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United Kingdom Competition Appeals Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Competition Appeals Tribunal >> Hutchison 3G UK Limited v Office of Communications [2008] CAT 11 (20 May 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/CAT/2008/11.html Cite as: [2008] CAT 11 |
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Neutral citation [2008] CAT 11
IN THE COMPETITION
1083/3/3/07
APPEAL TRIBUNAL |
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Victoria House
Bloomsbury Place
20 May 2008
London WC1A 2EB
Before:
VIVIEN ROSE
(Chairman)
PROFESSOR ANDREW BAIN
OBE
ADAM SCOTT TD
Sitting as a Tribunal in England
and Wales
BETWEEN:
HUTCHISON 3G UK
LIMITED
Appellant
-v-OFFICE OF
COMMUNICATIONS
Respondent
supported by
O2 (UK)
LIMITED
T-MOBILE (UK) LIMITED
VODAFONE LIMITED
ORANGE PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS
SERVICES LIMITED
BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS
PLC
Interveners
Heard at Victoria House from 24 January to 5 February
2008 |
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JUDGMENT ON NON PRICE CONTROL
MATTERS (Non-Confidential Version) |
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APPEARANCES |
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Miss Dinah Rose QC and
Mr Brian Kennelly (instructed by Baker & McKenzie) appeared on
behalf of Hutchison 3G (UK) Limited.
Mr Peter Roth QC, Mr
Josh Holmes and Mr Ben Lask (instructed by the Office of
Communications) appeared for the Respondent.
Mr David Anderson QC and
Miss Sarah Lee (instructed by BT Legal) appeared on behalf of
British Telecommunications plc.
Miss Kelyn Bacon (instructed by SJ Berwin) appeared on
behalf of O2 (UK) Limited.
Miss Marie Demetriou
(instructed by Field Fisher Waterhouse) appeared on behalf of Orange
Personal Communications Services Limited.
Mr Jon Turner QC and Mr
Meredith Pickford (instructed by Miss Robyn Durie, Regulatory Counsel,
T-Mobile) appeared on behalf of T-Mobile (UK) Limited.
Miss Elizabeth McKnight
(Partner, of Herbert Smith) appeared on behalf of Vodafone
Limited. |
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Note: Excisions in this
judgment (marked “[… ][X]”) relate to commercially confidential
information: Schedule 4, paragraph 1 to the Enterprise Act
2002. |
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I. INTRODUCTION
1.
This appeal is brought by the Appellant (“H3G”) under section 192 of the
Communications Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”). H3G is a mobile network operator
which challenges certain aspects of two decisions adopted by the
Respondent (“OFCOM”) on 27 March 2007.
2.
H3G’s appeal concerns the prices that mobile network operators charge for
mobile call termination (“MCT”). Mobile call termination is the process of
connecting a voice call from the caller’s network to the recipient’s
network. Consumers expect to be able to make calls from their fixed line
or mobile phone to any other retail customer irrespective of the service
provider (fixed or mobile) to which the receiving party subscribes.
Network operators enter into contractual arrangements with each other for
the provision of access to each other’s networks. Under those arrangements
the terminating network operator makes a charge for each call terminated
on its network, known as a mobile call termination charge.
3. The
charge for mobile call termination is expressed in pence per minute or
“ppm”. Usually the mobile network operators (“MNOs”) set different prices
for terminating day-time, evening and weekend minutes. There are tens of
billions of minutes terminated on the networks of the MNOs each year so
that changes of a fraction of a penny in the rates make a difference of
many millions of pounds in the income and expenditure of these
companies.
4. In
the United Kingdom there are two main forms of mobile network commonly
known as ‘2G’ and ‘3G’. Second Generation or 2G networks were originally
designed to support mobile voice calls and text messaging services using a
radio transmission technology known as Global System for Mobile
Communications (“GSM”). 2G networks were subsequently enhanced to support
low speed mobile data services such as mobile internet access and picture
and multimedia messaging services. Third Generation or 3G networks are
aimed at supporting higher speed call services (for video telephony) and
higher speed mobile data |
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services for faster internet
access and multimedia messaging. The radio technology for 3G is different
from that used within 2G but many of the services delivered over the
technologies are similar. A key difference is that 2G networks cannot
offer the higher speed data services now possible on 3G
networks.
5. In
2000 the Government held an auction for licences to operate 3G spectrum.
At that time there were four main MNOs in the mobile market using 2G
technology: the firms now called O2 (UK) Limited (“O2”), T-Mobile (UK)
Limited (“T-Mobile”), Vodafone Limited (“Vodafone”) and Orange Personal
Communications Services Limited (“Orange”). To ensure that there was
sufficient competition to encourage the roll out and adoption of 3G
technology, the Government designed the auction so that one licence was
reserved for a new entrant. The new entrant who acquired the fifth licence
was H3G. There are three main spectrum bands used by the five MNOs each of
whom has a separate block of spectrum within these bands. The sums paid by
the MNOs for these licences were considerable. The MNOs differed in the
amount of spectrum they were allocated but they all paid more than £4
billion for their allocation, with one of them paying almost £6
billion.
6. The
four MNOs operating in the UK who used to operate only 2G networks now
operate both 2G and 3G networks. They are all substantial companies
belonging to groups which operate across Europe. They have intervened in
these proceedings because they are directly affected by any challenge to
the rate which OFCOM has determined they can charge for mobile call
termination on their networks. These four are commonly referred to
collectively as the “2G/3G MNOs”. H3G, which entered the market as the
fifth licensee of the 3G spectrum, operates a 3G network only but it has
always had roaming arrangements in place so that in areas of the country
which are not covered by H3G’s 3G network, its customers can interconnect
using a 2G network.
7. The
dates on which the MNOs began to offer their 2G and 3G services are as
follows: |
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8. It
is important to bear in mind that so far as the retail market for mobile
phone services is concerned, the MNOs are not the only service providers.
There are also the mobile virtual network operators (“MVNOs”) who compete
with the five MNOs for retail mobile phone customers. The MVNOs are
companies which do not operate their own mobile network infrastructure but
contract with one of the MNOs to use its network. From the perspective of
the customer they appear very much like MNOs, billing customers directly
for the mobile services provided to them. An example of such an MVNO is
Virgin Mobile, which offers a range of retail tariffs and which bills its
customers for mobile services but provides those services using the
T-Mobile network. There are thus many more companies participating in the
retail mobile market than there are networks.
9. In
addition to the MNOs and MVNOs there are the fixed network operators or
FNOs, the largest of which is British Telecommunications plc (“BT”). Fixed
network subscribers also need to be able to interconnect with subscribers
to mobile networks and BT has in general paid the same mobile call
termination charges to the MNOs as the MNOs pay to each other. More than
15 billion fixed-to-mobile call minutes are originated every year of which
BT’s share is about 50 per cent. The FNOs also charge each other, and the
MNOs, for terminating calls on their fixed networks. The charges that BT
can impose for termination are fixed by OFCOM at a level such that, we
were told, the average charge is about 0.4 ppm. |
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1 Vodafone
carried out commercial trials of its 3G voice services before the November
2004 launch date and launched its 3G data card services in April
2004.
2 O2 began to
offer 3G data services for business customers in September 2004 and
offered 3G voice and data services for post pay customers from February
2005.
3 T-Mobile began
using its 3G spectrum in 2004 but the first 3G specific service was
launched in October 2005. |
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10. The
United Kingdom operates a “calling party pays” (“CPP”) system which means
that the entire cost of the call is paid for by the calling party. Mobile
call termination charges are paid in the first instance by the originating
network operator to the terminating operator and thus form an element of
the costs that determine the charge collected by the originating operator
from its retail subscriber customer. CPP is contrasted with RPP (receiving
party pays) although the term RPP has two senses. It can refer to retail
RPP where the retail recipient of the call pays a charge for each call
received but it can also refer to an arrangement whereby the cost of
terminating the call simply lies with the receiving network, leaving that
network to cover that cost in whatever way it considers appropriate other
than by a direct charge to the originating network.
11. BT is
important not only as the major FNO in the UK but also because it provides
transit services to other fixed and mobile operators. BT directly
interconnects with approximately 180 communications providers in the UK
and is under a regulatory obligation as regards certain parts of its
transit business – for example, charges it can impose for transit are
regulated. Many operators therefore rely on BT to terminate their calls on
other networks under BT’s interconnection agreement with that network
rather than having to negotiate their own agreement with each of the 180
communications providers. In such a case BT pays the MCT charge imposed by
the terminating network and charges the transiting operator that MCT
charge plus the transit fee and an additional circuit charge for
conveyance. The terminating MNOs are not able to identify in respect of
calls coming from BT whether the call comes from a BT subscriber or
whether the call originates with a subscriber of another operator who is
using BT’s transit services to route the call.
12. At the
time when H3G was negotiating its first interconnection agreement with BT
prior to the launch of H3G’s service in the United Kingdom, BT charged its
subscribers a range of retail price bands for calls from fixed-to-mobile
telephones with each price band relating to calls to a particular mobile
operator. There were distinct retail charges per minute for calls made
during a weekday, during the evening and night, and during a weekend. The
retail charges reflected a margin over the mobile call termination charge
paid to the relevant mobile operator. |
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Since then, BT has increased the
variety of fixed-to-mobile bands but has consolidated its retail charges
so that calls to each of the four 2G/3G MNOs are now charged at rates that
do not discriminate between the four of them. BT has, however, kept a
different retail rates band for calls from its network to
H3G.
II. REGULATORY BACKGROUND (i)
The EU Legislation
13.
Regulation of electronic communications across Europe is now based on the
European Common Regulatory Framework (“CRF”) which was promulgated in
April 2002 and had to be implemented by the Member States by July 2003.
This superseded earlier EU regulatory instruments. The CRF comprises
(amongst other instruments) Directive 2002/21/EC on the common regulatory
framework for electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ
L108/33 (“the Framework Directive”) and four other directives referred to
in the Framework Directive as the Specific Directives. The most relevant
Specific Directive as regards this appeal is Directive 2002/19/EC on
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and
associated facilities [2002] OJ L108/7 (“the Access
Directive”).
14. Under the
Framework Directive, the Member States must designate a national
regulatory authority (“NRA”) to carry out the regulatory tasks set out in
the CRF. Such NRAs must be independent of the government of the Member
State and must exercise their powers impartially and transparently.
Article 8 of the Framework Directive sets out the policy objectives and
regulatory principles of which the NRAs are required to take the utmost
account in carrying out their tasks under the Framework Directive and the
Specific Directives. These objectives include the following in article
8(2) -
“The national regulatory
authorities shall promote competition in the provision of electronic
communications networks, electronic communications services and associated
facilities and services by inter alia:
(a) ensuring that users,
including disabled users, derive maximum benefit in terms of choice,
price, and quality; |
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(b) ensuring that there is
no distortion or restriction of competition in the electronic
communications sector;
(c) encouraging efficient
investment in infrastructure, and promoting innovation; and
(d) encouraging efficient
use and ensuring the effective management of radio frequencies and
numbering resources.”
15. Among the specific tasks
conferred on the NRAs is an obligation to carry out an analysis of
relevant markets in the telecoms sector. In identifying such markets, the
NRA is required to take the utmost account of recommendations and
guidelines published by the EC Commission as to what product and service
markets should be analysed. Once the NRA has identified the relevant
markets in its own territory it must determine whether each of those
markets is “effectively competitive”. Where an NRA determines that a
relevant market is not “effectively competitive” it must identify
undertakings with “significant market power” (“SMP”) on that market and
must then impose on such undertakings appropriate specific regulatory
obligations or maintain or amend such obligations where they already
exist. The Access Directive also provides for the NRA to conduct market
analysis into the markets identified in the Commission’s Recommendation.
Article 7(3) of the Access Directive provides that Members States shall
ensure that, as soon as possible after the entry into force of the
Directive, and periodically thereafter, NRAs undertake a market analysis
to determine whether to maintain, amend or withdraw any obligations that
are in place at the date that the CRF comes into effect. Further article 8
of the Access Directive provides that where an operator is designated as
having SMP on a specific market as a result of the NRA’s market analysis,
the NRA must impose obligations of the kind set out in articles 9 to 13 of
the Access Directive. Those obligations, commonly referred to as the “SMP
conditions”, include, in article 13, the setting of price
controls:
“13. Price control and cost accounting
obligations
1. A national regulatory
authority may, in accordance with the provisions of Article 8, impose
obligations relating to cost recovery and price controls, including
obligations for cost orientation of prices and obligations concerning cost
accounting systems, for the provision of specific types of interconnection
and/or access, in situations where a market analysis indicates that a lack
of effective competition means that the operator concerned might sustain
prices at an |
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excessively high level, or apply
a price squeeze, to the detriment of end-users. National regulatory
authorities shall take into account the investment made by the operator
and allow him a reasonable rate of return on adequate capital employed,
taking into account the risks involved.
2. National regulatory
authorities shall ensure that any cost recovery mechanism or pricing
methodology that is mandated serves to promote efficiency and sustainable
competition and maximise consumer benefits. In this regard national
regulatory authorities may also take account of prices available in
comparable competitive markets.”
16. In
February 2003 the EC Commission published, pursuant to its obligation
under article 15 of the Framework Directive, its Recommendation on
relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications
sector susceptible to ex ante regulation (“the Recommendation on
Market Definition”). Market 16 in the Annex to the Recommendation defined
“voice call termination on individual mobile networks” as one of the
markets which the NRA ought to analyse to see if it is effectively
competitive within that NRA’s territory.
17. The
United Kingdom’s NRA is OFCOM. The decisions with which this appeal is
concerned relate to OFCOM’s analysis of Market 16 as defined in the 2003
Recommendation. That Recommendation on Market Definition has since been
replaced by an updated Recommendation published in December 2007. The new
Recommendation still identifies voice call termination on individual
mobile networks as a market which NRAs should analyse but this is now
Market 7 rather than Market 16.
18. Where an
NRA intends to impose ex ante regulation on an undertaking with
significant market power in a case which would affect trade between Member
States, it must consult with the EC Commission and the NRAs in the other
Member States. This obligation is imposed by article 7 of the Framework
Directive and is usually referred to as “Article 7 consultation”. The
Commission and the other NRAs are entitled to comment on the draft measure
and the reasons for it within a period of one month and the NRA must take
the “utmost account” of such comments. Where the measure proposed by the
NRA is a measure which decides whether or not an undertaking has SMP in a
relevant market in a case which affects trade between Member States, the
Commission may indicate to the NRA that it has serious doubts about
whether the measure is compatible |
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with Community law and the
objectives under the CRF. Ultimately the Commission may issue a decision
requiring the NRA to withdraw such a draft measure. This power is commonly
referred to as the Commission’s veto. The Commission’s power of veto
extends only to certain proposed decisions by the NRA including the
decision to designate an undertaking as having or not having SMP. At
present the Commission does not have a veto over the kinds of ex ante
regulation that the NRA can impose on an undertaking with SMP,
although the Commission may comment to the NRA on the suitability of the
proposed regulatory measures on which it is consulted.
(ii) Implementation of the CRF in the United
Kingdom
19. The CRF
was implemented in the United Kingdom by the 2003 Act. Section 45 of the
2003 Act empowers OFCOM to set conditions of various kinds, including SMP
conditions. Section 47 provides that OFCOM must not set a condition under
section 45 unless the condition is non-discriminatory, proportionate and
transparent. We consider the test which OFCOM must apply before setting a
price control condition in more detail later in this
judgment.
20. Section
79 of the 2003 Act sets out what OFCOM must do when carrying out its
market analysis and before it makes a determination that an undertaking
has SMP, requiring it, for example to take due account of all applicable
guidelines and recommendations issued by the European Commission. Section
87 provides that where OFCOM has made a determination that a person has
SMP it shall set such SMP conditions authorised by this section as they
consider it appropriate to apply to that person. Section 87 goes on to
list the kinds of SMP conditions that OFCOM can impose, including price
controls which are described in subsection (9) –
“87 (9) The SMP conditions authorised by this section also
include (subject to
section 88) conditions imposing
on the dominant provider-(a) such price controls as OFCOM may direct in
relation to matters connected with the provision of network access to the
relevant network, or with the availability of the relevant
facilities;
(b) such rules as they may make
in relation to those matters about the recovery of costs and cost
orientation; |
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(c) such rules as they may make
for those purposes about the use of cost accounting systems;
and |
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(d) obligations to adjust prices
in accordance with such directions given by OFCOM as they may consider
appropriate.
(10) The SMP conditions
authorised by subsection (9) include conditions requiring the application
of presumptions in the fixing and determination of costs and charges for
the purposes of the price controls, rules and obligations imposed by
virtue of that subsection.”
21. Section 88 of the 2003 Act
then sets important preconditions which must be satisfied before OFCOM
sets a price control authorised by section 87(9):
“88 Conditions about network access pricing
etc.
(1) OFCOM are not to set an
SMP condition falling within section 87(9) except where-(a) it appears to
them from the market analysis carried out for the
purpose of setting that condition
that there is a relevant risk of adverse effects arising from price
distortion; and
(b) it also appears to them that
the setting of the condition is appropriate for the purposes of-(i)
promoting efficiency; (ii) promoting sustainable competition;
and
(iii) conferring the greatest
possible benefits on the end-users of public electronic communications
services.
(2) In setting an SMP
condition falling within section 87(9) OFCOM must take account of the
extent of the investment in the matters to which the condition relates of
the person to whom it is to apply.
(3) For the purposes of
this section there is a relevant risk of adverse affects arising from
price distortion if the dominant provider might-(a) so fix and maintain
some or all of his prices at an excessively high
level, or
(b) so impose a price squeeze,
as to have adverse consequences
for end-users of public electronic communications services.
(4) In considering the matters mentioned in subsection
(1)(b) OFCOM may-
(a) have regard to the prices at
which services are available in comparable competitive
markets; |
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(b) determine what they consider
to represent efficiency by using such cost accounting methods as they
think fit. |
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(iii) Regulation of the market
for mobile call termination charges in the United Kingdom
22. The CRF and the 2003 Act
superseded the pre-existing regulatory regime in the telecoms sector which
had been implemented in the United Kingdom by the Telecommunications Act
1984. In 1999 the former Monopolies and Mergers Commission concluded that
the mobile call termination charges of two of the MNOs might be expected
to operate against the public interest and recommended the imposition of
price controls on termination charges. The former Director General of
Telecommunications amended the two MNOs’ licences to include charge
controls. In 2003 charge controls were imposed in respect of the mobile
call termination charges of all four 2G/3G MNOs. Following the coming into
force of the 2003 Act and the publication by the Commission of its
Recommendation on Market Definition, OFCOM conducted its analysis of
Market 16. OFCOM’s determinations were set out in its statement dated 1
June 2004 on Wholesale Mobile Call Termination (“the 2004
Statement”). Broadly, the 2004 Statement concluded -
(a) that there
were separate relevant services markets for mobile call termination on
each of the MNOs’ networks, regardless of whether termination took place
on the 2G or 3G network;
(b) that all MNOs
had 100 per cent share of the market for termination of calls on their own
network and there were absolute barriers to entry which precluded the
possibility of any other undertaking providing mobile call termination
services on those markets;
(c) that a
price control should be imposed on the price of mobile call termination
charges of the 2G/3G MNOs using the 2G spectrum; |
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(d) that there
should be no price control in respect of termination using 3G spectrum –
at the time this affected only H3G since the other MNOs had not yet
launched their 3G services;
(e) the
regulatory obligation imposed on H3G should not include a price control in
respect of either termination on its 3G spectrum or of termination via its
roaming arrangements on 2G spectrum.
23. The price
control in the 2004 Statement was set to apply until 31 March 2006. H3G
appealed against the 2004 Statement on grounds that OFCOM had erred in
finding that it had SMP. The Tribunal’s judgment delivered in November
2005 in Hutchison 3G (UK) Limited v Office of Communications [2005] CAT 39 (“H3G (1)”) found that OFCOM had erred in its analysis of
market power and remitted the case back to OFCOM. We will need to consider
in some detail exactly what was decided by the Tribunal in that judgment.
The Tribunal in H3G (1) made an order requiring OFCOM to reconsider
whether H3G has SMP taking into account the extent to which BT has
countervailing buyer power and any other matters relevant at the time of
OFCOM’s reconsideration. On 13 September 2006, OFCOM published a
consultation paper setting out its proposed reassessment of H3G’s market
power and on 27 March 2007, OFCOM published its “Assessment of whether H3G
holds a position of SMP in the market for wholesale mobile voice call
termination on its network Statement” (“the Reassessment Statement”)
confirming its earlier conclusion that H3G had SMP during the period
covered by the 2004 Statement.
24.
Meanwhile, on 7 June 2005 OFCOM published a consultation document
proposing a one year extension of the price control set in the 2004
Statement for a further year, until 31 March 2007. On the same day, in
parallel with that proposal, OFCOM published a Preliminary Consultation to
initiate consideration of the issues which would need to be addressed
during the next review of Market 16 for the period after the price control
set in the 2004 Statement expired. Towards the end of 2005 OFCOM issued a
statement extending the price control in the 2004 Statement for a further
year up to 31 March 2007, making it clear that the extension was not
intended to limit in any way the range of
conclusions |
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that might be drawn from the
consultation that had commenced for the review of the market for the
period thereafter.
25. On 30
March 2006 OFCOM published a more detailed consultation document
Wholesale mobile voice call termination (“the March 2006
Consultation”) in respect of Market 16 after March 2007. That consultation
set out OFCOM’s initial view that there are separate markets for mobile
call termination supplied by each of the five MNOs, and that the prima
facie evidence indicated that each of these mobile operators had SMP in
the market in which it supplies call termination. The March 2006
Consultation analysed the detriments which could arise from the exercise
of SMP in these markets and explored a number of regulatory options for
addressing those detriments. On 13 September 2006, having considered
responses to the March 2006 Consultation, OFCOM published a third
consultation Mobile call termination – Proposals for consultation
(the “September 2006 Consultation”). In the September 2006
Consultation, OFCOM again set out its view that there are separate markets
for mobile call termination supplied by each of the five MNOs and each of
these mobile operators has SMP in the market in which they supply MCT. The
September 2006 consultation also described the detriments which are likely
to arise from the exercise of that SMP, and the remedies which OFCOM
proposed should be imposed. These remedies included price controls to
apply to each of the five MNOs for four years to 31 March 2011,
obligations to meet reasonable demand for call termination on fair and
reasonable terms, prohibitions of undue discrimination and obligations
concerning transparency of charges and contract terms.
26. Having
considered responses to the September 2006 Consultation, OFCOM published
the final statement on 27 March 2007 (“the 2007 Statement”) setting out
its conclusions that -
• There are
separate markets for the provision of wholesale mobile voice call termination in the UK to other Communications Providers
by each of Vodafone, O2, Orange, T-Mobile and
H3G;
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•
Each of the five MNOs has SMP in the market for termination of voice calls
on its network(s);
•
Charge controls should be imposed on the supply
of MCT by each of the five MNOs, and those
controls should apply to all voice calls whether terminated on 2G or 3G
networks;
• The charge control should
apply for 4 years from 1 April 2007;
•
Average charges of Vodafone, O2, Orange and T-Mobile should be reduced to
5.1 ppm (2006/7 prices) by the final year of the charge control period (1
April 2010 to 31 March 2011). The reduction should be implemented in 4
equal (percentage) steps across the four years starting from the 2G capped
rate which applied during 2006/07 pursuant to the application of the price
control in the extended 2004 Statement;
•
Average charges of H3G should be reduced to 5.9
ppm (2006/7 prices) by the final year of the
charge control (1 April 2010 to 31 March 2011). This level reflected cost
differences between H3G and the 2G/3G MNOs. The change was to be
implemented by an initial reduction to 8.5ppm (2006/7 prices) followed by
three reductions each of equal (percentage) changes across the next three years (i.e. from April 2008 to
March 2011);
•
Further conditions were imposed requiring provision of voice call
termination on fair and reasonable terms and conditions (including
contract terms), prohibiting undue discrimination, and requiring charge
transparency.
(iv) OFCOM’s dispute resolution function
27. The issues raised in this
appeal also turn in part on the proper interpretation of a different set
of powers that the CRF requires Member State to confer on the NRA, namely
the power to resolve disputes between undertakings. There are two separate
powers. The first is in article 20 of the Framework Directive which
provides -
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“1. In the event of a dispute
arising in connection with obligations arising under this Directive or the
Specific Directives between undertakings providing electronic
communications networks or services in a Member State, the national
regulatory authority concerned shall, at the request of either party, and
without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2, issue a binding
decision to resolve the dispute in the shortest possible time frame and in
any case within four months except in exceptional circumstances. The
Member State concerned shall require that all parties cooperate fully with
the national regulatory authority.
2. Member States may make
provision for national regulatory authorities to decline to resolve a
dispute through binding decision where other mechanisms, including
mediation, exist and would better contribute to resolution of the dispute
in a timely manner in accordance with the provisions of Article 8.
…
3. In resolving a dispute,
the national regulatory authority shall take decisions aimed at achieving
the objectives set out in Article 8. Any obligations imposed on an
undertaking by the national regulatory authority in resolving a dispute
shall respect the provisions of this Directive or the Specific
Directives”.
28. The second power is in article 5(4) of
the Access Directive:
“With regard to access and
interconnection, Member States shall ensure that the national regulatory
authority is empowered to intervene at its own initiative where justified
or, in the absence of agreement between undertakings, at the request of
either of the parties involved, in order to secure the policy objectives
of Article 8 of [the Framework Directive], in accordance with the
provisions of this Directive and the procedures referred to in Articles 6
and 7, 20 and 21 of [the Framework Directive]”.
