MG CONSTRUCTION LTD AGAINST AGD EQUIPMENT LTD [2020] ScotCS CSOH_72 (14 July 2020)
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OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
[2020] CSOH 72
CA1/18
OPINION OF LORD ERICHT
In the cause
M G CONSTRUCTION LIMITED
against
AGD EQUIPMENT LIMITED
Pursuer
Defender
14 July 2020
Pursuer: Marney; Brandon Malone & Company
Defender: Brown; Anderson Strathern LLP
Introduction
[1] The pursuer, a construction company, purchased a pile driving hammer from the
defender. The hammer failed while in use on a construction site. The manufacturer
replaced the hammer. The pursuer raised an action against the supplier for recovery of the
amount paid in settlement of breach of the construction contract, loss of profit on the
remaining work due to be carried out, legal costs, consultancy fees and lost director’s time,
on the ground that the hammer was not of satisfactory quality under section 14 of the Sale of
Goods Act 1979.
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[2] The case called before me for proof before answer on liability. I heard the evidence
prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, with closing submissions being made by telephone due to
the restrictions resulting from the outbreak.
The failure
[3] A piling hammer (also known as a rig) is a hydraulic impact hammer used for pile
driving. It is attached to a leader which acts as a guide for the hammer so that verticality
may be easily maintained resulting in the piles being driven into the ground plum. The
leader is attached to the base excavator. The base excavator is a vehicle which is separate
from the hammer, but to which the hammer is attached. The base excavator provides the
necessary hydraulic power and ability to travel the machine from pile position to pile
position. The ram box, which is also known as a swivel arm, is part of the leader assembly.
[4] There was an incident with the hammer on 17 May 2015. The pursuer had been
contracted by Barhale Limited to drive piles on a site in Portobello. The ram box failed,
breaking into two parts, and the hammer collapsed.
[5] On inspection of the failed hammer, it became apparent that it had sheared along the
line of a pre-existing crack. The crack had gone all the way round. The crack had been
repaired by a weld. That weld will be referred to in this opinion as the “casualty weld”.
Metal plates had also been inserted within the box. There was also another weld, on the
surface of the ram box. That other weld will be referred to in this opinion as the “check
weld”.
[6] The pursuer’s position was that the casualty weld had not been made by the pursuer
and so must have been made prior to delivery. The defender’s position was that it had not
been made before delivery. The defender drew attention to a scenario (the “Defender’s
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Scenario”) which might explain the making of the casualty weld after delivery. The
Defender’s Scenario was that after taking delivery of the hammer the pursuer’s staff had
misused it by pushing it against piles which had not been inserted into the ground straight
in order to straighten them. The misuse caused the swivel arm to fail due to fatigue, and
that failure was repaired by the casualty weld shortly before the incident.
[7] The key issues at proof were whether the pursuer had proved that the casualty weld
had been made before delivery, and if so whether the pursuer had failed to mitigate or had
broken the chain of causation.
Statutory provision
[8] Section 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 provides:
“14.—Implied terms about quality or fitness.
(1) Except as provided by this section and section 15 below and subject to any
other enactment, there is no implied [term] about the quality or fitness for
any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale.
(2) Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business, there is an implied
term that the goods supplied under the contract are of satisfactory quality.
(2A) For the purposes of this Act, goods are of satisfactory quality if they meet the
standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking
account of any description of the goods, the price (if relevant) and all the
other relevant circumstances.
(2B) For the purposes of this Act, the quality of goods includes their state and
condition and the following (among others) are in appropriate cases aspects
of the quality of goods—
(a) fitness for all the purposes for which goods of the kind in question are
commonly supplied,
(b) appearance and finish,
(c) freedom from minor defects,
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(d) safety, and
(e) durability.”
Witnesses as to fact
Pursuer’s witnesses
Craig Milloy
[9] Mr Milloy was the managing director of the pursuer. He holds a BSc in civil
engineering and in the past was a chartered civil engineer. He had in excess of 28 years of
experience in piling as a contractor and company owner.
[10] Mr Milloy’s evidence was that in around 2014 the pursuer decided to approach the
defender for procurement of a new top drive hydraulic hammer. They selected the hammer
manufactured by FAMBO because they already had FAMBO hammers. They were
informed by Gordon Law of the defender that the defender had a hammer in stock available
for immediate delivery, avoiding the normal fabrication lead time of around 6 months. The
defender advised him that the hammer was in stock as it was the last rig manufactured in
Sweden by FAMBO, who were terminating their manufacture process. Bauer, who had
acquired FAMBO sometime prior to this, were taking control of manufacture in Germany.
[11] The defender fitted the hammer to the pursuer’s base crawler excavator. During the
commissioning process, there were a number of difficulties with the hammer. The
difficulties were referred to in emails from the pursuer to the defender on 20 September,
23 September, 30 September 2014 and letter of 24 October 2014. The problems included
hammer rams not retracting, hydraulic output, hammer guides and cage, hammer not
giving full stroke, tyre rods breaking, hammer hitting mass ten plate and electrical cables
lengthened and protected.
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[12] Mr Milloy said that if an operator had damaged the arm as suggested by the
Defender’s Scenario, the operator would have had to report it to the pursuer’s plant
department and it would have appeared within their report. There was no possibility that
the plant manager Morris Crane would not have been aware of damage or major repair
work. The pursuer was a relatively small company with under 20 employees. It has eight
hammers, which are the basis of its operation. The pursuer’s operational records of using
these hammers over 50 years show no such damage. In any event, the pursuer’s plant
department would not attempt a repair like this, but would subcontract it to a coded welder.
In any event they would have not made the repair which was done, but would have
replaced the part. It was a relatively small part and could have been replaced for £200 or so.
The workshop was next to Mr Milloy’s office and he would have been aware if a hammer
was taken in for repair. The pursuer’s staff were fully trained and did not have a practice of
misusing hammers. There was no evidence of misuse of hammers in the 28 year history of
the company. On being asked in cross-examination whether it could be that an employee
did try to use it to straighten a pile, Mr Milloy responded that there was always the
possibility but he found it unlikely. His employees did not have the skill to conceal the
casualty weld with paint. The weld was very poor quality but the concealment was
extremely high quality.
[13] He gave evidence that the pursuer had an inspection regime whereby there are
regular inspections by the company’s plant department staff and in addition the hammer
was inspected on a daily basis by the operator for general maintenance purposes. It was
also inspected on a 6 monthly or annual basis by insurance inspectors.
[14] Mr Milloy was not on site on the day in question so did not see the hammer
immediately prior to the incident.
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[15] Barhale raised an action against the pursuer for breach of contract which Mr Milloy
settled on a commercial basis for a reduced sum.
[16] The pursuer returned the hammer to the defender retaining the smaller part of the
section of the Ram Box containing the failed weld. It did so in order to retain some evidence
in case they sued the defender. That part had since become lost. It was a mistake to lose it.
In this opinion I shall refer to the lost part as the Smaller Ram Box Section and the other part
of the section of the Ram Box containing the failed weld as the Larger Ram Box Section.
[17] On cross-examination he explained that a fault in the hammer did not have potential
to cause delay in the Barhale contract: the pursuer would just have used another hammer.
