. Accordingly, in respect of the first factor, I find

that neither the debtor nor RBS was responsible for the trustee’s mistake; both acted in good

[100] I turn to consider the history. There is a protracted course of dealing between the

parties, or, more accurately, between the debtor and the pursuer’s predecessor in title (and

Group as its agent). Prior to the raising of this action, the debtor went through the Trust

Deed process. This commenced in 2006. The debtor was only discharged from that process

in December 2013. Her PPI claim was made in early 2014. Within a few months thereafter a

compromise was reached and the amount of the settlement sum agreed. A small part of this

was paid. However, the outstanding settlement sum has been withheld since that time. In

order to secure payment of the outstanding settlement sum, the debtor was obliged to raise

the payment action, which she did against Group in August 2014. I have set out the

procedural history above (at paras [8] and [9]), but the pursuer succeeded at first instance in

[101] A few days before this case was to be advised, the Court was informed that Group’s

PTA to the Supreme Court in the payment action had been refused. While the pursuer had

expressed the hope that this case would have an impact on the payment action in the

Supreme Court, the interrelationship between the payment action and the outcome of this

case remains less than straightforward. For the reasons the pursuer explained, it raised the

present action in 2020. With commendable frankness, the pursuer’s senior counsel

acknowledged that it was only relatively lately appreciated that the proper counterparty to

the debtor’s PPI claim was the pursuer, as the successor to RBS and, further, that Group

acted as the undisclosed agent of RBS at the material time. Accordingly, even if reduction of

the discharge were granted in this action, the pursuer would require to amend the payment

action in order to reflect the position, first adopted in these proceedings, that the correct

counterparty to the debtor is the pursuer (and not Group, the defender in the payment

action). While the pursuer assumes that amendment would readily be granted in the

payment action, I share the debtor’s doubts as to whether the court seized of that issue

would so readily grant that amendment, given the protracted procedure in the payment

action and the impact of such an amendment at what can only be described as an

exceptionally late stage in that case. Nor would I presume to trespass on the discretion

available to the judge in the payment action in respect of any amendment.

[102] In relation to the consequences for the parties if reduction is granted, in my view this

is the most problematic factor for the pursuer. The pursuer made it clear that it would not

seek to recover from the debtor any sum already paid toward her PPI claim. It restricts any

set off it seeks to exercise against the outstanding settlement sum. In light of the pursuer’s

stance, issues of reliance, prejudice, unjustified enrichment or repetition do not arise.

However, the pursuer’s approach seeks to elide the real practical and procedural difficulties

that would arise as a consequence of partial reduction of the debtor’s discharge. The

pursuer has focused only on the effect of reduction on it. It underestimates the impact on the

debtor. However, there are, in my view, two principal difficulties for the pursuer, even if

partial reduction were granted. These concern the manner by which any balancing of

accounts in bankruptcy is to be effected, and the impact of a partial discharge on the debtor.

In relation to the balancing of accounts in bankruptcy, the pursuer’s position appears to be

premised on this being mandatory (see para [92(3)]), above) or without any formal

mechanism to effect it. I turn to consider the correctness of that proposition.

(a) Compensation, set off, and balancing of accounts in bankruptcy

[103] In parties’ submissions, the terms “compensation”, “set off” and “balancing of

accounts in bankruptcy” appeared, at times, to be used interchangeably. Care must be

taken, however, as these terms embody distinct legal concepts. “Compensation ” is

statutory, governed by the Compensation Act of 1592 (“the 1592 Act”), and involves

extinction of the debt set off (or “compensated”). The rules of “balancing of accounts in

bankruptcy” (as Bell termed it in his Commentaries on the Law of Scotland and on the Principles

of Mercantile Jurisprudence, 7th McLaren ed, 1871, vol 2, p 118) are derived from the common

law and represent, in effect, a permissible relaxation by the Court of the strict requirements of

the 1592 Act in the exercise of an equitable discretion according to the circumstance of the

case (see eg Ross v Ross (1895) 22 R 461 at 464-465 per Lord McLaren). In current practice, it is

sometimes referred to as “insolvency set off”. However described, it is “an equitable

adjustment of mutual debts and credits, to avoid manifest injustice”: per Lord Hope in

Heritable Bank plc v Landsbanki Islands HF [2013] UKSC 13; 2013 SC(HL) 201 at paragraph 39.