29. Article
20 covers all disputes arising in connection with obligations under the
Directives without distinguishing between disputes relating to the
provision of network access and other disputes. Article 5(4) covers
disputes “with regard to access and interconnection” whether they arise in
relation to a regulatory obligation or not. There is therefore an overlap
between them in that a dispute which is “with regard to access and
interconnection” and which also arises in connection with a regulatory
obligation will fall within both provisions. |
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30. These powers so far as they
relate to dispute resolution were implemented in the United Kingdom by
section 185 of the 2003 Act. OFCOM’s task in resolving a dispute is set
out in section 188 of the 2003 Act; OFCOM must consider the dispute and
make a determination resolving it, using whatever procedure OFCOM
considers appropriate. OFCOM must make its determination as soon as
practicable and, except in exceptional circumstances, within four months
of the date on which it accepts jurisdiction over the
dispute. |
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31. Sections
185 to 190 implement the dispute resolution powers in both article 20 of
the Framework Directive and article 5(4) of the Access Directive. The
power to intervene on its own initiative which is also required by article
5(4) is implemented by section 105 of the 2003 Act. Section 105 applies
where it appears to OFCOM that a “network access question” has arisen and
needs to be determined and where it considers that, for the purpose of
determining that question, it would be appropriate for OFCOM to exercise
certain of its powers to set, modify or revoke conditions imposed on
communications providers. A “network access question” is defined as “a
question relating to network access or the terms or conditions on which it
is or may be provided in a particular case”.
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
(i) The non price control matters in H3G’s
appeal
32. H3G’s appeal covers three main
areas:
(a) the
findings of SMP in each of the Reassessment Statement and the 2007
Statement (see paragraphs [44] to [141] below);
(b) OFCOM’s decision
to impose a price control in the form imposed by the 2007 Statement (see
paragraphs [142] to [298] below);
(c) the level
of the price control fixed both for H3G and for the 2G/3G MNOs in the 2007
Statement.
33. Although
the appeal therefore challenges two separate decisions by OFCOM, it has
been treated as a single appeal. BT has also lodged an appeal against the
2007 Statement, arguing that price control imposed in the 2007 Statement
sets rates which are too high. These two appeals are the first occasion on
which the Tribunal has followed the procedure set out in section 193 of
the 2003 Act. That procedure requires the Tribunal to identify whether an
appeal raises any “specified price control matters” as defined. The price
control matters to which the procedure applies have been specified in rule
3 of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (Amendment and Communications Act
Appeals) Rules 2004 (SI 2004 |
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No. 2068) (“the 2004 Rules”). If
an appeal does raise specified price control matters, then those matters
are to be referred by the Tribunal to the Competition Commission for its
determination. Matters raised by the appeal which are not price control
matters are to be decided by the Tribunal. Once the Competition Commission
has notified the Tribunal of its determination of the price control
matters referred to it, the Tribunal must decide the appeal on the merits
and, in relation to the price control matters, must decide those matters
in accordance with the determination of the Competition Commission, unless
the Tribunal decides, applying the principles applicable on an application
for judicial review, that the Competition Commission’s determination would
fall to be set aside on such an application.
34. The
issues as to whether H3G has SMP in the relevant market for the purposes
of the Reassessment Statement and the 2007 Statement, and the issue as to
whether a price control should have been imposed on it in the 2007
Statement are not price control matters and hence fall to be determined by
the Tribunal. We refer hereafter to the first group of issues as the “SMP
Issue” and to the second group of issues as the “Appropriate Remedy
Issue”. The issues in the H3G appeal and in the BT appeal as to the level
of the price control imposed by the 2007 Statement are specified price
control matters which must be determined by the Competition
Commission.
35. BT and
the four 2G/3G MNOs have intervened in the H3G appeal. Broadly the stance
taken by them in relation to the non price control matters which the
Tribunal must determine is as follows:
(a) Orange intervenes in relation
to the SMP issue only to the extent that the issues raised by H3G go to
the proper interpretation of OFCOM’s dispute resolution powers under
section 185 of the 2003 Act. Orange broadly supports OFCOM’s
interpretation of its dispute resolution powers. In relation to the
Appropriate Remedy Issue, Orange also supports the arguments raised by
OFCOM in its Defence; |
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(b) O2 limited its
intervention, as regards the non price control matters, to supporting
OFCOM’s Defence on the Appropriate Remedy Issue;
(c) Vodafone
adopts OFCOM’s submissions in their entirety and urges the Tribunal to
reject all aspects of H3G’s appeal on the non price control
matters;
(d) T-Mobile largely
supports and adopts OFCOM’s submissions in relation to the SMP issue, save
(i) in respect of certain submissions relating to the appropriate approach
to dispute resolution and (ii) as regards OFCOM’s focus on the end-to-end
connectivity obligation in the determination of the disputes referred to
OFCOM under section 185 of the 2003 Act. As regards the Appropriate Remedy
Issue, T-Mobile largely supports and adopts OFCOM’s
arguments;
(e) BT
intervened in support of OFCOM on both the SMP Issue and the Appropriate
Remedy Issue. However BT disagrees with OFCOM’s interpretation of its
dispute resolution powers and supports instead OFCOM’s second line of
defence in relation to the SMP findings (described below).
(ii) The Termination Rate Disputes
36. OFCOM’s dispute resolution
powers under section 185 of the 2003 Act have been described earlier.
Between 21 December 2006 and 19 March 2007 (that is before the publication
of the 2007 Statement), a number of disputes between BT and the MNOs over
the level of MCT charges for calls from BT’s network to the mobile
networks were referred to OFCOM for determination. BT’s complaint was,
broadly speaking, that the 2G/3G MNOs wanted to charge BT a “blended rate”
for calls incorporating an additional charge in respect of calls which
were terminated on the 3G network of the 2G/3G MNOs. The rate that those
MNOs could charge in respect of termination on the 2G spectrum was set by
the price control imposed in the 2004 Statement; but that Statement had
left 3G termination unregulated. |
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37. In
addition to these disputes, there was also a dispute between BT and H3G as
to the price which H3G should charge for calls to its subscribers (whether
terminated on H3G’s own 3G network or on the 2G network of its roaming
partner) and disputes between H3G and Orange and between H3G and O2 as to
the rate of Orange’s and O2’s MCT charges payable by H3G.
38. On 7 July
20074 OFCOM issued determinations of the disputes concerning BT
in its Statement Determinations to resolve mobile call termination rate
disputes between T-Mobile and BT, O2 and BT, Hutchison 3G and BT and BT
and each of Hutchison 3G, Orange and Vodafone (“The BT Dispute
Determinations”) and on 10 August 2007 OFCOM issued its determination of
the disputes concerning H3G and Orange/O2 Determinations to resolve
mobile call termination rate disputes between Hutchison 3G and each of O2
and Orange (“the H3G Dispute Determinations”). Broadly, OFCOM found
that the 2G/3G MNOs were entitled to charge a blended rate and upheld the
level of charges which all five MNOs sought to apply.
39. Four
appeals were lodged against the BT Dispute Determinations, by BT, by
T-Mobile, by H3G and by a number of FNOs. Further, H3G appealed against
the H3G Dispute Determinations. These appeals are referred to as the
Termination Rate Dispute Appeals. The rates fixed in the BT and H3G
Dispute Determinations were to a large extent overtaken by the 2007
Statement which fixed the rates for the period 1 April 2007 to 31 March
2011. Those Determinations were still relevant for the period up to 31
March 2007 and the appeals were pursued in respect of that period. As will
be seen, some of the issues raised in the Termination Rate Dispute Appeals
overlap with the issues raised by the SMP Issue in the current H3G appeal.
This is because a key element of OFCOM’s reasoning in deciding that H3G
has SMP in the market for call termination on its network concerned the
test that OFCOM would apply in relation to any dispute about H3G’s charges
referred to it by BT under section 185 of the 2003 Act. By an order dated
31 October 2007 in the Termination Rate Dispute Appeals and an order dated
20 November 2007 in H3G’s Appeal
4 The BT Dispute
Determinations were reissued on 19 July 2007 with some minor typographical
errors corrected.
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against the Reassessment
Statement and 2007 Statement, the Tribunal ordered that the overlapping
issues in H3G’s Appeal and the Termination Rate Dispute Appeals be heard
at a combined hearing in January and February 2008. This hearing took
place between 24 January and 5 February 2008.
IV. PRELIMINARY REMARKS
40. This is
the judgment of the Tribunal on the non price control matters arising from
H3G’s appeal against the Reassessment Statement and the 2007 Statement.
The Tribunal is handing down at the same time a separate judgment on the
core issues in the Termination Rate Dispute appeals.
41. A number
of the parties to the H3G appeal lodged statements from witnesses of fact
relating to the non price control matters. None of the parties asked to
cross examine the witnesses of fact, so this evidence has been treated as
uncontested in so far as it sets out primary facts. H3G, OFCOM and
T-Mobile also served expert evidence from economists relating to certain
aspects of the case, as discussed below. All the parties emphasised at the
hearing that they relied not only on the points made in their oral
submissions but on the points raised in their pleadings, witness
statements and their skeleton arguments. The Tribunal has carefully
considered all the written material submitted by the parties as well as
the oral argument, in arriving at the conclusions set out in this
judgment.
42. In
drafting this judgment, the Tribunal has also had regard to the
introductory remarks in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Argos
& Littlewoods [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1318:
“5. Complicated as appeals of
this kind to the Tribunal are often likely to be, it may be that the
Tribunal will, over time, find it possible to deal with such appeals in
judgments which are not so long as those under appeal in the present
cases. …The reasoning of Griffiths LJ (as he then was) in Eagil Trust
Co Ltd v. Pigott-Brown [1985] 3 All ER 119 at 122, endorsed by the
Court of Appeal as being of general application in English v. Emery
Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605, [2002] 1 W LR 2409,
applies to such a judgment of the Tribunal as to any other. Griffiths LJ
said:
"a judge should give his reasons
in sufficient detail to show the Court of Appeal the principles on which
he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision. They need
not be elaborate. I cannot stress too strongly that |
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there is no duty on a judge, in
giving his reasons, to deal with every argument presented by counsel in
support of his case. It is sufficient if what he says shows the parties,
and if need be, the Court of Appeal the basis on which he has acted … (see
Sachs LJ in Knight v. Clifton [1971] Ch 700 at 721)."
6. The same applies to findings
of fact, so that the Tribunal may not need to make a finding on every
disputed factual issue. Nor is it always necessary for the Tribunal to set
out each party's submissions in detail before explaining its reasons for
deciding the case. We therefore express the hope that, in future, it will
be possible for the Tribunal to express its findings of fact and its
reasoning in more succinct form. Its efforts to do so will have the
support of this court, provided always that the essential tasks identified
by Griffiths LJ have been fulfilled.”
43. According
to Schedule 4 to the Enterprise Act 2002 the Tribunal must have regard to
the need for excluding from its decision, so far as practicable,
commercial information the disclosure of which would or might, in the
Tribunal’s opinion significantly harm the legitimate business interests of
the undertakings to whom the information relates. This is subject to the
requirement that the Tribunal also has regard to the extent to which any
such disclosure “is necessary for the purpose of explaining the reasons
for the decision”: see paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 4. At an early stage of
these appeals, a confidentiality ring was set up by the Tribunal to ensure
that information that the parties considered confidential was kept within
the circle of the parties’ legal advisers and external consultants. In
preparing this decision, the Tribunal has had regard to the fact that some
aspects of its decision are only comprehensible if the relevant figures
are set out and that much of the information initially regarded as
confidential by the parties is now out of date. The Tribunal has therefore
only redacted figures which relate to the period after 1 April 2007 (when
the price control which is the subject of these appeals) came into
force.
V. THE FINDINGS OF SIGNIFICANT
MARKET POWER (i) Background
44. The first
main part of H3G’s appeal is its assertion that OFCOM erred in finding
that H3G had SMP over the period covered by the Reassessment Statement as
extended (that is between 2004 and 2007) and by the 2007 Statement (that
is between 2007 and 2011). The relevant provisions of the Framework
Directive which refer to the concept of SMP have already been described in
broad terms.
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Article 16(3) of the Framework
Directive provides that OFCOM must determine, on the basis of its market
analysis, whether a relevant market for mobile call termination is
“effectively competitive”. Article 16(4) of the Framework Directive goes
on to provide –
“Where a national regulatory
authority determines that a relevant market is not effectively
competitive, it shall identify undertakings with significant market power
on that market …”
45. Recitals
(25), (27) and (28) of the Framework Directive explain the background to
the concept of significant market power as used in the CRF. Recital (27)
states that it is essential that ex ante regulatory obligations
should only be imposed where there is not effective competition, that is
in markets where there are one or more undertakings with significant
market power and where national and Community competition law remedies are
not sufficient to address the problem. Article 14(2) of the Framework
Directive defines SMP in the following terms:
“An undertaking shall be deemed
to have significant market power if, either individually or jointly with
others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, that is to say a
position of economic strength affording it the power to behave to an
appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimately
consumers”.
46. This
definition is reflected in section 78 of the 2003 Act which provides that
a person shall be taken to have significant market power in relation to a
market if he enjoys a position which amounts to or is equivalent to
dominance of the market. Section 78 also provides that references to
dominance of a market must be construed in accordance with any applicable
provisions of Article 14 of the Framework Directive.
47. H3G does
not dispute OFCOM’s definition of the relevant market as the market for
wholesale mobile voice call termination provided to the other
communications providers by H3G in the United Kingdom. It also does not
dispute OFCOM’s finding that H3G has 100 per cent market share in that
relevant market and that there are absolute barriers to entry which
prevent the development of any competitor to H3G in that market. What H3G
disputes is OFCOM’s conclusion that BT did not have sufficient
countervailing buyer
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power to negate what would
otherwise be H3G’s SMP. H3G’s case in a nutshell is that on a proper
analysis of the legal and factual position, H3G is unable to act
independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately its consumers,
because of the countervailing buyer power (“CBP”) exercised by
BT.
48. The
debate focuses on the buyer power of BT, rather than any of the other
communications providers who interconnect with H3G because BT is the
largest purchaser of mobile call termination. The charge that BT agrees
with each MNO acts as a ceiling to the charge that other operators would
be willing to accept from the MNO. It also acts as a floor because the
terminating MNO would be unwilling to agree a more favourable rate with
another MNO. OFCOM therefore treats BT’s charge as effectively setting the
charge for all other agreements between suppliers and purchasers of mobile
call termination. Even if this was not the case, the fact that BT is by
far the largest purchaser of mobile call termination means that if it were
found not to have a level of CBP sufficient to negate any prima facie
finding of SMP, it could reasonably be assumed that neither would any
other purchaser of mobile call termination.
49. The
importance of assessing CBP when considering whether an undertaking has
SMP is recognised in the guidance issued by the EC Commission. First there
is the Guidance published by the EC Commission in 2002 on market analysis
and the assessment of significant market power under the Common regulatory
framework [2002] OJ C165/6 where the Commission states (paragraph
78):
“It is important to stress that
the existence of a dominant position cannot be established on the sole
basis of large market shares. As mentioned above, the existence of high
market shares simply means that the operator concerned might be in a
dominant position. Therefore, NRAs should undertake a thorough and overall
analysis of the economic characteristics of the relevant market, before
coming to a conclusion as to the existence of significant market power. In
that regard, the following criteria can also be used to measure the power
of an undertaking to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its
competitors, customers and consumers. …”
50.
Similarly, the EC Commission notes on page 20 of its Explanatory
Memorandum to its Recommendation on Market Definition that a market
definition of call termination on individual
networks: |
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“… does not automatically mean
that every network operator has significant market power; this depends on
the degree of any countervailing buyer power and other factors potentially
limiting that market power. Small networks will normally face some degree
of buyer power that will limit greatly the associated market power ... The
existence of a regulatory requirement to negotiate interconnection in
order to ensure end-to-end connectivity (as required by the regulatory
framework) redresses this imbalance of market power. However, such a
regulatory requirement would not endorse any attempt by a small network to
set excessive termination charges.”
51. The
Tribunal was also referred to Guidance issued by the Director General of
Communications in August 2002 on criteria for the assessment of SMP and to
a Working Paper on the SMP concept in the new regulatory framework
produced in October 2004 by the European Regulators Group (“ERG”). The ERG
is a group of NRAs established by the European Commission to encourage
cooperation and coordination in order to promote the development of the
internal market for electronic communications: see recital (36) of the
Framework Directive. Both these documents point to an assessment of CBP
being an important factor when assessing the existence of
SMP.
52. H3G’s
appeal against the 2004 Statement also centred on the existence and extent
of any CBP on the part of BT. As we have already mentioned, that appeal
was successful and the Tribunal in its judgment H3G (1) remitted
the 2004 Statement to OFCOM for further consideration, giving rise to the
Reassessment Statement. The reasoning used by OFCOM in rejecting H3G’s
argument on CBP was essentially the same in both the Reassessment
Statement and the 2007 Statement. H3G’s submissions, at least by the time
of the hearing, also did not distinguish between the two Statements. We
therefore set out our conclusions on the challenge to the finding of SMP
in Statements together.
(ii) OFCOM’s reasoning on the existence of
CBP
53. OFCOM
began its assessment of CBP by referring to the fact that CBP is “not a
binary issue” – it is not an absolute concept in terms of its strength. It
is a concept which embodies a possible range of strengths so that in any
case where it is relevant, the relevant question is likely to be not
whether there is CBP or not, but whether there is any CBP, and if so how
much and what effect does it have. Having referred to guidance issued by
the Office of Fair Trading and the ERG,
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OFCOM identified the economic
factors which are relevant to a finding of CBP and considered how they
applied to BT. OFCOM found a number of factors present in the market which
would point towards BT having CBP:
(i) BT is a well informed and
price sensitive purchaser of mobile call termination and is increasingly
price sensitive as H3G’s subscriber base grows.
(ii) BT is an important customer
for H3G – it is generally accepted that no network operator can survive in
the market without an interconnection agreement with BT.
However, OFCOM also found that
there were factors that pointed against BT having CBP:
(iii) Whereas BT may have been in
a position to exercise CBP at the time of the initial negotiations on MCT
rates before the launch of H3G’s retail service because it could have
delayed or threatened to delay interconnection and hence disrupt the
launch of H3G’s service, it was not in a position to engage in such
conduct during either of the relevant periods, that is between 2004 and
2007 or between 2007 and 2011 because there was a binding contract in
place.
(iv) There was no “reciprocity of
trade”: that is to say that because BT’s own call termination rates are
fixed by OFCOM, BT cannot try to bring the price at which it sells
termination on the BT network to H3G into the negotiation over the price
at which it buys termination on the H3G network.
(v) There are no alternative
sources of supply to which BT could turn if H3G tried to impose too high a
price.
(vi) BT does not have the option
either to refuse to buy mobile call termination from H3G or to delay
purchasing mobile call termination in |
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order to put pressure on H3G to
lower its price. This is partly due to commercial constraints which
prevent BT from acting in such a manner and partly due to the fact that,
as explained further below, BT is subject to a regulatory obligation to
interconnect with other network operators.
(vii) That regulatory obligation
imposed on BT (generally referred to as BT’s end-to-end connectivity
obligation) entitles BT to refer to OFCOM disputes with H3G over the
reasonableness of the prices H3G charges for MCT. But the existence of
this dispute resolution procedure does not, OFCOM found, mean that BT has
sufficient CBP.
54. OFCOM
also analysed other aspects of the market and what they indicated about
the existence of CBP. It looked at the recent negotiations which had taken
place between the different parties and the attempts by the parties to
change the level of the mobile call termination rates. OFCOM concluded
(paragraph 5.75 of the 2007 Statement) that the behaviour of purchasers
and suppliers of MCT, in respect of proposals to increase or decrease MCT
charges, had been strongly conditioned by the existence or threat of
regulation in these markets, and by the expectation that these markets may
be subject to further regulation from April 2007. OFCOM reasoned that no
inferences could therefore be drawn about the parties’ relative bargaining
power from observing their behaviour on the market at such a
time.
55. As well
as the end-to-end connectivity obligation, there were other regulatory
constraints imposed on BT which, OFCOM found, may weaken BT’s CBP. BT is
required to allow Carrier Pre Selection (CPS) and Indirect Access (IA)
which enable competing retail service providers to provide calls to
customers using the BT network. OFCOM noted (paragraph 5.91) that while
the purpose of these conditions is to promote competition in a range of
downstream markets, they also have a specific impact on the retail market
for calls to mobiles. The ability of consumers to switch to alternative
CPS or IA based providers of such calls may weaken BT’s ability to
threaten to cease purchasing wholesale MCT. |
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56. There
were also more general commercial constraints on BT’s ability to refuse to
buy interconnection from MNOs. OFCOM noted that there would potentially be
a significant commercial imperative for all originating operators,
including BT, to provide their subscribers with the opportunity to call
each of the mobile networks. OFCOM commented (paragraph 5.142 of the 2007
Statement, footnotes omitted):
“Although it might be thought
that this may not be the case where a new entrant MNO (with few, if any
customers) wishes to sell call termination to a large incumbent network,
Ofcom notes that the evidence suggests that BT, the largest purchaser of
MCT, regarded the entry of H3G in 2001 as an opportunity for incremental
income from its retail customers rather than a potential threat to its own
access and origination revenue. In this case BT therefore judged that it
had a commercial incentive to purchase call termination services from
H3G.”
57. In light
of all these factors OFCOM’s view was that BT does not have sufficient CBP
to constrain the MNOs’ ability to behave to an appreciable extent
independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers, such
that MNOs are unable to sustain charges appreciably above the competitive
level.
58. As
regards the Reassessment Statement, OFCOM concluded that nothing had
occurred in the market over the period between the publication of the 2004
Statement and the adoption of the Reassessment Statement to alter its
earlier assessment and hence OFCOM concluded that BT did not have CBP
sufficient to negate H3G’s market power. It further concluded that H3G had
SMP in the relevant market but that it was not appropriate to impose a
price control on H3G’s mobile call termination. In the 2007 Statement
OFCOM largely repeated the reasoning on which it relied in the
Reassessment Statement.
59. As
regards the different factors for and against BT’s CBP, H3G adopts and
relies on points (i) and (ii). H3G’s appeal relates to that part of
OFCOM’s findings which decided that BT did not have power to refuse or
delay purchase of mobile call termination from H3G because of BT’s
regulatory obligation to interconnect. H3G accepts that OFCOM has
correctly proceeded on the basis that the crucial question is the extent
to which BT’s CBP is constrained by its obligation to interconnect with
other operators. However, H3G argues that OFCOM has misconstrued the
obligation to which BT was subject. Key to this appeal
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therefore are the proper
interpretation of the regulatory constraints imposed on BT and the way
that OFCOM would be expected to resolve a dispute about the reasonableness
of MCT charges if BT referred such a dispute to it.
60. There has been some confusion
caused by the use of different terms to describe different levels of
pricing. We therefore set out at the start how the Tribunal is using these
terms in this judgment, whilst recognising that these may not bear the
same meanings as those used by OFCOM or the parties in this
case.
(a) An
abusive price means a price which is so high as to amount to an abuse
by the undertaking of its dominant position;
(b) An
excessively high price means a price which would satisfy the test set
out in section 88 of the 2003 Act that OFCOM must apply when considering
whether it has power to include a price control in the SMP conditions it
decides to set under section 87 of that Act;
(c) A price
appreciably above the competitive level means a price which may not be
cost based and is in fact significantly above a price set at a competitive
level;
(d) A price set
at the competitive level means a price which normally reflects the
costs incurred by an efficient operator. (The Tribunal does not thereby
prejudge in any way the approach to be adopted by the Competition
Commission in determining the price control matters in this
appeal.)
These categories are not mutually
exclusive – for example an abusive price will also clearly be an
excessively high price and a price which is appreciably above the
competitive level may, or may not, be so high as also to be abusive or
excessively high. |
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61. Before
considering OFCOM’s reasoning and H3G’s challenge to it in detail, it is
necessary to describe BT’s obligation to interconnect with other
communications providers and how BT contracts with the MNOs for
interconnection.
(iii) BT’s end-to-end connectivity
obligation
62.
“End-to-end connectivity” describes the process of enabling retail
customers to make calls to other customers on the same network or on other
providers’ networks. Competing communications providers need to be able to
interconnect with other networks so that their subscribers can call any
person who has a mobile or fixed phone irrespective of the network used by
the person being called. The Common Regulatory Framework recognises the
importance of interconnection and article 5(1) of the Access Directive
provides that -
“National regulatory authorities
shall, acting in pursuit of the regulatory objectives set out in article 8
of [the Framework Directive], encourage and where appropriate ensure, in
accordance with the provisions of this Directive adequate access and
interconnection, and interoperability of services, exercising their
responsibility in a way that promotes efficiency, sustainable competition
and gives the maximum benefit to end-users”.
63. Article 5
further provides that NRAs must be empowered to impose obligations on
undertakings to the extent that this is necessary to ensure end-to-end
connectivity and, as we have seen earlier, article 5(4) provides for OFCOM
to take action either on its own initiative or when asked to resolve a
dispute between the parties.
64. Before
September 2006, OFCOM had not imposed an explicit obligation on BT aimed
at ensuring end-to-end connectivity. However, it appears that the industry
in general and BT in particular acted on the basis that BT was bound,
whether formally or informally, to provide interconnection because of BT’s
obligations as a universal service provider (in accordance with Guidance
issued by the former Director General of Telecommunications on “End-to-end
connectivity” dated 27 May 2003) and before that, because of a condition
in BT’s licence under the old regulatory regime. On 13 September 2006
OFCOM imposed a condition on BT under section 74(1) of the 2003 Act
requiring it to provide “end-to-end connectivity”, that is to say, a
condition which obliged BT to purchase wholesale
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MCT services on reasonable terms
from any MNO requesting it to do so (“the E2E Statement”). The end-to-end
connectivity obligation is an “access-related condition” for the purposes
of section 73(2) of the 2003 Act and that subsection provides that OFCOM
may impose such conditions as appears to it appropriate for the purpose of
securing efficiency on the part of communications providers, sustainable
competition between them and the greatest possible benefit for the
end-users.
65. OFCOM
explained in the E2E Statement why it decided to impose an end-to-end
connectivity obligation only on BT and not on all the MNOs. OFCOM noted
that once a communications provider has secured an agreement to send calls
to BT’s network, they are in a position to send calls to all other
networks (thereby securing end-to-end connectivity for their subscribers)
because of BT’s position as a transit provider. This meant that imposing
an obligation on all providers was neither appropriate nor
proportionate.