He accepted that the pursuer’s records might not record everything that had been done to a
machine in its history, but in re-examination agreed with his counsel’s suggestion that if the
pursuer had undertaken a significant repair to the machine he would expect to see that
recorded.
[18] I found Mr Milloy generally to be a credible and reliable witness on factual matters
on which he had direct personal knowledge. However I did not accept his inference from
such facts that the casualty weld was not made by the pursuer’s staff. The pursuer’s
procedures and inspections and the location of Mr Crane’s office do not exclude the
possibility of an employee carrying out the casualty weld outwith the proper procedures
and not making the pursuer or Mr Crane aware of what he had done. A further difficulty
with Mr Milloy’s evidence is that Mr Milloy was not on site at East Kilbride on 12 May and
had no direct knowledge of what Mr Jack did that day.
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Mark Jeffrey
[19] Mr Jeffrey has been employed by the pursuer since 2008 and is the leading foreman.
He was on site at East Kilbride on Tuesday 12 May 2015, prior to the failure of the hammer
at Portobello on Sunday 17 May. He saw something on the paintwork on the hammer arm.
It looked like a blemish in the paint but he had not noticed it before and wanted to get it
checked. It did not look like a crack, just a mark. He put out a call to the fitter, Scott Jack
and pointed out the blemish in the paint to him. Mr Jack was not sure what the mark on the
paint was either. Mr Jack ground off the paint. Mr Jeffrey could not recall whether or not he
saw the metal when the paint had been ground off, but as far as he knew there was nothing
to see as Mr Jack continued to investigate. Mr Jeffrey went off to do other things and did not
witness what Mr Jack did. Mr Jack told Mr Jeffrey that he applied a weld to see if the heat
showed up a crack or movement, but it did not. They proceeded on the basis there was no
crack there and the rig was not taken out of service. Mr Jack did not have paint with him.
[20] In assessing Mr Jeffrey’s evidence, two difficulties present themselves. The first is
that there is a stark difference of fact between Mr Jeffrey and Mr Jack on the state of the
hammer on 12 May 2015. Mr Jeffrey’s evidence was that there was a blemish in the paint.
Mr Jack’s daily report, set out in below, states there was a crack. There is a material
difference between these accounts as a blemish is a less serious defect than a crack. A crack
might support the Defender’s Scenario, whereas a blemish might not. Without hearing
evidence from Mr Jack, it is impossible to decide whether Mr Jeffrey’s account or Mr Jack’s
account is to be preferred. Further, Mr Jeffrey has no direct knowledge of what Mr Jack did,
as Mr Jeffrey was elsewhere on site at the time. On account of these difficulties, little weight
can be placed on Mr Jeffrey’s evidence in considering whether the pursuer has proved its
case.
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Morris Crane
[21] Mr Crane is the pursuer’s plant manager, a post which he has held for around
12 years.
[22] During the commissioning process a number of problems came to light. There was
excessive welding on the hammer which prevented it from sliding on the guides: the
excessive welding had to be ground off. The hammer would not flow to its proper weight.
The defender had fitted an improper hydraulic valve and had not calibrated the gauge
properly. The main hydraulic rams for the hammer were overheating. The hammer was
travelling too far on the slides and damaging the top of the hammer and guides when it got
to its maximum height. After commissioning, there was an instance when the machine was
being used in Newcastle when hydraulic control valves became faulty. There was then a
period of normal operation until the incident. Mr Crane was not on site at the time of the
incident. He subsequently went to the site and took photographs.
[23] After the incident, he received Scott Jack’s daily report sheet for Tuesday 12 May
2015. In that report sheet Mr Jack recorded:
“TRAVEL TO EAST KILBRIDE REPORT OF OIL LEAK ON FAMBO HAMMER.
COULD NOT FIND ANY LEAKS TIGHTENED SEVERAL CONNECTORS AND
UNIONS. NOTICED SMALL CRACK IN PAINTWORK ON SIDE SHIFT RAM BOX
SECTION. APPLIED WELD TO CRACK FOR VISUAL CHECK. RETURNED TO
YARD”
[24] After the incident, the defender replaced the hammer and took the old hammer
away. Mr Crane’s recollection was that all parts of the hammer were taken away, but he
was not certain about that. He was sure that they took the larger part of the arm away and
that it had not been cut, broken up, or touched in any way before they took it away.
Whether or not they took the smaller section, he could not be sure.
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[25] He said that his photograph showed rust on the casualty weld which would not have
been there had the casualty weld been done a few days before the incident.
[26] I found Mr Crane generally to be a credible and reliable witness on matters of which
he had direct factual knowledge. However he was not on site at East Kilbride on 12 May
and had no direct knowledge of what Mr Jack did that day. I do not accept his inference
drawn from the rust, as it was based on colouring in a photograph and I was not satisfied
that colour reproduction in a photograph is sufficiently accurate to allow a diagnosis of rust.
Thomas Gibson
[27] Thomas Gibson is a former director of the defender. He had a telephone
conversation with Francis McCauley following the incident. He was driving home. There
were two people on the call, Mr McCauley and one other. They were very aggressive on the
call. They were putting hypothetical situations to him. He agreed with their suggestion that
if the pursuer had carried out the repair it should have been tested. He did not say that the
pursuer had carried out the repair to the arm. Everything was hypothetical at that stage as
the investigations had not been completed and it was not clear exactly what had happened.
[28] In cross-examination there was put to him the account of the conversation given by
Mr McCauley in his investigation report. Two different versions of Mr McCauley’s report
had been lodged in process and the witness was referred to the version of the report forming
part 4 of the Appendix to Ms Wasserman’s report (Production 7/8). The account of the
conversation in that version of the report stated:
“Regarding the (failed) weld on the Ram Anchorage point [Mr Gibson]
acknowledged that there was a crack and that an attempt had been made to
undertake a repair, which was unsatisfactory. [Mr McCauley] questioned
Tom Gibson regarding the attempted repair asking if it should have been
test/certificated? Tom Gibson’s reply was that it should have been sent for testing
but hadn’t been”
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Mr Gibson’s response was that Mr McCauley asked a similar question which was if you had
carried out a repair would it have certification to which Mr Gibson had replied yes if they
had carried out a repair. Mr McCauley asked if it would be good practice to have it tested
and Mr Gibson said yes. Mr McCauley said did you and Mr Gibson said no.
Defender’s witnesses as to fact
Michael Probst
[29] Mr Probst is the director of quality management at Bauer. He is based in Germany
and has held that position for 7 years. With reference to a photograph of the actual hammer
which failed, which had been taken prior to delivery, it could be seen that there were no
visible signs of welding. If the weld had been ground flat and painted over it would be
visible.
[30] The quality control information which the FAMBO provided Bauer with would have
suggested that the hammer was in good working condition. The quality control procedure
for the hammer would have been carried out by FAMBO. The ram box was designed to be
made out of a single sheet of steel. The design did not include a weld at the point of the
casualty weld.
[31] When asked on cross-examination whether the hammer which failed was the last
FAMBO hammer made in Sweden he replied he was not sure and he could not answer that.
The parts were manufactured individually by different companies and assembled in Sweden
by FAMBO.
