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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons >> DANIELLE FOWLER & MARK SCOBBIE v. HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE [2013] ScotHC HCJAC_166 (27 November 2013) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotHC/2013/2013HCJAC166.html Cite as: [2013] ScotHC HCJAC_166 |
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APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
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Lord Justice ClerkLord Drummond Young Lord Clarke
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[2013] HCJAC 166 XC636/12 and XC640/12
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LORD CARLOWAY, the LORD JUSTICE CLERK
in
APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION AND SENTENCE
by
DANIELLE FOWLER
and in
APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE
by
MARK SCOBBIE Appellants;
against
HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE Respondent: _____________ |
Appellant (Fowler): Beardmore; Harvie Diamond & Co, Glasgow
Appellant (Scobbie): Alonzi; Capital Defence
Respondent: Niven-Smith AD; the Crown Agent
27 November 2013
General
[1] On
31 October 2012, at the High Court in Glasgow, Danielle Fowler was found
guilty, along with Mark Scobbie, of a charge which libelled as follows:
"(1) on 23 June 2011 at ... 31 Eriboll Street, Glasgow and in the common close there you ... did assault Robert Glen, ... and did repeatedly punch and kick him to the head and body, repeatedly strike him on the head and body with a glass bottle or similar implement, seize him by the legs, drag him down a stairway ... causing his head to strike off the stairs ..., all to his severe injury, permanent disfigurement and to the danger of his life and you did abandon him ... and attempt to murder him".
Miss Fowler was sentenced to 11 years imprisonment. Mr Scobbie was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment (4 months being attributable to a bail aggravation).
Circumstances
of the offence
[2] The trial judge reports
that the complainer was aged 42 and an alcoholic. He had not known the
appellants in advance of the day of the incident, but had met up with them in
the city centre. Miss Fowler lived in a first floor flat at the address in the
libel. At about 7.00pm, MP, who lived across the landing, heard noises coming
from the flat. Although the spyhole of her own door had been partially
obstructed by one or other of the appellants, she was able to see Miss Fowler
and another person (Mr Scobbie) dragging a body from the flat and along
the landing. They then returned to the flat. Mrs P went out, noting that
there was "blood everywhere", including down the stairs. The deceased was
lying at the bottom of the stairs, hunched against the door of a downstairs
neighbour. He was clearly severely injured. The police were called. As she
returned to her own flat, Mrs P noticed a bloodstained mop lying outside Miss Fowler's
flat. It had not been there earlier.
[3] The
police arrived at about 7.45pm and summoned an ambulance. The complainer was
taken to the Western General, but transferred to the Southern General because
of a large blood clot on his brain. He had in excess of 10 injuries to his
head, requiring suturing, as well as other bruises. He also had cuts and
abrasions over the rest of his body. He remained in hospital for some
11 days.
[4] At
about 8.50pm, a senior police officer arrived. Having noted the apparent
source of the trail of blood, and the mop which had been used to wash it away,
he called at the flat. The door was opened by Miss Fowler, who was
wearing a bloodstained football top. Her hands were also bloodstained and
there was blood spatter on the wall in the hall. Mr Scobbie was in the
livingroom, also wearing bloodstained clothing and holding a vodka bottle.
There were clear signs of a disturbance.
[5] The
appellants were detained. Miss Fowler initially said: "I just pushed him out
the door". However, at the police station, she admitted that she had hit the
complainer, but said that this was because she had been raped; an allegation
which she later withdrew. She also appeared to admit that she had "plunged
him". Both appellants were too intoxicated to be interviewed formally. Miss
Fowler was interviewed on the following day, when she made certain admissions
about cleaning up the blood and obstructing the neighbour's spyhole but,
ultimately, she denied the charge and incriminated Mr Scobbie.
[6] Her
testimony was that she had asked the complainer to leave her flat. A fight had
broken out between Mr Scobbie and the complainer. Eventually both she and Mr
Scobbie had put the complainer out. However, he managed to get back in and was
again asked to leave. Another fight broke out between him and
Mr Scobbie. The complainer had eventually fallen in the hallway and had
been dragged out by Mr Scobbie. Miss Fowler admitted that she had cleaned
blood in the hall outside the door.
[7] Mr Scobbie
also gave evidence, but he maintained that what he had been doing in the flat
was trying to restrain Miss Fowler, who had stabbed the complainer on the
shoulder. He had dragged the complainer into the hallway in order to prevent
further assaults by the appellant Fowler. He had covered the spyhole of the
neighbour's door. He maintained that he only dragged the victim to the top of
the stairs and propped him against a wall. The appellant had then kicked him
down the stairs, causing his head to strike the concrete steps repeatedly on
the way down.
