APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
Lord Nimmo
Smith
Lord Philip
Lord MacLean
|
[2007]
HCJAC 21
XC755/06
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LORD NIMMO
SMITH
in
CROWN APPEAL AGAINST
SENTENCE
By
HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE
Appellant:
Against
JAMES McGOVERN
Respondent:
|
Act: Bain, AD; Crown Agent
Alt: Ogg, QC, Hamilton;
Liam O'Donnell, Glasgow
16
March 2007
Introduction
[1] This
is a Crown Appeal against the sentences passed on the respondent at the High
Court in Paisley on 5 October 2006. The respondent pled guilty to a charge of
breach of the peace involving the repeated discharge of a handgun or similar
instrument, and two charges of contraventions of the Firearms Act 1968 ("the
Firearms Act"). The sentencing judge
admonished the respondent on one of the firearms charges, and sentenced him to
concurrent extended sentences on the breach of the peace charge and the other
firearms charge, the sentences each comprising a custodial term of three years
and an extension period of two years.
The Lord Advocate has now appealed against these sentences in terms of
section 108 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995
("the 1995 Act"), alleging that the sentences were unduly lenient and that the
sentencing judge erred in law in his approach to the relevant statutory
provisions.
The charges
[2] The
respondent originally faced six charges in an indictment. The Crown accepted his pleas of not guilty to
charges 2, 5 and 6. The charges to which
he pled guilty were in the following terms:
"(1) On 18 June 2005 at Earl Street, Glasgow, you
did conduct yourself in a disorderly manner, shout and swear, repeatedly
discharge a handgun or similar instrument at the window of the house occupied
by Sandra Dunlop at 116 Earl Street, Glasgow, place the lieges in a state of
fear and alarm and commit a breach of the peace;
...
(3) Between 10 March 2006 and 16 May 2006,
both dates inclusive, at Flat 2/1, 116 Earl Street and at the cycle path near
to Balmoral Street, both Glasgow, you did have in your possession a firearm to
which section 1 of the Act aftermentioned applies, namely a handgun without
holding a firearm certificate in force at the time and you did commit this
offence in an aggravated form within the meaning of section 4(4) of said Act,
said firearm having been converted from an imitation firearm which though had
the appearance of being a firearm had been so constructed as to be incapable of
discharging any missile through its barrel:
CONTRARY to the Firearms Act 1968, Section 1(1)(a) and 4(4) as amended
by the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988;
(4) Between 10 March 2006 and 16 May 2006,
both dates inclusive, at Flat 2/1, 116 Earl Street and at the cycle path
near to Balmoral Street, both Glasgow, you did have in your possession without
the authority of the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers, a prohibited
weapon, namely a handgun being a firearm with a barrel less than 30 centimetres
in length and which had a length of less than 60 centimetres overall; CONTRARY to the Firearms Act 1968, Section
5(1)(aba) as amended by the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1997;
....".
The judge's sentencing powers
[3] The
offence of breach of the peace in charge 1 was an offence at common law in
respect of which the maximum sentence that the High Court may impose in solemn
proceedings is life imprisonment, and there is no minimum sentence.
[4] The
offence in charge 3 was a contravention of the following provisions. Section 1 of the Firearms Act (as
amended) provides, so far as material:
"(1) ... [I]t is an offence for a person -
(a) to have in his possession, or to purchase
or to acquire, a firearm to which this section applies without holding a
firearms certificate in force at the time or otherwise than as authorised by
such a certificate; ..."
By subsection (3) the section
applies to every firearm, with certain exceptions which do not arise in the
present case. Section 4 provides by
subsection (3) that it is an offence for a person other than a registered
firearms dealer to convert into a firearm anything which, though having the
appearance of being a firearm, is so constructed as to be incapable of
discharging any missile through its barrel.
Subsection (4) provides inter alia:
"A person
who commits an offence under section 1 of this Act by having in his possession
or purchasing or acquiring .... a firearm which has been converted as mentioned
in subsection (3) above (whether by a registered firearms dealer or not),
without holding a firearm certificate authorising him to have it in his
possession, or to purchase or acquire it, shall be treated for the purposes of provisions
of this Act relating to the punishment of offences as committing that offence
in an aggravated form."
By Part 1 of Schedule 6 to the Firearms
Act (as amended), the maximum sentence for this offence, the offence having
been committed in an aggravated form within the meaning of section 4(4), and
the respondent having been prosecuted on indictment, was imprisonment for seven
years, or a fine, or both. There was no
statutory minimum sentence.
[5] The
offence in charge 4 was a contravention of the following provisions of the
Firearms Act (as amended):
"(1) A person commits an offence if, without
the authority of the Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers (by virtue of
provision made under section 63 of the Scotland Act 1998), he has in his
possession, or purchases of acquires, or manufactures, sells or transfers - ...
(aba) any firearm which either has a barrel less
than 30 centimetres in length or is less than 60 centimetres in length overall,
other than an air weapon, a muzzle-loading gun or a firearm designed as
signalling apparatus;
..."
