BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | ||
Scottish Sheriff Court Decisions |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Sheriff Court Decisions >> Blair And Patterson Ltd v. McDermott [2006] ScotSC 43 (01 May 2006) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotSC/2006/43.html Cite as: [2006] ScotSC 43 |
[New search] [Help]
(A200/03)
JUDGMENT OF
in the appeal
in the cause
BLAIR AND PATTERSON LTD
Pursuers
and Appellants
against
GEORGE McDERMOTT
Defender
and Respondent
Act: Walls, Solicitor, Pinsett Masons (for
Pursuers)
Alt: Ms K Olson, Solicitor Maclay Murray
& Spens) for the First Third Party
The Sheriff
Principal, having resumed consideration of the cause, refuses the appeal and
adheres to the Sheriff's interlocutor dated 25 April 2005; continues the cause on the question of
expenses to a date to be afterwards fixed.
NOTE:
1. This
appeal arises in an action relating to a contract for the building of an
extension to a cottage entered into between the pursuers, the builders, and the
owner of the property, the defender. In
the principal action the pursuers seek recovery of sums said to have been
certified for payment prior to their contract with the defender being
terminated. In a counter-claim the
defender seeks a large sum of damages.
He contends that the pursuers were in breach of express and implied
terms of the contract between them. As a
result, he contends that he was unable to use the cottage over a prolonged
period. He further contends that the
extension as constructed is so unsafe that it will require to be demolished,
and that damage has been caused to the cottage itself which will require to be
repaired. His claim for damages covers
demolition and rebuilding costs, along with associated professional fees.
2. The
pursuers deny that they were in breach of contract. In essence they maintain that they carried
out the building works in accordance with the architect's design, and certain
design instructions from a structural engineer.
Both the architect and the structural engineer were convened by the pursuers
as third parties under the provisions of Ordinary Cause Rule 20.1(2). The defender did not adopt the case stated by
the pursuers against either of the third parties.
3. The
action which was raised as a commercial action under the provisions of Chapter
40 of the Ordinary Cause Rules proceeded to a debate on preliminary pleas
tabled by both parties. Following that
debate the Sheriff, in an interlocutor dated 25 April 2005 sustained those
pleas for a variety of reasons and dismissed the cause so far as directed
against both third parties. The pursuers
have appealed that interlocutor in so far as it relates to the first third
party, the architects, who are hereinafter referred to as "the third
party". No appeal is taken against the
decision in so far as it relates to the structural engineers. Moreover the pursuers now accept that the
Sheriff was correct in deciding that their averments as directed against the
third party were irrelevant. They
tendered and lodged an extensive minute of amendment in the course of the
appeal procedure.
4. It is
proper to record that, following the usual minute of amendment and answers
procedure a motion to allow the record to be amended in terms called on 25 April
2006. At that calling Ms Olson on behalf of the third party, opposed allowance
of the pursuers' amendment, arguing that it failed to cure the absence of
specification which had proved fatal before the Sheriff. Due to the complexity of the issues I did not
determine Ms Olson's submissions but allowed the amendment and continued the
cause to the appeal diet. The situation
is thus one in which allowance of the amendment is not to be taken as
prejudicing the third party's argument as to whether it cures the defect in the
original pleadings, and the pleadings as they now stand have not been the
subject of scrutiny at first instance.
In the interests of expedition it is however desirable that I should express
my view as to whether the pursuers' case against the third party in the
counter-claim is sufficient to proceed to enquiry.
5. Before
turning to the submissions of parties it is appropriate to give attention to
the manner in which the case is now pled.
In statement in fact 3 the defender sets out seven respects in which the
pursuers are said to have been in breach of express and implied terms of the
parties' agreement. Certain of the
specified breaches contain reference to more than one alleged defect in the
building. The pursuers deal specifically
with each of these allegations in answer 3 and in five instances make averments
which might be said to be directed against the actings of the third party. They make the following averment which is of
some importance: "Explained and averred
that there is no need to demolish the cottage and rebuild it. The type, extent and severity of the alleged
defects are such that they can be rectified without demolition".