66. OFCOM
further explained its decision as regards the terms and conditions under
which BT would be obliged to contract with a public electronic
communications network (PECN):
“3.32 Ofcom is also proposing
that BT is not obliged to purchase wholesale narrowband call termination
services at any price, but to do so where requested by a PECN and where
the terms and conditions offered by that PECN are reasonable. Whether a
particular term or condition (including charge) is reasonable will depend
on the particular circumstances relating to any decision not to purchase
in the context of the need to ensure end-to-end connectivity and may lie
within a broader range of outcomes than that which might be considered in
the circumstances of SMP. In particular, as Ofcom has to ensure that any
charges it imposes are proportionate, it is unlikely to set charges at a
level set in the context of addressing a finding of SMP.”
67. None of
the parties has argued in this appeal that the Tribunal should treat the
period before 13 September 2006 differently from the period after that
date for the purposes of these appeals. We have therefore proceeded on the
basis that BT was at all material times subject to an end-to-end
connectivity obligation but that there was at all times a proviso (“the
E2E Proviso”) to that obligation to the effect that if the terms proposed
by an actual or proposed counterparty did not |
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seem reasonable, after
negotiations in good faith, BT was entitled to refer the matter to OFCOM
for resolution.
(iv) BT’s Standard Interconnection Agreement and dispute
resolution
68. When BT
enters into an interconnection agreement with another operator it does so
on the terms of a Standard Interconnection Agreement or “SIA”. This SIA is
a substantial document which sets out a wide range of services provided by
BT to the counterparty and by the counterparty to BT. The SIA is entered
into for an indefinite term and can be terminated only on 24 months’
notice. Clause 12 deals with the provision of services by BT to the MNO
and clause 13 deals with the provision of services by the MNO to BT. Both
clauses stipulate that the charges payable by the recipient of the
services are the charges specified from time to time in a document known
as the Carrier Price List. Both clauses also contain provision for the
variation of those charges though these are not the same in both clauses.
Clause 13 sets out the mechanism whereby the parties can seek to vary the
price charged for the services that the MNO provides to BT by sending to
each other a Charge Change Notice proposing a new charge. If the parties
cannot agree on whether the proposed charge should come into effect, then
either party may refer the matters in dispute to OFCOM. If OFCOM upholds
the charge proposed in the Charge Change Notice the change takes effect on
the date specified in the Charge Change Notice and the parties must enter
into an agreement to modify the SIA accordingly. If OFCOM does not uphold
the proposed change then that Charge Change Notice ceases to be of any
effect. The parties refer to a Charge Change Notice served under clause 13
as an “Operator Charge Change Notice” or “OCCN” to distinguish it from a
notice concerning a proposed change in BT’s prices served under clause 12
of the SIA. It is common ground that when a dispute is referred to OFCOM
under clause 13 of the SIA, its jurisdiction to determine the dispute is
the jurisdiction now set out in section 185 of the 2003 Act.
(v) OFCOM’s reasoning concerning the end-to-end
connectivity obligation
69. OFCOM
considered the effect of BT’s end-to-end connectivity obligation in the
context of assessing H3G’s market power because it analysed whether BT
could
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counter that SMP by refusing to
purchase or delaying the purchase of mobile call termination from H3G.
OFCOM noted that BT is constrained in its ability to refuse or delay
purchase by the end-to-end connectivity obligation. But because of the E2E
Proviso if BT and an MNO were unable to agree upon terms for the supply of
MCT, either party could refer the dispute to OFCOM to resolve. Therefore,
the extent to which any CBP that BT would otherwise possess is negated by
its end-to-end connectivity obligation could depend in part on the
expectation of the parties to a dispute as to how OFCOM would set about
resolving that dispute.
70. OFCOM then stated as follows
(paragraph 5.152 of the 2007 Statement):
“In
resolving a dispute relating to the application of BT’s end-to-end
connectivity obligation, Ofcom would
consider each dispute on its merits, in the light of the specific facts
and circumstances and the arguments put to it by the parties to the
dispute, including the reasonableness of any resolution on both
parties.”
71. OFCOM
considered that a number of alternative approaches would be open to it in
dealing with a dispute. But it would consider the question of what is
“reasonable” for the purposes of the E2E Proviso by reference to the
purpose underlying BT’s end-to-end connectivity obligation. OFCOM
identified this purpose as to remove the risk of a potential market
failure from BT refusing to buy call termination. OFCOM recognised that
while in principle BT’s customers value calling customers of smaller
networks and customers of smaller networks may value receiving such calls,
there may be some circumstances in which BT would not have an incentive to
provide interconnection for such calls. On this basis, OFCOM continued
(paragraph 5.154):
“… a
reasonable charge for BT to purchase MCT with a view to ensuring
end-to-end connectivity may be at a
price appreciably above the competitive level. As such, if a charge appreciably above the
competitive level were in dispute, Ofcom considers it unlikely that it would insist
on a strictly cost based charge (such as used in deriving cost benchmarks ... to
set efficient regulated charges in [an SMP condition] charge control) ie a charge that
was not appreciably above the competitive level.”
72. In
OFCOM’s view neither party in a negotiation over MCT charges would assume
that OFCOM when resolving such a dispute would impose a charge
for |
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MCT that was not appreciably
above the competitive level. OFCOM concluded (at paragraph 5.161)
that:
“… a purchaser and supplier of
mobile call termination, properly apprised as to Ofcom’s approach to
dispute resolution, would therefore negotiate on the basis that if a
charge appreciably above the competitive level were in dispute, Ofcom
would be unlikely to impose a charge for MCT in the context of such a
dispute that was not appreciably above the competitive
level.”
73. Given
this expectation, the E2E Proviso did not qualify BT’s obligation to buy
interconnection from H3G to a degree which meant that BT was in a position
to exercise countervailing buyer power against H3G. Therefore OFCOM’s
dispute resolution function in the context of BT’s end-to-end connectivity
obligation did not have the effect of negating H3G’s market
power.
74. OFCOM
went on to consider other aspects of the dispute resolution function which
also contributed to its conclusion that that function did not rule out SMP
on the part of H3G. OFCOM considered that certain limitations of the
dispute resolution process mean that it should not be seen as a substitute
for the appropriate regulatory processes for addressing the question of
market power as set out in articles 15 and 16 of the Framework Directive.
In addition, dispute resolution is of limited assistance in curbing
pricing appreciably above the competitive level as it is aimed at
resolving a dispute between two (or more) parties and regulators can only
act in the context of that dispute - which may not address the
“regulatory” issue i.e. general pricing issues. Moreover, it is only a
mechanism that OFCOM can rely on when asked to do so by one or more of the
parties in dispute. It is therefore not necessarily the case that: an MNO
would bring a dispute; or, another provider would refuse to purchase
interconnection at a charge appreciably above the competitive
level.
(vi) The Grounds of Appeal and OFCOM’s
Defence
75. H3G relied on three grounds of appeal
in its challenge to the findings of SMP:
(a) first H3G argued that BT’s
ability to refer disputes to OFCOM itself precluded SMP on the part of
H3G; |
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(b) in the
alternative, H3G argued that the likely outcome of a dispute referred to
OFCOM would, if OFCOM interpreted its powers properly, inform the
negotiations and act as a constraint on H3G;
(c) finally
H3G argued that if OFCOM is correct in interpreting the end-to-end
connectivity obligation in a manner which in effect requires BT to buy MCT
at high prices, then that is a flaw in the drafting of the end-to-end
connectivity obligation and OFCOM cannot cure that fault by imposing price
control regulation on H3G.
76. During
the course of the proceedings, the first two grounds tended to merge into
one. The extent to which the ability to refer a dispute will act as a
constraint on the negotiating positions of the parties depends on their
expectation as to how OFCOM would resolve that dispute. We do not
therefore deal separately with the “ability to refer” point and the
“expectation of the likely outcome” point.
77. H3G
argued that the basic error that OFCOM has made throughout its
consideration of this matter is in relation to its interpretation of the
E2E Proviso which limits BT’s obligation to interconnect to where
interconnection is offered on reasonable terms and conditions. Going back
to the wording of the E2E Statement, H3G identifies the first appearance
of OFCOM’s error in the statement made by OFCOM that when it is
considering whether terms presented to BT are reasonable, it is unlikely
to set charges at the level it would set in the context of addressing a
finding of SMP. OFCOM, H3G says, jumps from saying that there is an
obligation on BT to pay for interconnection at a “reasonable” price to
saying that they would not impose the same price that they would if
considering a “reasonable” price for the purpose of setting an SMP price
control condition. This is wrong, H3G say, because where a dispute
concerns the reasonableness of proposed price under BT’s end-to-end
connectivity obligation, OFCOM should not be imposing a price at all but
simply be declaring the maximum price that BT can reasonably be expected
to pay. |
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78. The
thrust of H3G’s case on how OFCOM should approach resolving a dispute
between BT and H3G over H3G’s mobile call termination charges was as
follows:
(a) H3G
accepts that the existence of the end-to-end connectivity obligation on BT
would be an important consideration in any such dispute;
(b) However, OFCOM
erred in treating the end-to-end connectivity obligation as having only
the purpose of securing interconnection between BT and the other networks
– according to section 73(2) of the 2003 Act, the purpose is to ensure
interconnection in a way which promotes competition and accords with
OFCOM’s wider statutory obligations under the Common Regulatory Framework
and the 2003 Act;
(c) given
OFCOM’s wider duties under the 2003 Act it would be ultra vires for
OFCOM to determine a dispute by setting a price at a level which
constitutes an excessively high level likely to have adverse consequences
for end-users so as to trigger OFCOM’s power to set a price control under
section 88 of the 2003 Act.
79. The wider
duties to which H3G refers in this part of its argument are those
contained in article 8 of the Framework Directive as implemented by
sections 3 and 4 of the 2003 Act. The objectives in article 8 so far as
they relate to the NRAs’ duty to promote competition have already been
described (see paragraph [14] above). Section 3 of the 2003 Act sets out
the two principal duties of OFCOM in carrying out its functions, namely to
further the interests of citizens in relation to communications matters
and to further the interests of consumers in relevant markets “where
appropriate by promoting competition”. The other subsections of section 3
set out a wide range of matters to which OFCOM must have regard, where
relevant, in performing its functions. These include securing the optimal
use of the spectrum (section 3(2)(a)); the desirability of encouraging
investment and innovation in relevant markets (section 3(4)(d)); and the
interests of consumers in respect of choice, price, quality of service and
value for money (section 3(5)). |
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80. Section 4
of the 2003 Act sets out six Community requirements in accordance with
which OFCOM must act when carrying out various of its functions, including
its dispute resolution function under section 185. The relevant Community
requirements for the purposes of these appeals are:
(a) the first
Community requirement which includes the requirement to promote
competition in relation to the provision of electronic communications
networks and services (section 4(3)(a));
(b) the fourth
Community requirement which is a requirement to take account of the
desirability of OFCOM carrying out its functions in a manner which, so far
as practicable, does not favour one form of network or service or one
means of providing such a network or service over another (often referred
to as the requirement of technological neutrality) (section 4(6));
and
(c) the fifth
Community requirement which is to encourage the provision of network
access and service interoperability for the purpose of securing efficiency
and sustainable competition and the maximum benefit for customers of
communications providers.
81. OFCOM’s
main line of Defence relied on the reasoning set out in the Reassessment
and 2007 Statements namely that it was legally possible that the outcome
of the exercise of its function under section 185 in a dispute between H3G
and BT could be a price set at a level which was appreciably above the
competitive level. This meant that the dispute resolution powers were not
a sufficient constraint on H3G’s exercise of market power to negate a
finding of SMP.
82. In its Defence OFCOM elaborated on
what this would mean:
“ … When determining a dispute as
to the price for [call termination], Ofcom will be concerned principally
with reasonableness as regards BT, the party that is subject to the
obligation in question. Ofcom will accordingly seek to ensure that the
price asked of BT for termination is not so high that it would be
unreasonable for BT to be expected to purchase at that price; and
conversely that BT does not |
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insist on a price that is so low
that it cannot reasonably expect termination to be supplied at that price
(i.e. in effect a constructive refusal by BT to purchase).”
83. OFCOM
argues that compliance with its other regulatory obligations does not mean
that its only option in determining a dispute between H3G and BT would be
to impose a price at the competitive level and thus a consideration of
H3G’s costs. On the contrary, such an approach would amount, in OFCOM’s
view to using the end-to-end connectivity obligation as a regulatory
device for imposing a price control on an MNO, circumventing the thorough
SMP regime.
84. Whether,
when referring to a price “appreciably above the competitive level” in its
reasoning, OFCOM meant a price which was or which could include an
“excessively high price” or an “abusive price” in the sense that the
Tribunal has described those terms was never entirely clear. H3G
interpreted it in that way and submitted that OFCOM had erred by holding
that it could, in the exercise of its dispute resolution powers require BT
to connect with other networks even at prices which were excessive and
uncompetitive – even so excessive as to have an adverse effect on
consumers. The Tribunal understands OFCOM’s reasoning in the Statements
and in its submissions in these appeals as indicating that OFCOM was not
accepting any particular constraint on the price which it might consider
appropriate to set in the context of dispute resolution.
85. OFCOM put
forward a second line of defence. If, contrary to its primary position,
the dispute resolution powers did require OFCOM to resolve a dispute in a
manner which ensured that the price was not appreciably above the
competitive level, then it would still not constrain H3G’s SMP. This is
because such dispute resolution powers would amount to regulation of H3G
and hence fall to be disregarded when assessing H3G’s market power. Such
powers must be disregarded, OFCOM argues, to avoid the circularity which
arises from an argument that an undertaking cannot be regarded as having
the ability to act independently of customers and consumers if there is a
mechanism in place to allow the regulator to prevent the undertaking from
attempting to do so. OFCOM argued that H3G’s position was contrary to the
scheme of the Common Regulatory Framework because it would in effect make
it impossible for the regulatory authority to find SMP in relation to
wholesale markets where the |
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participants had the right under
the Directives to refer a dispute about terms and conditions to the
regulator.
86. Vodafone
supported OFCOM’s conclusions as regards the effect of its dispute
resolution powers on BT’s CBP whilst appearing not to go quite as far as
OFCOM went – or at least as far as H3G argues that OFCOM went. Vodafone
argued that OFCOM might well approve charges which may exceed the most
efficient level but which are nonetheless within the bounds of
reasonableness such that BT could pay them without suffering any
significant detriment itself and without giving rise to any significant
detriment to end users. There is no reason to expect that OFCOM would
resolve a dispute by holding that BT’s obligation to purchase applies only
if H3G offers the most efficient cost-reflective price for such services.
This means, according to Vodafone, that OFCOM’s exercise of its dispute
resolution powers “would be unlikely to be sufficient to prevent H3G from
setting its mobile call termination charges at a level which appreciably
exceeds the most efficient level for such services”. On Vodafone’s
argument, it is not necessary to conclude that OFCOM could lawfully set an
abusive price or an excessively high price under its dispute resolution
powers in order to negate SMP. It is only necessary to acknowledge that it
could set a price above the level that would be the most efficient cost
related price.
(viii) Can OFCOM determine a
dispute pursuant to section 185 by setting a price appreciably above the
competitive level?
87. The first
issue between the parties was therefore whether OFCOM was right to assert
that the parties could not expect, when negotiating about a proposed
change of price, that OFCOM would determine a dispute between them in a
way that ensured that BT did not have to pay a price which was appreciably
above the competitive level. If OFCOM was wrong about that and BT’s and
H3G’s expectations should be that BT can always avoid being forced to pay
such a price by referring the dispute to OFCOM then, say H3G, BT has
sufficient countervailing buyer power to counteract any significant market
power arising from H3G’s monopoly on call termination on its
network. |
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88. This
question as to the parties’ expectations about OFCOM’s approach to dispute
resolution had become a live issue by the time the Reassessment Statement
and the 2007 Statement were issued in March 2007. This was because the
disputes over MCT charges between BT and the MNOs and between H3G and two
of the 2G/3G MNOs had by that time been referred to OFCOM under section
185 of the 2003 Act (see paragraph [37] above). The reasoning set out by
OFCOM in its decisions determining those disputes closely reflected how
OFCOM had said, in the 2007 Statement, that it would approach
dispute resolution in such circumstances. Thus H3G’s allegations in the
current appeal that OFCOM erred in law in stating how it would
resolve any disputes translate, in the context of H3G’s appeal against
the BT and H3G Dispute Determinations, to allegations that OFCOM erred in
law in the way it in fact determined those disputes. The Tribunal’s
judgment on the core issues in the Termination Rate Dispute appeals sets
out in full the Tribunal’s reasoning as to why, in the Tribunal’s
judgment, OFCOM erred in its exercise of those powers.
89. For the
purposes of the current judgment, the Tribunal’s conclusions can be stated
as follows. OFCOM is correct in asserting that it has a range of options
available to it when exercising its dispute resolution powers in relation
to disputes concerning MCT rates. OFCOM must, however, approach dispute
resolution having regard to all its statutory obligations and not focus
unduly on the existence of other regulatory constraints imposed on one or
other of the parties to the dispute, such as BT’s end-to-end connectivity
obligation. In resolving a dispute, there will be a range of possible
prices which it would be intra vires for OFCOM to set. But it could
never be appropriate for OFCOM to set a price which was an abusively high
price. If OFCOM’s reasoning in the two Statements was intended to indicate
that it did have power to set an abusively high price when resolving a
dispute, then that would, the Tribunal finds, constitute an error of
law.
90. There
might, however, be cases in which it would be appropriate for OFCOM to
resolve a dispute by setting a price which is not at a competitive level
and which is even appreciably above that competitive level. In any
dispute, there will be two prices being put forward, presumably a higher
one being urged on OFCOM |
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by the supplier and a lower one
being urged by the purchaser. It may be that in fact both these prices are
prices above the competitive level and even appreciably above that level,
without being abusive. This might happen for example where the prevailing
price before the service of the OCCN was a price set at a time when it was
a cost reflective price but where, by the time of the OCCN, costs have
reduced so that the prevailing price is no longer cost reflective. The
purchaser may still be content to pay the prevailing price but wish to
resist a proposed increase in the supplier’s OCCN. If OFCOM resolved the
dispute in the purchaser’s favour and upheld its rejection of the OCCN it
would in effect be setting a price which was appreciably above the
competitive level. Provided that the price is not so high that OFCOM
should exercise its powers to intervene on its own initiative, it might be
reasonable for OFCOM to resolve a dispute in that way. This is the case
whether or not the dispute is referred in the context of one party being
subject to an obligation to agree to “reasonable” terms – an obligation
which can arise through a regulatory or a contractual
condition.
91. This
leaves the question of whether it would be ultra vires for OFCOM to
resolve a dispute under section 185 by setting a price at an excessively
high level within the meaning of section 88(3) of the 2003 Act. The
Tribunal notes that this terminology is taken from article 13 of the
Access Directive which refers to a situation where market analysis
indicates that a lack of effective competition means that the operator
concerned might sustain prices at an excessively high level, or apply a
price squeeze, to the detriment of end-users. It is not at all clear
whether the concept of “an excessively high price having adverse
consequences for end-users” is intended to be the same as or different
from the concept of “an abusively high price”. It is noteworthy that
whereas the Common Regulatory Framework expressly provides that the
concept of significant market power is intended to be the same as the
concept of dominance under Article 82 EC (see article 14(2) of the
Framework Directive) it does not say whether an abusively high price and a
price sustained at an excessively high level are meant to mean the same
thing or not.
92. In any
event, there is nothing in the Common Regulatory Framework to suggest that
the NRA is required, when exercising its dispute resolution powers, to
ask
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itself the rather convoluted
question whether, if the price which is being proposed in the context of a
dispute were instead being considered as the price which there was a risk
that an undertaking with SMP might charge, that risk would be such that
the power to set a price control SMP Condition was triggered. The test
under article 13 of the Access Directive and under section 88(3) of the
2003 Act forms no part of the dispute resolution process. Rather it is one
step in a complex series of tests to be applied in the course of a market
review, balancing a wide range of different objectives, when the NRA is
deciding which of a range of remedies it is appropriate to impose
following a finding of SMP. We doubt that it is useful to ask whether
OFCOM is precluded from setting a price which would, in fact, be
“excessively high” whether or not OFCOM turned its mind to that question.
In so far as the price would also be abusive we have held that OFCOM
cannot set that price. In so far as the price would be something less than
an abusively high price but still a price appreciably above the
competitive level then whether it is appropriate to resolve the dispute at
that price will depend on the circumstances of the particular case just as
whether it would be appropriate to set a price control under section 88 in
order to avoid the risk of that price prevailing would depend on all the
circumstances of a different particular case.
93. Further,
in the Tribunal’s judgment OFCOM did not need to decide whether it had the
power to set an excessively high price when resolving a dispute in order
to decide whether BT’s countervailing bargaining power was sufficient to
negate H3G’s SMP. The Tribunal agrees with the submissions made by
Vodafone in this regard. The expectations that the parties to a
negotiation could properly have about the way in which OFCOM would resolve
the dispute are not such as to give BT CBP sufficient to negate H3G’s
market power.
94. Therefore
the Tribunal finds that even if OFCOM did make the error of law alleged by
H3G, the error was not such as to vitiate the finding that H3G had SMP in
the Reassessment Statement and the 2007 Statement. OFCOM was right to
reject H3G’s primary argument because the existence of the dispute
resolution powers does not constrain H3G’s market power so as to undermine
the finding of SMP. |
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(ix) OFCOM’s second line of defence
95. The
Tribunal has heard extensive argument on OFCOM’s second line of defence
which can be summarised as follow. OFCOM’s dispute resolution function
under section 185 of the 2003 Act is a regulatory function. The
determination of a dispute between H3G and BT amounts to regulation of
both those parties, not just of BT. In so far as the dispute resolution
powers therefore constrain H3G from setting an excessively high price,
they fall to be disregarded as a matter of law when assessing whether H3G
has SMP.
96. This is
because of the application of what is called the “modified greenfield
approach”. The modified greenfield approach is a way of distinguishing
between those regulatory constraints existing in a market which ought to
be taken into account when assessing market power under the Framework
Directive and those which should be ignored. The application of the
modified greenfield approach in a situation where the regulator is
considering whether SMP exists has been approved both by the European
Commission in its monitoring of the decisions of NRAs under the CRF and by
this Tribunal in the H3G (1) judgment. In the H3G (1)
judgment, discussed in more detail in paragraphs [108] et seq.
below, the Tribunal held that under the modified greenfield approach,
the potential power of the regulator to impose SMP conditions on H3G must
be disregarded when considering whether H3G has SMP. Conversely the
regulatory obligation imposed on BT to provide end-to-end connectivity did
not fall to be disregarded but should be taken into account when
considering the scope of BT’s countervailing buyer power and hence the
strength of H3G’s market power.
97. OFCOM
therefore argues that whatever the Tribunal decides as regards the correct
test applied by OFCOM when exercising its dispute resolution powers, it
would be contrary to the scheme of the CRF for the potential exercise by
OFCOM or any NRA of its dispute resolution function to be treated as
precluding SMP on the part of a network operator. H3G’s reliance on
dispute resolution in this manner would effectively make it impossible for
an NRA to find that a wholesaler has SMP in so far as that wholesaler is
operating in a |
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market in respect of which the
counterparty has a right to refer disputes to the regulator.
98. This line
of argument was strongly supported by BT. BT’s position on the SMP Issue
was that OFCOM’s power to regulate the MCT rates set by H3G through the
dispute resolution process cannot be taken into account by OFCOM when
assessing SMP. Thus, all H3G’s arguments about the proper test to be
applied under the dispute resolution powers are irrelevant. BT asserts
that in fact OFCOM’s understanding of its dispute resolution powers was
wrong and that it is not entitled to set H3G’s mobile call termination
rate at a level appreciably above the competitive level. This is
consistent with the stance taken by BT in its challenge to the BT Dispute
Determinations. T-Mobile also argued that although OFCOM’s approach to its
dispute resolution powers was incorrect, none of OFCOM’s errors leads to
H3G’s conclusion that the end-to-end connectivity obligation properly
applied removes H3G’s or any other MNO’s SMP.
99. H3G’s
counter-argument is that the function of dispute resolution in this case
does not regulate the seller, H3G but only the buyer, BT. H3G accepts that
OFCOM was right to regard its task in any dispute between BT and H3G as
being a dispute about what are “reasonable” terms and conditions for the
purposes of BT’s end-to-end connectivity obligation. Since BT is the only
operator subject to an end-to-end connectivity obligation, OFCOM’s
implementation of the E2E Proviso in the context of a dispute resolution
amounts to regulation of the price at which BT buys mobile call
termination – it is not regulation of the price at which H3G sells
mobile call termination. OFCOM’s dispute resolution powers do not,
therefore, fall to be disregarded in assessing H3G’s SMP under the
modified greenfield approach.
100. In the
alternative, H3G argues that if it is wrong and dispute resolution does
amount to regulation of H3G as well as of BT, that regulation does not
fall to be disregarded as a matter of law. According to H3G, the modified
greenfield approach only precludes the regulator from taking account of
the potential for SMP regulation in assessing whether an
undertaking has SMP. It does not |
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require the regulator to ignore
all potential regulation which might be brought to bear on the putative
dominant undertaking.
101. H3G rejects the
suggestion that its argument “emasculates” the SMP provisions in the CRF.
The finding of SMP is very fact sensitive and if H3G is right that the
potential for dispute resolution under BT’s end-to-end connectivity
obligation prevents H3G from having SMP, that is because of the particular
circumstances of H3G in this market. A finding that H3G did not have SMP
would not automatically read across either to the other MNOs in the United
Kingdom or to MNOs in other Member States.
(a) Do OFCOM’s dispute
resolution powers in this case amount to regulation of both BT and H3G or
only of BT?
102. H3G
characterised OFCOM’s role in determining this dispute as “finding the
price above which H3G’s mobile call termination rates would be
unreasonable i.e. the price level above which BT would be entitled to
refuse to purchase H3G’s call termination service”. H3G argued that the
right and proportionate way for OFCOM to resolve a dispute about whether
BT is being asked to interconnect at a reasonable price is not by imposing
a price but by making a declaration. OFCOM should declare what is the
maximum reasonable price at which BT can be obliged to interconnect. The
effect of such a declaration is not to impose any price control on H3G
because the parties remain free to negotiate commercially above or below
the price that has been declared. All that OFCOM has to do is to clarify
the obligation of BT under its end-to-end connectivity
obligation.