The maximum sentence for this
offence, in terms of Part 1 of Schedule 6 to the Firearms Act, as
substituted by section 288 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, in a prosecution
on indictment, was imprisonment for 10 years, or a fine, or both. By section 287 of the Criminal Justice
Act 2003 a new section 51A was added to the 1968 Act. This provided a minimum sentence for certain
offences under section 5. So far as
relevant, it provides:
"(1) This section applies where -
(a) an individual is convicted of -
(i) an offence under section 5(1) ... (aba) ... of
this Act..., and
(b) the offence was committed after the
commencement of this
section and
at a time when he was aged 16 or over.
(2) The Court shall impose an appropriate
custodial sentence ... for a term of at least the required minimum term (with or
without a fine) unless the Court is of the opinion that there are exceptional
circumstances relating to the offence or to the offender which justifies not
doing so.
...
(5) In this section 'the required minimum
term' means - ...
(b) in relation to Scotland -
(i) in the case of an offender who was aged
21 or over when he committed the offence, five years ....".
Section 51A has been effective
since 22 January 2004.
[6] Section
196 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995
obliges the Court, when passing sentence on an accused who has pled guilty, to
take into account the stage in the proceedings at which the offender indicated
his intention to plead guilty and the circumstances in which that indication
was given. The Court is also obliged to
state whether, having taken account of these matters, the sentence imposed is
different from what would otherwise have been imposed, and if not, why
not. In modern practice, following Du Plooy v HM Advocate 2005 JC 1, a discount of up to about one third is
allowed for a plea of guilty. Section
205B of the 1995 Act provides for the imposition of a minimum sentence for a
third conviction of Class A drug trafficking offences, unless the Court is of
the opinion that there are specific circumstances which relate to any of the
offences or to the offender and would make the minimum sentence unjust. In the absence of such specific
circumstances, section 196(2) nevertheless empowers the Court to pass a
sentence of less than the statutory minimum to take account of a plea of
guilty, but the maximum discount which is permitted under that subsection is a
period equal to 20% of the minimum sentence.
There is no comparable provision permitting a discount below the
statutory minimum sentence provided by section 51A of the Firearms Act. It was not therefore in dispute before us
that the effect of that section is to over-ride the provisions of section 196
of the 1995 Act, so that the Court is obliged to pass a sentence of not less
than the statutory minimum unless it is of the opinion that there are
exceptional circumstances relating to the offence or to the offender which
justify its not doing so.
The English cases
[7] Counsel were agreed that
there was no Scottish case in which the effect of section 51A of the
Firearms Act had been considered.
Reference was instead made to a series of decisions in the Court of
Appeal in England. Of these, the most important were R. v Jordan,
Alleyne and Redfern [2004] EWCA Crim 3291, [2005] 2 Cr. App. R.(S.) 44, in
which the members of the court were Rose, L.J. (Vice President, Court of Appeal
Criminal Division), Douglas Brown, J. and Mackay J., and R. v Rehman and Wood
[2005] ECWA Crim 2056, [2006] 1 Cr. App. R.(S.) 77, in which the members of the
court were Lord Woolf, C.J., Goldring J. and Walker J. The Firearms Act is a United
Kingdom statute, and we would regard these
authorities on the effect of Section 51A as highly persuasive. It is clearly desirable that the Firearms Act
should receive similar effect throughout the United
Kingdom and that this should be reflected
in uniformity of sentencing practice, other things being equal.
[8] In
R. v Jordan, Alleyne and Redfern the Court held that where
section 51A required a minimum sentence to be imposed, the Court might not
impose a sentence less than the required minimum to reflect the fact that the
offender had pled guilty. At
paragraph 23 the Court said:
"[Section
51A] is plain and unambiguous on the face of it, and it applies whenever an
individual is convicted. The contention
that Parliament cannot have intended to prevent the reduction of a sentence
following a guilty plea is not, in our view, correct."
At paragraph 26, the Court said: "The rigour of section 51A is mitigated by
the possibility of exceptional circumstances being found." At paragraph 30 they said:
"In our
view, once a judge has properly identified exceptional circumstances, the
sentence is at large. The minimum
sentence provided in the section is a factor which the judge can take into
account, as he will also take into account the guideline case of Avis [1998] 2 Cr App R (S) 178 and
all available mitigation. This will not
only involve the exceptional circumstances themselves, but also good character
and a timely plea of guilty. This will
only arise where there are real exceptional circumstances. These cases will be rare."
[9] In
R. v Rehman and Wood the Court said at paragraph 4:
"The
weapons, with which we are concerned, are ones in relation to which Parliament
by section 51A has signalled it was important that there should be imposed
deterrent sentences. By 'deterrent
sentences' we mean sentences that pay less attention to the personal
circumstances of the offender and focus primarily upon the need for the courts
to convey a message that an offender can expect to be dealt with more severely
so as to deter others than he would be were it only his personal wrongdoing
which the Court had to consider."
At paragraph 11 the Court said:
"[I]t is not appropriate to look at
each circumstance separately and to conclude that it does not amount to an
exceptional circumstance. A holistic
approach is needed. There will be cases
where there is one single striking feature, which relates either to the offence
or the offender, which causes that case to fall within the requirement of
exceptional circumstances. There can be
other cases where no single factor by itself will amount to exceptional
circumstances, but the collective impact of all the relevant circumstances
truly makes the case exceptional."
