Appeal No. EAT/532/96

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 14 October 1996

Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (P)
MR D A C LAMBERT
MRS J M MATTHIAS

MR H SHAH	APPELLANT

ZETA COMMUNICATIONS LTD	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING - EX PARTE

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MR SHAH
(Appellant in person)	

	MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT):   Mr Shah wishes to appeal against the unanimous decision of an Industrial Tribunal held at Shrewsbury over a period of four days. In their decision they held that Mr Shah had resigned voluntarily, and therefore was not dismissed, and therefore had no claim for unfair constructive dismissal.

	The circumstances in which his employment came to an end as a design and development engineer are set out in the reasons of the Industrial Tribunal who had to ask themselves whether the complaint made by Mr Shah that the employer’s conduct towards him amounted to a breach of contract was correct. In the facts they included a paragraph which we can well understand Mr Shah finding offensive to him: paragraph 25 of their decision. We do not think that this was the sort of case where such a finding was necessary to their decision, and for our part we approach this case on the basis that it is not there. 

	Nonetheless, the tribunal did have to pick their way through the facts and the disputed facts, and it is apparent to us from what we have been told by Mr Shah and accept, that in very many respects the employer’s case against him was not fully justified. He made those submissions to the Industrial Tribunal who had the task of deciding where the merits lay in the dispute between the parties. They saw and heard the witnesses, we have not. We do not have a witness box in this court; we cannot hear any evidence; we cannot retry any of the facts. Is there a point of law which has been raised such that this appeal can go ahead for a full hearing? I have to say that in the judgment of this court there is none. 

	Quite rightly, as a result of Mr Shah’s researches, he has discovered a number of cases which set out general principles. It is to be noted that, for example, the tribunal themselves referred to one of the cases on which Mr Shah places reliance, and they have, in our judgment, accurately identified the questions of law which they had to determine.

	Accordingly, as it seems to us, we cannot say that in this case there an arguable point of law fit to go for a full hearing. I can well understand Mr Shah’s unhappiness at the result of the case, but that unhappiness has got to manifest itself in a point of law, a misdirection by the Industrial Tribunal, before we can take up the appeal and decide it.

	As always with these sort of cases, it is with reluctance that we have arrived at our decision, but in our judgment there is no point of law in this appeal.