6. The
pursuers then proceed to make the following general averments: "Explained and averred that the pursuers
acted in accordance with the terms of the contract. The third party inspected the pursuers' work
and in issuing interim certificates under clause 62(1) indicated that he (sic) was satisfied that the work covered
by these certificates had been properly executed. Reference is made to letters from the third
party dated 26 June 2002, 16 September 2002 and 28 February 2003 enclosing
interim certificates 1, 2 and 3 respectively which are referred to for their
terms and incorporated herein brevitatis
causa. Further explained and averred
that the third party was in breach of its obligations to the defender under its
contract with him. It was an implied
term of his contract with the defender that it would exercise the knowledge,
skill and care reasonably to be expected of an architect of ordinary skill and
competence. An ordinary competent
architect would not have undertaken design and contract administration work
unless the terms of the contract regarding inter
alia the scope of work, allocation of responsibilities and limitation of
responsibilities were clearly agreed in writing. Reference is made to standard 4.1 of the
Architects Registration Board "Code of Professional Conduct and Practice". An ordinary competent architect who had a
duty under a contract to certify payments for work properly carried out would
have regularly visited the site.
Reference is made to the "Architect's Job Book" published by RIBA and in
particular to work stage K. He would
have issued interim payment certificates only if he was satisfied having
inspected the works, that the contractor had carried out the works "properly",
that is to say in accordance with the terms of the contract, and in accordance
with his design. An ordinary competent
architect would have provided adequate drawn and written information to a
contractor to enable him to properly construct an extension. He would have incorporated the structural
engineer's design into his drawings. He
would have co-ordinated the structural engineer's design with his own and the
existing building. In particular he
would have incorporated the structural engineer's design for the new timber-framed
wall construction, the double header plate, the birdsmouth and both the holding
down and lateral restraint straps. He
would have ensured that the structural engineer's design was relevant to the
existing structure, so that the new extension floor and walls were adequately
supported off existing walls. In
particular, he would have taken reasonable care to ensure that his design for
the extension would have provided an adequately insulated, draft-free, waterproof
envelope. He would have taken reasonable
care to ensure that the contractor erected a waterproof enclosure over the
building during the works rather than advise the contractor that there was no
need to do so. He would have provided
sufficient design information to allow the contractor to construct an effective
joint between the existing flat roof and the new extension wall. He would have prepared contract documents
referring to him as "the architect" only if he was to administer the building
contract. He would have issued
instructions to the contractor when it became apparent to him or ought to have
become apparent to him that the information (including design information)
given to the contractor was inadequate.
He would have drawn to the employers and to the contractors' attention
any defects in workmanship he observed or ought to have observed on inspecting
the works. In each and all of these
respects the third party failed to act with the knowledge, skill and care to be
expected of an ordinary architect of ordinary skill and competence. As a consequence of these failures the
defender has suffered loss and damage. Had
the third party adequately fulfilled its duties under its contract with the
defender, the extension to the cottage would have been adequately designed and
the works adequately supervised". Averring
that the third party owed a duty of reasonable care to the defender, the
pursuer then goes on to aver a case of negligence in broadly similar terms.
7. The
defender's averments of loss are set out in statement of fact 4. Following a general denial, and certain
averments that the defender has failed to mitigate his loss the pursuer
responds with the following: "Esto the defender has sustained any
loss, explained and averred that any loss was caused by the third party's breach
of contract et separatim fault. Reference is made to answer 3. Separatim
esto the defender's losses were to any extent caused by breach of contract
on the part of the pursuer, the same losses also having been caused and
materially contributed to by the third party's breach of contract et separatim fault as condescended upon,
the pursuer entitled to a right of relief or contribution from the third
party".
8. The
pursuer has a plea in law that any loss and damage sustained by the defender
resulted from breach of contract et
separatim fault and negligence on the part of the third party. Thereafter the pursuer states two pleas in
law in the following terms:
"6. Esto
the defender has suffered loss and damage as a consequence of the pursuers'
breach of contract (which is denied) said loss and damage also having been
caused or contributed to by the third party's breach of contract as
condescended upon, the pursuer is entitled to relief or contribution therefrom.
7. Esto the defender has suffered loss and
damage as a consequence of the pursuer's breach of contract (which is denied),
it also having been materially contributed to by breach of contract et separatim fault and negligence on the
part of the third party any damages awarded should be apportioned inter se in terms of section 3(2) of the
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940".