At paragraph 12 the Court said:
"So far as we can determine the
rationale of Parliament, the policy was to treat the offence as requiring a
minimum term unless there were exceptional circumstances, not necessarily
because the offender would be a danger in the future, but to send out the
deterrent message to which we have already referred. The mere possession of firearms can create
dangers to the public. The possession of
a firearm may result in that firearm going into circulation. It can then come into possession of someone
other than the particular offender for example by theft in whose hands the
firearm would be a danger the public.
Parliament has therefore said that usually the consequence of merely
being in possession of a firearm will in itself be a sufficiently serious
offence to require the imposition of a term of imprisonment of five years,
irrespective of the circumstances of the offence or the offender, unless they
pass the exceptional threshold to which the section relates."
[10] The
application of this approach in practice may be illustrated by a brief account
of the relevant circumstances in the cases to which we were referred. In R.
v Jordan, Alleyne and Redfern the appellant Jordan pled guilty to possessing a loaded Second World War
revolver in working order. He had had it
for about six months, having been given it by a cousin. He was of previous good character. The appellant Alleyne pled guilty to
possessing a gun and ammunition. He had
been working for a drug dealer who had buried the gun in some woodland. He recovered the gun about a week before his
arrest with the intention of preventing its use against himself. The appellant
Redfern pled guilty to possessing a pistol which he had bought about three
years earlier. There was no ammunition
for it. It had been modified so as to
permit the discharge of a missile capable of causing death. He believed that the gun was a replica when
he bought it. No exceptional
circumstances were found in the first two cases, but Redfern's belief that the
gun was a replica was treated as an exceptional circumstance. In R. v
McEneaney [2005] ECWA
Crim 431, [2005] Cr. App. R.(S.) 86, the appellant pled guilty to one charge of
possessing a firearm without a firearms certificate and three charges of
possessing a prohibited weapon. The most
serious charge related to a semi-automatic handgun which had been constructed
as a blank firing weapon but had been converted to fire ammunition and had
actually been fired. His explanation for
possessing this firearm was that he had found it whilst out walking one day,
and he had thereafter kept it. There was
no evidence that it was he who had converted the weapon or who had fired
it. A psychiatric report disclosed that
he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and long-standing personality
difficulties. It was held that the
appellant's psychiatric history and the circumstances of the offences did not
amount to exceptional circumstances in combination. In R.
v Blackall [2005] ECWA Crim 1128,
[2006] 1 Cr. App. R.(S.) 22, the appellant pled guilty to possessing a revolver
and ammunition. He had kept the revolver
in his house since being rendered paraplegic some years earlier in a shooting
incident, in order to protect himself from future attacks. It was held that there were no exceptional
circumstances relating to the offence, but that the fact that the appellant was
a paraplegic with many consequential physical disabilities, making it much more
difficult for him to cope with a sentence of imprisonment, amounted to
exceptional circumstances which justified a reduction of the sentence below the
required minimum. In R. v Mehmet
[2005] ECWA Crim 2074 the appellant pled guilty to possession of a
self-contained, gas-cartridge revolver in working order and capable of
discharging pellets. No ammunition was
found. The appellant come into
possession of it some years previously, at a time when possession of it was
lawful. He intended, if it was used,
that it was to be for sporting purposes.
In January 2004 the weapon became unlawful, but at that time he was
suffering from depression and knew nothing of the change of legislation. The Court held that, while no one of those
circumstances was capable by itself of constituting an exceptional
circumstance, the combination of all the factors in the case enabled them to
say that this was one of those rare cases where the Court was justified in
finding the exceptional circumstances contended for by the appellant. They regarded the particular factors they
identified as presenting "an unusual and cumulative picture". In Evans
v The Queen [2005] ECWA Crim 1811, the
appellant pled guilty to several offences, including one of possession of a
semi-automatic firearm, a self-loading pistol which was in working order and
had been used by him. The Court
considered a psychological report which stated that the appellant had a severe
level of obsessive compulsive disorder and clinically significant levels of
anxiety and depression. The Court said,
at paragraph 16:
"In our
judgment, the appellant's psychological condition does not constitute
exceptional circumstances within the meaning of [section 51A]. The appellant knew what he was doing and knew
that what he was doing was wrong. He
retained the prohibited weapon with that knowledge. The intervention of a specialist firearms
team was required to find the weapon in his house. In the context of a statute intended to
protect the public from the possible consequences of unlawful possession of
firearms, evidence, in an intelligent man, well aware of the public issues
involved, of feelings of compulsion to obtain and store guns, does not amount
to exceptional circumstances."
