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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Benn v. Saga Petroleum (UK) Ltd [1999] UKEAT 905_99_2910 (29 October 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1999/905_99_2910.html Cite as: [1999] UKEAT 905_99_2910

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR COTTLE (of Counsel) Messrs Cowles & Co Solicitors Lloyds Bank Chambers 1433a London Road London SW16 4AF


 


LORD JOHNSTON: This is an appeal at the instance of the employee against a finding of the Employment Tribunal that she had neither been unfairly dismissed nor discriminated against in either sex or racial terms in relation to the termination of her employment with the respondents.

1. Mr Cottle presented us on behalf of the appellant with a detailed skeleton argument and elaborated upon it only briefly but commendably in that respect pointing to the fact that there were a number of inconsistencies in the factual decision of the tribunal which rendered their ultimate decision which was that, by a majority, they found that the appellant had accepted redundancy voluntarily when offered to her, should be regarded as perverse.
2. He pointed to the fact that there was no real dispute that proper redundancy procedures in terms of selection had not been gone through. He pointed to the fact that there was a document written by the solicitors acting for the employer to the effect that there was no real alternative but to make the appellant redundant, which was he submitted, inconsistent with any suggestion that she had accepted it voluntarily. There was some confusion about the issue of alternative employment and he pointed particularly to the opinion of the minority of the tribunal which was set out in paragraph 23 of the decision, the essence of which is that the employer having not properly not followed the redundancy procedures. It was made out that there was an improper handling of the appellant's case which was compounded, the minority thought, by the way she had been treated. Not least the minority member was prepared to accept that upon evidence given the true reason for the appellant's dismissal was that her manager considered that she was a disruptive influence in the accounts department which was not made out.
3. The majority view of the tribunal is completely to the opposite effect. They are entirely satisfied with a particular reference to paragraph 28 that at the end of the day the appellant not only accepted voluntary redundancy in the sense that it was being offered to her, but that she wanted so to proceed. They also held that they did not consider that she had been unfairly treated not least in relation to the issue of whether or not there was evidence supporting the view that she was a disruptive influence and that was reason why she was being made redundant.
4. We have no hesitation in concluding that the issues raised by this appeal are purely questions of fact and that the decision of the majority does not get anywhere near the necessary criteria to categorise it as perverse, which must at least establish on the face of the record a wholly irrational approach to the evidence that was before the tribunal. So far as the minority is concerned, her judgment merely highlights, in our view, the fact that there were two sides to this question upon the evidence, that the tribunal addressed them and came to a conclusion by a majority on the basis of which we cannot interfere being solely issues of fact.
5. For these short reasons we have to hold that there is no issue of law raised by this case, which would warrant it proceeding to a full hearing, and the appeal will be dismissed.