“Set off” is not a term of art in Scots law (though it is in England, with its own rules), but

appears to be used by the parties as shorthand covering both compensation and balancing

accounts in bankruptcy. Reference should also made be to Lord Rodger’s typically erudite

and illuminating discussion of retention and “retention for the purposes of compensation”

(“retention-compensation”), albeit that discussion was in a non-insolvency context: see per

Lord Rodger in Inveresk plc v Tullis Russell Paperwork Ltd [2010] UKSC 19; 2010 SC(UKSC)

1056 at paragraphs 70 to 107. In that discussion, Lord Rodger distinguished between

retention (as the withholding of performance) and retention-compensation (ie retention or

withholding of payment with a view to preserving compensation or set off in order to

extinguish the sum set off): see ibid at paragraph 78 and Goudy, Law of Bankruptcy, at

pp 550-551. What the pursuer seeks to do is akin to the latter: to withhold payment of the

outstanding settlement sum to enable this to be set off against (and thereby extinguish pro

tanto) the unpaid balance, once the debtor’s discharge from that liability is reduced and once

[104] The pursuer’s position was that the requirement “to plead” compensation was a

requirement only when one was litigating directly about the two claims to be set off. It

submitted that in this context, “pleading” a balancing of accounts in bankruptcy should be

regarded as no more than a requirement that it “actively” be requested by the pursuer

because it will not operate automatically. The pursuer submitted that in a standard

insolvency setting there was no need to lodge formal “pleadings” with the insolvency

practitioner but rather bring to his or her attention that there is a mutuality of debts and that

set off ought to be applied. Here, the pursuer had sought a balancing of accounts since the

[105] In relation to the alternative forum of the Trust Deed process, the pursuer accepted it

was possible for a trustee to be appointed formally to carry out the setting off, but it is

submitted that this is not required in this case. It submitted that there is no calculation to be

carried out. The practical effect (indeed, it submitted the total effect) of the proposed set off

would be to prevent the pursuer’s losses, caused by the debtor’s insolvency, from being

compounded by requiring the pursuer to pay over further sums to the debtor by way of the

outstanding settlement sum. The imposition of a trustee would serve only to increase the

administration costs – the trustee would need to be paid – and thus would further reduce

the sum that could be offset by the pursuer against its losses. The pursuer’s intention is that

the order to be granted by the Court will have the effect of reducing the discharge of the

debtor to the extent necessary and bringing about a balancing of accounts. The pursuer’s

(b) The consequences flowing from the requirement that compensation as a set off must be pleaded?

[106] I do not accept the pursuer’s submissions on this point. It is a recognised feature of

compensation, and appears implicit in the balancing of accounts in bankruptcy, that the plea

of compensation (or the equivalent for a balancing of accounts) must be pled before it can be

given effect to: see the discussion of compensation in Gloag, On Contract at p 644 under the

rubric “Does not Operate ipso jure”. That this is a requirement is at least implicit in the

discussion of balancing of accounts in bankruptcy, and flows from the Court’s equitable

control over its application (on which, see per Lord Hodge in Integrated Building Services

Engineering Limited (t/a Operon) v Pihl UK Ltd [2010] CSOH 80 at para 25). The Court

exercises its control, either by sustaining plea of compensation (with the effect of

extinguishing that liability) or permitting the balancing of the accounts in bankruptcy (and

for which the Court may permit a party to retain a liquid sum for that purpose, as it did in

Ross, ibid). This is to be contrasted with the position in English law, where set off operates de

jure. That is not the position in Scots law. If it is correct that any balancing of accounts must

be pled, then there must be an extant forum in which it is possible to do so . In the

circumstances of this case, this could either be in the payment action (assuming amendment

is allowed to substitute the pursuer for Group as the defender and to include relative

averments and a plea), or by a trustee in an insolvency process giving effect to this in

adjudicating on a creditor’s claim (including the creditor’s assertion of a balancing of

accounts). In respect of the debtor, that insolvency process is the Trust Deed process.

[107] While the pursuer’s desire is to avoid further procedure, I do not accept that that is

correct or competent as a matter of procedure to effect, or to enable the giving of effect, of

the desired balancing of accounts simply by the pursuer “actively requesting” it. At the very

least, RBS (or the pursuer, as the successor to RBS) would require to reformulate its claim in

the Trust Deed process (ie by reducing it, after deduction of the outstanding settlement sum

from the unpaid balance) or the outstanding settlement sum would form part of the assets in

the Trust Deed process and which the trustee would apply in part-satisfaction of RBS’s

claim. On either scenario, the trustee would require to adjudicate on any reformulated claim

by RBS (including its assertion of set off) or by setting off the unpaid balance (for which the

debtor would have been rendered liable anew as a consequence of the partial reduction of

[108] However, in my view, a more fundamental difficulty presents itself. The pursuer has

failed fully to address the con sequences of even a partial reduction of the discharge on the

debtor. It would place the debtor in a highly irregular position from which it would be

difficult for her to extricate herself. While reduction of the discharge would not render the

debtor apparently insolvent (which would arise on the granting of a trust deed), she would

nonetheless be returned to a state of insolvency as the undischarged granter of the Trust

Deed. This may entail possible adverse consequences for her crediting rating and other

financial commitments. Furthermore, as the effect of the partial reduction of discharge

rendered her liable for the unpaid balance (as this is a necessary antecedent to any balancing

of accounts), she would remain liable for the lesser amount of the unpaid balance remaining

after set off of the outstanding settlement sum. This is because a discharge only relieves the

debtor of liability; it does not extinguish the underlying debt. Even if the pursuer effected a

balancing of accounts, meaning that it could apply the outstanding settlement sum to reduce

the unpaid balance by a like amount, the debtor would remain undischarged in respect of

the lesser amount of the unpaid balance. That liability is not insubstantial (being in excess of

£15,000). Strictly speaking, any asset the debtor acquired after the grant of the Trust Deed

could be applied as acquirenda to satisfy that sum. Critically, and in contrast with the

position of a debtor in a sequestration, the debtor would not be able to rely on any automatic

discharge. In the absence of reduction of the trustee’s discharge, and the Trust Deed process

being revived in some way, there would be no trustee appointed in respect of the debtor’s

estate who could grant her a discharge of new in respect of that part of the unpaid balance

for which (as a consequence of the partial reduction) she remains liable.