[32] I found Mr Probst to be generally a credible and reliable witness. However I do not
accept his inference that the hammer was in good working condition: he has not excluded
the possibility that the casualty weld was concealed in such a manner that it was not picked
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up by the quality control procedures. The question of the state of the hammer prior to
delivery is a matter for the court having heard all the evidence.
Stefan Lämmle
[33] Mr Lämmle has worked for Bauer Maschinen GmbH as a technical specialist
customer service advisor and has worked for them since 1997. He has worked within Bauer
as a welder in steel construction, assembly of drilling rigs and mechanical repairs. From
April 2014 until August 2015, he worked in customer service for FAMBO. He had a
qualification as a construction machinery mechanic master.
[34] He inspected the failed hammer on 27 May 2015, after the incident, and produced a
report (the “Bauer report”) dated 1 June 2015.
[35] The Bauer report found that the damage to the leader was caused by the failure of
the swing arm on the pivoting device. It was found on the swivel arm that two pieces of
steel were joined together by a welded joint. The weld was not carried out correctly
according to the specifications of BMA. The square tube at this weld weakened which led to
failure of the components. After the detection of a crack at the swivel arm, welding repairs
were performed. This incident should have been reported to Bauer Maschinen to be
expertly repaired. Even a half penetration weld would have withstood the normal stresses
occurring. Impermissible form forces have been possibly initiated. With an expert repair
the extent of damage could have been avoided.
[36] I found the Bauer report to be useful on factual matters in that it set out in detail,
including photographs, the results of an inspection of the failed hammer by Mr Lämmle
shortly after the incident. However it was not an expert report but an internal report by
Bauer and does not constitute opinion evidence. In particular, there is a finding in the report
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that after the detection of a crack at the swivel arm, welding repairs were performed. That
finding was based on no evidence and is a matter for the court. Accordingly, I do not accept
that finding.
Robert Law
[37] Mr Law is the managing director of the defender. He has worked for the defender
since 1983, beginning work as a trainee and having been the managing director since 2002.
[38] The defender purchased the hammer from FAMBO in July 2014. He had bought all
of FAMBO’s stock. The hammer supplied to the defender was the last one ever made by
FAMBO in Sweden. It was then supplied by the defender to the pursuer about 11 August
2014. The hammer was subject to quality testing prior to delivery. This was carried out by
FAMBO at the factory. No defects were noted on inspection by the defender.
[39] Mr Law had sold FAMBO equipment since 2002 and had always found their
equipment to be well designed, well-built and safe and had never known of a weld to fail in
any of their equipment.
[40] The hammer was supplied with the warranty valid for 12 months from the date of
purchase. From delivery of the hammer in 2014 until the incident in May 2015, there were
several occasions when the pursuer contacted the defender about the warranty. These were
minor issues and the defender repaired the machine. This showed that the pursuer was
aware of the warranty, but they chose not to follow the warranty procedure when the crack
was discovered.
[41] After the incident, Mr Law made an offer of replacing that hammer as it seemed to
him the only way that litigation would be avoided. He did not accept liability. In an email
dated 9 June 2015 he stated “This is an ex gratia offer of settlement and is offered in the spirit
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of maintaining a good relationship with you”. After sundry correspondence and
discussions, it was agreed that the hammer would be replaced and the pursuer would
pay £7,500 plus VAT as the new hammer was better than the damaged one. This was set out
in an email from the defender to the pursuer dated 17 June 2015 which stated “This is not an
admission of liability on our part”.
[42] There was no inventory taken when the parts of the hammer arrived at the
defender’s yard. Mr Law decided that they should be put into storage in case they were
required at some point in the future and they were put in stillages, that is steel pallets with
sides used to store equipment. It was only in September 2018, when the defender was asked
to make the parts available for examination by its experts that Mr Law realised that all of the
swivel arm (ram box) had not been returned. The Smaller Ram Box Section had not been
returned. The other half of the ram box had been cut off from the main frame and cut away
on three sides. That meant that they had only one edge of the casualty weld. The missing
part and the parts cut away had been cut with angle grinders. The defender does not
generally use angle grinders to cut items in its workshop. Grinders are regularly used on
construction sites. In his view, the pursuer must have failed to return the part of the swivel
arm (ram box) which would have been attached to the piling rig. He further believed that
they had cut away the part which was attached to the mounting plate.
[43] Mr Law explained the Defender’s Scenario. He was aware from experience that it
was common practice for some piling contractors to use the base excavator to push against
the leader to straighten up piles that are already embedded in the ground. The FAMBO
hammer and the leader are not designed to be used in that way. Using it in that way will
result in the hammer being exposed to a greater degree of force than it is designed to take.
The swivel arm (ram box) is not designed to withstand the force of the base excavator
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pushing against it when it is locked on a pile which is already embedded in the ground. An
overload failure or a fracture caused by excessive force being applied to the equipment is
most likely to occur in the swivel arm (ram box) at the weakest point, in this case the
casualty weld. Employing this practice with a 40 tonne excavator would have imparted
impermissible forces on the swivel arm.
[44] Mr Law commented on a document entitled “M G Construction Plant Management
System”. The purpose of that document was to act as a record of maintenance work. It
shows the hours worked by the base machine or excavator on which the pursuer had
mounted the FAMBO. They show a total of 655 working hours from 18 September 2014 to
8 March 2015. He assumed that given that the hammer was used in conjunction with the
excavator, it had been used for approximately the same number of hours. He would expect
a machine like this to work about 1000 hours per year.
[45] I found Mr Law to be generally a truthful and reliable witness on matters of fact. I
did not accept his evidence about the number of hours the hammer worked. That evidence
was based on documentation showing the hours the excavator worked, but he had no basis
of knowing whether the hammer had been attached to that particular excavator for all of
these hours. I accept his explanation as to the effect on a hammer of misuse in straightening
piles, but note that this was a general explanation of what might hypothetically happen and
was not direct evidence as to what actually happened in this case.
Gary Woodfull
[46] Mr Woodfull is currently employed as the plant manager for the BCS group. The
BCS group includes Barhale. He has over 30 years’ experience in the construction industry
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and has worked for various companies over that period. He has engaged in several internal
and external (at Walsall College) site manager courses.
[47] He was asked by Barhale to attend at the site after the incident and did so on 18 May
2015, the day after the incident.
[48] On his inspection of the box section he noticed a hairline crack. The hairline crack
had been welded over and it was a fresh weld. In order to carry out a weld competently
there required to be the grinding back of the surface. From his experience it looked like a
very amateur job in an attempt to patch up the crack. He prepared a report for Barhale.
[49] In his view, the fracture could have been caused by the Defender’s Scenario. A piling
on of the mass would have caused repeated damage to the box section. The crack could
have been caused by the treatment of the machinery. The crack on the box looked like it had
been a fresh weld albeit that there was rust present in the inside. He would expect to see
rust on the inside of the crack if this had happened over a period of time and had been left
rather than the crack occurring immediately before his inspection. The crack on the box
section was too large to attempt to repair by simply welding and the proper procedure
should have been followed in respect of any attempts to weld it, or the machine should have
been replaced.