103. The Tribunal
rejects this analysis of OFCOM’s role in dispute resolution. First, this
is contrary to the wording of article 20 of the Framework Directive from
which the powers in section 185 in part flow. That article refers to the
NRA issuing “a binding decision to resolve the dispute in the shortest
possible time frame”. That is not consistent with OFCOM’s powers being
limited in this case to setting a price above which the parties remain
free to negotiate. |
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104. H3G’s argument
also conflicts with the terms on which the disputes were referred by it to
OFCOM. In H3G’s letter of 19 March 2007 to the Director of Investigations
at OFCOM, H3G set out the scope of the dispute between it and BT, Orange
and O2. Under the heading “Remedies Sought” H3G said “Ofcom should resolve
the various disputes by determining a reasonable price for the [mobile
termination rates] as between (i) BT and H3G (ii) H3G and Orange and (iii)
H3G and O2.” In respect of the first, H3G asked that it should be paid the
same as Orange’s higher 3G termination rate assuming this was approved for
Orange. In respect of (ii) and (iii) H3G mirrored BT’s request that the
rate payable by H3G to its competitors for terminating H3G calls on their
3G networks should be no more than the existing 2G regulated rates. In the
alternative H3G asked that OFCOM should determine a rate derived from the
results of an appropriate implementation of OFCOM’s model for the charges.
There was no suggestion here that OFCOM should set a range of rates or
that it should be setting a rate which left the parties free to negotiate
different, higher prices.
105. The powers that
OFCOM can exercise once it has determined a dispute clearly point to it
making a definitive ruling as to what the price should be. Section 190(2)
of the 2003 Act provides that:
“(2) [OFCOM’s] main power (except
in the case of a dispute relating to rights and obligations conferred or
imposed by or under the enactments relating to the management of the radio
spectrum) is to do one or more of the following-(a) to make a declaration
setting out the rights and obligations of the parties to the
dispute;
(b) to give a direction
fixing the terms or conditions of transactions between the parties to the
dispute;
(c) to give a direction
imposing an obligation, enforceable by the parties to the dispute, to
enter into a transaction between themselves on the terms and conditions
fixed by OFCOM; and
(d) for the purpose of
giving effect to a determination by OFCOM of the proper amount of a charge
in respect of which amounts have been paid by one of the parties of the
dispute to the other, to give a direction, enforceable by the party to
whom the sums are to be paid, requiring the payment of sums by way of
adjustment of an underpayment or overpayment.” |
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106. These powers,
particularly the power in section 190(2)(d), clearly envisage that OFCOM
rules on what the price should be and incorporates in that ruling an order
adjusting the payments that have been made pending the resolution of the
dispute. The Tribunal therefore concludes that it was a proper exercise of
its dispute resolution powers in this case for OFCOM to set the price at
which mobile call termination was to be sold by H3G and bought by
BT.
107. Further, as is
apparent from the Tribunal’s judgment in the Termination Rate Dispute
appeals being handed down today, the Tribunal considers that OFCOM was
wrong to focus to such an extent on the end-to-end connectivity obligation
when investigating the dispute between BT and H3G. Dispute resolution is
not intended to operate as ancillary to pre-existing regulatory
constraints. It is a form of regulation in its own right so that the
fixing of the price at the end of the dispute resolution process does
amount to a form of price regulation by OFCOM of H3G. This does not mean
that the regulation has to be of the same kind as is imposed as a price
control condition on a party that is found to have SMP. As the Tribunal
said in H3G (1), the dispute resolution power and the power to set
SMP conditions exist in parallel. But it is nonetheless a form of
regulation.
(b) Is this a form of
regulation which falls to be disregarded under the modified greenfield
approach in considering whether H3G has SMP?
108. Both parties
argued that the Tribunal had decided this point in their favour in the
H3G (1) judgment. It is necessary therefore to set out the
reasoning of the Tribunal in that case in order to determine precisely
what was decided on this point.
109. H3G’s argument
in the H3G (1) case was different from the arguments that were put
forward in this appeal. In the earlier case H3G argued that, at least in a
case where the regulator has based a finding of SMP on the existence of
power over price, it is relevant if not important to consider the effect
of regulation or possible regulation on the entity in question. Thus one
of the main matters that has to be taken into account in assessing whether
or not the entity can charge excessive prices is the extent to which it
would be restrained from doing so by the prospects of regulatory
intervention to stop it. In that case, therefore H3G
was |
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relying on the potential power of
OFCOM to set a price control under its SMP powers in order to argue that
it was constrained in its pricing and hence did not have
SMP. |
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110. OFCOM’s
response to this was described by the Tribunal at paragraph [89] of the
judgment as follows:
“If it were a good point then one
could expect it to be a frequent if not a universal answer to any attempt
to impose ex ante regulation. Any entity in respect of which it was said
that it could behave independently of its market counterparts would be
likely to say that it could not and would not do so because if it did then
it could see that it would attract regulatory intervention. It would
therefore argue that it does not in fact have significant market power
within the guidance given in Article 14(2) of the Framework Directive. The
argument might also be extended into cases of alleged abuse and ex post
regulation, where logically it might be thought to apply on the same basis
(notwithstanding the different direction in which the facts might be
pointing) in relation to allegations of dominance. Thus one would have the
paradox: there could never be SMP where one has a vigilant regulator, so
ex ante regulation would never be appropriate (or indeed necessary)
despite the fact that it could turn out (on the facts) that there was
dominance (and abuse) after all. That is not an attractive scenario, and
it is one which we would only espouse if we were bound to by
authority.”
111. Having
concluded that they were not bound by authority to accept the proposition,
the Tribunal referred to the EC Commission’s decision in Case DE/2005/0144
RegTP decided on 17 May 2005. The Decision was one given pursuant
to the Commission’s power to veto decisions taken by the national
regulatory authority as to whether an undertaking has SMP (see paragraph
[18] above). RegTP was the national regulatory authority in Germany and
had provisionally found that 53 fixed network operators other than the
incumbent did not have SMP in the market for call termination on their
networks. The incumbent fixed network operator, DTAG, was under a
regulatory obligation to interconnect with the other operators. The
question was whether or not it was right to take this obligation into
account in assessing whether DTAG had CBP for the purpose of deciding the
extent of the MNOs’ market power. |
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112. The EC Commission stated at paragraph 22 of its
decision:
“In economic terms, it is not
appropriate to exclude regulatory obligations that exist independently of
a SMP finding on the market under consideration but that can have an
impact on the SMP finding on the markets under consideration. From a
methodological viewpoint obligations flowing from existing regulation,
other |
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than the specific regulation
imposed on the basis of SMP status in the analysed market, must be
taken into consideration when assessing the ability of an undertaking to
behave independently of its competitors and customers on that market.”
(emphasis added).
113. Thus the Commission regarded
it as appropriate to take into account the existence of the regulatory
interconnection obligation on DTAG, but not the effect of regulation on
the very parties whose market power was under
consideration. |
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114. The Commission stated further in paragraph
23 of its decision:
“The purpose of a Greenfield
approach is indeed to avoid circularity in the market analysis by avoiding
that, when as a result of existing regulation a market is found to be
effectively competitive, which could result in withdrawing that
regulation, the market may return to a situation when there is no longer
effective competition. In other words any Greenfield approach must ensure
that absence of SMP is only found and regulation only rolled back where
markets have become sustainably competitive, and not where the absence of
SMP is precisely the result of the regulation in place.”
115. The Tribunal in H3G (1) went on to
conclude:
“98. … In other words, a
potentially regulated person cannot claim that it does not have SMP
because regulation has procured a situation in which it no longer has it.
So long as it is regulation which is bringing about competitive outcomes,
the markets are not competitive independently of that regulation. It
follows that the potentially regulated person cannot say that it does not
have SMP because the threat of regulation means that it does not have the
necessary power. That would be circular and illogical. OFCOM relied on
this reasoning.
99. Although that Decision turned
on a consideration of the effect of regulation on someone other than the
person who is the subject of the investigation (the equivalent of BT in
the present case) we agree that the reasoning applies as OFCOM says it
does. The effect of this is that the possibility of regulation being
brought to bear on H3G is a factor that cannot be prayed in aid by H3G as
militating against its having SMP. We reiterate that H3G’s submissions
would give rise to an illogical and unattractive, if not an unprincipled,
position, and we consider them to be wrong. The correct position is as
found in the RegTP decision, namely that regulatory obligations on a
market counterparty can be taken into account, but not the potential for
regulation on the party whose market position is under
consideration.”
116. OFCOM and the
Interveners relied on these passages as establishing a general principle
that all regulation, not just SMP regulation, potentially brought
to bear on the party whose market power is being investigated should be
disregarded. |
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117. OFCOM also
relied on a passage in the judgment in H3G (1) where the Tribunal
was considering whether the existence of clause 13 of the SIA enabling the
party who wishes to resist a price change to refer the dispute to OFCOM
also meant that there was no SMP. H3G relied on this as a further
“regulatory presence” that meant that H3G could not set an excessive price
and therefore had no SMP. OFCOM argued that this would amount to enabling
an undertaking to contract out of a dominant position by contracting for a
third party to resolve disputes. The Tribunal concluded that the clause 13
mechanism did not preclude a finding of SMP. First, they held that the
contractual position went to the question of abuse not to the question of
SMP. The second reason for rejecting the argument was expressed as
follows:
“138. … (b) The second answer
lies in identifying just what the clause 13 mechanism is. It is not
actually a full third party arbitral mechanism of the kind one sees in,
for example, a rent review clause. The arbiter in clause 13 is the
regulator. The regulator’s powers are conferred and constrained by
statute, and while Ofcom’s are extensive they do not include the power to
be a third party arbitrator. In truth clause 13 does not invoke that
latter sort of status. The sort of dispute that clause 13 contemplates
is a form of interconnection dispute, which Ofcom would resolve as
regulator, not as a third party dispute resolver. Its intervention would
therefore be as regulator, and would be a form of regulation. It therefore
falls to be disregarded, as a matter of principle, just as Ofcom’s general
presence as a regulator with a potential effect on the conduct of the
putatively regulated person falls to be disregarded, for the reasons given
above. This is the same point that we have considered and dealt with
above. Accordingly we do not consider that the Clause 13 mechanism for
dispute resolution has any material effect on the question of whether H3G
had or has SMP.” (emphasis added)
118. H3G argues that
it is clear from the Tribunal’s actual decision in H3G (1) that the
Tribunal did not regard dispute resolution powers as subject to the
modified greenfield test in the same way as SMP powers. As to paragraphs
[98] and [99] of the judgment, H3G argue that these passages should be
read in the context of the argument that the Tribunal was rejecting, which
was limited to the proposition that prospective SMP regulation itself
ruled out a finding of SMP. The Tribunal was not, H3G argued, laying down
any wider principle than that. |
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119. H3G contrasts what the
Tribunal said in paragraph 138(b) with the reasons given for remitting the
case to OFCOM. The Tribunal held that OFCOM had erred in that although it
had correctly (under the modified greenfield approach) considered the
effect of the end-to-end connectivity obligation on
BT’s |
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countervailing bargaining power,
it had not taken into account the fact that the obligation to grant access
was subject to the proviso that the terms and conditions had to be
reasonable. OFCOM had therefore treated the obligation to interconnect as
entirely removing any negotiating leverage from BT. This approach was
wrong, as the Tribunal explained in paragraphs [132] and [142] of the
judgment:
“132. … The possibility of
dispute resolution by OFCOM in the future is therefore part of the overall
picture which has to be taken into account in assessing whether BT has a
real and effective bargaining position that is sufficient to counter the
factors which would otherwise point in favour of H3G having
SMP. |
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142. In assessing the position of
that counterparty it would be illogical not to look at the effect of
regulation (and no-one suggested we should not), so OFCOM were quite
correct in doing so in this case. However, as we have observed, the full
factual position in this respect must be looked at – one most look at how
far the regulation will actually operate in any deemed negotiations. It is
in failing to do so that OFCOM erred in its Decision.”
120. The Tribunal
therefore remitted the decision to OFCOM requiring it to reconsider its
determination of SMP taking into account “the extent to which CBP exists
in BT”. Why, H3G asks, would the Tribunal have remitted the decision to
OFCOM if the Tribunal had decided that the proviso to the end-to-end
connectivity obligation was ultimately ineffective as a constraint on
H3G’s market power because the dispute resolution powers were to be
disregarded?
121. In the
Tribunal’s judgment, the H3G (1) case does not decide the point one
way or the other. The point at issue in that case was whether potential
SMP regulation precluded a finding of SMP and the Tribunal found
that it did not. The Tribunal also found that OFCOM had erred in
concluding that because BT was effectively bound to connect under its
end-to-end connectivity obligation it did not have any CBP. This ignored
the important point that the end-to-end connectivity obligation was
subject to the “reasonable terms and conditions” proviso. The Tribunal did
not decide whether this proviso had the effect of precluding SMP or not.
That was precisely the question which was remitted to OFCOM for
reinvestigation, the Tribunal making it clear that it was entirely open to
OFCOM having examined the point, to conclude that it made no
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difference and that H3G had SMP.
OFCOM carried out the investigation required by the H3G (1)
judgment and arrived at the conclusion that the E2E Proviso did not
make any difference. It is the task of this Tribunal to decide now whether
that reassessment is correct. We do not therefore regard ourselves as
bound by the H3G (1) judgment either to accept or reject H3G’s
argument on this point.
122. The Tribunal’s conclusion on
this point is that the dispute resolution powers of OFCOM under section
185 of the 2003 Act should be disregarded under the application of the
modified greenfield approach. The exercise of OFCOM’s dispute resolution
powers is a form of regulation which has the effect of curbing H3G’s
exercise of market power even though that may not be its sole or even main
aim. If H3G were to propose an abusively high price for mobile call
termination whether during initial negotiations for interconnection or
during the currency of an interconnection agreement, BT could refuse to
accept that price and refer the matter to OFCOM for resolution. As we have
found, OFCOM would be required in resolving the dispute to set a price
which was below the level which constitutes an abuse of H3G’s dominant
position. If BT chose, for its own commercial reasons, to accept an
abusively high price, and simply pass the cost on to its own customers, it
would be open to OFCOM to intervene in the exercise of its powers under
section 105 of the 2003 Act or to open an investigation under Article 82
EC or Chapter II of the 1998 Act. Alternatively a third party, for example
a transit customer, who has seen an increase in the price of transit might
bring an action under competition law challenging the price set by H3G.
All these possibilities are ways in which regulatory intervention could be
brought to bear to prevent H3G from charging an abusive price or from
exercising its market power in some other way when setting the terms and
conditions on which it supplies mobile call termination. It is important
not to lose sight of the overall purpose of examining this question which
is to determine whether the market for mobile call termination on H3G’s
network is effectively competitive within the meaning of the Framework
Directive and, if it is not, whether H3G has significant market power. The
fact that a company with a large market share is constrained in its
pricing decisions by the threat of ex post regulation of one sort
or other does not mean that the company is not
dominant. |
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123. We also accept
the argument put forward by OFCOM that H3G’s interpretation of the
modified greenfield test risks undermining the scheme of the CRF. We do
not regard this point as having been made “in terrorem” by OFCOM
and the interveners as H3G suggested. It is clear from the Framework and
the Access Directives that the process of market review and the imposition
of SMP conditions is intended to exist alongside the NRAs’ dispute
resolution powers. Reliance on the dispute resolution powers to curb the
exercise of market power is not a satisfactory substitute for proper ex
ante regulation in the form of price controls in markets which are
found not to be effectively competitive because of the existence of SMP.
As BT put it “dispute resolution per se is not intended to “cure”
existing underlying behavioural or structural imbalances in the market”.
Reliance on dispute resolution powers would give rise to obvious
uncertainties for the market as a whole and would be disruptive, costly
and resource intensive for the participants in the dispute and those
further down the supply chain. If it had been intended that SMP could not
exist in markets where the parties had the right to refer disputes for
resolution, this would have been made clear in the scheme.
124. We do not
accept that H3G’s argument that the findings of SMP are “fact sensitive”
overcomes this fundamental difficulty. H3G referred to a number of
features of the market which, they submitted, distinguished their case
from other MNOs in the United Kingdom and which distinguished the United
Kingdom markets from the markets in other Member States. These included
the regulatory structure, BT’s status as a price sensitive customer and
H3G’s status as a new entrant with a small market share. We have
considered all the points put forward by H3G in this regard in both their
written and oral submissions and concluded that none of these factors
overcomes OFCOM’s argument that to regard the potential exercise of an
NRA’s dispute resolution powers as constraining market power would be
contrary to the scheme for regulation established by the CRF.
125. Both H3G and
OFCOM provided the Tribunal with information about the findings of NRAs in
other Member States as regards whether a new entrant to the mobile market
has SMP in the market for call termination on its own network. This showed
that no Member State has thus far finally concluded that a
new |
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entrant in a similar position to
H3G in the United Kingdom does not have SMP in Market 16. No one
has pointed us to any indication from the EC Commission during the
consultations required by the Framework Directive that it regards the
findings by the NRAs as unsatisfactory. However, we accept that the
position is still fluid in a number of important Member States – even
though this fluidity is in part generated by challenges to findings of SMP
by companies within the Hutchison group itself – and that it would not be
safe for the Tribunal to rely on this material to conclude that H3G’s
argument must be wrong. Although we do not regard this material as
supporting H3G’s case, we do not rely on it in rejecting its argument
either.
(x) The initial negotiations
126. H3G alleged
that OFCOM had erred in failing to appreciate that a proper analysis of
the initial negotiations between H3G and BT when the first interconnection
agreement was signed showed that H3G did not have market power. The
initial negotiations between BT and H3G resulted in an SIA being signed
between them on 13 August 2001. However, the price provisions in the
agreement were not settled at that stage and further negotiations took
place in the latter part of 2001 and early in 2002. In its Notice of
Appeal H3G relied on the initial negotiations only in respect of the
finding of SMP in the Reassessment Statement. But at the hearing, H3G
confirmed that they relied on the negotiations in respect of the finding
of SMP both in the Reassessment Statement and in the 2007
Statement.
127. H3G argued that
the contemporaneous material before OFCOM and the Tribunal shows that when
H3G first approached BT to conclude an interconnection agreement, they
were under considerable time pressure because the agreement had to be in
place in time for H3G to be able to conduct its planned tests of the
network. H3G felt constrained to accept a price which was too low and
which may actually have been below H3G’s efficiently incurred costs at the
time. H3G also relied on the content of a letter to H3G from BT dated 11
August 2006 in which BT referred to its “commercial position” as being
that it was not willing to pay more for 3G termination than it paid for 2G
termination. As to the relevance of the initial negotiations to the
question that OFCOM, and now the Tribunal, |
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has to address, H3G argued that
the issue is whether, and to what extent, what happened in those
negotiations “produced continuing effects” on the balance of market power
between H3G and BT. In fact that price struck at that point remained in
effect during the whole period covered by the 2004 Statement (apart from
the increase to 16.6 ppm towards the end of that period). This means, H3G
argues, that H3G should not be treated as having SMP during that whole
period.
128. BT strongly
contests H3G’s description of the events that led up to the setting of
H3G’s price at launch and argues that the Tribunal has already made
findings in the H3G (1) judgment effectively rejecting H3G’s
version of events. More significantly BT and OFCOM both argue that the
Tribunal’s judgment in the earlier appeal shows that H3G’s argument as to
the relevance of the initial negotiations is wrong.
129. It is common
ground that the question for the Tribunal to decide is not whether H3G had
SMP at the time of the initial negotiations. Even if the OFCOM had
concluded that there was no SMP at that time, it is still necessary to
consider how that affects the question whether they had SMP in 2004. This
was made clear in the judgment in H3G (1) where the Tribunal
described the relevance of the material relating to the initial
negotiations in the following terms (paragraph [74] of the
judgment):
“It is material which would go to
an assessment of whether BT had CBP at the time of those negotiations.
However we do not think that we need to consider it for that purpose. The
decision did not find that there was no CBP at the time of the
negotiations. In essence it assumed that there was … but said that it was
the future that the Decision had to look to. The extent to which it is
necessary to look to those negotiations is therefore limited (though they
are not necessarily completely without significance …).”
130. In the later
part of the judgment the Tribunal explained why it was remitting the 2004
Statement to OFCOM on this point:
“140. H3G provided some evidence
to OFCOM showing how the latter part of the negotiation went in 2001 and
2002. OFCOM has come to the conclusion that that evidence went only to the
negotiations at that time and “did not provide a sufficient indication of
how future negotiations with BT would run, given the change in H3G’s
circumstances [i.e. it now had a connection as opposed to its negotiating
one]”. If that means that that evidence (and other evidence of the
negotiation) did not provide a conclusive demonstration of how future
negotiations will go, then
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that is plainly right. That,
however, is not the point. The point is whether, and to what extent, what
happened in those negotiations provides at least some useful material in
assessing how future negotiations would go. For our part we do not think
that it can be dismissed entirely. There were various elements which might
(and we stress “might”, because we are not determining the point) be taken
still to point to the fact that BT had a real negotiating
position.”
131. The Tribunal set out various factors arising
from the evidence and continued:
“141. There is therefore material
from the prior negotiation which might be said to have some continuing
relevance to what the position would be in any price negotiation between
H3G and BT. It is therefore overly-simplistic and wrong to say that the
end-to-end connectivity obligation determines the question of CBP. As we
have said, we reach no decision on these additional matters, but we
consider that the Decision, and the process underlying it, does not seem
to have addressed them. Any proper consideration of CBP ought to have done
so, and that failure makes the Decision flawed in this respect. It may
well be that the circumstances would require a fuller investigation of
BT’s position (it is arguably a monopsonist), the possibility of joint
dominance, and such things as its relationship with H3G and its attitude
and propensity in relation to the protection of the interests of its own
customers (bearing in mind the words “and ultimately consumers” in
Framework Directive Art 14(2)) when considering the level of termination
charges which it was inevitably going to pass on, but we say no more about
it because the overall position is not (in the circumstances of this case)
one which we are called on to investigate. We do not have the material to
do it, and no-one has suggested we should.”
132. We accept the
point made by OFCOM that its reconsideration of the relevance of the
initial negotiations was limited to considering whether they cast any
light on how the parties would negotiate if a situation arose in the
course of the period of the price control. We agree with OFCOM that the
initial negotiations are not relevant because the circumstance which might
have given BT bargaining power in 2001 – namely the fact that H3G was
anxious to avoid a delay to the start of its service – was no longer
operative by the start of the period covered by the 2004 Statement. The
Tribunal therefore concludes that even if the evidence established that BT
had CBP at the time of the initial negotiations, this did not mean that it
still had CBP during the period 2004-2007 or the period
2007-2011.
(xi) Excessive pricing by H3G
133. Having
concluded that OFCOM was right to reject H3G’s argument that BT had
countervailing buyer power sufficient to counteract the market power that
H3G could exercise as a result of its market share, was OFCOM also correct
in concluding that H3G had SMP in the market for call termination on its
network? |
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134. There were two
additional points made by H3G. H3G alleged that OFCOM erred in law by
equating any price other than a strictly cost based price with a price
which is appreciably above the competitive level. This point arose from
paragraph 5.154 of the 2007 Statement in which OFCOM was referring to the
likely outcome of the reference of a dispute as to what was a reasonable
charge for the purposes of BT’s end-to-end connectivity obligation. OFCOM
said:
“On this basis, a reasonable
charge for BT to purchase MCT with a view to ensuring end-to-end
connectivity may be at a price appreciably above the competitive level. As
such, if a charge appreciably above the competitive level were in dispute,
Ofcom considers it unlikely that it would insist on a strictly cost based
charge (such as used in deriving cost benchmarks … to set efficient
regulated charges in the charge control) ie a charge that was not
appreciably above the competitive level”.
135. It emerged from
OFCOM’s Defence that the paragraph was not intended to indicate that OFCOM
regarded any price other than a strictly cost based price as being a price
“appreciably above the competitive level” and hence an indicator of SMP:
see para 102 of the Defence. OFCOM accepted therefore that a dominant
undertaking does not necessarily abuse its dominant position by charging a
price which is not a cost based price. This is indeed clear from other
passages in the 2007 Statement such as paragraph 4.14 where OFCOM denies
that it has equated SMP with the ability to persistently raise prices
above costs by any amount.
136. Secondly, the
Tribunal heard argument as to whether H3G had in fact imposed excessive
prices for MCT in the past and whether this was an alternative basis on
which OFCOM could found its finding of SMP.
137. OFCOM’s
findings in relation to excessive pricing in the 2007 Statement were that
the 2G/3G MNOs have previously (that is, before these charges were
regulated by the 2004 Statement) sustained 2G termination charges
significantly above a reasonable estimate of costs. Further, the
underlying 3G charges proposed by the 2G/3G MNOs were substantially
greater than OFCOM’s estimate of costs (in some cases more than double).
OFCOM also noted that “The underlying charges of three of the 2G/3G MNOs
are also substantially greater than H3G’s charges”: see paragraph 4.64 of
the 2007 Statement. |
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138. It appears from
this that whatever may have been the case with regard to the 2G/3G MNOs,
OFCOM was not relying on the level of H3G’s prices as evidence supporting
the finding of SMP on the part of H3G. OFCOM emphasised that although
evidence that MNOs are able to sustain charges to an appreciable extent
above the competitive level supports the view that the MNOs have SMP, it
is not a prerequisite to a finding of SMP (see paragraphs 4.45 and 5.173
of the 2007 Statement).
139. The
consideration of the reasonableness or otherwise of H3G’s prices is
relevant to another aspect of this case, namely whether there was a risk,
for the purposes of section 88 of the 2003 Act, that H3G would set prices
at an excessively high level. It is convenient therefore to deal with
pricing issues in that context rather than here since OFCOM did not
purport to rely on evidence of excessive pricing by H3G in support of its
finding that H3G has SMP.
