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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Pritchard v Hamer [1996] UKEAT 27_95_3101 (31 January 1996) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1996/27_95_3101.html Cite as: [1996] UKEAT 27_95_3101

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BAILII case number: [1996] UKEAT 27_95_3101

Appeal No. EAT/27/95

EMPOLYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal

On 31 January 1996

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (P)

MR P M SMITH

MRS R A VICKERS

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MR R PRITCHARD          APPELLANT

MRS ANN HAMER           RESPONDENT

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Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised


 


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APPEARANCES

For the Appellant NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE           APPELLANT


 


MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT): On 16 November 1994 the Industrial Tribunal, held at Ledbury, unanimously decided that the sum of £7,046 was improperly deducted from the wages of the Applicant, Mr Ronald Pritchard, and that he was entitled to be paid that money by Mrs Ann Hamer of Grange House School. The full reasons for that decision were sent to the parties on 25 November 1994. They explained why, in their view, Mr Pritchard was not entitled to claim constructive dismissal, in addition to his successful claim for arrears of wages.

Mr Pritchard appealed against the rejection of his claim for constructive dismissal. His Notice of Appeal was served on 9 January 1995. The Notice of Appeal was settled by a firm of solicitors in Hay-on-Wye. They stated that the ground of appeal was that the Industrial Tribunal had erred in law in relation to the interpretation and application of the principles relating to constructive dismissal.

It is unnecessary to examine the arguments in view of what happened subsequently. The case was listed for a Preliminary Hearing. This is common in cases of constructive dismissal, since, in most cases, it is a question of fact whether or not there has been a constructive dismissal. It came before the Appeal Tribunal on 18 October. There was no attendance by Mr Pritchard. No-one represented him. An Order was made in these terms:

"UPON THE Appellant being neither present nor represented and upon Ms A Hamer the Respondent in person not being called upon to address the Court THE TRIBUNAL ORDERS that the appeal be dismissed."

Unfortunately, there is no transcript of a judgment giving reasons why Mr Pritchard's appeal was dismissed. It is the practice of this Tribunal, as of all judicial bodies, to give reasons for decisions. An order dismissing an appeal because someone has not attended is not normally sufficient to explain to an Appellant why he is not allowed to go on with his case. We do not know precisely what happened. But, whatever happened, Mr Pritchard was dissatisfied with the situation. He wrote a letter on 28 October explaining why he had not attended, giving an account of conversations that he had had with the Listing Officer of this Tribunal before the date, in which he says he had given prior warning why he could not attend. His belief was that his case would be decided on written representations. Those representations were in the Notice of Appeal settled by his solicitor setting out the grounds of appeal.

In those circumstances, on my direction, a letter was sent by the Registrar informing Mr Pritchard that his letter of complaint about the absence of reasons for rejecting his case would be considered as an application for review. This Tribunal has the power to review its own decisions on a number of grounds. Rule 33 of The Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993 provides that:

"(1) The Appeal Tribunal may, either of its own motion or on application, review any order made by it and may, on such review, revoke or vary that order on the grounds that__

(a) the order was wrongly made as the result of an error on the part of the Tribunal or its staff;

(c) the interests of justice require such review"

In our view, the interests of justice require reasons to be given for the decisions of this Tribunal. It may also be argued that it was an error to make the order without giving any reasons. That was an error on the part of the Tribunal. In those circumstances the matter was re-listed for today as an application for review by Mr Pritchard.

Not surprisingly, the Respondent Mrs Hamer is puzzled by this. She thought that the appeal had been dismissed. She went on to inform us of unfortunate news. She is now bankrupt and unable to pay. This is not the end of this sorry story. Mr Pritchard then wrote us another letter, with another set of reasons why he cannot turn up today.

The position is that we are faced with the same situation as on the previous occasion. Mr Pritchard has not turned up to argue his appeal. He has not sent in any further arguments as to his case. We are pessimistic whether he will turn up at any future appeal hearing. Nevertheless, having considered the point raised in the Notice of Appeal, we consider that he has an arguable point on the constructive dismissal, on the facts found by the Tribunal. We will direct that the appeal proceeds to a full hearing. We express the strong wish that at the full hearing, Mr Pritchard will turn up to argue his case, or, if he does not, he obtains someone to represent him to argue his case. This Tribunal will then be in a better position to give a reasoned decision whether or not there is an error of law in the decision of the Industrial Tribunal.

The order is that the case is directed to proceed to a full hearing of this Tribunal. The parties are to exchange and lodge Skeleton Arguments at least 28 days before the date listed for the full hearing.