Finally, in R.v Rehman & Wood, the appellant pled
guilty to possession of a replica blank-firing handgun which, although a
replica, could easily be altered to as to be capable of firing live
ammunition. He was a collector of models
and purchased the replica firearm with the intention of displaying it. He said that he did not know that the gun
could be converted. He had a positively
good character. His background, his
ignorance of the unlawfulness of the weapon, his plea of guilty at the first
opportunity, his previous good character, his co-operation throughout the
search and arrest procedure and his employment with a public authority of which
he was a valued employee, collectively made it possible to come to the
conclusion that exceptional circumstances existed. The appellant Wood pled guilty to several
contraventions of the Firearms Act, including one count of possession of a
prohibited weapon, which was a single-barrelled shotgun with a barrel less than
30 centimetres long. He was a collector
of weapons. He was of extremely good
character, as described in the report.
He had inherited the weapon from his grandfather. The Court said, at paragraph 32:
"[H]e of all people should have
understood that this was not the sort of weapon which should have been in his
possession. He did not take the action
which he should have done to check whether it was lawful to possess it. The fact that he had committed the other
offences demonstrates that he did not attach sufficient significance to the
very strict statutory provisions which applied to the possession of
firearms. The other offences are not
ones to which section 51A applied.
But they showed on his part a carelessness with regard to the possession
of firearms which prevents us treating the circumstances as exceptional."
[11] The principles
which may be derived from these cases appear to us to be as follows. In enacting section 51A of the Firearms
Act, Parliament intended, that, for the protection of the public against the
dangers arising from the unlawful possession of firearms, considerations of
retribution and deterrence should be given greater emphasis, and the personal
circumstances of the offender less emphasis, than would normally be the case in
sentencing. While there may be cases in
which exceptional circumstances are found to exist, the emphasis is on the word
"exceptional", and such cases will be rare.
In deciding whether or not exceptional circumstances exist, it is
necessary to consider as a whole all relevant circumstances relating both to
the offence and to the offender. Some
circumstances may amount to aggravation and some to mitigation, and some may be
relatively neutral, which is why it is to the circumstances taken as a whole
that regard must be had. We do not
accept the submission of senior counsel for the respondent that it is only
those circumstances that are claimed to be exceptional that fall to be taken
into account.
The material before the
sentencing judge
[12] The sentencing judge had before him, and
took into account, information derived from a number of sources, which for
convenience we place under separate headings.
The history of the case
[13] The respondent
originally appeared on a summary complaint on 25 October
2005 on two
charges which became charges 1 and 2 in the subsequent indictment. He appeared from custody on petition on 17
May 2006 in
respect of inter alia the firearms
offences which became charges 3 and 4 in the subsequent indictment. He was refused bail. He was fully committed on 25
May 2006. He pled guilty to charges 1, 3 and 4 in the
indictment at a continued preliminary hearing on 8 September
2006.
Previous offending
[14] The respondent
had numerous previous convictions, extending back to 1975. The notice of previous convictions shows that
he was convicted on 46 separate occasions, three of them on indictment, for a
variety of offences, including offences of violence and dishonesty. He had previously been convicted of charges
of assault on his partner, the complainer in charge 1 of the present
indictment.
The circumstances of the offences
[15] The sentencing
judge was provided with a Crown narrative, in agreed terms, as follows:
"INTRODUCTION
The accused and the Crown witness
Sandra Dunlop have been in a long-term relationship for approximately 28 years.
They have 2 children as a result of this relationship, Angela McGovern (23) and
Lewis McGovern (15).
CHARGE 1
About
approximately 11pm on 18 June 2005, Sandra Dunlop and her son Lewis
McGovern were within the flat at Flat 2/1, 116 Earl Street, Scotstoun, Glasgow.
At this time Sandra Dunlop answered the close security entry buzzer and
found it to be the accused seeking access.
Due to Sandra Dunlop and the accused being estranged partners, and a
recent argument, Sandra Dunlop did not allow the accused access to her home and
refused to activate the door entry system giving the accused access to the
common close.
The
accused then started to shout and swear at Sandra Dunlop. She informed the accused that she was going
to phone the police, and moved towards her phone. Within her hallway she heard a loud 'bang'
and saw a flash.
Sandra
Dunlop then phoned the police, dialling 999.
At
this time the parties' 15-year-old son Lewis made his way over to the
livingroom window giving a view over Earl Street.
He saw the accused make his way over to a nearby skip where he appeared
to retrieve an item. The accused then
moved to the centre of the roadway directly outside the flat, and looked up
towards the window of the premises.
Fearing
that the accused was about to throw an item at the window, Lewis McGovern
stepped back, losing the accused from his view.
However, Lewis McGovern heard a loud bang, but did not see what the
accused had retrieved from the skip or what had caused the noise.
At
the same time, neighbours of Sandra Dunlop were within their flat, having
settled their children down for the evening.
They heard the sound of the argument between the accused and Sandra
Dunlop, and heard a loud bang. They
looked out of their living room window and saw the accused standing in the
roadway outside.
The
accused was seen to be holding an item, which looked like a small pistol type
handgun approximately 8" in length. The
accused appeared to be pulling on the top of the pistol in what could be
described as a cocking motion, and pointed it in the general direction of
Sandra Dunlop's window before firing it.
The
accused repeated this action before placing the pistol in the holdall he was
carrying and making off along Earl Street.
The police were again called.