(xii) The Tribunal’s conclusion on SMP
140. The Tribunal’s
conclusions on the existence of SMP on the part of H3G in the market for
mobile call termination on H3G’s network can be summarised as
follows:
(a) OFCOM was correct in
concluding that the availability of its dispute resolution powers under
section 185 of the 2003 Act did not constrain H3G’s market power to a
degree sufficient to preclude a finding of SMP because:
i. although OFCOM must not, when
setting a price in the exercise of its dispute resolution powers, set that
price at a level which amounts to an abuse of a dominant position, it
might, depending on the circumstances, set a price which is appreciably
above the competitive level;
ii. because OFCOM could set a
price appreciably above the competitive level, the existence of the
dispute resolution mechanism, and the parties’ expectations as to how
OFCOM will exercise its powers, do |
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not mean that BT has sufficient
countervailing buyer power to preclude a finding of SMP on the part of
H3G;
iii. this is the case whether or
not it would be ultra vires for OFCOM to set a price which could be
regarded as an “excessively high price” in the context of the test set out
in section 88(3) of the 2003 Act;
iv. in any event, OFCOM’s powers
of dispute resolution constitute a form of price regulation on H3G which
falls to be disregarded when assessing H3G’s market power, under the
modified greenfield approach described by the Tribunal in the judgment in
H3G (1);
(b) OFCOM was
correct to conclude that the evidence of the initial negotiations between
BT and H3G in 2001/02 did not indicate that BT had sufficient CBP during
the period covered by the Reassessment Statement or the 2007 Statement to
counteract H3G’s market power;
(c) OFCOM did
not base its conclusion on H3G’s SMP on any findings that H3G had in the
past charged a price appreciably above the competitive rate for mobile
call termination;
(d) OFCOM was right
to rely on other factors such as BT’s regulatory obligations regarding
Carrier Pre-Selection and Indirect Access and more general commercial
considerations which might weaken BT’s CBP;
(e) OFCOM was
therefore entitled to conclude that H3G had and has SMP because of its 100
per cent market share, the existence of absolute barriers to entry and the
absence of sufficient countervailing buyer power on the part of its main
customer BT.
141. The Tribunal therefore
dismisses H3G’s appeal in so far as it challenges both the Reassessment
Statement and the finding of SMP in the 2007
Statement. |
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VI. THE DECISION TO IMPOSE A PRICE CONTROL
REMEDY
142. The second main
challenge by H3G to the 2007 Statement was its assertion that OFCOM was
wrong to impose a price control remedy on H3G – the Appropriate Remedy
Issue.
143. The 2007
Statement set a number of conditions for the MNOs including two conditions
relating to mobile call termination rates, Condition MA3 relating to
fixed-to-mobile interconnection charges and Condition MA4 relating to
mobile-to-mobile interconnection charges. These Conditions control the
average charges which the MNOs may levy. The price control was set for all
mobile call termination without distinguishing in terms of price between
termination on a 2G network and termination on a 3G network. Thus for the
first time, termination on 3G networks was regulated through an SMP price
control condition and H3G was subject to a price control along with the
2G/3G MNOs who had previously been regulated under SMP conditions as to
their charges for 2G termination but not for their 3G
termination.
144. The Tribunal’s
task is to consider whether OFCOM was wrong to exercise its power under
section 88 to impose a price control remedy on H3G. The question of
whether the price control in fact set by OFCOM is the right one is a
specified price control matter which must be determined by the Competition
Commission. On 18 March 2008, the Tribunal referred the specified price
control matters in this appeal to the Competition Commission and those
matters are in the course of being investigated in that
forum.
145. It is also
important to note that H3G is not arguing that MCT charges should be
unregulated generally. On the contrary, part of the H3G appeal seeks the
imposition of a stricter price control on the four 2G/3G MNOs. H3G does
not challenge the inclusion of 3G termination as supplied by the 2G/3G
MNOs in the price control set for those operators. Rather H3G’s case is
that because of its unique position in the market, it should be allowed to
negotiate a price with its customers unconstrained by the kind of price
control that OFCOM imposed. |
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(i) The regulatory background
146. Before
examining H3G’s arguments on this aspect of the case it is necessary to
describe the scope of OFCOM’s powers in setting a price control and some
other aspects of the industry which are relevant to the grounds of appeal,
in particular the current arrangements for mobile number
portability.
(a) The setting of SMP Conditions
147. Section 45 of
the 2003 Act provides for OFCOM’s powers to set conditions. Section
45(2)(b) provides for the imposition, among other things, of “an access
related condition” and an SMP condition. Section 47(1) of the 2003 Act
provides as follows:
“Ofcom must not, in exercise or
performance of any power or duty under this Chapter –
(a) set a condition under
section 45, or
(b) modify such a
condition,
unless they are satisfied that
the condition or (as the case may be) the modification satisfies the test
in subsection (2).”
148. Section 47(2) of the 2003 Act provides
that:
“That test is that the condition or modification is
–
(a)
objectively justifiable in relation to the networks, services,
facilities, apparatus or directories to which it relates;
(b)
not such as to discriminate unduly against particular persons or against a
particular description of persons;
(c)
proportionate to what the condition or modification is intended to
achieve; and
(d) in relation to what it is
intended to achieve, transparent.”
149. The power to
impose SMP conditions is provided in sections 87 to 92 of the 2003 Act.
Before an SMP condition may be imposed, there must be a finding of SMP
made in respect of the undertaking concerned (see sections 46(7) and (8)).
Section 87 makes provision for the particular conditions which may be
imposed by OFCOM on an operator which it has determined has SMP and
section 87(9) |
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confers the power to set a price
control condition. Sections 87(9) and 88 have been set out earlier (see
paragraph [20]-[21] above) but since section 88 is key to understanding
this part of the appeal we set it out here again:
“88 Conditions about network access pricing
etc.
(1) OFCOM are not to set an
SMP condition falling within section 87(9) except where-(a) it appears to
them from the market analysis carried out for the
purpose of setting that condition
that there is a relevant risk of adverse effects arising from price
distortion; and
(b) it also appears to them that
the setting of the condition is appropriate for the purposes of-(i)
promoting efficiency; (ii) promoting sustainable competition;
and
(iii) conferring the greatest
possible benefits on the end-users of public electronic communications
services.
(2) In setting an SMP
condition falling within section 87(9) OFCOM must take account of the
extent of the investment in the matters to which the condition relates of
the person to whom it is to apply.
(3) For the purposes of
this section there is a relevant risk of adverse affects arising from
price distortion if the dominant provider might-(a) so fix and maintain
some or all of his prices at an excessively high
level, or
(b) so impose a price squeeze,
as to have adverse consequences
for end-users of public electronic communications services.
(4) In considering the matters mentioned in subsection
(1)(b) OFCOM may-
(a) have regard to the prices at
which services are available in comparable competitive
markets;
(b) determine what they consider
to represent efficiency by using such cost accounting methods as they
think fit.
…”
150. H3G characterised these
provisions as imposing stringent pre-conditions for the imposition of a
price control condition because price control is a highly intrusive form
of regulation which may have unintended adverse consequences, both
for |
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the company being regulated and,
more generally, for competition. H3G stressed that the implications for a
business of not being able to set the price for its own service over a
four year period in a dynamic and fast-changing market are very severe and
we do not understand that OFCOM disagreed with this description of the
statutory scheme.
(b) Mobile Number Portability
151. Mobile number
portability refers to the process whereby someone who decides to move from
one mobile phone service provider to another can choose to take their
phone number with them to the new network. Where a customer of MNO “A”
(“the donor network”) wishes to transfer to MNO “B” (“the recipient
network”), the recipient network will advise the customer to contact the
donor network in order to obtain from it a Porting Authorisation Code
(PAC). The Code will normally be provided immediately over the phone but
will be confirmed later in writing within two working days. The customer
will pass that PAC to the recipient network. That network will then enter
the PAC and the phone number into the industry porting system. From this
point in the process the donor network has five working days to complete
the port. The customer is not without a mobile service over these five
days. They can either continue to use their existing mobile connection for
a further five days or they may be given a temporary number by their new
MNO. Thereafter the calls to the number are automatically received on the
new handset.
152. Under the
current system of routing calls, a call to a ported number will initially
be routed to the donor network not to the recipient network. This is
because the phone numbers were allocated in blocks to the networks and so
are recorded by the industry as “belonging” to that network. The donor
network will recognise the number as one that has been ported and will
route it to the customer’s new recipient network. It is the donor network
rather than the recipient network whose mobile call termination rate is
charged to the network from which the call is being made (“the originating
network”). The originating network therefore pays the donor network for
the termination at the donor network’s mobile call termination rate and
the donor network passes this money onto the recipient network minus a
deduction known as the donor conveyance charge to |
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compensate the donor network for
its costs of routing the call on to the recipient network. This means that
where a customer moves to H3G from one of the other MNOs and ports their
number, H3G only receives the balance of the other MNO’s mobile call
termination charge (after deduction of the donor conveyance charge) rather
than its own mobile call termination charge.
153. Where a
customer switches to a new network without porting their number, the
customer will be given a new number by the new network, calls will be
routed directly from the originating network to the new network and the
mobile call termination charge will be imposed by the network at its own
mobile call termination rate. Under the current arrangements, it is
therefore less advantageous for H3G if a customer moving to its network
decides to port its number from its old network and conversely, under the
current arrangements, the 2G/3G MNOs have a particular incentive to
persuade H3G subscribers to port their numbers when they move as they then
get the benefit of H3G’s higher termination charges. H3G charges and
receives its higher MCT rate both on calls terminated on its 3G network
and on calls terminated on the 2G network of its roaming
partner.
154. OFCOM has
carried out a review of the UK’s mobile number portability arrangements.
On 29 November 2007 OFCOM issued a Statement entitled Telephone number
portability for consumers switching suppliers – Concluding Statement
setting out its decision as to how the system should be changed. The
current system is to be replaced by a new direct routing system by
September 2009. The time taken to port numbers under the current system
must be reduced to two working days by April 2008 at the latest and
further reduced to less than two hours by 1 September 2009. On 29 January
2008 Vodafone lodged an appeal against that statement with the Tribunal.
Although H3G welcomed the Mobile Number Portability Statement as at least
to some extent a positive development H3G argues that it will only be some
considerable time after direct routing has been implemented (perhaps two
years or longer) when H3G and the market sees the full benefit of improved
mobile number portability. |
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(ii) OFCOM’s decision to impose a price control on
H3G
155. Four sections
of the 2007 Statement focus on the issues concerning the appropriateness
of setting a price control. In section 6 OFCOM sets out its duties and
objectives. Section 7 sets out the benefits of regulating MCT charges and
discusses the issues arising if those charges remain unregulated. Section
7 also describes the welfare analysis that OFCOM carried out to identify
any benefits from regulation, further details of this analysis are set out
in Annex 19 to the Statement. Section 8 discusses the different regulatory
remedies OFCOM has considered and section 9 discusses the detail of the
price control that OFCOM has decided to impose. Further information about
the cost modelling that has been used in setting the rates is set out in
the various Annexes to the Statement.
156. For our
purposes sections 6 to 8 are the most relevant. In section 6 having set
out its statutory duties under sections 3 and 4 of the 2003 Act, OFCOM
describes the relevant considerations to be borne in mind when deciding on
appropriate remedies -
(a) seeking to
promote the interests of consumers by ensuring prices are not excessive
and resources are efficiently allocated;
(b) ensuring
technological neutrality and avoiding regulatory distortion of MNO
decisions about delivery of mobile termination – seeking to ensure MNOs’
incentives to use one technology (for example, 2G) over another (for
example, 3G) are not distorted by regulation;
(c)
encouraging investment and innovation in existing and new mobile
services – seeking to ensure operators recover efficiently incurred costs;
and
(d) ensuring
competitive neutrality and avoiding economic distortions, for example in
the downstream retail market. |
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157. In section 7 OFCOM describes
the detrimental impact of excessive mobile call termination charges which
it considers under five headings:
(a)
excessive prices overall. Generally speaking, if MNOs set
excessive prices for mobile call termination they may be able to earn
excess profits at the expense of consumers. However this possibility is
offset to a considerable extent in this sector because of the “waterbed
effect”, a term used to describe the fact that, to some extent, the
pressures of competition in the retail market may lead MNOs to use the
profits they make, including profits from terminating calls, to offer more
attractive benefits to consumers on that retail market. Although OFCOM
doubted whether the waterbed effect was complete (that is, whether there
would be sufficient competitive incentive for the MNOs to pass on all
the profits they make from MCT to consumers by reducing retail prices)
OFCOM concluded that it would not rely heavily on the need to avoid the
risk of excessive pricing when deciding what conditions should be
imposed.
(b) Inefficient
structure of prices. OFCOM concluded that even if the waterbed effect
was complete, leaving MCT charges unregulated would lead to an inefficient
structure of prices in retail and wholesale markets and this would have a
detrimental impact on consumers. The structure of prices would lead to
over-consumption of mobile retail services and under consumption of other
services provided by operators which pay mobile call termination charges,
for example, fixed retail services.
(c)
Distortion of consumer choice. Excessive termination charges
feed through to higher retail prices for fixed-to-mobile and
mobile-to-mobile calls between networks. However on-net mobile calls (that
is between two subscribers on the same network) incur no explicit
termination charge and mobile-to-fixed call termination is charged at a
regulated rate. Excessive mobile call termination charges also enable
reductions in the prices of mobile retail services. OFCOM concluded that
consumer choices would be distorted between mobile and fixed calling due
to distortions in the |
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relative prices of fixed and
mobile services as the relative prices do not reflect the underlying
resource costs.
(d) Inequitable
distributional effects. As mobile call termination charges are a major
component of the price of calls to mobiles, callers to mobiles may face
excessive prices for some services and lower prices for others. Although
mobile subscribers may benefit from having the high profits passed through
to them in the form of lower mobile retail prices, the consumers who
benefit are not necessarily the same people as the ones who are paying the
extra charge, particularly the fixed network subscribers. The overall
effect is likely, OFCOM concludes, to be detrimental to
consumers.
(e) Risk of
anti-competitive behaviour. The ability to set excessive charges for
mobile call termination could also be used to distort and reduce
competition in retail mobile services. In particular OFCOM identified a
potential for anticompetitive pricing by the larger MNOs to the detriment
of smaller MNOs and therefore to the detriment of competition. If
unregulated, the MNOs could charge a lower mobile call termination rate to
each other than they charge to the smaller network (although the smaller
network could avoid this problem by using BT to transit its calls to the
MNOs). However, to the extent that a reduction in mobile call termination
charges lessens the risk of such behaviour, OFCOM considered that it was a
further benefit to be derived from charge controls.
158. In section 8 of the 2007
Statement OFCOM set out the various regulatory options available including
reliance on ex post intervention under competition law, imposing a
condition that charges should be “fair and reasonable” and imposing a
transparency obligation. OFCOM concluded that a direct charge control was
the most cost effective option for constraining MNOs with SMP from setting
excessive charges to the detriment of consumers. The price control was set
for the period from 1 April 2007 until 31 March 2011. OFCOM concluded that
the maximum average charge (referred to in the Conditions as the Target
Average Charge or “TAC”) for the 2G/3G MNOs during the fourth
year |
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of the charge control period
should be 5.1ppm expressed at 2006/07 prices. The TAC set for H3G for the
fourth year of the charge is 5.9ppm.
159. As well as
setting the TAC which the MNOs must ultimately achieve, the Conditions
also set the “glide path” controlling the maximum average price that the
MNOs can charge in each of the first three years of the control period. By
following annual reductions set by the glide path, the MNO arrives at the
final TAC. For the four 2G/3G MNOs, OFCOM concluded that the charges
should be reduced in four broadly equal percentage steps starting from the
regulated 2G rate which applied in 2006/7 pursuant to the price control in
the extended 2004 Statement.5 In the case of H3G, OFCOM applied
a different glide path, requiring H3G to reduce its charges in the first
year to an average of 8.5 ppm (at 2006/7 prices).
160. The two
Conditions MA3 and MA4 are intended to set the same charges, the purpose
of having two charges being simply to ensure that, because MNOs have the
scope within the average set by the price control to set different charges
for mobile call termination they should not be able to charge relatively
high charges for terminating fixed-to-mobile calls to offset low charges
for mobile-to-mobile.
(iii) The test for the Tribunal to apply
161. Part of H3G’s
challenge to the 2007 Statement as regards the Appropriate Remedy Issue
was expressed in terms that arguments put forward by H3G to OFCOM in
response to the consultation document were not adequately investigated by
OFCOM and that the reasons set out in the 2007 Statement for rejecting
them were not explained in sufficient detail. In taking us to the passages
in the 2007 Statement where OFCOM had dealt with H3G’s objections to the
proposed price control, H3G argued that OFCOM should have undertaken much
more analysis and investigation and should have described this process
with fuller reasons for arriving at its conclusion that H3G’s point was
unfounded. |
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5 The actual first
year rates were adjusted to take account of the fact that the new capped
rates came into effect part way into the first year.
66 |
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162. Market review
is already a complex and lengthy task. The current review took almost 22
months to complete and the 2007 Statement stretches to over 900 paragraphs
plus a further 16 Annexes. Much of the 2007 Statement is devoted to issues
which were hard fought by the MNOs during the consultation period but
which are not part of this appeal, in particular market definition.
Although H3G is clearly a major “stakeholder” in the review, if OFCOM were
required to carry out all the investigations that the principal parties
urge upon it and explain at length its reasoning for rejecting each of the
points put forward by H3G at the level of detail H3G now appears to
expect, the task of carrying out these market reviews would become
unmanageable. In the circumstances of this review, therefore, provided
that OFCOM summarises the main points put to it by the principal
participants and states briefly why it accepts or rejects the point, it
should not ordinarily be criticised for lack of analysis.
163. It is apparent
from the 2007 Statement that OFCOM did consider the arguments put forward
by H3G to the effect that it should be treated differently from the other
2G/3G MNOs and it accepted them to the extent that gave rise to the
different Target Average Charge in the price control and to the different
glide path. OFCOM did not consider that the differences justified leaving
H3G unregulated.
164. However, this
is an appeal on the merits and the Tribunal is not concerned solely with
whether the 2007 Statement is adequately reasoned but also with whether
those reasons are correct. The Tribunal accepts the point made by H3G in
their Reply on the SMP and Appropriate Remedy issues that it is a
specialist court designed to be able to scrutinise the detail of
regulatory decisions in a profound and rigorous manner. The question for
the Tribunal is not whether the decision to impose a price control was
within the range of reasonable responses but whether the decision was the
right one.
(iv) H3G’s case on the price control
remedy
165. H3G’s Notice of
Appeal (as amended) and its skeleton argument set out the background
facts, as H3G see them, as well as setting out the more
formal |
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grounds of appeal. It became
apparent during the course of the appeal that the grounds of appeal
relating to the Appropriate Remedy Issue overlap to a certain extent and
the factual material presented by H3G was relied on as relevant to more
than one ground of appeal. For example, H3G’s argument that the welfare
analysis carried out by OFCOM was seriously flawed was relevant to its
submissions that the price control was disproportionate because, on a
proper analysis, the welfare gains from regulating H3G were very small. It
was also relied on in support of the allegation that OFCOM had erred in
its assessment of its duty to maximise the benefit to end users for the
purposes of section 88(1)(b)(iii) of the 2003 Act. Similarly, evidence
aimed at showing that H3G was in a different position on the market from
the other MNOs is relied on as relevant both to the allegation that OFCOM
erred in failing to apply the statutory tests to H3G individually and to
the allegation of discrimination contrary to section 47(2)(b) of the 2003
Act.
166. To avoid
repeating the arguments raised, this judgment deals with the points in the
order which appears to the Tribunal to be the most logical, noting that
the Tribunal’s conclusions on each point hold good regardless of the legal
context in which the point is raised.
167. In outline,
H3G’s arguments can be summarised as follows. First, H3G alleges that
OFCOM erred in its overall approach to the question posed by sections 87
and 88 of the 2003 Act whether to impose a price control on H3G. OFCOM
considered the benefits and detriments arising from regulation of the
industry as a whole rather than the benefits and detriments arising from
regulating H3G in addition to regulating the 2G/3G MNOs. This meant that
the decision to impose a price control on H3G was “swept up” in the
general “regulation versus no regulation” decision.
168. Secondly, H3G
alleges more specific errors on the part of OFCOM in its application of
the statutory provisions. The imposition of a price control was
disproportionate contrary to section 47(2)(c) of the 2003 Act because
OFCOM- |
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(a) compared
the position in which all the MNOs were regulated by a price control with
the position where none of the MNOs was regulated whereas it should have
considered the continuation of the current state of regulation as the
primary counterfactual;
(b) greatly
exaggerated the benefits to be gained from regulating H3G; properly
measured, the benefits of regulating H3G in addition to the other MNOs are
rather insignificant;
(c) failed to
take into account the substantial detriments which arise from the price
control which deprives H3G of the freedom to set its mobile call
termination rates at a level which enables it -
i. to act as the “maverick”
competitor in the retail market competing vigorously by offering
attractive retail packages to customers; and
ii. to recoup the loss of funds
which arises because of the system of charging for mobile call termination
for ported numbers;
(d) failed to take
into account the serious adverse effect the price control would have on
H3G’s financial position both in absolute terms (because H3G’s business in
the United Kingdom is not yet profitable) and relative to its competitors
– the price control was disproportionate in the basic sense that the cost
to H3G outweighs any benefits that are gained from
regulation.
169. H3G also alleges that the
decision to impose a price control was discriminatory in the sense that it
treated different cases alike. OFCOM failed to appreciate that H3G should
be treated differently from the other MNOs because -
(a) H3G is a new entrant coming
into a market which is already “mature and saturated” so that it can only
compete with the established MNOs by attracting their customers away from
them, not by attracting new users; |
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(b) H3G has a much
smaller market share in terms of subscribers – this places H3G at a
considerable disadvantage because it is a net payer of mobile call
termination charges whereas for the other MNOs who have roughly equal
market shares, their payments of each other’s mobile call termination
charges are largely cancelled out by the payments they
receive;
(c) H3G
suffers from a traffic imbalance, which means that its subscribers make a
much larger number of calls to other networks (for which H3G has to pay
the mobile call termination charge) than the number of off-net calls they
receive (for which H3G is paid its charge);
(d) further, the
disadvantages identified in (a), (b) and (c) above are caused or
aggravated by the distortion of the competitive structure of the market
produced by the current arrangements for mobile number
portability;
(e) in
rejecting H3G’s arguments in favour of leaving it unregulated, OFCOM
ignored academic literature and decisions from other Member States
indicating that asymmetric regulation in this market may be advantageous –
OFCOM wrongly based its reasoning (expressly or impliedly) on an
assumption that asymmetric regulation was undesirable.
170. Finally, H3G
alleged that OFCOM wrongly concluded that there was a relevant risk of
adverse price distortion for the purposes of section 88(1)(a) of the 2003
Act. H3G argues that on a proper analysis of the factual background, there
was no evidence to support a finding that there was a risk that H3G would
fix or maintain its mobile call termination charges at an excessively high
level so as to have adverse consequences for end users.
171. H3G also argued
that the imposition of a price control was not appropriate for the
purposes of promoting efficiency and sustainable competition or conferring
the greatest possible benefit on end users for the purposes of section
88(1)(b) of the 2003 Act because the price control exacerbates the
distortions already apparent in the market caused by the unsatisfactory
mobile number portability arrangements. The points that were relied on in
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relied on in relation to one or
more of the other grounds and are dealt with in this judgment in the
consideration of those other grounds.
172. In support of
their arguments on this part of their appeal, H3G relied on the expert
evidence of Dr Stephen Littlechild, Emeritus Professor of Commerce at the
University of Birmingham and Director General of Electricity Supply
between 1989 and 1998. Dr Littlechild is the author of a number of papers
on price controls on mobile call termination charges and was an adviser to
the Secretary of State for Industry on the privatisation of BT. By the
time of the hearing, three witness statements had been lodged by Dr
Littlechild. At the opening of his oral evidence he confirmed that he was
not arguing a positive case that H3G should not be subject to a price
control, rather his primary submission was that the arguments for a price
control are not sufficiently strong to justify that as the obvious
conclusion. In particular, he contends, OFCOM did not properly assess the
disbenefits of regulating H3G.
173. In response,
OFCOM filed two witness statements from Mr Geoffrey Myers who is employed
by OFCOM as a Director of Competition Economics in the Competition Group.
Mr Myers holds MA and MPhil degrees in Economics and has worked as a
professional economist in the public sector for sixteen years, eleven of
them with OFCOM. T-Mobile also lodged an expert report by Dr Mike Walker
of CRA International which is an economic consultancy established in the
USA. He is a D.Phil in Economics and holds several academic posts relating
to the economics of competition law.
174. H3G submitted
that the Tribunal should prefer the evidence of Dr Littlechild to that of
Mr Myers or Dr Walker. As regards Mr Myers, H3G said that he cannot be
treated as an independent expert because self evidently he is a senior
employee of OFCOM and he was involved in the taking of this decision.
There was no suggestion that Mr Myers was acting in bad faith but his
evidence could not be treated as the evidence of an independent expert.
H3G was more critical of Dr Walker whom they described as “an advocate for
T-Mobile”. H3G gave examples where it alleges Dr Walker refused to accept
propositions which might be adverse to the interests of T-Mobile even when
it was plain that the position |
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he was maintaining was
unsustainable and where he was “not as neutral as he might have
been”. |
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175. The Tribunal
considers that these criticisms are unfounded. All three witnesses were,
in the Tribunal’s judgment, doing their best to assist the Tribunal and
were aware of their duty to the Tribunal. We do not consider that it was
inappropriate for OFCOM in this case to deploy an in-house economist as an
expert. Although Dr Walker’s oral evidence was delivered in a rather
different style from that of Dr Littlechild or Mr Myers we did not regard
it as inappropriate or gain the impression that he was acting as an
advocate rather than an expert. Further, the Tribunal in this case is well
able to assess the merits and demerits of the arguments that the experts
were debating. The Tribunal does not therefore distinguish between the
value of the evidence in the manner proposed by H3G.
(v) OFCOM’s alleged error in
applying the statutory tests to the market as a whole rather than to H3G
individually
176. H3G’s
first argument was that OFCOM failed to apply the tests individually as
required by the legislation. |
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177. H3G’s arguments to OFCOM in
response to the consultation documents are summarised by OFCOM in
paragraph s 7.6 and 7.7 of the 2007 Statement:
7.6 H3G argued that
Ofcom’s proposals were inconsistent with its statutory duty to promote
competition, to further the interests of citizens by ensuring that high
speed mobile data services are made available across the UK, and to
encourage investment and innovation. In H3G’s view, Ofcom’s proposals
would reduce competition, to the detriment of consumers. H3G also argued
that, as H3G currently has only a 5% share of active UK subscribers, the
impact of any reduction in MCT charges on callers to H3G’s network will be
small, and unlikely to balance the negative impacts on competition which
H3G envisages flowing from reduced MCT charges. In H3G’s view the impact
on consumers of reductions in H3G’s MCT charges will also be further
diluted by MNOs’ practice of offering bundles of “any network” calls, and
also by the practice of FNOs not directly reflecting differences in MCT
charges in their retail prices for calls to mobiles.
