Boardman v Nugent Care Society & Anor (Unfair Dismissal : Reasonableness of dismissal) [2012] UKEAT 0071_12

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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Boardman v Nugent Care Society & Anor (Unfair Dismissal : Reasonableness of dismissal) [2012] UKEAT 0071_12_1007 (10 July 2012) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2012/0071_12_1007.html Cite as: [2012] UKEAT 0071_12_1007, [2012] UKEAT 71_12_1007

Appeal No. UKEAT/0071/12/CEA

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

FLEETBANK HOUSE, 2-6 SALISBURY SQUARE, LONDON, EC4Y 8JX

At the Tribunal

On 15 May 2012

Judgment handed down on 10 July 2012

Before

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SUPPERSTONE

MR T HAYWOOD

MR H SINGH

MRS Z BOARDMAN APPELLANT

(1) NUGENT CARE SOCIETY

(2) BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF CLARENCE HIGH SCHOOL RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SUPPERSTONE

1. Mrs Zainab Boardman, the Appellant, appeals against a decision of an Employment Tribunal sitting at Liverpool, sent to the parties on 19 May 2011, the majority of the Tribunal deciding that the Appellant’s claims of unfair and wrongful dismissal failed (the minority decided that both claims succeeded).

2. Before her dismissal the Appellant was employed by Nugent Care Society, the Respondent, a charitable organisation which runs Clarence High School which is an independent school for secondary pupils with education, behavioural and emotional difficulties. She was the longest serving teacher at the school, having worked there for thirteen years teaching mathematics.

3. On 31 July 2008 the Appellant was summarily dismissed for gross misconduct, namely assaulting a pupil on 1 February 2008. She complained to the Employment Tribunal that her dismissal was unfair and wrongful. She strongly denied the allegation which she contended had been inadequately investigated; there was procedural unfairness; and no reasonable employer could have decided to dismiss her. The Respondent’s case was that there had been a full and proper investigation; that the decision to dismiss her fell within the range of reasonable responses; and that the dismissal was therefore fair.

4. In their reserved judgment, sent to the parties on 28 April 2009, the tribunal unanimously upheld the Appellant’s complaint and found her to have been unfairly dismissed. The Respondents appealed. On 25 May 2010 this Tribunal (Cox J presiding, (UKEAT/0277/09/JOJ)) allowed the appeal by reason of the Tribunal’s failure properly to consider and assess certain material evidence and remitted the matter to a fresh Tribunal to be re-heard. It is the decision of that Tribunal which is the subject of the present appeal.

5. On this appeal the Appellant was represented by Mr Dijen Basu and the Respondent by Mr Simon Gorton QC, both of whom also appeared before the Tribunal. We are grateful to them for their written and oral submissions.

6. The Tribunal briefly set out the essential chronology at paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5 of their judgment, as follows:

“2.4 An incident occurred on 1 February 2008. Miss Dunn, a Teaching Assistant, complained of the treatment by Mrs Boardman of a pupil DH. The Claimant was suspended on 4 February 2008 and recorded her version of events on 8 February 2008. She was interviewed by the police and the police investigation was completed at the end of April 2008. The matter was investigated by a Marie Higgins for the Respondents with the Claimant being interviewed by Mrs Higgins. Mrs Higgins attended the police station [and] was allowed access to the police investigatory material.

2.5 A disciplinary hearing chaired by Eileen Byrne, who gave evidence to this tribunal, started on 25 July 2008 and on 31 July 2008 the Claimant was dismissed for gross misconduct. The Claimant appealed and the appeal hearing took place over two dates, firstly 16 October 2008 chaired by Mrs Shelton (who gave evidence to this tribunal) and was continued on 21 November 2008. The appeal panel confirmed the dismissal.”