At
approximately midnight on the same day Angela McGovern, the daughter of the accused,
was in her next-door neighbour's house, when her partner informed her that he
had allowed the accused into their home at 56 Larchfield Avenue, Scotstoun.
Angela
McGovern returned home, and entered her living room where she found her
father. She spoke to him briefly, and
then embraced him prior to his leaving.
At this she felt a hard object within the accused's waistband. She asked
her father what the object was and he replied 'That's my gun in there be
careful.'
Angela
McGovern did not see the gun referred to, but instructed the accused to leave,
as she was nervous.
Meanwhile
police officers received a message via personal radio within regards to an
ongoing firearm incident at 116 Earl Street, Glasgow.
A full firearms procedure was adopted resulting in the attendance of
armed response unit and dog units. The
locus was secured and searched with a negative result.
At
approximately 2055 hours, on 21 June 2005, police officers met the accused by
arrangement, and the accused agreed to attend a City Centre Police Office on a
voluntary basis. He was later
interviewed there and stated with regard to his attendance at Earl Street:
'I was asking her to give me some money [be]cause my money goes through
my daughter's bank account. She refused
to even give me ah couple of pound, that's all I was wanting'.
When
asked: 'That's the information we've
got, you were shouting and swearing and then, they're speaking about this
flash, this bang and there is witnesses saying they saw you in the street, with
what appears to be a handgun?'
The
accused said: 'It's an imitation
starting, well it's a starting pistol, nothing comes out of it, it's just a
noise.'
The
accused was cautioned ad charged and made no reply.
The
pistol was not recovered.
CHARGES 3 & 4
Around
10 March 2006 Sandra Dunlop states that she was within her home address, along
with the now accused, within the main bedroom.
Sandra Dunlop saw the accused remove a blue polythene bag from under the
bed, which contained a handgun.
The
accused then removed the handgun from the bag.
At
2.55pm on 16 May 2006 police officers went to Sandra Dunlop's address, as a
result of a matter no longer before the court.
They detained the accused and conveyed him to Glasgow City Centre Police
Office.
At
approximately 6pm he was taken to an interview room, to be interviewed. While in the room and before the interview
began, the accused asked to be informed why he was being detained although this
had already been explained. He was informed again of the reason for his detention.
The
accused, at this time, stated: 'Look, I want to help. I have been wantin' tae hand this in for
weeks. Gie us a bit of paper'. He was given a sheet of paper in order that
he could draw the police witnesses a sketch of the area in which the gun could
be found. The accused thereafter stated,
'You'll get the gun. A blue bag like you
get in the Paki shop. It's at the fence
across from ma hoose'.
As
a result of the information given by the accused, police officers went to the
area described by the accused, and recovered a silver-coloured, black handled
handgun.
On
examination by Ballistics Officers, the weapon was found to be a blank firing
self loading (sometimes called semi automatic) pistol. The weapon was German in origin, and was
originally designed to fire 9mm blank rounds.
The
weapon on closer examination was found to have been converted to be capable of
firing modified blank firing cartridges loaded with a steel ball bearing. The pistol was modified, by cutting off the
standard barrel just forward of the gas vent.
The remaining portion of the barrel had been opened up possibly by
drilling through into the forward end of the chamber block.
Within
the lab, test shots were fired successfully using a 9mm centre fire blank
cartridge and a modified blank cartridge.
The blank round performed as normal although the pistol did not
self-load due to the modifications made.
A
modified round with the ball bearing was fired and found to have a lethal
potential."
Social Enquiry Report
[16] Before passing
sentence, the sentencing judge obtained a Social Enquiry Report. This disclosed that the respondent was aged 49
and lived with his partner, Sandra Dunlop, aged 43. They had two children, a daughter, aged 25,
who lived nearby with her two children, and a son aged 16 who lived with his
parents. The respondent informed the
social worker that the relationship with his partner had at times been
volatile. He acknowledged that his
temper, alcohol and drug misuse were the main cause of difficulties. Notwithstanding this, the respondent's
partner confirmed that she would be willing to consider his returning to live
with her, but only on the understanding that he sought treatment in relation to
his substance misuse and behaviour. This
was borne out by a letter signed by the respondent's partner which was put
before the sentencing judge, in which she expressed herself in somewhat more
optimistic terms than she did to the social worker. The respondent told the social worker that he
had suffered two heart attacks and had angina.
He had developed deep vein thrombosis as a result of intravenous drug
abuse. He had been a heroin addict for
about 25 years. He had been on a methadone
programme and had experienced periods of being free from drugs, followed by
relapses. He said his alcohol misuse had
become a problem for him more recently, with negative effects on his behaviour
and ability to manage his anger.
[17] Under the
heading "Attitude to Offence" the social worker reported that, in respect of
charge 1, the respondent said that he had been separated from his partner for
several weeks as a result of relationship difficulties. He went to her house in order to access money
for heroin, but he was refused entry and his belongings were thrown from the
window. He claimed that he was sober, but
he was desperate for money to buy drugs.