7.7 H3G claimed that
Ofcom had failed to give proper consideration to these issues and had
failed to conduct a proper cost-benefit analysis which assesses the
relative size of these effects, particularly when considering the merits
of the three glide path options set out in respect of H3G. H3G also argued
that Ofcom’s welfare analysis, being based on a global analysis of all
MNOs, fails to consider the specific position of H3G as a 3G-only MNO. H3G
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Ofcom’s analysis indicated that
there are still significant welfare gains to be made from reducing 2G
rates, particularly given the relative volume of calls.”
178. OFCOM’s response was recorded at paragraph
7.28:
“Ofcom is not persuaded by H3G’s
argument that, because it has relatively few subscribers, regulation will
be of limited net benefit. First, H3G will grow over the period of the
control and Ofcom does not consider that the consequent volume of
terminated minutes will be insignificant. Second, Ofcom’s analysis of the
financial effect on H3G at paragraphs 9.204 et seq. suggests that the
proposed remedy will not undermine H3G’s overall financial position and,
moreover, H3G’s reduced MCT termination revenue would be small compared to
its overall revenues. Therefore, for the reasons argued here and in
section 9 Ofcom considers that there are material overall welfare gains
from the regulation of H3G.”
179. O2 argued in
its Statement of Intervention that although H3G describes this ground of
appeal as an error of law, its complaint in reality is that H3G’s
arguments that it should be permitted to set unregulated mobile call
termination charges due to its specific situation were rejected by OFCOM.
There is some force in that argument. OFCOM acknowledged in the 2007
Statement that H3G had argued that it should be treated differently from
the other MNOs and OFCOM clearly rejected those arguments. It is not right
therefore to say that OFCOM simply assumed that H3G should be
treated in the same way as the other MNOs without considering whether the
differences between H3G and the others meant that H3G should remain
unregulated. OFCOM did consider this and concluded that H3G should be
subject to a price control, albeit one which was different from the
control imposed on the other MNOs. It is for the Tribunal now to decide
whether OFCOM was right to arrive at that conclusion by considering the
particular points raised by H3G.
(vi) Was the imposition of a price control
disproportionate?
180. H3G’s second
argument on the Appropriate Remedy Issue is that the imposition of a price
control was disproportionate and therefore contrary to section 47 of the
2003 Act. That section (set out in paragraphs [147]-[148] above) provides
that OFCOM must not exercise its powers to set a price control condition
unless it is satisfied that the condition is proportionate to what the
condition is intended to achieve. |
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(a) The correct counterfactual for assessing the benefits
of price control
181. H3G argues that
OFCOM erred in comparing the consequences of regulating all the MNOs with
the consequences of not regulating any of them. The correct comparison
should be between the consequences of regulating the 2G/3G MNOs and the
consequences of regulating all five of them. H3G referred us to OFCOM’s
publication Better Policy Making: OFCOM’s approach to Impact Assessment
published in July 2005. That document states that one of OFCOM’s key
regulatory principles is that it has a bias against intervention and that
it aims to choose the least intrusive means of achieving its objectives.
In identifying options, the document states, OFCOM will consider a wide
range of options including not regulating.
182. H3G relies in
particular on paragraph 3.3 of the Better Policy Making guidance
which describes the process of carrying out an impact
assessment:
“At the outset we should identify
the issue to be addressed and the options available to us. In doing so, we
should continue to bear in mind the need for options to be linked with our
statutory duties. We will start by considering the option of not
changing the regulatory framework, either by not introducing regulation or
by retaining existing regulation. This option – no new intervention – will
generally be the benchmark against which other options are judged i.e.
what costs and benefits would be incurred additional to those which would
be incurred if there were no new intervention?” (emphasis
added)
183. H3G argues that
OFCOM’s approach in the 2007 Statement was contrary to this guidance.
OFCOM considered the benefits of regulating all five MNOs against the
counterfactual of not regulating any of them. But the existing regulation
which OFCOM should have considered retaining and which should have been
the benchmark against which the regulation of all five should have been
judged was the regulation imposed by the 2004 Statement.
184. The Tribunal
does not accept H3G’s analysis on this point. First the regulatory
position which H3G was urging OFCOM to adopt in the 2007 review is
significantly different from the position arrived at in the 2004
Statement. The result of the 2004 Statement was not simply that H3G was
not subject to a price control and the other MNOs were, but that no 3G
termination was subject to a price control. It is true that at the time,
H3G was the only MNO offering 3G
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termination and also that the
2004 Statement did not impose a price control on H3G in respect of its
termination of calls on the 2G networks of its roaming partner. But over
the period covered by the 2004 Statement the 2G/3G MNOs launched their 3G
termination services and imposed or proposed to impose charges for them.
It was clear by the time OFCOM was consulting on the 2007 market review
that the number of 3G subscribers had increased considerably to several
million and that H3G had a substantial share of those subscribers. It was
no longer realistic to leave 3G termination free from price control.
OFCOM’s function in this review was to determine how termination on 3G
networks should be treated. H3G does not dispute that it is appropriate
now to control the 3G termination prices of the other MNOs. Once it had
become clear that prices for 3G call termination should be regulated for
the 2G/3G MNOs, the maintenance of the 2004 Statement position was
untenable.
185. Secondly the
Tribunal agrees with OFCOM that once a particular regulatory control
expires, the status quo established by that control has no better
claim to legitimacy for the future than any other proposed regime in
circumstances where the market conditions have changed substantially
between the date that the earlier regulatory regime was imposed and the
date when the matter is being reconsidered.
186. We therefore
conclude that OFCOM was right in this instance to consider the matter
afresh and not to approach its task by considering first whether the
regulatory position under the 2004 Statement should be
maintained.
(b) OFCOM’s assessment of the benefits of regulating the
2G/3G MNOs and H3G
187. H3G argues that
OFCOM has overstated the benefits to be gained from regulating H3G.
OFCOM’s analysis of welfare gains in the 2007 Statement was in part
qualitative and in part quantitative. OFCOM identified five possible
detriments that could be avoided by regulation; excessive prices overall,
inefficient structure of prices, distortion of consumer choice,
inequitable distributional effects and risk of anti-competitive behaviour.
In relation to one of these detriments, the avoidance of an inefficient
price structure, OFCOM devised a model which compares consumer welfare in
two scenarios, one where there is |
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no regulation and no threat of
regulation and one where mobile termination charges are regulated in the
manner proposed. The description of the model used and the assumptions
made is set out in Annex 19 of the 2007 Statement. OFCOM notes (paragraph
A19.25 of Annex 19) that, despite objections raised by H3G, it is
appropriate to model the aggregate impact of regulating H3G alongside the
other MNOs since “this captures the overall consumer welfare gains of
regulating all the MNOs at the proposed rates”. But OFCOM said that it had
considered the impact on H3G specifically in addition.
188. In making a
comparison between the two scenarios, OFCOM had to determine what the
price for mobile call termination was likely to be in the absence of
regulation and the absence of the threat of regulation. OFCOM calculated
that the monopoly price termination charge (that is the charge that would
maximise revenue for a monopoly provider) was 23.9 ppm. If the model was
run using this price of 23.9 ppm there was a consumer surplus of £54.4bn.
This could be compared with £55.9bn which is the result if the model is
run using a termination charge derived from the average of the charges in
the proposed price control (5.2ppm). The difference of £1.4bn between
those two figures is the consumer gain considered to arise from regulation
in the last year of the price control 2010/11 (in real 2006/7 prices and
to the nearest £0.1bn).
189. OFCOM also
carried out the analysis using a sensitivity figure, 14.5 ppm, instead of
23.9 ppm, being the average between the regulated and unregulated charges.
This resulted in an unregulated consumer surplus of £55.5bn compared with
a regulated surplus of £55.9bn resulting in a consumer surplus of £0.4bn
in 2010/11 (in real 2006/07 prices).
190. In the body of
the 2007 Statement OFCOM described this outcome in the following terms
(paragraph 7.49):
“ … it is also important to
recall the circumstances and purpose of Ofcom’s welfare analysis. Ofcom
has estimated the welfare gains from regulating call termination by
comparing a situation with unregulated (excessive) termination charges
against regulated termination charges. This exercise only seeks to derive
an order-of-magnitude quantification of the benefits of a more efficient
structure of prices and does not include quantification of the benefits to
consumers from addressing the other detriments of excessive MCT charges
discussed elsewhere in
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this section. The analysis
compares an unregulated termination charge of 23.9ppm (based on an
estimated monopoly termination charge) and a regulated termination charge
of 5.2 ppm based on the weighted average (by termination volumes) of
Ofcom’s proposals for charges set out in Section 9. The assumptions
underpinning Ofcom’s welfare analysis are set out in Annex
19.
7.50 The estimated welfare gain
amounts to £1.4 billion in 2010/11 and over four years of a hypothetical
charge control assuming a smooth industry average glidepath down to the
target charge from the monopoly charge amounts to approximately £3.2
billion in present value terms at the beginning of 2007/08. Ofcom
reiterates that the purpose of this exercise is to derive an order of
magnitude estimate and not a precise estimate of the overall gains from
regulation compared to no regulation (or threat of regulation). Even if
the unregulated termination charge were significantly less and fell
mid-way between the potential monopoly level and the regulated level, the
welfare gains remain positive and large. In this sensitivity, the welfare
gain amounts to £0.4 billion in 2010/11 which translates to a gain of £0.9
billion in present value terms.”
191. It was common ground between
the parties by the time of the hearing that the welfare analysis carried
out by OFCOM was only directed at one of the five detriments considered by
OFCOM as arising from an absence of regulation of mobile call termination
charges. It was also accepted that the exercise had various flaws and that
it could be useful only in giving a general idea of the value of the
welfare gains to be derived from regulation. |
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192. H3G levelled two criticisms
at the model. First they argued that OFCOM had chosen the wrong two
scenarios to compare with each other. They argued that OFCOM should have
compared a scenario where all the MNOs except H3G are subject to the price
control being proposed in the 2007 Statement and H3G remains outside the
price control with the scenario where all five MNOs are subject to the
price control proposed. |
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193. Although OFCOM did not agree
that this was the correct comparison, Mr Myers, in his witness statement
carried out an exercise to measure the welfare gain comparing the two
scenarios put forward by H3G. By the time of the hearing Dr Littlechild
accepted the methodology used – dubbed by Mr Myers the “share of volume
methodology”. This involves developing a welfare model specific to H3G by
appropriate adjustment of the key inputs (volume, costs and prices) for
the services included in the model. Using this share of volume
methodology, Mr Myers calculated the estimated welfare gain relating to a
more efficient structure of prices as follows: |
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194. Clearly the amount arrived
at as the estimated welfare gain depends on the figure which is used in
the model as the figure which H3G would charge in the absence of
regulation. This was H3G’s second criticism of the model and, by the time
of the hearing, the main area of disagreement between Dr Littlechild and
Mr Myers. Dr Littlechild considered that the correct figure was 10.7 ppm
because this was the average of the charges that H3G had in fact set
during the period when it was unregulated. He rejected the use of the 16.6
ppm as being a purely temporary price proposed by H3G as a result of the
prices set by its competitors – this was not the termination charge that
H3G would set on a continuing basis in the absence of a price control. On
the contrary, Dr Littlechild said, “H3G would be either willing or
constrained to maintain its termination charges at a level not exceeding
the 10.7 ppm previously obtaining”. He was careful to say that this was
not a prediction of what price H3G would charge if it were unregulated
over the coming four year period but he said that this was the most
appropriate price to include in the model. H3G also rejected the use of
the monopoly figure of 23.9 ppm because OFCOM’s reliance on this price was
inconsistent, it argued, with OFCOM’s acceptance that the price which the
MNOs could charge BT was constrained by the E2E Proviso – OFCOM would
never set the monopoly price as the “reasonable” price for interconnection
under BT’s E2E connectivity obligation so it did not make sense to use
this as the likely price H3G would charge in the absence of a price
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195. Using the price
of 10.7 ppm, the present value of the welfare gain derived from the
H3G-specific, share of volume, model over the four-year price control
period 2007 – 2011 would be £29m. £29m over four years amounts to a little
over £7m per year and, Dr Littlechild calculates, represents a welfare
gain of 15.4 pence per year per adult in the United Kingdom. He concludes
that in his opinion a welfare gain of about 15 pence per person per year
is not material “It is more reasonable to describe such a potential gain
as negligible”.
196. Mr Myers in his
second witness statement rejected this assessment by Dr Littlechild.
First, Dr Littlechild treats the gains indicated by this model as the
totality of the welfare gains arising from regulation whereas in fact this
model only purported to measure one of the five potential gains. The other
gains, such as avoiding competitive distortion or the distortion of
consumer choice are not measured by this or any other quantitative
analysis but are nonetheless real. Secondly Mr Myers disputes the use of
the 10.7 ppm as the input for H3G’s unregulated price. Mr Myers points to
H3G’s proposal to charge 16.6ppm in November 2006 as indicating “its
willingness and ability to increase charges in the absence of price
control”. Thirdly Mr Myers does not regard a welfare gain of £29m as
negligible saying that although the amount is small in relation to the
size of the market, it is not a trivial figure in absolute terms. He
states “the interpretation of this amount depends on whether it is offset
by effects in other directions … or whether it represents a lower bound on
the net benefits of regulation.” Mr Myers’ view is that this is not offset
by effects in other directions but is in fact reinforced by net welfare
gains from other sources which had been subject to qualitative rather than
quantitative analysis.
The Tribunal’s conclusion on welfare gains from
regulation
197. The Tribunal
does not agree that the welfare gains from regulation are negligible in
this market. First, the Tribunal does not consider that the original
exercise carried out by OFCOM in Annex 19 of the 2007 Statement was
flawed. OFCOM was very clear about the purpose of the model – that it was
only intended to measure the benefits from one of the five sources of
potential welfare gain – and acknowledged the limitations inherent in such
an exercise. In so far as H3G’s criticism of the comparison of regulation
of all five MNOs with |
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regulation of none of them is
based on the argument that the correct counterfactual was with the
position under the 2004 Statement rather than with no regulation of any
MNOs, the Tribunal has already explained why it rejects that criticism
(see paragraphs [184]-[186] above). In so far as H3G’s criticism is based
on the alleged distinction between H3G and the other MNOs, as is discussed
further below, the Tribunal does not consider that OFCOM erred in
rejecting the arguments of H3G that it should not be
regulated.
198. The Tribunal
considers that OFCOM’s analysis of welfare benefit as explained in Annex
19 was a useful and appropriate exercise and that it indicates, in broad
terms, that there is a significant welfare gain to be derived from
regulating the MNOs as compared with not regulating them.
199. As regards the
H3G-specific “share of volume” exercise carried out by the parties for the
purposes of this appeal, the Tribunal does not consider that there is one
single “right” figure to include as the price which H3G would charge in
the absence of regulation or the threat of regulation such that all other
figures are “wrong”. It is useful to run the model with a range of figures
to get an order of magnitude of the consumer surplus. In the absence of
regulation and the threat of regulation, including the threat of
regulation through the medium of the E2E Proviso or dispute resolution,
H3G would have both the incentive and the ability to raise its prices
significantly above its historic level. OFCOM was entitled to posit that
there might be no reason for the MNOs, including H3G, to refrain from
charging the monopoly price. It makes sense, therefore, to include that
price as indicating the upper bound of the quantified welfare gain.
Similarly it is useful to consider whether there is any gain even using a
figure at the lower bound, namely the 10.7 ppm proposed by Dr Littlechild.
At that lower bound there is still a welfare gain of about £30 million
derived from regulating H3G. To this must be added the other welfare gains
from the four other factors identified by OFCOM. The fact that these have
not been subject to quantitative analysis does not make the gains from
these sources any less real or significant.
200. Looking at the
welfare analysis carried out by OFCOM over all the five elements, OFCOM
has, in the Tribunal’s judgment, clearly established that
there
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are welfare gains from regulating
the MNOs, and from regulating H3G. Whether these gains are offset by the
costs of regulation or the disbenefits arising from regulation is a
different question which is discussed further below.
(c) Does the price control undermine H3G’s ability to
compete in the retail market?
201. H3G argues that
OFCOM has failed to give sufficient weight to factors which indicate that
there are significant disbenefits from imposing a price control on H3G.
First, H3G says that the imposition of a price control prevents H3G from
setting its mobile call termination rate at a level which generates enough
income to support its effort to offer attractive retail packages and hence
compete effectively against the 2G/3G MNOs.
202. Evidence in
support of this aspect of H3G’s case was given by Mr Kevin Russell who is
the Chief Executive Officer of H3G. Mr Russell has been working with H3G’s
2G and 3G international telecommunications operations spanning 15
countries for over 12 years and has been closely involved in the
development and deployment of the Hutchison group’s global 3G strategy. He
described in his first witness statement the likely effect of the price
control and indeed the effect it had already had on H3G’s retail offering.
He points out that the price control will substantially increase the net
amounts that H3G has to pay to its closest competitors, the other MNOs. He
summarises H3G’s position as to OFCOM’s decision to impose a price control
in the following terms:
“33. I cannot understand how this
approach might be thought to favour competition. The Decisions benefit the
incumbents at the expense of H3G, the new entrant operator which is the
one operator least able to deal with such an effect and still compete
effectively. The result will be a lessening of competition, higher retail
prices and delays to the wider adoption of mobile broadband
technology.
34. The current position is that,
in circumstances where [mobile number portability] is not effective, the
regulatory arrangements are structurally tilted in favour of the incumbent MNOs because H3G,
the new entrant, is subject to a price control and is therefore obliged to make
payments to them which they can use to fund marketing and other
strategies to maintain their share and defeat H3G’s attempts to win
customers from them. This seems illogical to me.”
203. Mr Russell’s
evidence is that H3G has little choice, in responding to the impact of the
price control, but to increase prices for new contract customers and
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costs. Their first step was to
withdraw the successful “Double Minutes, Double Text” promotion which had
been available on 12-month and 18-month contracts taken out on certain
price plans between 4 July 2006 and 30 November 2006. As the name suggests
subscribers on these contracts obtained double their normal volume of
voice minutes and texts for the first few months of their contract, for no
extra charge. These tariffs provided, Mr Russell says, great value for H3G
subscribers and customer acquisitions rose significantly during the course
of the promotion. These tariffs were withdrawn because this step would
have a significant impact on H3G’s termination costs and withdrawal could
be implemented quickly since it would not require a change to H3G’s
billing system. Mr Russell states that he believes they were correct in
their assessment of the effect of withdrawing this tariff on their
termination costs:
“H3G’s traffic imbalance has
shifted over the course of 2006 and 2007 and, as regards the change in
outbound minutes, I believe that has been in large part due to withdrawal
of ‘Double Minutes, Double Text’.”
204. Mr Russell also
gave confidential evidence of other steps that H3G had taken to reduce its
costs.
205. Mr Russell
concludes that with H3G now adopting a less aggressive approach to pricing
the downward trend in the tariffs of the 2G/3G MNOs, which he believes
were introduced as a delayed response to H3G’s promotions, would slow or
stall in 2008-9. H3G does not regard imposing any price control on H3G as
proportionate given H3G’s current financial position and the market
conditions identified.
206. The interveners
denied that H3G played the role of maverick competitor and said that they
did not particularly take account of H3G in deciding their own offers.
Vodafone points to the fact that in his Report Mobile access and call
origination services market – Identification and analysis of market and
Determination of market power – Explanatory Statement and Notification
(4 August 2003), the former Director General of Telecommunications
concluded that the market was already competitive at the time H3G launched
its service. Mr Tillotson who is the Consumer Business Unit Director at
Vodafone gave evidence on this point. He points to H3G’s lack of success
in winning a substantial proportion of the
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gross new connections in the four
years since it entered the market and concludes that this low rate of
growth is difficult to reconcile with H3G’s contention that it has had a
significant impact on retail competition.
207. As Vodafone put
it in its Statement of Intervention, all the MNOs use any “surplus”
revenues generated from the supply of mobile call termination services to
fund competition to recruit and retain mobile subscribers. It would
distort competition among MNOs and other service providers to allow H3G to
levy excessive mobile call termination charges in absolute terms and
relative to other MNOs, since that would enable H3G (but not other MNOs)
to offer more aggressive discounts to subscribers than other (potentially
more efficient) MNOs could afford to offer. There is no good reason,
according to Vodafone, to assist H3G to compete, relative to other MNOs by
allowing it to generate “extra” mobile call termination revenues to fuel
competition in the retail end of the market. To do so merely rewards
inefficiency and perpetuates distortions of competition arising from the
present asymmetric regulation of H3G’s and other MNOs’ call termination
charges.
208. Mr Barden de
Lacroix who is the Director of T-Mobile’s consumer business also gave
evidence that the MNOs are under pressure to provide close substitutes for
each other’s retail packages in terms of handsets, inclusive minutes and
other additional services. His evidence is that the effect of H3G’s
ability to charge more for its mobile call termination has been to
increase the costs borne by H3G’s rivals and to provide H3G with a
significantly larger income stream from termination which can be used by
it to help fund its activities in the retail market. H3G has used this
advantage to offer high call volume pay-monthly packages which it is not
commercially viable for T-Mobile to meet. Mr Barden de Lacroix
says:
“Mr Russell’s characterisation of
the imposition of charge controls on H3G as leading to a “cross subsidy by
H3G to the incumbent MNOs” seems to me to be turning things on their head.
Regulating H3G’s termination charges in the same way as the other MNOs
will lead to the removal of the cross-subsidy by the other MNOs to H3G
that currently exists.” |
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The Tribunal’s conclusions
209. The Tribunal’s
conclusions on this aspect of the case are as follows. First the Tribunal
recognises that the practice of levying mobile call termination charges
that are much higher than short run marginal costs enables MNOs to use
some of the income from those charges to subsidise (not using that term in
a pejorative sense) the retail packages they offer. For example, it is now
typical to offer a free or heavily subsidised handset on a 12, 18 or
24-month contract plus a number of minutes that can be used to call any
mobile network at any time of the day. In deciding to regulate the MNOs’
charges OFCOM correctly took account not only of the fact that it had
found each MNO to enjoy SMP on its own network but also of the fact that
the revenues generated from mobile call termination charges are available
in part to be deployed in financing customer acquisition activity in the
retail market. It is important therefore to recognise that a decision to
regulate some but not all MNOs would alter the conditions for competition
in the market for the supply of mobile subscription and call origination
services.
210. OFCOM argued
that it is not in the wider interests of the public to have retail
packages which are subsidised by high mobile call termination charges in
an unconstrained manner. This is particularly the case because of the
position of fixed line callers to mobile networks. OFCOM noted at
paragraphs 7.54 to 7.56 of the 2007 Statement that while fixed termination
charges are regulated at cost, excessive mobile termination charges amount
to a transfer of rents from fixed-to-mobile operators. This is not an
efficient allocation of resources and, in a situation where fixed and
mobile operators may compete with each other more closely, could result in
a competitive distortion with mobile retail prices subsidised at the
expense of fixed operators. Even if MNOs represent the key to challenging
BT’s continued control over the local loop, OFCOM concluded that it is not
efficient for this competition to be based on excessive charges for mobile
call termination -
“7.56 For the same reason, Ofcom
does not accept H3G’s view that increased competition in mobile markets,
founded on the unique ability of one player with SMP to set MCT charges
without regulatory constraints, should be pursued as a regulatory
objective. Neither does Ofcom accept H3G’s view that the objections
to
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this approach may be set aside in
the case of an MNO with a relatively small market share as the distortions
between fixed and mobile sectors remain material – particularly as H3G
grows.”
211. The Tribunal
agrees with this analysis. The fixed network operators pay the same mobile
call termination charges as the MNOs and the customers of the fixed
networks do not necessarily benefit from the “waterbed effect” feeding
through to cheaper retail mobile call charges. This is an important factor
pointing not only in favour of imposing a price control on mobile call
termination charges generally but against leaving one MNO’s charges
outside the control imposed on the other four.
212. Even if one
considers only competition amongst the MNOs and other mobile service
providers and not between mobile and fixed networks, the ability of H3G to
offer cheaper retail packages because of the money they make on mobile
call termination is not necessarily beneficial to the competitive process
or in the long term interests of consumers. Mr Barden de Lacroix referred
in his evidence to the H3G “We Pay” tariff whereby H3G subscribers on that
tariff received a five pence credit to their mobile phone accounts for
every calling minute they received. Whereas that tariff may have been
beneficial to the customers who bought it, the Tribunal agrees that it
shows that there is a significant distortion in the retail market brought
about by the disparity between H3G and the other MNOs’ mobile call
termination rates. The “We Pay” tariff was only feasible commercially
because H3G’s mobile call termination charges were so much higher than the
charges set by the other MNOs. Such a disparity is likely either to remain
in place or to increase if the 2G/3G MNOs are subject to the price control
set out in the 2007 Statement and H3G is not.
213. Whether any
adjustment should be made to the price control actually set in order to
alter the competitive advantage given to H3G in this manner is a matter
for the Competition Commission to consider. We do not accept that it
justifies removing all price control from H3G. |
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(d) Allowing H3G to recoup
sums lost through the mobile number portability
arrangements
214. At the hearing
H3G put forward an additional point that arises from the way in which
mobile number portability currently affects the amount that H3G receives
for mobile call termination on its network for subscribers who have ported
their numbers to H3G from a rival network. As explained earlier, when a
subscriber moves network and takes their number with them, the call to
that subscriber is still routed through the donor network, and then
redirected to the new recipient network. The donor network charges the
network of the subscriber making the call its own mobile call termination
charge, not the charge set by the recipient network. The recipient network
receives that charge, less a small conveyance fee from the donor network.