[50] The welding specification procedure did not appear to have been undertaken. Check
welds should be carried out on site and when a crack appears must be carried out by a
competent welder. There must be certificates to ensure that the proper materials are being
used. Good practice would suggest that the machinery should have been taken out of
service immediately in the interests of safety. The hammer should have received a fresh
weld and been replaced due to the weight bearing on it rather than simply patched up in a
manner that it was.
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[51] On cross-examination it became apparent that Mr Woodfull’s evidence was
predicated on his understanding that there was only one weld. When the evidence of there
being a casualty weld and a check weld was pointed out to him, he accepted that his original
evidence was misleading.
[52] I did not find Mr Woodfull’s evidence to be of assistance. He is not an independent
expert, but an employee of a Barhale group company who investigated the incident as it
occurred on a Barhale site. His evidence was predicated upon there only being one weld,
whereas the evidence as a whole establishes that there was a casualty weld and a check
weld.
Francis McCauley
[53] Mr McCauley works for Barhale Limited, which was the company that had
contracted the pursuer to work on the site at the date of the incident. He is the Health and
Safety advisor for the Scotland region. On 21 May 2015 he had a conversation with
Mr Gibson. Mr Gibson acknowledged that there was a crack and a repair was attempted.
Mr McCauley asked him should this have been tested or certified and he replied it should
have but was not.
[54] On cross-examination Mr McCauley agreed that on 21 May 2015 he thought that the
check weld was a repair. At that time he had not seen Mr Jack’s report in which Mr Jack
stated that he had applied a weld for a visual check. If he had he would have factored that
in. He agreed that the conversation was more nuanced than appeared in his report, and that
Mr Gibson’s position was not as stark as presented in that report.
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Bernhard Lindermair
[55] Mr Lindermair was currently the managing director and CEO of RTG Rammtachnik
GmbH which is a fully owned subsidiary of Bauer Maschinen. He had been the executive
director of the business unit of piling technology of Bauer since 2005, including the FAMBO
products. He was the managing director of FAMBO from approximately 2010 to 2015. He
had worked with Bauer Maschinen for 27 years and had an engineering degree from a
technical university in Germany.
[56] Bauer acquired FAMBO on or around 2003 – 2004 and it became a fully owned
subsidiary of Bauer. The FAMBO production facility in Sweden was closed in 2015 and
production of FAMBO products was moved from Sweden to Bauer in Germany. Since 2015,
production of FAMBO products had been in Germany in the Bauer factory, although the
FAMBO brand was still used.
[57] The quality control information which FAMBO provided to Bauer in relation to the
hammer would have suggested that the FAMBO hammer was in good working condition.
There is no specific quality inspection of the ram box and as FAMBO carried out quality
control procedure for the hammer, Bauer did not have any further information to provide.
The inspection of the ram box had been carried out by FAMBO and Sweden. The FAMBO
hammer was not an uncommon piece of machinery and about 180 units had been supplied
throughout the world. If there was a design flaw it would have presented a massive
problem.
[58] I found Mr Lindermair to be a credible and reliable witness in so far as his evidence
went. However, he was unable to assist on FAMBO’s quality control procedures.
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Expert witnesses
Pursuer’s expert witnesses
Darren Prince
[59] Mr Prince was a technician working for SOCOTEC UK Limited.
[60] He examined four samples as follows:
Sample 1, labelled “Red Layer, metal section near weld. Position 1.”
Sample 2, labelled “White Layer, metal section near weld. Position 1.”
Sample 3, labelled “Red Layer, metal section away from weld. Position 2.”
Sample 4, labelled “White Layer, metal section away from weld. Position 2.”
[61] Samples 1 and 3 produced a spectrum consistent with urethane/acrylic paint.
Urethane/acrylic paints are most commonly found as top coats.
[62] Analysis of samples 2 and 4 produced a spectrum consistent with epoxy paint.
Epoxy paints are very commonly used in industrial coating application.
[63] There was a 98.5% correlation between samples 1 and 3, of which would suggest that
they were the same product. There was a 99.6% correlation between samples 2 and 4 of
which would suggest that these were the same product.
Scott Bate
[64] Mr Bate was also a technician with SOCOTEC UK Limited.
[65] He examined two samples, a red sample and a white sample. He compared the red
sample with the red welded piece and found that under FTIR spectra comparison, the match
between the red coats was almost exact. He also compared the white sample against the
white welded piece and found that the match between the white coats was almost exact.
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Daphne Wassermann
[66] Ms Wassermann is a chartered mechanical and metallurgical engineer with over
40 years experience. She holds a first class MA degree in natural sciences (metallurgy) and
an MSc in the mechanics of materials. In addition to her career as an engineer with various
companies, she also has extensive experience as an expert witness, both in the UK and
abroad.
[67] In Ms Wassermann’s opinion, the failed box section was manufactured in two parts.
It was unlikely that the hammer could have been overloaded if it had been used within the
manufacturer’s guidance. The casualty weld was not carried out effectively. There was lack
of fusion, lack of penetration, slag inclusions and pores and porosity. In Ms Wassermann’s
view, had the casualty weld been examined at manufacture this would have been noticed.
Had it been made from one piece then there would have been no weld to fail.
[68] She would not expect a section manufactured in two parts and welded to operate
within the same parameters as a part manufactured from a single section of the material.
She could see no reason why the component should have been in two parts in this case: it
was relatively short and normally manufactured in one part.
[69] The casualty weld was very poor with a number of defects. It was not executed
correctly. In her opinion, the incorrect execution of the weld was the cause of the failure.
[70] In her opinion, the hammer with the casualty weld would have failed under normal
use. The stresses calculated by Bauer, when combined with the weld defects and the
repeated impact loading, would be sufficient to cause failure of the faulty weld.
[71] The section that failed was short and the pursuer could not have anticipated that
there was a weld in that location. The weld had been ground flat and painted over so that
there was no indication of the presence of a casualty weld.
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[72] Her understanding of the evidence was that Mr Jack noticed some cracking of the
paint and applied a small weld to monitor whether there was a crack in the metal causing
the paint to crack. She would not recommend that action to determine whether a crack was
present. Dye penetrant or alternatively magnetic particle inspection should have been
carried out to check for the presence of a crack. However, in her opinion, the application of
the check weld by Mr Jack did not have any effect on the failure of the hammer. If Mr Jack
had not noticed the crack in the paintwork and had taken no action the hammer could still
have failed.
[73] Prior to the proof, Ms Wassermann had met with the defender’s metallurgy expert,
Mr Dalton, as directed by the court. At the joint meeting of experts, agreement was reached
on the following. The weld would not be visible under the paint if it were a good weld.
There was however disagreement as to the situation where there was a poor weld. There
was agreement that a check weld was not an ideal way to monitor cracking or yielding, but
that the check weld was unlikely to have had a significant influence on the failure. There
was agreement that the strength of the casualty weld was low and it was not fit for purpose.
The poor quality of the casualty weld was the cause of failure. It was agreed that the check
weld was not good practice but there was disagreement as to the extent to which this was
poor practice.