He accepted that the weapon referred to in charge 1 belonged to him and
was in a bag of his belongings. He
removed the gun and caused a breach of the peace, but claimed that he was
shocked at the presence of the gun and that it was discharged
accidentally. He expressed considerable
remorse at having caused fear and alarm to his partner and son. In the next paragraph under this heading,
which may be taken to relate to the offences in charges 3 and 4, the writer
states:
"Mr McGovern reports that he had
purchased the gun with the intention of converting it from an imitation firearm
to one capable of firing live bullets for the purpose of a newspaper article,
which he proposed to compile with a journalist friend. Mr McGovern reported that he recognises the
seriousness of the illegal possession of such a weapon, however presented, in
the opinion of the writer, as somewhat blasé in discussion of the potential
consequences of owning or using a gun, for instance Mr McGovern stated
that he believed that while terrified, his family 'knew I would never shoot
anyone'."
[18] The social
worker undertook an assessment using the Level of Services Inventory - Revised
(LSI-R), described as a validated assessment instrument, which provides a
structured examination of the risk of re-offending and itemises areas of
criminogenic need, which may need to be addressed through a programme of
intervention. Using this instrument the
respondent was assessed as requiring a high level of service. It was stated that he might benefit from
structured intervention in the areas of alcohol/drug misuse, anger management,
use of violence and criminal activity. Senior
counsel for the respondent submitted that it was wrong to regard the Social
Enquiry Report as providing an assessment of the respondent as being at high
risk of re-offending. On the contrary, we
regard this as an assessment that he was at high risk of re-offending.
The News of the World
[19] The sentencing judge was provided with
information about co-operation between the respondent and a journalist working
for the News of the World. The information was contained in a copy of
report from that paper dated 29 October 2000 and a statement by the journalist,
David Leslie. The journalist stated that
he was introduced to the respondent in early 2000. The respondent agreed to act as a "snout" for
the journalist, passing on any newsworthy items that he felt would be of
interest. The respondent provided the
journalist with information and practical assistance, involving the purchase of
a replica handgun and its modification to fire live bullets, which led to the
story published on 29 October 2000.
The respondent attempted to provide further assistance to the journalist
in later years in connection with the availability of illegal firearms. It would appear that the respondent was
remunerated for his efforts. No specific
mention is made in the journalist's statement about contact between him and the
respondent in connection with the firearm mentioned in charges 3 and 4.
The plea- in-mitigation
[20] As appears
from the sentencing judge's report to this Court, and from a transcript of the
plea-in-mitigation by counsel who then appeared for the respondent, the
respondent was said to be genuinely contrite about his actions which were the
subject of charge 1. His partner and
family were prepared at the time of sentence to have him back at the family
home, indeed they appeared anxious that this should happen. So far as charges 3 and 4 were concerned,
counsel submitted that there were special circumstances which justified a
departure from the minimum sentence which would otherwise be required in
respect of charge 4. As reported by the
sentencing judge:
"In particular, it was said that
there would have been no prosecution but for the fact that [the respondent]
voluntarily advised the police of where the gun could be found. He also gave a full explanation as to how he
had come into possession of the gun. It
should be emphasised that the gun described in charges 3 and 4 was a totally
different gun from that described in charge 1.
I was also given some documentary evidence to the effect that the
appellant had been assisting a journalist from the News of the World newspaper in setting up a story which described
how guns could be obtained in the West of Scotland and handed to the police,
thus allowing the newspaper to claim credit for an act of public service. The appellant had acquired the gun for this
purpose and also to allow the journalist to do further articles on the ease
with which firearms could be obtained in Glasgow."
The sentence
[21] There was some
minor confusion on the part of the sentencing judge, which is also reflected in
the Minute of Proceedings, in relation to the numbering of the charges in
respect of which sentence was being passed, but before us counsel were agreed
that this was as follows. In respect of
charge 1 he imposed an extended sentence of five years, of which the custodial
term was three years and the extension period was two years. In respect of charge 3, he admonished the
respondent. In respect of charge 4 he
imposed an extended sentence of five years of which the custodial term was
three years and the extension period was two years. He made the sentences on charges 1 and 4
concurrent with each other. The sentence
was back-dated to 17 May 2006.
[22] In sentencing
the respondent, the sentencing judge said:
"Now the first thing I want to make
clear is that these two charges [sic]
will be dealt with entirely separately.
Both of them I regard as serious and they are made worse by the fact
that you have an appalling criminal record.
I am particularly concerned that two assaults in the past have been
committed against your partner. The
Court has very little time for people who behave in this way and, in addition,
in terms of the present first charge it is clear that you intended to
intimidate her in a way that I find truly appalling.
I
have also at the same time, of course, to consider the second charge, I beg
your pardon, the third and the fourth charges which are of course entirely
separate. The reason behind your
acquiring these items seems quite extraordinary but [counsel] has persuaded me,
particularly on the basis that you voluntarily went to the police to advise
them of the position, that there are exceptional circumstances that justify the
Court considering another sentence than the minimum of five years' imprisonment
which would otherwise be imposed. It
does, however, remain a serious matter.
I also accept that from the outset you have been prepared to plead
guilty and I think that, I am prepared to give some effect to the suggestion
that you were not in a position to put in section 76 letter.