7. The incident on 1 February 2008 took place during a detention at lunchtime of three boys that the Appellant was conducting with the assistance of Mrs Dunn. At paragraph 2.7 of their judgment the tribunal stated:

“The undisputed facts (emphasis added) in relation to the incident on 1 February 2008 are these. The three boys were unhappy that they were kept in detention after other children had been released earlier. This meant that they had to eat their midday meal in the classroom. They were unruly, they started throwing food. Mrs Ennis who had delivered the food to the classroom (and was another teaching assistant) reported to Mr O’Brien, another member of staff, in the staffroom that he ought to go to the detention room just to make sure that all was in order. Before Mr O’Brien got to the detention room Mrs Boardman and Mrs Dunn were having difficulty controlling the children and DH began to light up a cigarette, was told that he could not, and decided he wanted to go outside to have some fresh air, he was told he could not until he had finished his detention, he tried to get out of the door and there was some manhandling of him (more of which later). Mrs Dunn was upset by the whole incident and asked permission to leave the room, Mrs Boardman gave her that permission. (Emphasis added). Mrs Dunn met Mr O’Brien in the corridor who told her not to go to the staffroom but another room, Mr O’Brien went into the detention room…”

8. In an incident report made on the same day, Mrs Dunn stated that the Claimant had:

“picked [DH] up by his upper arms and threw him around the room and he bounced against the wall and looked shocked.”

9. On 8 February 2008 Mrs Boardman sent to her union official, Mr Roger Wells, who acted for her throughout, a statement setting out her account of events on 1 February 2008 which includes this explanation:

“DR and KJ started throwing sprouts at the wall. DH tried to push Mrs Dunn so that he could get out, I went towards Mrs Dunn to help and assist her, at this moment Mrs Dunn shouted, ‘I’ve had enough, I’m leaving’. As she was leaving DH tried to leave with her, he then pushed or fell on me. I went backwards and broke the heel of my boot. I was left on my own in the classroom with these children in this situation.”

10. The Tribunal continued:

“2.13 At the disciplinary hearing Mrs Boardman explained the situation differently—

‘ND [Mrs Dunn] tried to open the door to get out and said something like she’d had enough. At that stage DH was behind ZB [the Appellant] and ZB went back and as ZB was going back ZB tried to get hold of DH and they both went down onto the floor. ZB stated that the wall was a plywood wall and not a concrete wall. It was like a false wall. DH then got up and ZB tried to get up but could not and [then] she noticed one of her shoes was broken.’

2.14 That was the first time that the Claimant had said that she had fallen on the floor and Mrs Dunn said she never saw the Claimant fall on the floor with [DH] nor did she see the broken heel.

2.15 Mrs Dunn was also inconsistent in the way that she described matters. She was asked to re-enact the process on a number of occasions both throughout the disciplinary and the appeal process and concluded at one point by saying, that DH was ‘pushed forward rather than swung to the side and hit the wall’. Mr Wells confirmed to the school authorities that this case came down to the contradiction between what ND said and what ZB said.”

11. English was not the first language of either the Appellant or Mrs Dunn. Mrs Boardman is Iranian by birth and Mrs Dunn is German.

12. The majority view was that Mrs Dunn was more credible than the Appellant. In relation to the unfair dismissal the majority believed that

“Mrs Byrne and her panel had a genuine belief in the wrongdoing of Mrs Boardman. They had established the fact of that belief and that they believed it. There were reasonable grounds for the Respondents to have in their mind reasonable grounds upon which to sustain that belief namely the clear allegation by Mrs Dunn and by DH (who was actually the victim) and both the respondent panels had carried out as much investigation into the matter as was reasonable. …” (para 39).

13. The Tribunal continued:

“The majority go further than that. We had to deal with the wrongful dismissal claim. The majority also concluded that Mrs Dunn was a more credible witness than Mrs Boardman and that the assault had happened in the way Mrs Dunn describes and not in the way Mrs Boardman described it. …” (para 41).

14. The minority preferred the Appellant’s account of what happened on 1 February 2008 to that of Mrs Dunn. In addition the minority levelled criticisms at the investigation that was carried out.

The law

15. The relevant legal principles in this case are not in dispute. The reason for the Appellant’s dismissal related to her conduct. The tribunal then had to determine whether the dismissal was fair or unfair in accordance with section 98(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”). The determination of that question:

“(a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer’s undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and

(b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.”