[74] At their meeting the experts also considered whether the investigation had been
prejudiced by the lack of availability of the missing Smaller Ram Box Section. There was
agreement that the check weld was located on the side of the component which would have
been under compression during use. The remaining part of the fracture was at the side and
was unlikely to have been the initiation point of the fracture. It was therefore impossible to
tell whether the fracture was gradual, by fatigue or sudden. In addition, study of the paint
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near the weld and further away could have indicated whether all the paintwork was carried
out at the same time or whether the weld was overpainted at a later stage. It was not
possible to examine the swivel arm for any evidence of damage which could have led to it
being removed and repaired.
[75] As a result of the experts’ comment about what could be discovered from study of
the paint, the paint was analysed by Mr Prince and Mr Bate as set out above.
[76] In Ms Wassermann’s opinion as set out in her Supplementary Report dealing with
the paint analysis, the results of the paint testing demonstrated that the same paint was used
for the whole component. Therefore unless the whole component was repainted at some
stage, it was likely that the hammer was supplied with the casualty weld in place.
[77] She noted that there was a statement in Mr Woodfull’s report which stated that the
surface showed signs of rust. This implied that rust had been growing in the weld for some
time. She was referred to the brown colouration in Mr Crane’s photographs but said it was
notoriously difficult to tell rust from a photograph.
[78] On cross-examination, it transpired from an examination of the part from which the
paint samples were taken, that the samples were taken further away from the weld than
Ms Wasserman had thought when she wrote her Supplementary Report. Ms Wasserman
was asked whether that changed her view in her report that unless the whole component
was repainted at some time it was likely that the hammer was supplied with the casualty
weld in place. She said that she thought that was unclear now. When asked if she was
withdrawing her conclusion she said she was casting some doubt on it.
[79] She also commented on not having examined the Smaller Ram Box Section. She said
that without the full specimen we cannot see where the crack initiation was and what the
exact failure mechanism was: we only have a little strip of the weld not the full
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circumference of the weld but just one side of it. Without seeing the whole section she did
not know if it was a gradual crack (which was most likely) or sudden failure. Further, in
respect of rust she commented that we have not had the full cross section to see where
initiation started and which part corroded more. In respect of the check weld, she said that
it would be useful to know what was in Scott Jack’s head.
Defender’s expert witnesses
John Carter
[80] Mr Carter is a graduate of the Royal Institute of Chemistry. He is currently a
business development manager for coating and polymer for SGS (UK). Prior to joining SGS
he worked for 24 years within the coating industry, working his way up from the laboratory
bench through to operations director within various paint manufacturing companies prior to
14 years in independent coating testing. He currently chairs two working committees of the
National Association of Corrosion Engineers and is an active member of numerous NACE
working groups developing and updating test methods and specifications for coatings used
in the oil and gas industry.
[81] Mr Carter examined the hammer, which was found to have sections missing,
although additional sections (but not the Smaller Ram Box Section) were furnished to him at
a later date. The overall surface finish of the coating system was in a generally acceptable
condition. The coating system was found to be uniform in appearance across the primary
submitted hammer piece and the off-cuts received later. The material showed material
degradation and localised damage of coating which could be attributable to heat damage.
As the heat damage was on top of the coating, it could only be presumed that this occurred
after the coating had been applied.
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[82] Sample chippings were removed from the body of the hammer. The applied coating
was determined to be a two coat system. The initial layer was white and the top coat was
red. The white layer was epoxy and the material of the red layer was not known. Mr Carter
conducted examination by FTIR spectrometer, a film thickness tester and microscope.
[83] His conclusion was that the coating system was uniformly coated with a white
epoxy-based primer and a red top coat, forming a two-coat system. There was no evidence
of further touch ups or repairs that indicate later coating activity. On the contrary there
were observable defects that would potentially be a source of corrosion in the long term.
The spot film thickness measurements suggested that there was a variance that would not
generally be of satisfactory quality. Additional data evaluated on the sample in proximity to
the weld defects showed no indication of additional overcoating. The film thickness
measurement, both non-destructive and cross-sectional were consistent with the spread of
measurements across the body of the hammer. In the limited area of coated material in
proximity to the weld, there were signs of coating degradation that were consistent with
heat damage.
Tom Dalton
[84] Mr Dalton is currently employed by RCA Laboratories Limited as senior
metallurgist. He has been employed as a metallurgist in various roles since 1977 and
graduated from Manchester Polytechnic in 1988 with a Masters degree in metallurgy. He is
a fellow of the Institute of Materials, Minerals and Mining, and a chartered engineer.
[85] His understanding was that a crack had previously appeared at the same position as
the failure, and that the pursuer’s operators had performed a check weld. The check weld
was made either directly on top of, or very close to the casualty weld. The absence of
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corrosion on the surface of the unprotected steel suggested that the check weld was likely to
have at least been made only a short time before the catastrophic failures. Paint had been
ground away but it was not known whether this was to make the casualty weld or the check
weld.
[86] Mr Dalton inspected the hammer however the ram side of the swivel arm was not
included with the other items. In addition three of the four sides of the fracture on the
mounting plate side had previously been removed using a disc cutter and the parts removed
had not been supplied to him.
[87] Close visual examination of the only remaining section of the fracture confirmed the
presence of a partial penetration weld (the casualty weld). A partial penetration weld is one
which does not extend through the full thickness of the plate and is therefore considerably
weaker than a full penetration weld. The casualty weld was of very poor quality with an
uneven profile, little penetration and large areas of lack of fusion. Mr Dalton removed and
examined a small section. He also examined a similar FAMBO hammer and found that in
the other FAMBO hammer the box section was a single piece of steel with no weld being
present.
[88] In his opinion, the failure had occurred at the position which coincided with a point
of maximum stress, that is the natural position at which an overload failure would be
expected to develop. A section of plate had been inserted into the joint, presumably to
increase the strength. This was not good industry practice and could have acted to intensify
the stresses. The absence of any corrosion on the unprotected steel suggested that the
casualty weld was carried out only a short time before the catastrophic failure. Although it
was unlikely that the check weld played a significant role in the failure, the manner in which
it was carried out was not in line with good industry practice. Having discovered a crack
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the correct course of action would have been to inform the defender. An appropriate repair
procedure would have involved complete removal of the crack by grinding following which
the excavated area would have been replaced by a fully penetrating weld. All of this would
have been controlled by an appropriate welding procedure specification (“WPS”) and
carried out by a qualified welder. Had the check weld been carried out in a controlled
manner it is likely that the underlying substandard weld would have been identified and
replaced with a good quality weld.
[89] Although he accepted that a good quality weld could have been hidden by careful
grinding and painting, the casualty weld was of such a poor quality that it would be
expected that some indication of its existence would have been visible through the paint
layer.
[90] He gave the following reasons why in his opinion the casualty weld was not part of
the original manufacture:
(1) The fabrication drawing for the swivel arm did not show a weld at the
position of the casualty weld.
(2) The casualty weld was located precisely where an overload failure would be
most likely to occur.
(3) The casualty weld was made by a welder of poor skill and experience and
was not consistent with the high quality of another weld within the swivel
arm.
(4) The insertion of a section of steel plate into the joint was not a standard
procedure and was unlikely to have been carried out by a reputable
fabricator.
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(5) The only portion of the fracture which was available for examination
possessed a flame-cut edge whereas disc-cutting or saw-cutting would
normally be used for a material of this thickness.