The Forensic Evidence
[8] A
forensic scientist had examined both the locus and the clothing of the
appellants. There were three areas of blood spatter in the flat, suggesting
three different locations where assaults had taken place. One item of clothing
was Miss Fowler's green Celtic top, which had "contact bloodstaining,
including some smeared bloodstaining ... on the front and back". This blood was
that of the complainer. In examination-in-chief, the forensic scientist had
confirming that there was nothing about the pattern of blood on the top that
would assist in relation to the question of how that blood might have got
there. All that could be said was that the top had come into contact with wet
blood. It could have been a direct contact, or a secondary contact. This was
in contrast to blood spots which were found on Mr Scobbie's trousers and
trainers. The spots on the trainers involved the kind of pattern that might be
created when there was an impact into wet blood, suggesting that the trainers
had been close to an impact with wet blood. The amount of blood on the
trainers suggested a direct rather than secondary contact.
[9] The
cross-examination of the forensic scientist on behalf of Miss Scobbie involved
putting to her that the examination of Miss Fowler's clothing had produced
results which might be regarded as "neutral". The forensic scientist agreed
with that. In relation to Miss Fowler's top, the following exchange took
place:
"Was there much blood on that shirt? - No.
And did I hear you say that there is a possibility that that blood was there through secondary transfer? - Yes, some, some of the bloodstaining on the football shirt was, was light, but just more in keeping with a secondary transfer than a primary transfer.
For example, if someone had blood on their hands and wiped it on it for example, would that ... - Yes".
Speeches and Charge
[10] In
the speech to the jury on behalf of Miss Fowler, there was some focus on the
contrast between the findings on Mr Scobbie's trainers and those on
Miss Fowler's top. In a tantalising opening, it was said that, whereas it
was accepted that there was compelling evidence against Miss Fowler, there was
"One piece of evidence which should lead you to acquit her". This subject was
then left for some time, but reverted to towards the end of the speech when it
was said that the most important piece of evidence was "of course" in relation
to the top. The forensic scientist had preferred an explanation whereby the
blood had got there by secondary transfer. "Crucial, though, crucial is the
absence of blood spatter on her shirt". The jury were told that they might
expect that someone, who had been involved in what must have been a seriously
violent assault on a bleeding man, might have blood spatter on her clothing.
One place that there was no blood spatter, nor any evidence of such a spatter
having been cleaned, was on that top.
[11] In
the introductory passages of her charge to the jury, the judge stressed that it
was the jury's assessment of the evidence which counted and not the judge's.
She gave the jury the standard direction in relation to the evidence that, if
she had mentioned some evidence which the jury considered unimportant or failed
to mention evidence that the jury did think was important, they should "take
nothing from that" and should place what weight they thought fit on the
evidence or part of it.
[12] The
trial judge did, to a degree, set out what she understood to be the main points
made by the Crown and the defence in the speeches. She touched upon the
evidence of blood spatter in the flat and the finding of blood on the clothes
and shoes of both appellants, notably on the top of Miss Fowler and the
shoes of Mr Scobbie. She described the evidence of the forensic scientist
as being that there was contact bloodstaining on the top. When she came to
deal with the defence case, the trial judge reminded the jury that it had been
submitted on behalf of Miss Fowler that there was no forensic evidence in
relation to her shoes. She stated that Miss Fowler's counsel had suggested
that "although there was some blood on her shirt ... you would have expected more
if she had perpetrated the assault libelled". So, she continued, "the forensic
evidence, it is submitted, does not support the Crown case". The judge
concluded her remarks on the evidence by reminding the jury that she was "not
attempting to summarise all of the evidence ... [or] speeches" and commended the
speeches to the jury as a generality.
Note
of Appeal and Submissions on Conviction
[13] The ground of appeal
against conviction is that the trial judge misrepresented the defence position
to the jury. It is said in the Note of Appeal that at no stage did the defence
suggest to the jury that, if the appellant had committed the offence, more
blood would have been found on her shirt. The critical point was not the
amount of blood, but the type of bloodstaining. The Note of Appeal states that
it was accepted by the forensic scientist that she would have expected blood impact
spatter marks to be present on the clothing of a person participating in, or in
close proximity to, an attack on a person who was bleeding.
[14] In
submissions, it was accepted that the scientist had not said that she would
have expected blood spatter marks on the clothing of a person in close
proximity to an assault on a bleeding victim. In that important respect, the
Note of Appeal was admittedly factually inaccurate. Nevertheless, the trial
judge's directions on the evidence, which, unusually, she had elected to
summarise, were apt to confuse the jury. The trial judge had misinterpreted
what the defence line on the blood staining of the top had been.
Decision on Conviction
[15] All
that the evidence of the forensic scientist on the top consisted of, so far as
the cross-examination on behalf of Miss Fowler was concerned, was that the
staining was light and more in keeping with secondary rather than primary
transfer. There was no discussion of impact spatter or the significance of the
lack of such spatter. All that had been adduced was that there was not much blood
on the top and that it could have got there because someone had wiped his or
her bloodied hands on it.
[16] The
appellant did found upon the absence of blood spatter on the shirt as the "crucial"
piece of evidence. The trial judge, in her report, appears to accept candidly
that she may have misapprehended the defence position. That is not at all
surprising, when regard is had to what the evidence actually was. It may have
been legitimate for it to be submitted to the jury, as a matter of common sense,
that the absence of blood spatter on the top might suggest some lack of
proximity to an assault involving significant effusion of blood. However, what
is clear is that this was not put to the forensic scientist and she did not give
any evidence upon it.