16. The test to be applied in the case of misconduct is set out in British Home Stores v Burchell [1978] IRLR 379. Stages 2 and 3 of the test are in issue in the present case, namely whether Mrs Byrne had reasonable grounds upon which to sustain her belief that the Appellant committed the assault after a reasonable investigation.

17. In Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust v Rolden [2010] ICR 1457 Elias LJ stated at paragraph 13:

“Section 98(4) focuses on the need for an employer to act reasonably in all the circumstances. In A v B [2003] IRLR 405 the Employment Appeal Tribunal (Elias J presiding) held that the relevant circumstances include the gravity of the charge and their potential effect upon the employee. So it is particularly important that employers take seriously their responsibilities to conduct a fair investigation where, as on the facts of that case, the employee’s reputation or ability to work in his or her chosen field of employment is potentially apposite. In A v B the appeal tribunal said, at para 60:

‘Serious allegations of criminal misbehaviour, at least where disputed, must always be the subject of the most careful investigation, always bearing in mind the investigation is usually being conducted by laymen and not lawyers. Of course, even in the most serious of cases, it is unrealistic and quite inappropriate to require the safeguards of a criminal trial, but a careful and conscientious investigation of the facts is necessary and the investigator charged with carrying out the inquiries should focus no less on any potential evidence that may exculpate or at least point towards the innocence of the employee as he should on the evidence directed towards proving the charges against him.’”

We endorse the earlier observation made by this Tribunal (UKEAT/0277/09/JOJ, para 6) that it is also important for employment tribunals to conduct a very careful analysis of the facts and issues in such cases.

18. At paragraph 73 Elias LJ continued:

“The second point raised by this appeal concerns the approach of employers to allegations of misconduct where, as in this case, the evidence consists of diametrically conflicting accounts of an alleged incident with no, or very little, other evidence to provide corroboration one way or the other. Employers should remember that they must form a genuine belief on reasonable grounds that the misconduct has occurred. But they are not obliged to believe one employee and to disbelieve another. Sometimes the apparent conflict may not be as fundamental as it seems; it may be that each party is genuinely seeking to tell the truth but is perceiving events from his or her own vantage point. Even where that does not appear to be so, there will be cases where it is perfectly proper for the employers to say that they are not satisfied that they can resolve the conflict of evidence and accordingly do not find the case proved. That is not the same as saying that they disbelieve the complainant. For example, they may tend to believe that a complainant is giving an accurate account of an incident but at the same time it may be wholly out of character for an employee who has given years of good service to have acted in the way alleged. In my view, it would be perfectly proper in such a case for the employer to give the alleged wrong-doer the benefit of the doubt without feeling compelled to have to come down in favour of one side or the other.”

As Cox J observed, it is difficult to imagine a more serious allegation and outcome for a teacher than dismissal for gross misconduct in cases such as the present (UKEAT/0277/09/JOJ, para 5).

Submissions of the parties

19. Mr Basu makes his submissions under five broad headings. First he submits that the Tribunal fundamentally misunderstood which facts were “undisputed”. Second, the Tribunal applied a much higher degree of scrutiny to Mrs Boardman’s account than to that of Mrs Dunn. Third, the Tribunal failed properly to examine the sufficiency of the investigation that was conducted. Fourth, the Tribunal made a fundamental mistake in relation to s.98(4) of the 1996 Act. Fifth, the Tribunal failed to understand the significance of the argument that Mrs Dunn would not have left the room if Mrs Boardman had really assaulted a pupil.

20. Mr Gorton submits that in relation to the unfair dismissal claim this is in reality a perversity appeal which fails to come anywhere near the exacting threshold that is required for such an appeal to succeed (see Yeboah v Crofton [2002] IRLR 634). In relation to the wrongful dismissal claim it was a question for the Tribunal as to whom to believe, and the majority believed Mrs Dunn was more credible than the Appellant for the reasons stated.