As
far as the charge of breach of the peace is concerned, because I say I regard
that as very serious, I am satisfied that with your record and previous history
of assaulting your partner that had you gone to trial you would have faced a
lengthy prison sentence of perhaps five years.
I am prepared to accept, however, all the mitigating factors that have
been adduced in your favour. I have
taken into account the letter written by your wife and your early plea of
guilty and have decided that the sentence to be imposed is one of three years
imprisonment on charge 1. In respect of
the second charge, I beg your pardon, the second two charges, charges 3 and 4,
I am prepared to depart from the minimum sentence, as I have indicated, and I
shall impose a sentence of three years imprisonment on charge [4]. You will be admonished on charge [3].
...
Now
in addition, in respect of each of these two charges [charges 1 and 4] there
will be an extended sentence of post-custodial supervision for two years.
... I have imposed sentences of three years'
imprisonment on each of charges 1 and [4].
I had given thought to making these consecutive, in other words you
would have served six years' imprisonment but in the hope that you will take
advantage of your partner's generosity in having you back and that you will
have learnt your lesson in respect of these matters I am prepared, in the
circumstances, to make the two sentences concurrent."
[23] The sentencing
judge does not appear to have been addressed on, or to have considered, the
competency of imposing extended sentences on charges 1 and 4. Section 210A of the 1995 would only make
such a sentence competent in the case of a prisoner convicted of certain
specified sexual offences or a long-term prisoner convicted of offences
inferring personal violence.
[24] In his report
to this Court, the sentencing judge substantially repeats the considerations
which he expressly took into account in passing sentence. He states:
"The exceptional circumstances in
charge [4] were that the [respondent] himself had brought the existence of the
gun to the attention of the police, and this was the entire basis of the
charge. This was not in any way disputed
by the prosecution. There was no suggestion
that it had been used for any criminal purpose.
In addition the respondent had pled guilty at a continued preliminary
hearing. Accordingly, I felt entitled to
[conclude] that special circumstances existed for not imposing the minimum
sentence of five years' imprisonment. ...
In addition, as the minimum sentence was now not applicable, I
considered it further appropriate to give the [respondent] the benefit of a
discount for his plea of guilty at a preliminary hearing, and reduced the
sentence to one of three years' imprisonment.
I also considered in this respect, and in making the sentences
concurrent, that an excessive sentence might deter others wishing to hand in
guns in the future."
The appeal to this
court
Submissions for the Crown
[25] On
behalf of the Lord Advocate, the Advocate Depute submitted that the sentencing
judge erred in law in holding that exceptional circumstances existed. The two factors taken into account by him in
reaching that decision were the manner in which the existence of the firearm
came to the attention of the police and the respondent's plea of guilty. The sentencing judge placed undue weight on
the means by which the firearm had been recovered. He erred in holding that but for the
respondent's admissions there would have been no prosecution. Neither he nor the respondent could exclude
the possibility that the firearm would be discovered and linked to the
respondent by some other means. The
respondent revealed the whereabouts of the firearm to police officers on 16 May
2006 while
in custody on another matter. He
appeared on petition on 17 May 2006, and was remanded in custody. He was served with an indictment on 31 July
2006 for a
preliminary hearing on 31 August 2006.
At that hearing the case was continued on defence motion to allow a
firearms expert instructed on behalf of the respondent to provide his
report. An offer to plead guilty to
charges 1, 3 and 4 was first received on 4 September 2006.
In these circumstances the plea of guilty was of little utilitarian
value. The timing of the plea was in no
way exceptional, and the plea was all but inevitable standing the evidence
against the respondent. His action in
bringing the existence of the firearm to the attention of the police might be
indicative of a certain degree of remorse, and was mitigatory, but these
factors could not, either individually or taken together, amount to exceptional
circumstances.
[26] The Advocate
Depute further submitted that the sentencing judge erred in law in calculating
the discount appropriate in respect of the plea of guilty. He considered the plea of guilty to be one of
the factors leading him to hold that exceptional circumstances existed, and
accordingly imposed a sentence of less than five years' imprisonment. But having done that, he then proceeded to
apply a second discount in respect of the plea of guilty alone and allowed a
further discount of 25%. The only power
to mitigate the penalty imposed in respect of a contravention of section
5(1)(aba) was that contained in section 51A(2).
It was open to the sentencing judge to regard the plea of guilty as a
factor to be taken into account in assessing whether such exceptional
circumstances as were specified in section 51A(2) existed. But this specific provision overrode the
general power contained in section 196(2) of the 1995 Act to reduce a period of
imprisonment, and overrode the provisions of that section as regards account to
be taken of a plea of guilty. Were it
not so, the provisions of section 51A as to both minimum terms and exceptional
circumstances would be of no effect.
[27] There was no
question of the respondent having acquired the weapon in ignorance of its true
characteristics. He knew of the danger
posed by the firearm. He knew it was an
illegal weapon. He knew well that he
should not have it in his possession.