9. At the
outset of her submissions on behalf of the third party Ms Olson pointed out
that there was no suggestion of a contractual right of relief and as the common
law as to contribution had been superseded by the provisions of the 1940 Act it
was difficult to see the purpose of plea in law 6. Mr Walls for the pursuers accepted that
position and deleted this plea in law.
In respect of plea 7 Ms Olsen argued at the conclusion of her
submissions that the pursuer's pleadings did not set out on a basis on which
this plea could be sustained. For there
to be contribution between joint wrongdoers there required to be contribution
to a single wrong: Grunvald v Hughes 1965 SLT 209 per Lord Justice Clerk Grant
at page 211. There were no averments as
to how the pursuers and third party could be jointly and severally liable in
respect of a single wrong. To the
contrary the pursuers' pleadings identified as the wrong committed by the third
party that "the extension to the cottage would have been adequately designed
and the works adequately supervised" that is to say, the problem was caused by
the third party alone. That averment was
made both in relation to the contractual and delictual cases. It provided no basis for a contribution
between both the pursuer and third party.
The defender had not adopted the pursuers' averments against the third
party. If the pursuers were successful
in establishing their averments, that is to say were to prove that the third
party was solely responsible for the deficiencies in the cottage there would be
no question of a decree passing against them and consequently no question of
contribution. Whilst there was a formal
averment in the pursuers' averments in answer 4 that "the same losses also
having been caused or materially contributed to by the third party's breach of
contract et separatim fault" in fact
those averments were not supported by the earlier factual averments. The pursuers specifically averred that there
was no need to demolish the cottage and rebuild it and said that "the type
extent and severity of the alleged defects are such that they can be rectified
without demolition". On that basis there
was no single wrong and as certain of the allegations made by the defender
about defective work did not involve the architect at all there was simply no
basis upon which the plea of contribution could be sustained. Reference was made to Connor v Andrew Main & Sons 1967 SLT (Notes) 71, a case
in which it was held that although the third party had been competently
convened as the pursuer had not adopted the case against him and could not do
so there was nothing to be served by keeping him in the action.
10. In
response to these submissions Mr Walls accepted that it was the principle
position of the pursuers that sole responsibility for the defect rested with
the third party. The pursuers were
however entitled to adopt the alternative position as set out in their esto case. R
& W Watson Ltd v David Traill & Sons Ltd 1972 SLT (Notes) 38
supported the view that the pursuers would be entitled to recover a
contribution from the third party if they might also have been held liable in
respect of the loss or damage on which the action was founded without waiting
for decree to be pronounced against him.
The wrong which the defender had suffered was the loss arising from the
defects to the cottage, whatever those were.
The pursuers' principle position was that the extension to the cottage
did not require to be demolished but if it did both parties contributed to the
cause. There might be lesser defects to
which both the pursuers and the third party had contributed. This was a matter which might only be
resolved at proof and so long as it remained the position that there was a
possibility of the court holding that damage had been caused by the fault of
both the pursuers were entitled to retain the third party in the action. The case of Engdiv Ltd v G Percy Trentham 1990 SLT 617 supported the
view that the purpose the 1940 Act was to provide for a more equitable sharing
of ultimate liability.
11. In the
course of his opening submissions Mr Walls made reference to the fact that this
was a commercial action and contended that the court should take a "pragmatic
view" of the pleadings. No one is more
concerned than I to encourage the use of succinct pleadings in commercial cases
but two particular considerations remain.
The first is that any succinct statement of a party's case must nevertheless
give fair notice to the opposition and be fundamentally relevant. The second consideration is that where, as in
this case the parties have resorted to pleadings which are extensive if not
voluminous it becomes difficult to approach them on anything other than what
might be regarded as a "traditional" basis.
The one thing which is contrary to the ethos of proceedings in the
commercial court is to set out voluminous pleadings, some of which might be
relevant and some of which are plainly not.
It is not in keeping with the objective of rapid identification of the
issues to invite the court in that situation to take a broad view and remit
everything to probation in the hope that something will be proved.
12. In
addition to her submissions on contribution Ms Olson subjected the pursuers'
pleadings to a wide ranging attack based on lack of specification. Before turning to that it is, I consider,
appropriate to give consideration to the issue of whether there is any basis in
the pleadings on which the pursuer and third party could be held jointly liable
to the defender. Standing the defender's
refusal or failure to adopt the case against the third party there would, in
the absence of any such basis, be no purpose to be served by keeping the third
party in the action. It is clear that on
any view the question of contribution could only arise in the event of the
court taking a view after proof which is contrary to each of the pursuers' two
main defences. These are (a) that the
cottage does not need to be demolished and (b) if it does, this is entirely
due to failures on the part of the architect.