Discussion

Grounds (1) and (5): the “undisputed facts” and their significance

21. There were discrepancies in the evidence of the Appellant and Mrs Dunn as to what at various stages in the investigation and the disciplinary and appeal process they said had occurred. It is not necessary in this decision to set out the detail of those discrepancies. However what is clear is that at all times Mrs Dunn alleged that the Appellant had assaulted DH and Mrs Boardman denied that she had done so.

22. As a result of not interviewing the boys, the credibility of the evidence of Mrs Dunn and the Appellant was critical. The majority view was that “Mrs Dunn was more credible than Mrs Boardman” (para 19). In order to reach that conclusion it was incumbent upon the Tribunal first to identify what evidence was in dispute and what was not.

23. Yet at paragraph 2.7 of the Decision the Tribunal set out what they describe as “the undisputed facts” in relation to the incident. They say DH tried to get out of the door and (then these words) “there was some manhandling of him (more of which later)” (see para 7 above).

24. Mr Basu submits it was completely wrong to say that it was undisputed that there was some manhandling of DH. Mr Gorton submits this criticism is a simple misunderstanding of what the Tribunal meant by “manhandling”. Mr Gorton points to the fact that “the undisputed facts” were agreed by the Tribunal as a whole. He contends the Tribunal plainly were referring to physical contact which both parties agree took place: the issue, he submits, was what was the nature of that contact. We disagree. We do not know what the minority understood by the use of the word “manhandling”. However we consider that “manhandling”, certainly in this context, connotes the deliberate use of force to move someone against their will. The material Oxford English Dictionary definition of “manhandle” is “to handle roughly by striking or pushing”. The Appellant never accepted that she manhandled DH. We do not accept that we can disregard what Mr Gorton describes as an unfortunate use of language.

25. The question of manhandling, as Mr Basu contends, goes to the very heart of the allegation of assault for which the Appellant was dismissed.

26. Further, the significance of the Tribunal apparently not appreciating that at all times Mrs Boardman had denied that she had assaulted or manhandled DH is in our judgment highly material in the context of general observations the Tribunal made later in their decision on the credibility of Mrs Dunn and the Appellant. At paragraph 30 the majority said this:

“A word on credibility. The majority felt, unlike Mr Northam, that Mrs Dunn was a very good historian. She fielded and dealt with the questions in cross-examination extremely well whereas Mrs Boardman was confused and illogical at times. Interestingly when we read the appeal notes at page 204 and 205 we noted her criticisms which were these:

‘(page 204) – You dismissed me, you sacked me, even if that had happened for a small throw of a child. I have been teaching for 30 years and you dismissed me.’ ”

The majority continue:

“31. The indication there by Mrs Boardman was that she was placing her thirty years of teaching against a ‘small throw of a child’. Mr Northam thought this a normal thing for the Claimant to say when trying to defend herself. The majority disagreed. It sounded like a plea in mitigation not a denial.

32. At page 205 she goes on to say this to the appeal panel:

‘Mrs Boardman interrupted by saying that, “a child teenager next and the pregnancy, (sic) and EB was involved with it… and being sacked or dismissed just for small throw had ruined my career (sic)’.

33. The majority had the real impression that Mrs Boardman, realising what she had done, was really saying that she should not be dismissed for this ‘small throw’ but could not admit that to others and certainly not to herself.”

27. We do not think that the majority could have concluded that Mrs Boardman had effectively confessed unless they had misunderstood what she had said she had done. In our judgment the finding by the majority that what she said amounted to a confession was a perverse finding. It is clear from the appeal notes that Mrs Boardman was repeatedly saying that she did not assault DH (see, for example, pages 118 and 119 in the appeal bundle). Nothing she said could, in our view, be properly interpreted as an admission of any manhandling on her part.

28. We accept Mr Basu’s submission that Mrs Boardman was making the point, that even if she were guilty of a “small throw” (this being the description that DH had given of what had happened), she should not have been dismissed for this, after thirty years of teaching, especially given, as she contended, the Respondent had not dismissed another person for something more serious.

29. Mr Gorton made clear that it was no part of his submissions on behalf of the Respondents before the Tribunal that there was any such confession made by the Appellant.