This means that if, say, an Orange subscriber ports their phone number to
the H3G network, H3G will only receive the Orange mobile call termination
charge for calls made from other networks to that subscriber (minus the
Orange donor conveyance charge), not the higher H3G mobile call
termination charge. Mr Myers for OFCOM accepted in cross examination that
the target average charges set for the MNOs in the 2007 Statement do not
take into account the fact that for some of its incoming call traffic, H3G
will receive only the lower charge set by the donor network and not its
own higher charge. Conversely the 2G/3G MNOs get what H3G described as
“free revenue” when a customer ports their number from H3G to another MNO
because although the MNO receives the higher H3G charge, this is not taken
into account in determining the target average price.
215. In the 2007
Statement OFCOM records that H3G made “strong representations” in relation
to the existing mobile number portability arrangements, arguing that such
arrangements could result in H3G failing to recover the efficient costs of
provision in the case where the rate it receives for terminating a call is
below its actual cost of terminating that call. H3G also argued that the
existing porting arrangement gives an incentive to other MNOs to focus
their customer acquisition strategies on H3G’s customers in order to
benefit from the higher termination rate they would receive when a H3G
customer ports a number to their network. OFCOM had already published a
consultation document |
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proposing changes to the mobile
number portability to introduce direct routing. On the same day as it
published the 2007 Statement, OFCOM published a further consultation
document on whether it was appropriate to introduce an interim measure
that would address the revenue impact of the current indirect routing
system.
216. In that
consultation document Amendment to charge control on Mobile Network
Operators OFCOM set out various options for dealing with this point.
The option that OFCOM regards as best addressing the impact of the
existing arrangement for charging for calls to ported-in numbers was to
modify the charge control so that it takes full account of such imbalances
and remedies them so that all MNOs’ average effective termination revenues
would be based on the appropriate termination charge (as defined in their
TAC) regardless of an MNO’s actual proportion of calls to ported-in
numbers. OFCOM calculates that if this option were adopted, H3G would
receive in the first year of the charge control between £20-30m more
termination revenue compared with what it will receive under the price
control mechanism in fact imposed in the 2007 Statement. To put it another
way, because of the current mobile number portability charging
arrangements, H3G is worse off by £20-30m because it is not free to adapt
its prices itself to counteract the acknowledged effect of the current
mobile number portability arrangements.
217. H3G described
this consultation process as “stalled” because OFCOM has announced that it
will not pursue the consultation process on this point pending the
resolution of the wider challenges to the price control set by the 2007
Statement.
218. The Tribunal
considers that it would be wholly inappropriate to conclude that H3G
should remain outside the price control in order to enable it, in effect,
to anticipate the outcome of the consultation by increasing its charges to
make up the revenue “lost” to it because of the existing mobile number
portability charging arrangements. OFCOM explained that the reason it did
not take account of the point in setting the price control in the 2007
Statement was that this would represent a material change to the proposals
set out in the September |
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2006 consultation. If OFCOM’s
cost model has not fully taken account of the current practices regarding
mobile call termination for ported numbers this is a matter which should
be raised in the consultation. That consultation must be allowed to take
its course, once it is resumed following the disposal of H3G’s and BT’s
appeals against the 2007 Statement.
(e) Serious adverse effects of price control on H3G’s
financial position
219. H3G points out that the reduction in its
own charges is substantially greater, as a percentage of the current charge, than the
reduction in the charges of the other MNOs. This means that the amounts
that they will have to pay the other MNOs each month for mobile call termination
after netting off the amounts that they are owed by those MNOs will be substantially
greater than it is currently. Mr Russell gave evidence as to the effect
that this would have on H3G’s payments. He compared the amounts that H3G
currently pays per month on average during 2006, which was considerably
more than the amount it currently spends per month on its own marketing.
He estimates that the effect of the price control will increase H3G’s mobile call
termination payments to other MNOs by […][^] for the period from 1 April 2007
until 31 March 2011.
220. H3G provided a witness statement
from Mr David Dyson, the Chief Financial Officer of H3G. He described the
profitability milestones for the H3G business, starting with the first
service revenues (generated in March 2003) and moving ultimately to a
position where there is a cash flow breakeven with a return on
capital, that is, where
cumulative received revenues exceed cumulative paid costs and shareholders and loan holders have been
repaid in full all their funding with a reasonable return on their
investment. Mr Dyson says that H3G has achieved a number of profitability
milestones but by no means all of them.
221. Mr Dyson explores various models
of how H3G could change its business to respond to the imposition of the
price control. But all the strategies demonstrate a material adverse
financial impact on H3G as a result of the price control actually imposed and, Mr Dyson argues, are
indicative of adverse impacts of any price control within a reasonable range being
imposed. He concludes that H3G is not currently profitable and that it is
very hard to understand the rationale of |
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applying any price control on H3G
when profitability has not been achieved and in light of the fact that the
price regulation would involve a value transfer to H3G’s
competitors.
222. This argument
was put to OFCOM by H3G during the consultation process. In the 2007
Statement OFCOM did assess whether its decision “was likely to generate
any financial effects which present an unreasonable adjustment for the
MNOs”. OFCOM noted that of the five MNOs only H3G identified the financial
impact of OFCOM’s proposals as an argument against intervention. H3G
argued that the proposals would significantly reduce H3G’s revenues over
the four years of the control and result in a transfer of revenue from H3G
to the other MNOs.
223. OFCOM did not
dispute that a reduction in termination rates would reduce H3G’s
termination revenues compared to a scenario where it was not subject to a
price control. However, OFCOM noted that H3G’s own business plan, which
was completed in February 2006 did not forecast mobile call termination
charges which persisted at the current rate. OFCOM argued that when one
compares the rate set in the price control with the rate used in the
business plan forecasts, the difference was substantially less than the
figure that H3G relies on. OFCOM considered that the reduction in revenue
was caused by the fact H3G’s current charges were “well above cost” and
that the drop in revenue predicted by H3G reflected the degree of
reduction in charges that was needed in order to bring the charges into
alignment with an efficient cost benchmark.
224. The Tribunal
agrees with OFCOM that the size of the drop in revenue predicted as
resulting from the imposition of the price control is of limited relevance
to the question whether it is appropriate to set a price control since it
may, as OFCOM claims in this case, simply reflect the fact that the
unregulated price was far too high. H3G’s profitability is also of limited
relevance – the price control is not set to ensure that H3G makes any
particular level of profit but is rather based on the costs of an
efficient operator. There was no evidence that H3G would be forced to exit
the market as a result of the price control. Even if H3G did exit the
market there was nothing to suggest that the network would cease to be
operated in the United Kingdom. The Tribunal does not consider that H3G’s
arguments |
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as to the difficulty of achieving
profitability justify leaving its mobile call termination charges
unregulated for a further four years.
(f) Tribunal’s conclusion on disproportionate
ground
225. The Tribunal
concludes that none of the arguments raised by H3G establishes that the
imposition of a price control was a disproportionate measure. It is for
the Competition Commission to determine whether any of the points raised
by H3G justify an adjustment to the level of the price control actually
imposed.
(vii) Was the imposition of a
price control discriminatory contrary to section 47(2)(b) of the 2003
Act?
226. H3G alleges
that the imposition of a price control on H3G was discriminatory because
OFCOM failed to recognise and take account of the important differences
between H3G and the other MNOs and decided to impose the same kind of
price control on them all. This was contrary to section 47(2)(b) of the
2003 Act which provides that OFCOM must not set a price control unless it
is satisfied that the condition is not such as to discriminate unduly
against particular persons.
(a) Should H3G be regarded as
a new entrant into a mature and saturated retail market?
227. H3G argued that
it should be treated differently from the other MNOs because it is a new
entrant to a market which it characterised as “mature and saturated” when
H3G launched its service. Whereas the other MNOs could build their
businesses by attracting first time mobile phone users to their services,
H3G could only build market share by persuading existing mobile phone
users to switch service providers.
228. Mr Russell gave
evidence on behalf of H3G on this point. His evidence was that Orange and
T-Mobile joined a mobile market (in April 1994 and September 1993
respectively) with only limited customer penetration - of approximately
1.5 million to 2.3 million United Kingdom subscribers - and were able to
achieve growth from new customers coming to mobile. The vast majority of
UK consumers had no mobile phone at all. However, UK subscriber numbers
had |
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already increased to about 50
million by the time of H3G’s full commercial launch in March 2003. Mobile
phones had achieved much greater market penetration and a highly developed
“pay as you go” market sector already existed. H3G therefore needed to
acquire customers from incumbent MNOs to be successful in introducing its
3G technology. Moreover, the 3G handsets that H3G had to use were much
more expensive than the 2G handsets used previously because 2G was an
established technology and the 2G handsets were already being produced in
large numbers.
229. The Interveners
disagreed with the description of the market as “mature” and “saturated”.
Mr Tillotson said that Vodafone’s estimates indicate that in the four
years after H3G entered the market there were about 104 million gross
connections. A “gross connection” represents an occasion when a new number
is activated on a mobile network either when a customer ports their number
to a new network or where they are allocated a new number. This figure
therefore includes not only new mobile customers with first time
connections but also customers who have switched provider and those who
“churn and return” i.e. who remain with their existing provider with a
different mobile number (for example to take advantage of a new retail
package which applies to new numbers only).
230. Mr Barden
de Lacroix on behalf of T-Mobile stated that the total number of mobile
service subscribers has risen from 52.8 million at the end of 2003 (that
is after H3G had entered the market) to 69.7 million by the end of 2006.
These figures suggest that in that three year period the market grew by
about 17 million subscriptions, that is more than 30 per cent. The figures
also indicate that an increasing number of people are using more than one
mobile phone, a trend that is encouraged by the popularity of devices such
as “BlackBerry” type handsets, and MP3-capable phones.
231. The Interveners
also point to the success of the mobile virtual network operators who
compete with the five major MNOs for retail mobile phone customers.
Vodafone estimates that Virgin Mobile, which was the first MVNO and
launched in 1999, has a market share by subscribers of more than 6 per
cent in the United |
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Kingdom or approximately 4.5
million active subscribers. Other MVNOs include BT and Carphone Warehouse
as well as other companies with high profile brands such as Tesco and
Asda. There are now at least 13 significant MVNOs in the UK market
accounting for about 10 per cent of the retail market.
232. H3G also argued
that they are being subjected to a price control after a significantly
fewer number of years of operation than was the case for Orange and
T-Mobile. However, there are some advantages to late entry into the
market. Mr Barden de Lacroix’s evidence was that when T-Mobile entered the
market in 1993 it had network coverage of just 20 per cent of the UK
population and there was no mechanism for T-Mobile to insist that the
other UK networks allow roaming on their networks for T-Mobile
subscribers. In contrast when H3G entered the market O2 and Vodafone were
subject to licence conditions requiring them to provide national roaming
services to H3G if H3G was unable to secure such services commercially.
H3G was able to enter into a roaming agreement with O2. This meant that
H3G had 98 per cent coverage by population over the United Kingdom as soon
as it launched whereas T-Mobile only achieved such coverage by 2005, some
12 years after its entry into the market.
233. In the light of
the evidence adduced by the Interveners, the Tribunal is not convinced
that in 2007 H3G can properly be regarded as a new entrant or that it
suffered disadvantages on entering the market to the degree it claims.
Even if it would be right, as H3G argue in their Reply on the SMP and
Appropriate Remedy Issues, to leave “churn and return” figures out of
consideration and even if a proportion of the new gross connections and
additional mobile subscriptions are second phones taken up in a situation
where the subscriber is likely to favour his or her existing network, the
figures still indicate that the retail mobile market is far from stagnant.
H3G is a member of a substantial group of companies with considerable
experience in penetrating this market. Certainly in the Tribunal’s
judgment this factor does not justify leaving H3G’s price
unregulated. |
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(b) H3G’s smaller market share
and the reasons for its traffic imbalance with the other
MNOs.
234. H3G argues that
it is still substantially smaller than the other MNOs because it has only
4 per cent of subscribers whereas the 2G/3G MNOs have roughly equal shares
of the remainder of the market. This means that the adverse effects on its
business of the price control are much greater than is the case for its
competitors. An MNO with a small market share is likely to have a larger
proportion of its calls made “off-net” rather than “on-net”, that is the
proportion of outgoing calls which are made to someone on a different
network rather than on H3G’s network is likely to be greater for H3G than
is the case for the networks with a larger share of subscribers. Since no
mobile call termination is paid when the call is on-net, this means that
H3G pays mobile call termination charges for a higher percentage of its
calls than the other networks who have more on-net calls. Of course, this
also means that H3G receives a higher proportion of incoming calls
“off-net” that is, from subscribers on other networks.
235. There was some
discussion about the correct measure for market share in particular
contexts. Dr Walker, T-Mobile’s expert witness, pointed out that H3G’s
share of minutes called was 10.4 per cent in the final quarter of 2006 and
its share of total market revenue (that is taking retail revenue and
wholesale revenue from mobile termination charges) was more than 9 per
cent in that quarter. These figures were not challenged by
H3G.
236. OFCOM stated in
the 2007 Statement that it was “not persuaded” by H3G’s argument that
because it has relatively few subscribers, regulation will be of limited
benefit (paragraph 7.28):
“First, H3G will grow over the
period of the control and Ofcom does not consider that the consequent
volume of terminated minutes will be insignificant. Second, Ofcom’s
analysis of the financial effect on H3G … suggests that the proposed
remedy will not undermine H3G’s overall financial position and, moreover,
H3G’s reduced MCT termination revenue would be small compared to its
overall revenue. Therefore for the reasons argued here and in section 9
Ofcom considers that there are material welfare gains from the regulation
of H3G.”
237. H3G argues from
this that OFCOM had concluded that at H3G’s current market share
there was no justification for imposing regulation and that the
only
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justification put forward was
that H3G would grow. We do not consider that that is a fair reading either
of that paragraph or of the 2007 Statement as a whole. It is clear from
the 2007 Statement that OFCOM did not regard H3G’s presence in the market
now as so small that regulating it or not regulating it would have an
insignificant impact on the market. Looking at the variety of measures of
market share we do not think it was possible for OFCOM to conclude that
H3G’s current market share was so low that its pricing decisions could not
give rise to any of the detrimental effects identified. The fact that H3G
has a smaller market share and might remain smaller than the other MNOs
over the period of the price control is not in the Tribunal’s judgment a
reason why its mobile call termination charges should remain
unregulated.
238. H3G argued that
the 2G/3G MNOs have “much stronger SMP” than H3G and that BT’s CBP in
relation to H3G offsets or neutralises H3G’s SMP to a far greater degree
than is the case for the other 2G/3G MNOs. H3G argued from this that
because of its smaller market share the need for certainty in relation to
H3G’s prices was less strong in respect of H3G. BT disputed this. Mr Amoss
on behalf of BT stated that BT still requires certainty as to H3G’s mobile
call termination rates regardless of the fact that they currently have
only 4 per cent of the retail market by subscriber. Mobile call
termination from fixed lines to mobile is still a significant service in
terms of volume of calls, involving some 16,000 million minutes of calls a
year. A price difference of 5 pence per minute would cost fixed line
consumers about £800 million per annum and H3G’s share of this would still
be a significant sum in absolute terms even if its market share did not
increase substantially.
239. We agree with
Mr Amoss’s assessment. Even with a market share of 4 per cent of
subscribers (and a significantly higher share of minutes) H3G’s position
in the market is sufficiently significant to justify regulating its
charges.
(c) H3G’s traffic imbalance and the reasons for
it
240. Underlying
H3G’s arguments about its small market share, its status as a new entrant
and the reasons why it should not be subject to price control is the case
that H3G put forward about the disadvantages it faces because of the
current |
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mobile number portability
arrangements. Mr Russell gave evidence for H3G on this issue. He asserted
that in switching between MNOs most customers do not want to change their
telephone numbers because of the inconvenience this causes. Compared with
arrangements in markets overseas, the UK system is flawed – it presents a
significant barrier to growth and limits customer choice and freedom. He
identified two particular problems with the UK system. First that it is
“donor led” in that the customer must approach their existing operator to
start the process. This gives the existing network a chance to try to win
back the customer or persuade that customer to keep their phone number for
incoming calls. Mr Russell compares this with other countries that are all
recipient-led and thus avoid this problem. Secondly the process is
cumbersome and takes too long. Same day porting is international best
practice. For example in Australia, many ports are achieved within 1 hour
and the regulator requires that 90 per cent be completed within three
hours. In Ireland porting takes 20 minutes on average.
241. According to Mr
Russell the inadequacies of the UK mobile number portability system have
materially contributed to H3G having what he calls “a systemic traffic
imbalance” with the incumbent MNOs. This meant, he said in evidence, that
even at the level of termination charges set by H3G when it was
unregulated, H3G was a net out payer of mobile call termination charges to
the incumbents. The 2007 Statement will seriously exacerbate this effect.
Over the period covered by the 2007 Statement H3G estimates that the price
control imposed on H3G will leave it much worse off in terms of its
overall net interconnect position. This is because although H3G’s payments
to the other MNOs will diminish because their prices are also being
brought down by the 2007 Statement, H3G’s own revenue from mobile call
termination will decrease by a greater amount as a result of its price
control.
242. Further
the result of these problems, according to Mr Russell, is that H3G has
achieved a substantially lower percentage of customers who port their
numbers compared with the Hutchison group businesses in other
jurisdictions. He also states that the UK system encourages what he calls
“second hand set behaviour” whereby many customers retain their existing
hand set and number to receive in-coming calls and use the H3G phone for
making outgoing calls. This means that |
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although H3G earns revenue from
the new customer from the retail sale of the outgoing calls it does not
earn revenue from mobile call termination charges for the incoming calls.
He points to the fact that H3G customers make substantially more outgoing
calls than they receive, though the extent to which this is the case has
reduced somewhat when one compares the figures for the first nine months
of 2007 with the figures for 2006. H3G does not experience the same level
of traffic imbalance in any of the other jurisdictions in which it has 3G
operations and H3G relies on a correlation between this fact and the fact
that the other jurisdictions have effective recipient-led mobile number
portability arrangements as supporting its arguments. The Hutchison
companies around the world have not, according to Mr Russell’s evidence,
experienced the same degree of traffic imbalance despite the fact that
they have followed similar entry strategies.
243. The evidence
put forward by Mr Russell was, in the Tribunal’s judgment, largely
undermined by the evidence put forward by OFCOM and the
Interveners.
244. The Interveners
relied on market surveys conducted by OFCOM which indicate that very few
customers cite the length of time taken to port their number as a reason
not to change network. OFCOM’s research The consumer experience –
Research report (November 2006) shows that 95 per cent of consumers
who had switched provider believed that switching was easy or very easy.
Such evidence does not, of course, indicate how many people who did not
switch suppliers were discouraged from doing so by the number
portability arrangements. However, OFCOM’s November 2006 consultation
Review of General Condition 18 – Number Portability (16 November
2006) included the results of a consumer survey which found that of those
respondents who had not switched provider, only three out of 1,167
cited unprompted the time taken to transfer their number to a new network
as a reason for not switching. Of those respondents who had switched
provider, three quarters changed their number. Their reasons for not
porting their number were varied but only 10 per cent cited unprompted the
hassle or delay of porting their number as a reason for not doing so. Of
those respondents who had switched provider and ported their number, 82
per cent expressed themselves to be “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with
the time taken to transfer their number. |
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245. In its July
2007 consultation on number portability, Arrangements for porting phone
numbers when customers switch supplier – A review of General Condition 18
(17 July 2007) OFCOM stated that it does not agree with H3G that
present arrangements for routing calls to ported numbers necessarily
result in significant unmet demand for porting. In a survey annexed to
that statement it was reported that those customers who had switched
providers and had changed (that is not ported) their number, only 8 per
cent cited hassle or delay as the reason for not doing so.
246. H3G submitted
its own survey evidence to OFCOM and appended it to its Notice of Appeal.
This indicated a higher level of dissatisfaction with the current mobile
number portability arrangements but still indicated that the majority of
respondents who had ported their numbers were satisfied with the porting
time.
247. Moreover, there
was a great deal of evidence that in fact the numbers of people changing
network are very high. Mr Barden de Lacroix on behalf of T-Mobile referred
to a table contained in a report produced by Merrill Lynch dated 28 March
2007 entitled Global Wireless Matrix for Q4 2006. This table shows
that the level of “churn” in the market has been between 30 and 33 per
cent in each of the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. This does not support a
conclusion that switching is being impeded by concerns about the
portability process. Rather, as Mr Barden de Lacroix says the figures
demonstrate that “there are, every year, many millions of consumers who
re-evaluate their mobile phone subscription arrangements and are prepared
to move to a different MNO/MVNO in order to get a better deal”.
(§53)
248. H3G in their
Reply cast doubt on this, asserting that “the vast majority of customers
never switch networks” and referring to OFCOM’s recent survey data as
recording that only 12 per cent of subscribers had switched network in the
past 12 months. Dr Walker, for T-Mobile, explained during his cross
examination why this survey evidence was perhaps less reliable than the
other evidence put before the Tribunal which was based on actual reported
disconnections gathered from the operators. In any event, H3G’s Reply does
not properly describe the results of the OFCOM Research Report The
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(20 November 2007). The figures
show that the percentage of people who had switched in the last 12 months
as at the second quarter of 2005 and 2006 was 16 per cent and this had
fallen to 12 per cent for the second quarter of 2007. The Report also
stated that two in five consumers have ever switched suppliers, a quarter
had switched once and 16 per cent have switched at least twice. OFCOM
recorded that there had been a “significant increase” in the proportion of
consumers who have switched twice. Further, customers with a contract
(rather than ‘Pay As You Go’) are much more likely to switch – switching
amongst these customers increased from 50 per cent in 2006 to 55 per cent
in 2007. We do not therefore regard the Report as contradicting the points
made by the Interveners and OFCOM.
249. H3G also
criticised the figures relied on by the Interveners because they include
“churn and return” customers who remain with their existing network but
with a different mobile number. H3G argues, it is unrealistic to suggest
that a customer who is loyal to a particular network but simply changes
his phone number in order to move his subscription to a different package
offered by the same network, presents a real opportunity for a competing
network to win his business. We disagree. In our judgment, a customer who
is willing to change his phone number in order to improve the package he
is on with his existing network does represent a competitive opportunity
for another network since he is clearly more price sensitive than another
customer who stays with the same package year after year.
250. Mr Barden de
Lacroix has analysed where the customers who have ported away from
T-Mobile have gone. In the year to September 2006 only 14 per cent of
customers who ported away from T-Mobile ported to H3G. This figure
compares unfavourably with the 35 per cent who ported to Orange and the 31
per cent who ported to O2. It is also below the 17 per cent who ported to
Vodafone. Mr Tillotson gave the equivalent figures for the destination
networks for those who port away from Vodafone. These also showed that
each of Orange, T-Mobile and O2 was significantly more successful in
attracting customers than H3G. H3G’s competitors use the same porting
system and are subject to the same port lead times and donor conveyance
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networks have been more
successful than H3G in winning new customers cannot therefore be
attributable to the mobile number portability system.
251. The Merrill
Lynch figures to which Mr Barden de Lacroix refers show that H3G’s churn
figures are the highest of all the MNOs albeit that its rate of churn has
fallen from 7.1 per cent per month in 2004 to around 4 per cent per month
in 2006. Even at a churn rate of 4 per cent per month, this suggests that
H3G has been losing around half of its customers in the space of a year.
Mr Tillotson for Vodafone compared the figures from the 2006 Annual Report
of Hutchison Whampoa (H3G’s ultimate parent company) which show an average
churn rate of 4.9 per cent monthly for the UK and Ireland with Vodafone’s
churn rate for UK contract and pre-pay customers of 33.8 per cent
annually. This may be because, as H3G put it in their Reply, H3G is more
likely to have “value-seeking regularly churning customers” given that its
customer base is necessarily made up of those who have chosen at least
once to switch networks. But it still indicates that the mobile number
portability arrangements do not appear to be dissuading customers from
leaving H3G.
252. Mr Tillotson’s
evidence was that most customers attach little priority to keeping their
phone number. He points to the significant minority of Vodafone’s churn
rate which is accounted for by “churn and return” customers. The fact that
so many customers choose to change phone number even without switching
supplier in order to take advantage of a particular retail offer
illustrates the lack of importance that customers attach to retaining
their mobile phone number. Mr Tillotson accepted that the donor led
process did allow the donor MNO to try to win back the customer. But he
said, unsurprisingly, that their efforts to retain their customers apply
to all those who are switching whether they are doing so simply by
terminating their contract with Vodafone and getting a new number from
their preferred network or by porting their number to a
competitor.
253. As regards
H3G’s evidence about second handset behaviour Mr Tillotson said that from
“a purely intuitive perspective” it seemed unlikely that there can be many
customers prepared to tolerate the inconvenience of keeping two mobile
phones indefinitely rather than wait five days to transfer their number.
He |
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referred to market research
commissioned by OFCOM on phone usage among H3G users and particular among
those with more than one SIM card. The answers suggested that there are a
variety of reasons why a customer might wish to have more than one phone,
for example to split business and personal calls or to take advantage of
free calls at different times. None of the reasons given had anything to
do with the current mobile number portability arrangements.
254. Mr Tillotson
also casts doubt on H3G’s comparisons with its experience in other
countries where the MNO arrangements are faster and recipient led. He
refers to an international benchmarking study published by OFCOM in its
November 2006 consultation indicating that the UK compares favourably with
other countries in terms of the target maximum porting period and the
percentage of mobile phone users who have actually ported their number. Of
the 25 countries included in OFCOM’s survey, only seven have a shorter
maximum porting period than the UK and the propensity to port in the UK
was in line with the average. Furthermore the evidence does not support a
link between the proportion of customers who choose to port their numbers
and the target maximum porting period.
255. In its Defence
OFCOM set out a table comparing H3G’s average monthly incoming and
outgoing minutes per subscriber with the published data for the other four
MNOs. The table which showed the traffic levels calculated by reference to
the active subscriber figures of the other MNOs and an estimate of H3G’s
active subscriber base showed the following |
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256. OFCOM submitted that this
makes clear that H3G’s traffic imbalance is not caused by a deficit
of incoming traffic per subscriber (as would be the case if the mobile
number portability system and second hand set behaviour were the
cause) |
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but is due to a significant
surplus of outgoing traffic per subscriber for H3G in comparison with the
other MNOs. The figures show that H3G’s average monthly incoming traffic
per active subscriber was not much above the average monthly incoming
traffic per active subscriber for the other MNOs. The figures for incoming
traffic in this table exclude all on-net calls for H3G and the other MNOs.