(6) No edge preparation had been applied to the joint whereas the design
drawing showed this to be a requirement for all other welds in the swivel
arm. It would be reasonable to assume that had this weld been made during
the original fabrication it too would have incorporated an edge preparation.
(7) The casualty weld was a partial penetration type whereas the design drawing
showed fully penetrating welds to be a requirement for all other welds within
the swivel arm.
(8) A similar FAMBO Hammer which was fabricated around the same time as
the failed item did not contain a weld at this position.
(9) Whilst the casualty weld had been ground flush, all other welds within the
hammer were unground.
(10) There is no logical reason why the swivel arm would be made in two pieces
when the use of a single piece would have been simpler and more
cost-effective.
[91] In Mr Dalton’s opinion, the metallurgical investigation was severely compromised
by the fact that only one eighth of the fracture was available for examination. The Smaller
Ram Box Section was missing and could not be examined. Accordingly it was impossible to
conclusively establish the reason for the existence of the casualty weld. Had the whole of
the fracture been available, the investigation would almost certainly have been more
conclusive and it may have been possible to explain how the casualty weld came to exist.
Had the whole of the fracture been available it would have been possible to establish if the
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catastrophic failure was the result of the application of a single load which was in excess of
the strength of the joint, or was the consequence of a slowly developing defect which had
been present for a significant period of time. That information may have been helpful in
establishing the point at which the casualty weld had been made.
[92] The Defender’s Scenario would account for the presence of the casualty weld. The
failure scenario was that the arm became deformed, possibly by misuse or being damaged
during handling or transportation. Since the swivel arm is too strong to be straightened, the
only course of action is to remove it by flame cutting. The front edge would then be dressed
by grinding to remove the deformed region. Because the flame cutting process had melted
away a few millimetres of steel, the arm would now be shorter than it originally was so to
correct the length, a piece of steel would be inserted into the joint to act as a spacer. A repair
weld would be made to join the two pieces of the arm, but since the gap between the two
halves was excessive, the weld would be of poor quality. To disguise its presence the weld
is ground flush and painted over.
[93] On cross-examination he stated that rust can occur almost instantaneously, giving as
an example rust which appears on brake discs after washing a car.
[94] I heard Mr Dalton’s evidence under reservation of competency and relevancy as
counsel for the pursuer objected to his evidence on the ground that he had failed in his duties
as to impartiality as set out in Kennedy v Cordia (Services) LLP 2016 SC (UKSC) 59. His opinion
was not an objective unbiased opinion and he had assumed the role of advocate. He had
omitted to consider material facts and blurred the distinction between areas that truly fell
within his expertise and those which fell outside. For these reasons, counsel submitted that
Mr Dalton’s evidence should be excluded as inadmissible. In my opinion, Mr Dalton’s
evidence should not be excluded as inadmissible. Although he took into account the
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Defender’s Scenario, he did so objectively. His opinion was based on the full facts as
presented to him in the witness box. His evidence fell within his area of expertise.
Accordingly, I find that his evidence is admissible. It will however of course have to be tested
in accordance with the rest of the evidence and assessed as appropriate.
David Dimelow
[95] Mr Dimelow is a loss adjuster and director and head of engineering at Sedgwick. He
began his career in 1975 as an engineering apprentice at Rolls-Royce Plc. After completing
his engineering qualifications he moved into loss adjusting in 1988 and has worked as a loss
adjuster since. His qualifications are BEng (Hons), CEng, MIMechE, MBA. In his view the
poor quality of the casualty weld would have given rise to failure within 1 or 2 weeks.
[96] His report was based on the assumption that on 12 May 2015 the defect with the
swivel arm had been discovered.
[97] In his opinion the swivel arm was originally manufactured from one piece of square
tubular steel as detailed on the manufacturing drawing. It was not known when the swivel
arm was welded and a piece of steel inserted to strengthen the welded joint. As there was
no weld preparation as detailed on the FAMBO manufacturing drawing the failed weld was
not undertaken by FAMBO. The damage to the FAMBO leader and hammer was due to
misuse and abuse caused by excessive loads being transmitted through the equipment
whilst driving or straightening piles. The swivel arm initially failed due to fatigue and was
repaired shortly before the incident using a poor quality and poorly prepared weld which
was unable to withstand the excessive load being imposed due to misuse and abuse. Had
the pursuer reported the defect with the swivel arm when it was first noticed, the incident
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would not have occurred. If the hammer had been supplied from new with a poor quality
weld the swivel arm would have failed within 1 or 2 weeks not after 9 months of use.
[98] The pursuer submitted that Mr Dimelow was not adequately and appropriately
qualified to give opinion evidence to the court. He was a loss adjuster with limited
engineering qualifications and had never done the type of work which Mr Jack was
undertaking. He offered opinions as to welding with no relevant qualifications. He did not
take into account factual material which might have affected his opinion. He admitted he
was speculating.
[99] In my opinion, Mr Dimelow’s evidence consisted of little more than a summary of
the defender’s case. It offered no new original insights based on particular areas of
expertise. It came to conclusions based on limited evidence which are the preserve of the
court having heard all the evidence. His report was a perfectly proper and appropriate
report for a loss adjuster who was investigating an incident. However, it was not the report
of an expert witness for purposes of court proceedings, and accordingly was of no assistance
to me.
The missing sections of the ram box
[100] The defender objected to the admissibility of any evidence to be led by the pursuer
on whether the ram box was manufactured in two parts and the quality of the casualty weld
in the ram box, and the expert evidence of Ms Wassermann which was based on these
matters. The ground of the objection was that the pursuer failed to return all of the ram box
and that there was prejudice to the defender as a result of all of it not being available for
examination by the defender’s expert.
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[101] Counsel for the defender submitted that the Smaller Ram Box Section and the section
which was cut away were of vital importance in the proper investigation of the case. The
defender’s investigation of the origin of the weld was prejudiced as a result of not being able
to carry out physical investigations on the missing parts. The circumstances in which the
sections came to be lost were attended with suspicion and the court should be hesitant about
admitting the secondary evidence. The defender cannot be considered to have been at fault
for not having the ram box examined by experts before the hammer was returned.
Reference was made to Dickson - A Treatise on the Law of Evidence in Scotland – Chapter IV,
paragraphs 236, 237 and 241; Scottish and Universal Newspapers Limited v Gherson’s Trustees
1987 SC 27; Belling v McGowan 1983 SLT (Notes) 77; Stirling Aquatic Technology Limited v
Farmocean AB (No 2) Limited 1996 SLT 456; Peacock Group plc v Railston 2007 SLT 269; Haddow
v Glasgow City Council 2005 SLT 1219; Scottish Water Business Stream Limited v Automatic
Retailing (Scotland) Limited (In Administration) [2014] CSOH 57.
[102] Counsel for the pursuer submitted that the evidence was admissible. The missing
Ram Box section had been lost prior to litigation. Both parties had been prejudiced by its
absence. The lack of the Smaller Ram Box Section was a neutral fact. No case was ever
perfect or had every possible item of evidence. This case would require to be decided on
other evidence.