30. A further serious factual inaccuracy about which the Appellant complains is the finding “as an undisputed fact” that after the incident Mrs Dunn asked permission to leave the room and the Appellant gave her permission to do so.

31. In the disciplinary proceedings and before the Tribunal this point was very much in dispute. The Appellant’s account was that Mrs Dunn had walked out of the room leaving her to deal with the three boys. The Tribunal noted at paragraph 2.11 of its decision that on 8 February 2008 the Appellant recorded “Mrs Dunn shouted, ‘I’ve had enough – I’m leaving’”. At no time did the Appellant accept that Mrs Dunn had asked her permission to leave and that she had given it.

32. We consider it most unfortunate that the Tribunal should have made this error in the light of the earlier Tribunal’s failure to make proper findings on this issue and this Tribunal’s criticism in that regard. Cox J said at paragraph 48:

“Further support for our decision to allow this appeal comes from Mr Basu’s own, strong criticisms of the Tribunal’s judgment in both resisting the appeal and pursuing the cross-appeal. Mr Basu pointed to the evidence before the disciplinary panel that Ms Dunn had left the room immediately after the assault. If her account was right, he suggests that this was a most unusual thing to have happened, and that this was clearly a relevant piece of evidence for the panel to take into account. Yet, at paragraph 21 the Tribunal clearly ‘ducked the issue’, as he puts it, and made no finding upon it.”

33. We do not understand how the Tribunal could have found that it was an undisputed fact that the Appellant gave Mrs Dunn permission to leave the room. As Mr Basu submits “the nub of Mrs Boardman’s argument was Mrs Dunn would not have left the room if she had really seen her assault a boy, given that the boys were being very unruly, swearing and trying to leave the detention room and given that one of the boys was on the sex offenders’ register. If Mrs Dunn’s version of events were right then there was a real risk to Mrs Boardman and risk to the boys of being ‘picked up’ and ‘thrown around the room’ by Mrs Boardman” (Appellant’s skeleton argument, para 71).

34. In our judgment the Tribunal fell into error in making incorrect findings of fact on critical issues. In summary the Tribunal was wrong to find that it was not in dispute that (1) there had been manhandling of DH, and (2) the Appellant had given Mrs Dunn permission to leave the room after the incident. Further the Tribunal was wrong to find that the Appellant had effectively confessed to the assault on DH. Each of these findings are, in our judgment, unsustainable.

Ground (2): applying higher a degree of scrutiny to the Appellant’s account

35. The majority, at paragraph 22 of the Tribunal’s decision, stated:

“Mrs Dunn was consistent throughout when she said that Mrs Boardman had laid hands on DH and he had hit the wall. Mrs Boardman’s account did not mention immediately after the event that she had fallen over and that the young man had fallen on top of her against the wall and the floor. If the incident had happened in that way she would have said so immediately.”

36. Mr Basu disavows an allegation of bias. That being so, Mr Gorton asks what this criticism amounts to. It is clear that there were differences in the accounts given by both the Appellant and Mrs Dunn on various occasions. It is for a Tribunal to assess the credibility of the witnesses whose evidence it hears. The Tribunal was entitled to regard the Appellant’s failure to state in her original version of events that she had fallen on the floor as something of relevance. We consider the real risk to be that the errors made by the Tribunal as to “undisputed facts” and what the majority considered to be in essence a confession affected their approach to the credibility of the Appellant’s evidence as a whole.

Ground (3): the sufficiency of the investigation

37. Mr Basu’s oral submissions before us focussed on the failure by the Respondent to obtain any account of the incident from the other two boys who were present in the classroom at the time of the incident or clarification from DH. The Appellant contends that the Respondent should have interviewed all three boys about the incident.

38. All three members of the Tribunal were concerned that the Respondent did not interview the boys after the safeguarding procedure had finished. The reason for not doing so in relation to the two boys is set out at paragraph 2.24 of the Tribunal’s decision:

“Mrs Byrne explained that Marie Higgins, the investigating officer, had doubts as to whether the boys would need to be interviewed as they had agreed to be interviewed by the police but later refused to go to the police station to be asked questions. Marie Higgins consulted staff at the school and it was thought unlikely that the boys would co-operate again and not be able to give an accurate account of what happened even if they were prepared to co-operate. These were vulnerable boys with emotional difficulties it was said.”