The sentencing judge erred in not taking into account the risk of the
respondent using the firearm. He had
committed another offence (the offence in charge 1) involving use of a handgun
or similar instrument. Although this was
not itself a prohibited weapon, that offence demonstrated irresponsibility on
his part and highlighted the risk that he might use an illegal firearm in such
circumstances. The sentencing judge
erred in failing to take account of the wider risk posed to the public by the
respondent's actions. Whether or not he
considered there was a danger of the respondent using the firearm, there was a
clear risk that it might fall into the wrong hands.
[28] Finally, the Advocate
Depute submitted that the sentencing judge erred in ordering that the sentences
imposed on charges 1 and 4 be served concurrently. The offences were separate matters. Notwithstanding the wishes of the complainer
in charge 1, the sentencing judge considered that only a substantial custodial
sentence was appropriate on that charge.
The imposition of a sentence on charge 4 which did not result in the
respondent spending any additional period in custody did not adequately reflect
the serious nature of either charge, nor did it reflect the need for
retribution and the need to deter both the respondent and others from
possession of prohibited firearms.
Submissions for the respondent
[29] Senior counsel
for the respondent submitted that the sentencing judge was correct to hold that
there were exceptional circumstances. In
all the English cases referred to, the police had found the firearms. In the present case, the respondent had
volunteered information to the police which led to the recovery of the firearm
and to its being taken out of circulation.
This, and his plea of guilty, could properly be regarded as constituting
exceptional circumstances. The
respondent's previous bad character should not be taken into account. He would never have been charged in terms of charges
3 and 4 if he had not given information to the police. He was contrite. The firearm had not been used in connection
with any crime. The removal of the gun
from circulation was consistent with public policy.
[30] Counsel
further submitted that the sentencing judge had exercised a proper discretion
in making the sentences on charges 1 and 4 concurrent. It was appropriate to look at the indictment
as a whole, not just charge by charge, in order to achieve an appropriate
overall result.
Discussion
[31] We start with
charges 3 and 4, which relate to the same firearm, and in particular charge 4,
which is the more serious of them. The
question for consideration is whether the sentencing judge misdirected himself
in holding that there existed exceptional circumstances which justified the
imposition of a sentence of imprisonment of less than the statutory minimum
provided by section 51A of the Firearms Act.
We have set out above the principles which we derive from the English
cases, and which we propose to follow and apply in the present case. A number of matters appear to us to be of
considerable significance. The respondent had what the sentencing judge
correctly described as an appalling criminal record, including convictions for
assault, two of them against his partner.
In the course of committing the breach of the peace which was the
subject of charge 1, he repeatedly discharged a handgun or similar instrument
at the window of his partner's house.
While this was not in itself an illegal firearm, his use of it
demonstrated the respondent's willingness to use such a weapon in the
commission of a crime. A member of the
public might well have taken it for a real firearm. It was not subsequently recovered. When the respondent came into possession of
the firearm referred to in charges 3 and 4, he was well aware that it was an
illegal weapon. He hid it at a place
away from his house. He did not put it
beyond his own use, and it could also have fallen into the hands of someone
else. The sentencing judge appears,
quite rightly, to have placed little, if any weight on the respondent's
co-operation with the journalist from the News
of the World. The journalist's
statement does not refer to the respondent's possession of this particular
firearm in 2006, so it may be inferred that the respondent had not drawn it to
the attention of the journalist. In any
event, the only proper way of taking an illegal firearm out of circulation is
to inform the police and not a newspaper.
Against these considerations may be set the fact that it was the
respondent who provided information to the police which led them to recover the
firearm, and his subsequent plea of guilty.
[32] Bearing in
mind the policy of Parliament in enacting section 51A of the Firearms Act, and
looking at all relevant circumstances relating to both the respondent and the
offence, we are clearly of the view that the sentencing judge fell into error
in concluding that there existed exceptional circumstances within the meaning
of section 51A which justified the imposition of a term of imprisonment of
less than the statutory minimum. While
there were some mitigating features, they were, in our judgment considerably
outweighed by the aggravating features, such that, taken as a whole, the
circumstances could not properly be regarded as exceptional. For this reason alone the sentence on charge
4 must be regarded as unduly lenient.
[33] There is,
however, an additional reason for regarding this sentence as unduly
lenient. No issue was taken by either
counsel with the sentencing judge's selection of a starting point of five years'
imprisonment on charge 1 (though the amount of the discount to reflect a plea
of guilty and the competency of the imposition of an extended sentence may both
be open to question). Charges 1 and 4
related to entirely separate matters. No
doubt, as senior counsel for the respondent submitted, it lay within the power
of the sentencing judge to make the sentences concurrent, but that is not the
point. The result, as the Advocate
Depute pointed out, was that, having decided on the sentence in respect of charge
1, the sentencing judge effectively imposed no additional sentence in respect
of charge 4. In addition, he only
admonished the respondent in respect of charge 3, an offence which carried a
maximum sentence of seven years' imprisonment.
These are additional reasons for regarding the disposal in the present
case as unduly lenient.
Decision
[34] For these
reasons we shall quash the sentences imposed by the sentencing judge. Before deciding what sentences we should
impose in their place, we shall put the case out for further hearing.