I mention the first of these because it does not seem to me that there
is any answer to Ms Olson's submission that, if the cottage does not need to be
demolished yet it is proved that there are a number of deficiencies calling for
rectification, that would involve a series of distinct wrongs for each of which
either (but not both) the builder and architect might be said to be
responsible. The justification for maintaining
the third party in the action accordingly only exists solely on the footing
that the court may arrive at a conclusion that the extension will need to be
knocked down and that both the builder and architect contributed to that
situation. I am quite prepared to accept
Mr Walls' submission that, in principle, the third party can be kept in the
action so that the issue of joint liability can be resolved in this process
even if this is an eventuality arrived at only on the pursuer's fallback
position. The question, however, remains
whether there are relevant and specific averments upon which any such finding
of joint responsibility could be made.
13. In my
view there are no such averments and to allow this case to proceed to a proof
in which joint contribution was a potential issue would be a recipe for
confusion and unnecessary expense as well as possible unfairness to the third
party. Ms Olson submitted that the
passage which commences with the sentence "Had the third party adequately
fulfilled its duties...the extension to the cottage would have been adequately
designed and the works adequately supervised" sets out a case of sole
responsibility. There can be little
doubt about that; the whole thrust of
the pursuer's case is that the architects were to blame and this passages
encapsulates the essence of their case.
It proceeds: "Appropriate
instructions would have been issued to the pursuer. The extension would not have been designed
and built with defects. The defender
would not have suffered loss and damage".
There is no room for reading those averments as including a case of
joint fault or contribution. Such a case
is only to be found in the purely formal averments of an esto case in answer 4, and I can identify no factual averments
which support it.
14. Resolution
of that issue in favour of the third party is sufficient to support the view
that there is nothing to be gained by retaining that party in this
process. But the matter does not end
there. On any view, and particularly if
I am wrong in holding that there are no relevant averments which might
establish joint liability, there are various aspects of the pursuer's case
which are irrelevant or essentially lacking in specification. The averments about an architect not
undertaking design and contract administration work without responsibilities
being "clearly agreed in writing" are plainly irrelevant in establishing the
cause of the defender's loss, as are those about preparing contract documents
referring to himself as "the architect".
The averments about duty to visit the site are not accompanied by any
averments as to what constitutes "regularity" and in what respect there was any
failure. There is a general averment
that the architect should only have issued interim payment certificates if he was
satisfied that the work had been carried out "properly", but there is no
specification as to what was improper, which certificates should not have been
issued, or why. There is a reference to
providing adequate "drawn and written information" but no indication as to
where the inadequacy lay. Terms such as
"adequately", "sufficient" and "effective" are unaccompanied by any relevant
averments as to the inadequacy, insufficiency, or ineffectiveness of the items
which are the subject of the complaint.
There is a reference to drawing to the employers and contractors
attention "any defect in workmanship" that had been observed, again without
specifying what these defects were. The
very distinct impression which one is left with is that at any proof the court
would embark on a voyage of discovery, the pursuers' hope being that some of
these averments directed against the third party would be established. It would not in my judgment be fair to allow
this to happen.
15. It will
often be the situation in cases involving house owner, builder and architect,
that a dispute involving all three parties should be resolved in one
process. That is not the position in the
present case. The owner has not sought
to blame the architect, and the builder's case against him is unclear. In my view the appropriate and most
expeditious manner for this case to proceed is by way of a proof involving only
the builders and the owner. I make this
observation because it was Mr Walls' submission that if there was a basis in
principle for the third party remaining in the action but there were concerns
over the adequacy of specification of the averments against that party the
matter should be remitted to the Sheriff with the observation that questions of
specification are still to be resolved.
In my view such a course would do little other than hinder
progress. The issues between the
pursuers and the defender ought to be resolved at a proof in sufficient time
for questions of liability on the part of any other party to be addressed
before they are time barred.
16. In the
circumstances I shall adhere to the Sheriff's interlocutor and continue the
cause to determine all questions of expenses prior to remitting it to the
Sheriff to proceed as accords.
(signed) EFB