[109] I have no doubt that, if the case merited it, a means could be found to overcome the

procedural issues just noted. (Indeed, the pursuer might itself discharge the debtor from the

lesser amount of the unpaid balance, after it was reduced (ie extinguished) pro tanto by the

set off of the outstanding settlement sum.) The cases in which the Court has considered how

to achieve restitutio in integrum, which is often a condition of the grant of reduction, are

redolent of the Court exercising its discretion pragmatically and flexibly to fashion a remedy

to achieve a sufficiently restorative state of affairs: see, eg, cases such as Spence v Crawford

1969 SC (HL) 52, discussed in Somerville v 1051 GWR Limited [2019] CSOH 61 at paragraphs

33 to 37. However, in my view, this is not the case in which to do so.

[110] I stress that I do not determine this case as a question of competency. I do not accept

the debtor’s characterisation that what the pursuer seeks to do involves an impermissible

refashioning of an insolvency regime. My decision in this case should not be construed as

necessarily precluding the prospect in other cases, that it would be appropriate to reverse a

debtor’s discharge, even if there are other creditors. In other words, I do not believe that in

circumstances such as have occurred in this case that “the law is powerless to grant a

remedy” (per Lord Reed in Dooneen, quoted at para [11], above). In my view, there is

nothing inherently incompetent in seeking reduction of a debtor’s discharge in an

insolvency process, so long as the discharge was given effect in a procedurally competent

manner, was not prejudicial to the bona fide rights of third parties, that the parity of

treatment of creditors in was preserved and the other rules governing reduction and retitutio

[111] That said, I note that it has long been a feature of personal insolvency procedures in

Scotland to discharge a debtor of her pre-insolvency debts and thereby enable her to rebuild

her life free of them. (The history of that salutary development is traced in “Insolvency” by

Prof Gibb in “The Introduction to Scottish Legal History”, The Stair Society, volume 20.) I

return to the question of the impact on the debtor if partial reduction is granted. The

pursuer’s contention is that partial reduction of the discharge would put the parties in the

position they would have been but for the trustee’s mistake (see para [92(3)], above). While

on a superficial level that is correct, it fails to take into account the passage of time and the

disruption to a settled state of affairs. A very considerable amount of time has passed since

the debtor was discharged, more than six years ago, from an insolvency procedure

commenced 14 years ago, in respect of debts incurred more than 20 years ago. For most of

the last 7 years she has been embroiled in the payment action which has been through two

successive levels of appeal and in which the Supreme Court has recently refused to entertain

it as a third-level appeal. If the pursuer succeeds in this action, further amendment in the

payment action is proposed. The debtor’s witness statement was eloquent of the misery

caused by the effect of prolonged litigation has had on her. The pursuer’s rationale in

running this case was that it was a test case to obtain a ruling on the issue raised in Lord

Reed’s coda to Dooneen. It has achieved an answer to the issues it wished to litigate. The

amount of the outstanding settlement sum is paltry from the pursuer’s perspective and in

proportion to the legal fees likely to have been incurred. This is not an insignificant sum for

the debtor. There will be clear adverse impacts on her, and, on the pursuer’s approach, no

obvious means to alleviate them. Collectively, these factors provide “cogent reasons” to

refuse the reduction sought. I would regard it as bearing unduly harshly on the debtor , or it

being “unjust and inconvenient” in this case, to grant a partial reduction of her discharge. In

the whole circumstances, and in the exercise of my discretion, I refuse the remedy sought.

The third core issue: Waiver, personal bar, and mora, taciturnity and acquiescence

[112] In light of my decision on the fourth core issue, I do not need to consider various

pleas in bar invoked by the debtor. They were not pressed with any vigour. (The debtor did

not maintain the plea of personal bar in submissions.) In any event, the debtor advanced

these pleas by focusing on the absen ce of a challenge to the discharge until 2020. That may

be so, but that is to ignore that the reduction of the discharge is simply a means to the

pursuer’s end, which is to withhold payment of the outstanding settlement sum in order to

set that off against the unpaid balance. The pursuer (and Group) have been unwavering in

that purpose. Looking at those circumstances in the round, it cannot be said that the

pursuer (or Group) have waived any right to do so (even if they have changed tack about

the means to do so) or have been taciturn in its intention to do so. On the materials I have

considered, I would not have found any of these pleas established.

[113] I advised parties of my decision at the By Order on 5 December. I was invited to

reserve the question of expenses as well as question of the precise terms of the interlocutor.

Scottish Court of Session Decisions