[103] I note that this objection is wide in scope and seeks to exclude as inadmissible any
evidence led by the pursuer on whether the ram box was manufactured in two parts and the
quality of the casualty weld in the ram box. In seeking to exclude such a broad range of
evidence, in my opinion the defender goes too far. It seeks to exclude evidence pertaining to
the timing of the casualty weld which is not derived from the ram box, such as for example
evidence from Mr Milloy about the records not disclosing the making of a casualty weld
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after delivery, or evidence from Mr Jeffrey as to the state of the hammer on 12 May. It seeks
to exclude evidence as to the quality of the casualty weld, notwithstanding that there is no
dispute between the parties or their experts that the casualty weld is of poor quality. The
defender also specifically seeks to exclude the expert evidence of Ms Wassermann,
notwithstanding that Ms Wasserman’s evidence took into account that she had not been able
to examine the missing part. The lack of the missing part prejudiced the pursuer as well as
the defender. In these circumstances, I find that the evidence led by the pursuer on whether
the ram box was manufactured in two parts and the quality of the casualty weld in the ram
box, and the expert evidence of Ms Wassermann, is admissible. However, the absence of the
information which would have been available had the missing parts been available for
inspection by the defender’s expert and the pursuer’s expert must be taken into account in
assessing the weight of the evidence.
Pursuer’s submissions
[104] Counsel for the pursuer invited me to sustain the pursuer’s fourth plea in law and
repel the first, second and third pleas in law for the defender, and put the case out by order
to determine further procedure in relation to quantum.
[105] Counsel submitted that the hammer was supplied with the casualty weld. It
followed that it was not of satisfactory quality. He submitted that his case rested on the
witness evidence from Mr Milloy, Mr Crane and Mr Jeffrey. They had no knowledge that
anything was wrong with the hammer and no indication of any intervention by the pursuer.
Had some failure occurred requiring the casualty weld to be made they would have known
about it.
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[106] Counsel further submitted that the actions of Mr Jack did not break the chain of
Limited v Girozentrale [1996] 3 All ER 834; Compania Naviera Maropan v Bowaters (The “Stork”)
[1955] 2 QB 68; The Polyglory [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 353; The “Spontaneity” [1962] 1 Lloyd’s
[107] He further submitted that as the pursuer had been placed in a difficult situation by
the defender’s breach of duty and acted reasonably in the adoption of remedial measures,
there was no failure to mitigate his loss (Borealis v Geogas Trading; Banco de Portugal v
[108] He further submitted that as the present case proceeded by way of breach of
contract, there was no requirements to prove fault on the part of the defender
(Forsikringaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher 1989 AC 852; MacGregor on Damages 20th Ed at 7-011
to 7-15).
Defender’s submissions
[109] Counsel for the defender submitted that it was for the pursuer to satisfy the court
that the hammer was not of satisfactory quality under section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods
Act 1979 (Watters v The Masters Golf Co Limited [2013] CSOH 126; Tayside Contracts v
D Geddes (Contractors Limited) 2017 CSOH 108). Having regard to the absence of evidence
from Mr Jack, the fact that the part was not available for inspection and other factors, the
pursuer had failed to discharge the onus to prove the hammer was not of satisfactory
quality.
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[110] Counsel submitted that the casualty weld was not made by the manufacturer. The
casualty weld must have been formed at some point after the supply of the hammer. The
circumstances in which it came to be formed could only be known to the pursuer. However,
an inference could be drawn that the casualty weld was formed following damage being
caused to the ram box through misuse. It is known that contractors can and do misuse the
excavator to manipulate a pile of which was not embedded straight. As a result of operating
the equipment in that way, the ram box was subjected to forces which it was not designed to
withstand, the result being it is likely to deform. The Defender’s Scenario was a plausible
explanation for the repair of such deformation. This explanation accounts for features of
which Mr Dalton would not have expected to see in a manufacturer’s weld namely the flame
cut edge and the spacer plate standing proud on the inside surface of the smaller section of
the ram box. The defenders position was that both the casualty weld and the check weld
were carried out by Mr Jack.
[111] The defender further submitted that it was possible to carry out the weld remotely
shortly before the incident occurred without Mr Milloy or Mr Crane knowing that it had
been done. The absence of flash rusting around the weld was an indicator that the weld had
been made shortly before the rig failed. The ram box failed on Sunday 17 May, shortly after
Mr Jack’s involvement on Tuesday 12 May. It was not clear whether there had been piling
between these days. The same equipment could be used to make the casualty weld and the
check weld. The casualty weld could have been carried out in the field. The evidence was
consistent with the casualty weld being made shortly before the failure and had been
possible to use the hammer for a period before it failed. It could have been possible to make
the casualty weld without affecting the paintwork. The replacement of the hammer was not
an admission of liability.
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[112] Counsel further submitted that rather than apply a weld, Mr Jack should have
arranged to have had a more detailed inspection carried out and that the hammer should
have been taken out of service pending that being done. If those steps had been taken that
would have led to the ram box being replaced or properly repaired and the incident would
have been avoided. In failing to take the hammer out of service for proper investigations
and continuing to use it, the pursuer failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate its loss.
Alternatively, the pursuer’s decision to continue to use the hammer amounted to a break in
the chain of causation (Lexmead (Basingstoke) Limited v Lewis and others (also known as
Lambert v Lewis) 1982 AC 225; Schering Agrochemicals Limited v Resibel NV SA Court of
Appeal (Civil Division) 26 November 1992 unreported).
Discussion and decision
First issue: whether the pursuer has proved on the balance of probabilities that the casualty
weld was made during the manufacturing process
[113] In order to succeed, the pursuer must satisfy the onus of proving on the balance of
probabilities that the casualty weld was undertaken prior to the delivery of the hammer to
the pursuer.
[114] There was no dispute between the parties that the failure was caused by the poor
quality of the casualty weld. The dispute between them centred on the question of when the
casualty weld was undertaken.
[115] The pursuer’s position was that the casualty weld was not undertaken by or on
behalf of the pursuer and that therefore it must have been undertaken prior to delivery of
the hammer.
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[116] The defender’s position was that the casualty weld was not undertaken during the
manufacturing process, so must have been done after delivery. The defender suggested the
Defender’s Scenario as plausible explanation. The defender’s position was that the casualty
weld was undertaken by Mr Jack on 12 May.
[117] It is important to note at the outset that there is no onus on the defender to prove the
Defender’s Scenario. The onus is on the pursuer to prove its case.
[118] The fundamental difficulty which the pursuer faces in this case is that it has not led
Mr Jack in evidence. All we have is what he wrote in his report. He has not been made
available for cross-examination on whether what he wrote in his report was true. We do not
have his evidence on the state of the ram box when he first saw it. Without hearing from
Mr Jack we cannot resolve the conflict of evidence between his report that there was a crack
and Mr Jeffrey’s evidence that there was merely a blemish. We do not have Mr Jack’s
evidence on the nature or extent of the crack. We do not have Mr Jack’s evidence on
whether or not he made the casualty weld.
