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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Ernest Charles Thake v Travis Pirkins Trading Co Ltd [1997] UKEAT 1253_97_0812 (8 December 1997) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1997/1253_97_0812.html Cite as: [1997] UKEAT 1253_97_0812, [1997] UKEAT 1253_97_812

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR P O'BRIEN (of Counsel) 18A Carlisle Avenue St Albans Hertfordshire AL3 5LU


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): Mr Thake brought a complaint against his employers alleging that he had been unfairly dismissed. That matter came before an Industrial Tribunal held at Bedford on 18 June 1997 and the decision of the Tribunal is recorded in writing in a document which was sent to the parties on 1 August 1997.

The decision reads thus:

"These reasons are given in summary form. The Applicant's employment with the Respondent as a Yard Worker/Fork Lift Operator came to an end on 30 November 1996 by mutual agreement between himself and the Respondent.

The Applicant was not dismissed by the Respondent and his claim that he was unfairly dismissed by the Respondent within the meaning of the Employment Rights Act 1996 must therefore fail."

This being a decision in summary reasons form the Applicant, within the period allowed for by the Industrial Tribunal rules, through his adviser, asked for Extended Reasons. The response which was given is as follows:

"In general, Chairmen of Tribunals have been specifically requested by the President to give Summary Reasons only wherever possible in order to reduce the clerical and administrative burden upon Tribunal staff as well as the increased expense which is thereby incurred."

I pause there to interpolate that the word "President" in that context means the former President of the Industrial Tribunals.

"If, on those occasions when Summary Reasons are given, the representatives of parties involved make an application for Extended Reasons as a matter of practice, then it clearly will be difficult to implement this sensible policy.

In this particular instance it was the view of the Tribunal that the Applicant's case not was a strong one. It is therefore perhaps unlikely that he will wish to involve himself in an appeal. For these reasons and with all due deference to the Applicant's representative and his evident experience in these matters, I do suggest that he may wish to reconsider the matter of his request."

Then, in a later letter, the Industrial Tribunal Chairman, through the Regional Secretary to the Tribunal said:

"The reason offered to justify the request for Extended Reasons does not seem to me to be sound. With the best will in the world in the circumstances I cannot add to the Reasons which have already been given in any way that would be meaningful. If there must be Extended Reasons then the Summary Reasons already given must stand as those 'Extended Reasons'. I cannot take the matter further."

It seems to us to be plainly arguable that the Chairman was wrong in law in the way in which he sought to exercise what he believed to be a discretion, as to whether to provide Extended Reasons or not, where a request had been made timeously. It might appear that the Chairman of the Industrial Tribunal believed that it was within his power to act as a filter for appeals to this court.

Secondly, it might appear that if he had nothing to add to the decision which was already given, then the learned Chairman has misdirected himself in law, when an Industrial Tribunal is asked to adjudicate upon a complaint which has been made and where issues are joined between the parties.

On those two grounds it seems to us that it is manifestly arguable in the circumstances of this case that this case should be listed as a matter of urgency because, if the appeal is allowed, the consequence will be that the matter will have to be remitted to a newly constituted Industrial Tribunal for determination.

Accordingly, I ask that it be listed before me on the first day of next term. The estimated length of this hearing is half an hour. It should be listed as Category C. Notes of Evidence are not required.