[17] It
remains important for a charge to a jury to be looked at as a whole in the
context of the trial. Individual passages should not be scrutinised in
isolation (Withers v HM Advocate 1947 JC 109, LJG (Cooper) at 115).
The trial judge may not have conveyed the precise nuance of the point being
made by the defence to the jury. However, there is always a risk of
misunderstanding in such an area; hence the direction to the jury that it is
their recollection of the evidence which counts and their view on the weight or
importance to be attached to a particular piece of evidence. In any event, in
this case, the trial judge did focus the jury's attention on the absence of any
significant quantity of blood on the top (which had been the point explored in cross-examination)
and the defence speech, which included reference to the lack of spatter, was
commended to the jury by the judge despite its lack of evidential foundation. In
all these circumstances, there has been no material misdirection.
[18] In
any event, even if there had been a misapprehension on the part of the trial
judge, this cannot be said to have been productive of a miscarriage of
justice. The jury had been told that, if they believed the evidence of Miss Fowler,
or it raised a reasonable doubt in their minds, then the benefit of that doubt had
be given to her. The jury clearly rejected her testimony in its material
essentials. That is understandable given that there was ample evidence against
her demonstrating that she had participated in the attack to a much greater
degree than she had maintained in her evidence. Notably, she had been
identified as dragging the complainer out of the house. She had also made
certain admissions to the effect that she had stabbed the complainer. The bloodstaining
on her top was not just in one place but had been both to the front and back.
[19] The
appeal against conviction is accordingly refused.
Sentence
Miss Fowler
[20] It was accepted that the
offence was a callous one, particularly as it involved leaving the complainer
badly injured at the bottom of a stairwell. Without medical intervention, the
complainer would have died. Nevertheless, the submission was that the sentence
of 11 years was excessive. There had fortunately been no lasting effects on
the complainer and the Crown case had been that there had been no intention to
kill. The offence had been committed in the context of binge drinking, which
had taken place over a number of hours and all participants had consumed large
quantities of alcohol.
[21] Miss
Fowler was aged 28 at the time of sentence. She had a young son and, it was
said, she had been trying to control her alcohol intake with a view to
regaining care of the boy. A "Progress Report" from Turning Point Scotland,
which had not been available to the trial judge, had confirmed that she had
made such attempts after being liberated on bail pending trial. This report
alluded to Miss Fowler's troubled past and referred to her polite and
respectful approach to the residential setting of the programme in which she
had participated.
[22] The
main problem for Miss Fowler, apart from the nature of the attack, was her
extensive criminal record extending over a decade. In February 2012, she was
placed on probation after a conviction for assault and attempted robbery. In December
2012 she was sentenced to 9 months detention for assault and robbery. Summary
offences of dishonesty, assault and public disorder followed. She was placed
on probation in November 2003 for a breach of the peace, but contravened that
order and was sentenced to a further period of detention. She was given the
benefit of a probation order again in June 2006, after convictions for assault
to injury and breach of the peace. In August 2007, yet another probation order
followed an offence of having a knife. In August and October 2009, prison
sentences followed convictions for robbery and, again possession of a knife.
[23] Having
regard to the nature of the offence of which she was convicted and her criminal
record, the sentence of 11 years cannot be regarded as excessive. As the trial
judge reports, this was a very brutal, motiveless attack on a vulnerable
alcoholic, whom the appellants had met up with in the city centre. The attack
had been a prolonged one and had involved such activities as the obstruction of
the spyhole, in order to prevent the appellants being identified, and dragging
an unconscious dying man across a landing and down concrete steps. The
appellants were fortunate not to have been facing a charge of murder.
Mr
Scobbie
[24] The principal submission for Mr Scobbie was that, on a
comparative basis, although the trial judge had correctly identified there
being a distinction between the two appellants, the level of that distinction
had been inadequate. Mr Scobbie had been aged only 21 at the date of the
offence. Although he had a lengthy record, once the breach of probation and
bail offences were taken out of the equation, this consisted mainly of offences
of minor dishonesty and public disorder. He did not have the equivalent of
Miss Fowler's convictions for violence.
[25] It was also submitted
that the trial judge had failed to take into account the period which Mr
Scobbie had spent on remand. This was from his first appearance on petition on
27 June 2011 until his liberation by the Crown on 16 October 2011, with an
interruption between 18 July and 7 October, when he was serving a 5 month
sentence. This matter was not made the subject of a ground of appeal and the
court does not have the trial judge's comments on it. In these circumstances,
the court is not prepared to accept the assertion that she did not take the
period into account. However, assuming that it was taken into account, its
totality of some 91 days, when translated into the equivalent in a long term
sentence, the distinction in custodial terms between the two appellants becomes
relatively minor.
[26] The court regards the
distinction as thus insufficient in comparative terms. It will quash the
sentence of 10 years and substitute one of 8 years and 6 months.