The figures given for outgoing calls exclude on-net calls for H3G but
include on-net calls for the other MNOs. Figures for H3G’s incoming calls
including on-net calls were not available to OFCOM.
257. H3G countered this point by arguing that
because it has a smaller market share of subscribers one would expect it
to have a larger amount of off-net outgoing calls because a smaller proportion of the calls that
its subscribers make are on-net. A subscriber to H3G would necessarily
therefore make and receive a higher proportion of off-net calls than a
subscriber to one of the other larger MNOs. OFCOM however provided the
Tribunal with a note showing that this did not account for the discrepancy that the
figures illustrate. If one assumes that each of the four 2G/3G MNOs has a
market share of 25 per cent so that the incoming call figures (which exclude on-net) represent only
75 per cent of the total traffic, one would have to gross up the figures
in the table by 33.3 per cent to arrive at a figure for incoming calls
including on-net calls. This would convert the 43 - 71 mins figures to 57
- 95. Assuming H3G has a 5 per cent market share, its grossed up incoming
minutes figure would be [… ][K] mins instead of [… ][K] mins. As regards
outgoing calls, only H3G’s figure would need to be grossed up to include on-net outgoing calls since
these are already included in the figures for the other MNOs. This would convert H3G’s
figure of […][X] mins into a figure of [… ][X] mins.
258. The table would therefore look like
this: |
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259. These figures
still show that the traffic imbalance is caused by a substantially larger
number of outgoing minutes rather than a substantially smaller number of
incoming minutes. These figures, even once adjusted, do not support Mr
Russell’s evidence that the cause of the transfer imbalance is “second
handset behaviour” or otherwise the result of the mobile number
portability arrangements.
- The Tribunal’s conclusion on mobile number portability
and traffic imbalance.
260. In the
Tribunal’s judgment the evidence provided by OFCOM and the Interveners is
overwhelming in establishing that the mobile number portability
arrangements are not the sole or even the major cause of H3G’s failure
hitherto to grow its market share. There may be good reasons to reform the
current system for mobile number portability, for example to bring the
United Kingdom system into line with the arrangements which exist in other
jurisdictions or otherwise to improve the arrangements in ways which bring
advantages to consumers. Our concern in this case is to consider whether
there is evidence that the current arrangements, which apply to all the
MNOs, in fact have a particularly adverse effect on H3G because of H3G’s
position in this market. The evidence we have seen shows that there is a
large amount of subscriber switching in this market and many millions of
opportunities for the MNOs to compete with each other for customers’
business. Mobile number portability may at most be a contributory factor
towards the lack of customers prepared to switch to H3G but certainly does
not play the role that H3G has claimed for it in these
proceedings.
261. We do not find
the evidence of H3G’s experience in other jurisdictions, where the mobile
number portability arrangements in place are different, at all convincing.
First, it is very difficult to draw any conclusions derived from two
disparate facts plucked out of the information about a wide range of
international markets. The OFCOM survey cited by Mr Tillotson also
indicates that the inferences Mr Russell invites the Tribunal to draw from
this information are at least questionable. |
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- Should the Tribunal remit
the question of the cause of traffic imbalance to OFCOM?
262. H3G submitted
that if the Tribunal concluded that H3G’s failure to expand its business
was not caused by the mobile number portability problems then it should
remit the case to OFCOM to investigate further what the cause of traffic
imbalance was. Various other explanations for H3G’s limited market
expansion have been raised. H3G sought to amend its Notice of Appeal to
include an argument based on the allegation that the 2G/3G MNOs charge
lower retail prices for calls to other numbers on their own network
(on-net calls) than they charged for calls to numbers on competing
networks (off-net calls). This, they wished to argue, discouraged
customers from moving away from an MNO with a larger market share to one
with a small market share. The Tribunal refused to allow H3G to amend its
pleading to raise this point for the reasons set out in the judgment
handed down on 23 November 2007: see [2007] CAT 33.
263. Mr Tillotson
for Vodafone and Mr Barden de Lacroix for T-Mobile suggested various other
reasons that they consider more likely to be the cause of H3G’s perceived
lack of growth. The Tribunal made it clear at the outset of the hearing in
January that there was not enough evidence before the Tribunal for it to
be able to make findings as to aspects of H3G’s business that that
evidence highlighted. Similarly there was insufficient evidence before the
Tribunal from H3G as to what commercial strategy H3G had pursued since the
launch of its service in the United Kingdom in relation to what groups of
customers it had targeted and why.
264. The Tribunal is
therefore in a position where it has found that the cause for H3G’s low
market share and for its imbalance of traffic with the other MNOs is not
caused by mobile number portability arrangements but it is not able to say
what the cause is. If the Tribunal concluded that the reason for H3G’s
small market share was relevant to the decision to impose a price control
then it would need to remit the matter to OFCOM to investigate
this. |
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265. However, the
Tribunal is satisfied that there is no need to investigate further the
causes of traffic imbalance or the reason why H3G has not expanded its
market share.
266. We have set out
earlier (paragraph [234]-[239]) why the Tribunal does not consider that
H3G’s small market share justifies leaving its mobile call termination
charges outside the price control. H3G also alleges that OFCOM’s rejection
of the evidence that mobile number portability arrangements were
responsible for H3G’s slow growth meant that the assumptions OFCOM used
about likely growth in market share over the period of the price control
were over optimistic. OFCOM’s model used for setting the price control
assumes that H3G achieves parity of market share with the other MNOs by
2016 (see paragraph 9.43 of the 2007 Statement and paragraphs A5.38 and
A5.79 of Annex 5 to that Statement). H3G argues that unless substantial
changes are made to the mobile number portability arrangements, it is very
unlikely that H3G will increase its market share to such a significant
extent.
267. It is important
to understand the basis for OFCOM’s assumptions underlying the price
control. OFCOM was not trying to predict how H3G’s market share would grow
over the price control period. Any such prediction would have needed to
take account of H3G’s commercial strategy and any other factors peculiar
to H3G. OFCOM’s assumption was rather that a reasonably efficient MNO
would capture its fair share of churn in the market and that this would
lead to it increasing its market share at the expense of its competitors
over a given period. Whether or not H3G in fact does so is not, generally
speaking, OFCOM’s concern – that will depend on how well H3G manages to
compete with its rivals. The price control must be based on the assumption
that H3G will compete as well as the other MNOs so that H3G benefits from
over performing in relation to this assumption but is not favoured in the
event that it underperforms.
268. This approach
by OFCOM was entirely proper unless H3G put forward a reason why it would
not achieve that growth even if it were as efficient as its rivals. If H3G
had been able to establish that the mobile number portability arrangements
presented a significant hurdle to any new entrant in growing market share,
that is
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certainly a factor that might
have altered the assumptions underlying the price control. But once OFCOM
had rejected that argument, rightly in the Tribunal’s judgment, it was not
then incumbent on OFCOM to investigate every other alternative reason why
a company in H3G’s position might gain more or less than its fair share of
the business available over the period. There was nothing to undermine the
reasonableness of the assumption that the efficient entrant would achieve
market parity by 2016 and OFCOM was entitled to rely on that when setting
the price control.
269. The Tribunal
therefore does not consider that it is necessary or appropriate to remit
the matter to OFCOM for further investigation.
(d) Assumption that asymmetric regulation is
undesirable
270. H3G alleges
that OFCOM’s approach to the question whether it should impose a price
control on the 2G/3G MNOs but not on H3G was influenced by an assumption
that asymmetric regulation is in general undesirable in this market. H3G
argued that this ignored more recent academic literature which revises
this conventional view and points in favour of asymmetric regulation for
the benefit of market entrants. It is important to distinguish between two
different questions here. First there is the question, which is for the
Tribunal to determine, whether it is appropriate to impose what we shall
refer to as “asymmetric regulation” in this market, that is to impose a
price control on the four 2G/3G MNOs but not on H3G. Secondly there is the
question, which is for the Competition Commission to determine, whether it
is appropriate to impose what we shall refer to as “asymmetric price
control” that is to differentiate between H3G and the other MNOs in terms
of the Target Average Charge and/or the glide path set within the price
control.
271. Mr Myers’
witness statement on behalf of OFCOM emphasised the competitive
distortions that might arise from asymmetric regulation where the
unregulated MNO will be able to earn a much larger profit margin on each
minute of termination than the other four MNOs. The unregulated MNO would
have a competitive advantage in the retail mobile market arising from its
ability to exploit its market power in the wholesale mobile call
termination market. |
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Mr Myers therefore supported the
conclusion set out at paragraph 7.55 – 56 of the 2007 Statement where
OFCOM said:
“ … it is not efficient for this
competition to be based on excessive charges for MCT. For the same reason,
Ofcom does not accept H3G’s view that increased competition in mobile
markets, founded on the unique ability of one player with SMP to set MCT
charges without regulatory constraints, should be pursued as a regulatory
objective.”
272. Dr Littlechild
in his third witness statement stated that at least one economist
questions whether asymmetric regulation is inappropriate and whether
symmetric regulation makes the situation better or worse. That economist
is Dr Martin Peitz, and Dr Littlechild refers to two articles by Dr Peitz
in 2002 and 2005. He also referred to two other European NRAs who have
recently approved asymmetric rates for the benefit of a new entrant, or at
least a smaller player, and a recent public consultation on symmetry and
asymmetry of mobile and fixed termination rates issued by the European
Regulators Group (ERG). Dr Littlechild concludes in paragraph 23(c) of his
third statement that:
“To assess all these papers and
decisions is beyond the scope of the present response to Mr Myers. I have
referred to the ERG consultation, but otherwise do not proposed to
discuss, defend or rely on any of the arguments contained in these papers.
I cite them simply to demonstrate that the view taken by Ofcom and Mr
Myers, and by [an economist cited by Mr Myers], is not the only one. The
case against asymmetric regulation is not as straightforward as it may
once have seemed, particularly where new entrants and the nature of
competition are concerned. This correspondingly undermines Ofcom’s heavy
reliance on the principle of avoiding asymmetric regulation because of its
distorting effect on competition”.
273. In his oral
evidence Dr Littlechild seemed to go a little further than this, stating
that the documents he relied on espoused the view that there is an actual
disadvantage in symmetric regulation and a positive advantage in
asymmetric regulation, and that this undermines OFCOM’s reliance on the
disbenefits of asymmetric regulation. |
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274. The Tribunal has considered
the article by Dr Peitz published in 2002 Asymmetric access price
regulation in telecommunications markets and his later 2005 paper
Asymmetric regulation of access and price discrimination in
telecommunications. The Tribunal does not consider that they support
the principles proposed by Dr Littlechild. Dr Peitz is dealing with the
position of a |
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new entrant coming into a market
to compete with an established incumbent. It is not at all clear whether
Dr Peitz would, if presented with details of the market in which the MNOs
operate in the UK, consider that the points he raises in his papers have
any application in the situation that the Tribunal is considering. It is
certainly not right to regard Dr Peitz as recommending the outcome for
which H3G contends in its current appeal.
275. We have also
considered the European regulatory decisions to which Dr Littlechild
referred. The first was a decision of the Portuguese regulator ICP-ANACOM
which was proposing to amend the price control obligation imposed in the
wholesale market for mobile call termination. ANACOM required a reduction
by all the operators from the current mobile call termination rate of 11
Euro cents per minute but allowed Optimus to charge between 1.6 cents and
1.3 cents per minute more than the other two. ANACOM explained that this
asymmetry in favour of Optimus as a transitory measure prior to a new
market review exercise taking place before the end of 2008. The proposed
asymmetry reflected Optimus’ higher costs, the fact that it entered the
market six years later than the other MNOs and that it was disadvantaged
by network effects and traffic imbalances.
276. The European
Commission in its comments on these proposals asked ANACOM to reconsider
the proposed asymmetry of mobile call termination rates in favour of
Optimus. The Commission stated that “although in exceptional cases,
asymmetry might be justified by objective cost differences (which are
outside the control of the operators), the fact that an MNO entered the
market at a later stage and that it has a smaller market share can only
justify higher MTRs for a transitory period.” The Commission urged ANACOM
to move towards reducing MTRs to the level of costs of an efficient
operator which takes into account only those objective cost differences
which are outside the control of the operators.
277. The second
decision referred to by the parties was the decision of the French
regulator, Decision No 2007-0819 of French NRA, ARCEP, of 4 October 2007.
In France at that time there were three MNOs, Orange France, SFR and
Bouygues Telecom. Bouygues Telecom had entered the market later than
the |
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other two operators. In that
decision, ARCEP concluded on the basis of a wide ranging review of market
conditions that it was appropriate to grant a price differentiation to
Bouygues Telecom to take account of the progressive nature of the process
of convergence of prices towards costs. It set a price for an 18-month
period of €0.065 per minute for Orange France and SFR and €0.085 per
minute for Bouygues Telecom, indicating that it would reconsider the
levels and therefore the asymmetry thereafter. This decision was, the
Authority believed, fully consistent with the principle of symmetry in the
long term.
278. Finally the
Tribunal has looked at the public consultation document issued in December
2007 by the ERG on a draft common position on symmetry of mobile/fixed
call termination rates. The paper notes that the Commission considers that
termination rates should normally be symmetric and that asymmetry requires
an adequate justification. Referring to new entrants, the paper states
that the right of new entrants to recover their costs should be reconciled
with the regulatory objective of achieving the maximum level of efficiency
in the supply of termination services. Hence, asymmetries should not
remain in force for too long and each operator’s termination rate should
be brought down to the cost of an efficient operator as soon as possible.
The paper notes that asymmetric termination rates may be justified, but
stresses that this must be for a limited transitional period and that
differences in prices must effectively reflect differences in
costs.
279. In the
Tribunal’s judgment, there is nothing in the European materials that
supports H3G’s case in this part of its appeal. It is clear that what is
being discussed is asymmetric price control rather than asymmetric
regulation – there is no indication that it is appropriate to leave even a
new entrant’s prices unregulated entirely as H3G suggest here. That
question is simply not discussed in any of the material. Secondly it
appears that the justification put forward for the asymmetry is that the
new entrant is incurring higher costs as a result of objective
circumstances beyond the control of the operator, making it appropriate to
set asymmetric prices for a short time. However, in the present case, H3G
does not argue that its prices should be left unregulated because its
costs of 3G termination are substantially higher than those of the other
MNOs. Its argument |
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is that it should be allowed to
charge high mobile call termination rates in order to support its offering
in the retail market so that it can compete more energetically with the
other MNOs. There is nothing in the material we have been shown which
indicates any support for asymmetric regulation based on that
justification.
280. The form of
asymmetric regulation which H3G urged upon the Tribunal goes far beyond
anything that the material we have been shown contemplates. We do not
agree with Dr Littlechild that asymmetric regulation is simply an extreme
form of asymmetric price control so that the principles discussed in that
material can be extrapolated to support H3G’s case on this
point.
The Tribunal’s conclusions on the discrimination ground of
appeal
281. The Tribunal
concludes that there was no justification for treating H3G differently
from the other MNOs in deciding whether to impose a price control and that
the 2007 Statement does not discriminate against H3G within the meaning of
section 47(2)(b) of the 2003 Act. This does not of course prejudge in any
way what the Competition Commission may decide about whether there should
be asymmetric price control in this case either to the extent that exists
in the price controls set by OFCOM or to any different
extent.
(viii) Was there a risk of a
price distortion having adverse effects within the meaning of section
88(1)(a) of the 2003 Act?
282. According to
section 88 of the 2003 Act OFCOM must not set a price control unless it
appears to them from the market analysis carried out for the purpose of
setting that condition that there is a relevant risk of adverse effects
arising from price distortion. A relevant risk is defined, for the
purposes of this case, as a risk that the dominant provider might so fix
and maintain some or all of his prices at an excessively high level as to
have adverse consequences for end-users of public electronic
communications services.
283. H3G argues that
OFCOM did not adduce any evidence to support the allegation that there was
a real risk that H3G might raise its prices to an excessive level in the
absence of a price control. On the contrary, H3G argues, there is plenty
of |
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evidence to show that they would
not do so. H3G relies on the fact that the initial price struck with BT
when H3G launched its 3G service in March 2003 was the same as the 2G
rates fixed by one of the 2G/3G MNOs (T-Mobile) and comparable with those
fixed by another (Orange). In its Reply, H3G analyses the figures set out
in Figure A13.4 of the 2007 Statement where OFCOM compares 2G/3G 1800MHz
and 3G-only blended efficient charge benchmarks under a particular voice
and data traffic scenario. That shows, H3G says, that in 2003/4 when H3G
entered into its SIA with BT, the efficiently incurred cost benchmark for
3G only termination was over 10 ppm and indeed H3G argues that it is clear
from the figures in the 2007 Statement that until about 2006 the
efficiently incurred cost benchmark was above 10 ppm. Secondly, H3G argues
that H3G’s 3G rates have generally been lower than the 3G element within
the blended rate of the 2G/3G MNOs.
284. OFCOM’s primary
argument in rebuttal of this point is that there is no need for it to
adduce the kind of evidence to which H3G refers before it can be satisfied
that there is a relevant risk of excessive pricing for the purposes of
section 88. It needs only to show that the dominant provider has the
ability to raise prices and that it has the incentive to do so. Here one
is dealing with a dominant provider which has 100 per cent share of the
relevant market and absolute barriers to entry. There are two incentives
for an MNO to increase its prices because (a) this increases the costs of
MNOs’ competitors and (b) it generates revenues which can be used by the
MNO to compete in the retail market. OFCOM argues that those facts in
themselves are sufficient to satisfy the test in section 88.
285. The Tribunal
agrees with OFCOM’s analysis of this point. It is clear from the structure
of the SMP regime that the provisions contemplate that something more is
needed than a simple finding of SMP in order to justify the imposition of
price controls – it is possible that a communications provider can be
found to have SMP in circumstances where the test for imposing a price
condition is not satisfied. OFCOM referred, as an example of such a
situation, to its consideration during the market review leading to the
2004 Statement as to whether to impose a price control on H3G as regards
2G termination. We were referred to passages in the December 2003
consultation which show that |
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OFCOM decided that H3G had the
ability to set excessive prices for 2G termination services (see paragraph
5.125 of the Consultation) but found that it was less certain that it had
the incentive to do so because it was in H3G’s interest to migrate traffic
as soon as possible from its 2G roaming arrangement to its own 3G network.
This, along with the difficulties of establishing the costs of providing
the 3G service led OFCOM to conclude that a cost based price control for
2G call termination by H3G was not justified.
286. But in the
Tribunal’s judgment this does not mean that OFCOM must identify a period
in the past when the operator’s prices were not constrained by regulation
and attempt to assess how reasonable its prices were during that period.
It is enough that OFCOM can conclude that there is an ability to charge
high prices, an incentive to do so and no other factor in the market which
would remove the risk of excessively high pricing in the absence of
regulation. There is no need to show that the operator has charged or
attempted to charge an excessively high price.
287. As regards
other factors which might remove the risk of excessively high pricing, H3G
also reintroduced in this context the arguments it relied on for its case
on the SMP Issue namely that the E2E Proviso itself has the effect of
preventing BT from having to agree to excessively high prices and so
prevents the risk of such prices arising. In its Reply on the SMP and
Appropriate Remedy Issues, H3G points out that the end-to-end connectivity
obligation was designed to limit BT’s otherwise very significant
bargaining power and to equalise BT’s position with undertakings seeking
interconnection. In order to find that, absent a price control, H3G would
impose an excessive or abusive price on BT, OFCOM must conclude that it
would in a dispute between BT and H3G approve such a price as reasonable
under BT’s end-to-end connectivity obligation. This argument fails, in the
Tribunal’s judgment for the same reasons that the argument fails in
relation to the SMP Issue; first because OFCOM might set a rate as a
result of dispute resolution which is appreciably above the competitive
level, although not abusively high and secondly because under the modified
greenfield approach, OFCOM’s potential intervention to set the price must
be disregarded when considering H3G’s likely conduct in the absence of
regulation.
111 |
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288. Looking at the
conditions in this market, OFCOM was fully justified in concluding that
the test in section 88(1)(a) was met.
289. As a secondary
argument, OFCOM also relies on the pricing behaviour of H3G as evidence
which shows that the test in section 88(1)(a) is met. In particular OFCOM
points to H3G’s increase in its termination rate to 16.6 ppm as indicating
H3G’s ability and willingness to raise its prices in the absence of
regulation. H3G argued strenuously that this was not a fair interpretation
of events. Mr Russell’s evidence was that H3G only sought to increase its
own mobile call termination rate to achieve “a degree of parity in 3G
rates” with the 2G/3G MNOs who had introduced a 3G element into a blended
rate. H3G did not want to be “at a further competitive disadvantage” in
response to the actions of the 2G/3G MNOs. H3G’s position had always been,
however, that mobile call termination rates were set too high – that is
why it had appealed against OFCOM’s decision in the BT Dispute
Determinations, even though OFCOM had upheld the price that H3G sought to
charge.
290. The Tribunal is
not convinced by Mr Russell’s explanation of the H3G price rise proposed
in November 2006. The perceived need to achieve parity with the 3G rates
of the other MNOs in order to protect H3G’s competitive position can mean
two things. First, H3G might have been concerned that if it failed to
increase its own termination rate, its payment imbalance with the other
MNOs would widen as a result of the price increases imposed by the other
MNOs. Secondly it could mean that H3G was concerned that the MNOs would
increase their revenues from mobile call termination and be able to use
those sums in competing for customers in the retail market. But to
safeguard H3G’s position with regard to both those concerns, H3G needed
only to increase its rate to match the overall increase in rate that the
other MNOs were imposing, not to match the 3G element in the blended rate.
A much smaller increase in H3G’s rate to achieve parity with the blended
rates rather than the underlying 3G rates of the 2G/3G MNOs would have
cancelled out any widening of the payment imbalance between H3G and the
other operators and have provided H3G with a matching increase in absolute
revenues to support its own retail effort. |
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291. But whatever
the reason behind the price increase to 16.6 ppm proposed by H3G in
November 2006, the Tribunal accepts that this attempt by H3G to increase
its prices to BT supports OFCOM’s contention that the test in section
88(1)(a) is satisfied here. Given the arguments put to the Tribunal by H3G
regarding their poor profitability, OFCOM was fully justified in assuming
that if H3G had the ability to increase profits by charging more for
mobile call termination, it would be likely to do so.
292. As regards
H3G’s argument that its prices for 3G termination may have been fixed
below the rate of efficiently incurred costs in 2003/04 and that they have
generally been below the underlying rate for 3G termination included in
the blended rates of the other MNOs, OFCOM argues that this comparison is
misleading. One should not just look at the period since the 2G/3G MNOs
introduced blended rates but at the period since they introduced 3G
termination. There have been periods in which 2G/3G MNOs were providing 3G
call termination but were not charging any more for it than the regulated
2G price. During that period, H3G’s price for 3G termination was above the
price charged by 2G/3G MNOs. This is particularly the case given that H3G
charges its 3G termination rate in respect of calls which are in fact
terminated on the 2G networks of its roaming partners.
293. Mr Amoss giving
evidence for BT also disputed this contention by H3G. He points to the
fact that although H3G’s mobile call termination rate has remained
constant over the period since its service was launched, the overall rates
of the other MNOs declined over the same period. O2 in its Statement of
Intervention also argues that the fact that H3G’s termination rate has
remained static while the 2G rates of the other MNOS have fallen is a very
strong indicator that H3G’s mobile call termination charges are not
constrained in any way by competition and that there is a real risk that
H3G will charge excessive rates absent a price control.
294. In the light of
the fact that the rates under discussion are the subject of the
Termination Rate Dispute appeals the Tribunal does not consider it is
necessary in this judgment to explore further the appropriateness of the
comparisons being |
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made. It suffices to say for the
purposes of this part of the judgment that the Tribunal has seen nothing
in the history of the setting of charges for mobile call termination on 3G
networks which indicates that the market has become effectively
competitive or that OFCOM was wrong to conclude that there was a relevant
risk of adverse effects.
295. Section
88(1)(a) of the 2003 Act requires not only that there is a relevant risk
of adverse effects arising from excessively high prices but that these
prices must be such as to have adverse consequences for end-users of
public electronic communications services. This raises the question of
whether the “waterbed” effect is “complete” – that is to say, whether the
state of competition in the retail market is sufficient to ensure that all
surplus profits earned by MNOs from mobile call termination are passed
through to consumers in the form of lower retail call
packages.
296. In the 2007
Statement OFCOM acknowledged that the retail market has become more
competitive in recent years and it has become less likely that MNOs will
be able to retain excess profits earned in supplying termination services.
Nevertheless OFCOM states that it remains of the view that in a market
with a limited number of network competitors, complicated retail tariffs
and significant entry barriers the waterbed effect is unlikely to be
complete. The Tribunal shares this view and further agrees with OFCOM that
even if the waterbed effect were fully effective, excessive termination
charges may give rise to other detriments, in particular distortions
between fixed and mobile operators and inequitable distributional
effects.
297. The Tribunal’s
conclusions as to the undesirability of unconstrained mobile call
termination charges being used to advantage one mobile competitor in the
retail market have been set out earlier. In the Tribunal’s judgment these
concerns amply demonstrate that there would be a relevant risk of adverse
consequences for end-users if H3G were not subject to a price control in
respect of its mobile call termination prices. |
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(ix) The Tribunal’s conclusions on the price control
remedy |
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298. The Tribunal’s
conclusion is that none of the reasons put forward as to why it was
inappropriate to impose a price control remedy on H3G is well founded. In
the Tribunal’s judgment, OFCOM was correct in deciding to set a price
control for H3G as well as for the 2G/3G MNOs in the 2007
Statement.
VII. CONCLUSION
299. The conclusions
arrived at by the Tribunal on all the issues set out in this judgment are
unanimous. The Tribunal therefore:
(a) dismisses
the appeal against the finding of significant market power in the
Reassessment Statement; and
(b) dismisses the
appeal against the 2007 Statement in so far as it comprises matters which
are not specified price control matters. |
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Vivien Rose
Andrew Bain
Adam
Scott |
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Charles Dhanowa
Date: 20 May 2008
Registrar |
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