[119] The pursuer’s explanation for not leading Mr Jack is that it was not possible to do so
as Mr Jack was working offshore in Africa at the time of the proof and had refused to give
evidence. The absence of a key and essential witness abroad does not necessarily mean that
his evidence cannot be led. There are a number of mechanisms that can be used to ensure
that the evidence of a key witness is before the court. The proof can be discharged and
refixed for a time when the essential witness is available. The evidence of the essential
witness can be taken by remote video link during the course of the proof. The evidence of
the essential witness can be taken in advance of the proof on commission, either with the
witness physically present or by video link abroad. Steps can be taken to compel the
attendance of a reluctant witness, either for a proof diet or commission. The pursuer did not
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seek any of these solutions but instead proceeded with the proof in the absence of the
essential witness. In these circumstances, the pursuer has taken the risk that he will be
unable to prove his case.
[120] There was no direct evidence that the casualty weld was undertaken during the
manufacturing process. In the absence of any direct evidence that the casualty weld was
made prior to delivery, the pursuer founded its case on the evidence of Mr Milloy, Mr Crane
and Mr Jeffrey. I am not satisfied that pursuer’s case can be proved by the evidence of
Mr Milloy, Mr Crane and Mr Jeffrey in the absence of evidence from Mr Jack. None of
Mr Milloy, Mr Crane nor Mr Jeffrey was present when Mr Jack worked on the hammer on
12 May. The evidence of Mr Milloy, Mr Crane and Mr Jeffrey does not prove on the balance
of probabilities that the casualty weld was not made by Mr Jack.
[121] The pursuer also led various items of circumstantial evidence. However, in my
opinion, the circumstantial evidence does not prove on the balance of probabilities that the
casualty weld was made before delivery.
[122] It is clear that the casualty weld should not have been made. It should not have been
made as part of the manufacturing process: the design was for an unwelded, single
component. It should not have been made by the pursuer after delivery: any repair should
have been properly undertaken to an appropriate technical specification.
[123] Neither the pursuer’s records nor the defender’s records document the casualty weld
having been made. That does not take us any further forward in deciding whether it was
made before or after delivery. All it tells us is that whoever made it, whether before delivery
or after delivery, did not document it.
[124] The casualty weld was of very poor quality. That does not take us any further
forward either. All it tells us is that whoever made it, either before or after delivery, made a
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very poor job of it. It is no more likely that a person making and concealing an unauthorised
undocumented weld during the production process would make a poor quality weld than it
is that a person making and concealing an unauthorised undocumented weld after delivery
would do so.
[125] The particular hammer in question had not been made to order. It was one of the
last hammers made by FAMBO in Sweden and had been bought by the defender for stock. I
do not accept that in some way an inference could be drawn from this that the casualty weld
had been made as part of the manufacturing process. There was no evidence or logical
reason why a hammer in stock, or the last ones made in a particular factory, should differ in
any way from a hammer made to order.
[126] Nor can any inferences been drawn from the defects which require to be dealt with
during the commissioning period. These were separate defects and bore no relation to any
defect in the ram box or to whether it had been welded.
[127] Mr Jeffrey’s evidence was that there was a “blemish” in the paintwork. However,
absent evidence from Mr Jack, a blemish cannot be accepted as circumstantial evidence
pointing towards the casualty weld having been made prior to delivery. It is contradicted
by Mr Jack’s report that there was a “crack”, and without Mr Jack’s evidence the court
cannot resolve that contradiction.
[128] There was also circumstantial evidence about whether there was rust present in the
casualty weld. The pursuer said that there was, and an inference from this could be drawn
that the casualty weld was undertaken during manufacture. However, in my opinion, this
evidence cannot be relied upon as pointing to the casualty weld having been made before
delivery. I am not satisfied that the colour reproduction in the photograph was adequate
basis for Mr Crane to conclude that rust existed. In any event, I did not find the existence or
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absence of rust useful in dating the casualty weld. The evidence of the pursuer’s expert
Ms Wasserman on rust was inconclusive as she had not been able to inspect the Smaller Ram
Box Section. I have no reason not to accept the evidence of the defender’s expert Mr Dalton
that rust can occur within a relatively short time.
[129] Further, the replacement of the hammer by the defender free of charge (other than
betterment cost) is not an admission by the defender that the casualty weld was made prior
to delivery. It is not unreasonable or uncommon for a supplier of goods to replace goods
which are not defective as a goodwill gesture to enhance its reputation as a good company
with which to do business. This is particularly the case in situations such as this one where
the customer buys an upgraded item and pays for the difference between the original item
and the upgraded one. In any event, the supply of the replacement hammer was expressly
made without admission of liability.
[130] The defender sought to found upon the conversation between Mr Gibson and
Mr McCauley on 21 May 2015. I accept Mr Gibson’s account of that conversation. I find that
Mr Gibson was discussing a hypothetical situation rather than making an admission that the
casualty weld had been made by the pursuer. The conversation was shortly after the
incident and there was no evidence on which it could be said that by that time Mr Gibson
had become aware of sufficient information upon which to make such an admission. I did
not find Mr McCauley to be a reliable witness in respect of the conversation: he was under a
misapprehension that the check weld was a repair and in cross he stepped back from the
certainty of his original position.
[131] Turning now to the expert evidence, in my opinion in the absence of Mr Jack’s
evidence and the absence of an examination of the missing part of the ram box, the evidence
of Ms Wasserman does not establish that the casualty weld was made before delivery. The
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pursuer’s position was that the failure of the hammer was caused by stresses applied after
delivery, in the course of normal operation of the hammer, to a casualty weld which had
been made prior to delivery. This position was undermined by Ms Wasserman’s
acknowledgment that she could not see what the failure mechanism was because she had
only been able to examine a small strip of the weld and had not been able to examine the
Smaller Ram Box Section. The pursuer’s argument that the paint samples establish that the
casualty weld was painted over as part of the manufacturing process was fatally
undermined by the doubts expressed by Ms Wasserman when she realised that the paint
samples were not taken as close to the weld as she had thought.
[132] In Watters v The Master Golf Co Ltd at para [14], Lord Tyre quoted with approval the
following dictum of Lord Brandon:
"...The judge is not bound always to make a finding one way or the other with regard
to the facts averred by the parties. He has open to him the third alternative of saying
that the party on whom the burden of proof lies in relation to any averment made by
him has failed to discharge that burden. No judge likes to decide cases on burden of
proof if he can legitimately avoid having to do so. There are cases, however, in
which, owing to the unsatisfactory state of the evidence or otherwise, deciding on the
burden of proof is the only just course for him to take."(Rhesa Shipping Co SA v
[133] In my opinion, this is such a case. There was an absence of evidence from Mr Jack
which was essential to the fulfilment of the onus on the pursuer. The circumstantial
evidence led was not sufficient, on its own, to satisfy the onus. The pursuer’s expert
evidence did not satisfy the onus as it was limited by the lack of opportunity for the
pursuer’s expert to examine the Smaller Ram Box Section and by the location from which
paint samples were taken. In these circumstances the pursuer has failed to prove its case.
Second issue: effect of Mr Jack’s actions on mitigation and causation
[134] In view of my decision on the first issue, the second issue does not arise.
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Order
[135] As the pursuer has not satisfied the onus on it to prove its case on the balance of
probabilities, I shall uphold the defender’s second plea of law and grant decree of absolvitor.
I reserve all questions of expenses in the meantime.
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