39. However we note that the Appeal Panel made a finding that “as part of the internal investigation, the investigating officer could have approached the two boys who were witnesses to the alleged incident to ascertain if they wished to make a statement for the disciplinary process”.

40. One of the boys had told Mr O’Brien that “Miss has just ragged [DH]”. If he had been asked that boy would have been able to shed light on what he meant by “ragged”. We do not agree with the observation of the majority that “the question as to what the word ‘ragged’ meant, is a ‘red herring’” (para 25). Whether it meant that the Appellant physically assaulted DH or was verbally abusive to him may have been of relevance.

41. As for DH, he had provided a statement to the police when formalising his complaint, a summary of which was made by Mrs Higgins and formed part of the material considered by the Respondent in their investigation.

42. The minority member considered that

“the Respondents should have interviewed the three boys and questioned them on what happened after the safeguarding process had been completed. He believes that Mrs Dunn gave a number of demonstrations which were different in relation to what happened in the room whereas Mrs Boardman was consistent. Mr Northam felt that the version of events given by DH was challengeable by the investigating officer. Firstly in the transcript of his interview with the police DH ‘thought they would arrest him’. Secondly, when the investigating officer viewed the video of the interview when DH was alone with his mother he said he thought he would get in trouble. Thirdly, when the ‘ragging incident’ occurred he spoke to the other youth about being ‘a grass’ ” (para 14).

43. We bear in mind that we must not substitute our view for that of the Tribunal. The Tribunal had regard to the guidance in Roldan. We are not satisfied that the failure of the Respondents to obtain any account from the other two boys or clarification from DH was outside the band of reasonable responses. Accordingly in our judgment the failure by the Respondent to interview DH and the other two boys about the incident did not of itself result in there not being a reasonable investigation and there is no basis on which this Tribunal can disturb the Tribunal’s finding in that regard.

Ground (4): the ET misdirected itself in relation to s.98(4)

44. In his oral submissions Mr Basu focussed on paragraph 39 of the Tribunal’s decision. The majority stated that they believed that the Respondent panels had carried out as much investigation into the matter “as was reasonable”. However Mr Basu submits the third stage of the Burchell test requires the employer to have “carried out as much investigation into the matter as was reasonable in all the circumstances of the case” (emphasis added).

45. We are not persuaded that the omission of the words “in all the circumstances of the case” amounts to an error on the Tribunal’s part. At paragraph 10 of its decision the Tribunal set out the test in Burchell correctly, noting that it was doing so because it “is often misquoted or ill-quoted”. We reject the submission that the Tribunal misapplied the test by failing to consider whether there had been a reasonable investigation “in all the circumstances of the case”.

The wrongful dismissal claim

46. The majority “concluded that Mrs Dunn was a more credible witness than Mrs Boardman and that the assault had happened in the way Mrs Dunn described and not in the way Mrs Boardman described it” (para 41). We consider that the errors we have identified in the findings of fact made by the Tribunal necessarily impact on the Tribunal’s approach to the credibility of the Appellant on the wrongful dismissal claim and to the findings made by the Tribunal in this regard.

Conclusions

47. In our judgment for the reasons we have given we consider that the Tribunal made serious errors in its factual findings. The Tribunal failed to appreciate what was at all material times in dispute on the critical issue of what the Appellant had done. The Appellant had consistently denied that she assaulted DH. In our view the Tribunal’s decisions cannot be sustained. Accordingly this appeal is allowed, and the matter must, once again, be remitted to a fresh Tribunal to be re-heard. We reject Mr Gorton’s submission that the hearing should be conducted by the same Tribunal. In the light of our findings this would not be appropriate. The history of these proceedings leads us to repeat the observation of Cox J, that it would be helpful for the Regional Employment Judge to allocate this case for the purposes of case management and pre-hearing submissions by the parties, before that hearing takes place.

United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal