DECISION
Appeal
1. The
subject matter of this Appeal is the disputed decision (on review) not to
restore a Skania 144 topline tractor unit, registration number HLZ 6460 and an
attached Scmidz refrigerated box trailer, registration number MG 179
(collectively referred to as "the Vehicle") which was found to be
carrying approximately 4.25 million cigarettes ("the Goods") seized
on the 7 June 2008 on its arrival into the United Kingdom at Dover.
2. The
Vehicle was owned by McGeown International Limited ("the
Appellant"). The Appellant made application for restoration of the
Vehicle by way of a letter of the 9 June 2008. Restoration was offered by HMRC
in a letter of the 22 April 2009 subject to the payment of a sum of £24,600 –
the amount being equal to the trade value of the Vehicle. The Appellant sought
a review of that decision in its letter of the 20 May 2009. Following that
review, however, HMRC took the decision not to restore the Vehicle. That was
communicated to the Appellant in a letter of the 24 June 2009. It is that
review which is the subject matter of this Appeal.
Facts
3. The
facts of the case are not substantively in dispute, and can be shortly
summarised.
4. The
Vehicle was stopped on the 7 June 2008 at Dover Eastern Docks, at which point
it was being driven by an employee of the Appellant, Mr. Shane McLaughlin. Mr.
McLaughlin was interviewed at that time and confirmed that this was the first
time that he had worked for the Appellant and that he had only started working
for the Appellant on Monday 2 June 2008. There was some dispute in relation to
this point, insofar as the Appellant's documentation suggested that Mr.
McLaughlin commenced work on the 6 June 2008, but we find that nothing material
turns on that point.
5. Mr.
McLaughlin had been offered the job based, in part, on the fact that his uncle
had previously worked for the Appellant, and in part upon the recommendation of
a Mr. Darren Blair of a company called B Mac International.
6. In
his interview, it transpired that Mr. McLaughlin had not been given any
information about wages, nor had he actually met anyone from the company
itself, and had concluded the arrangements by phone and/or text.
7. After
delivering an outward bound load of cosmetics to a destination in France, he
was instructed to pick up a load of apples from MUK Logistics near Hanover in
Germany. From the information available to us, it seems that he travelled to
that location and waited in the cab of the lorry whilst the goods were loaded
onto the lorry. It is probably worth pointing out at this stage that the CMR
stated that the goods were to be picked up at Heuer Transport, although the CMR
itself and, indeed, all of the details on it, subsequently proved to be
fraudulent.
8. In
any event, in the interview which Mr. McLaughlin gave he indicated that he did
not take part in the loading of the Vehicle. After it was loaded, he set off
en route back to the United Kingdom. It appears that he only sealed the
trailer when he arrived in Adinkirke in Belgium, and then largely to prevent
stowaways from entering the trailer unit.
9. On
arriving in Dover, Customs Officials examined the load which was manifested as
24 pallets of apples. On inspection, the Officials observed that each pallet
contained 42 boxes and, upon further examination, it appeared that whilst there
was a top layer of apples in the boxes (all of which were of poor quality),
underneath that layer were cigarettes, totalling approximately 4.25m in
aggregate (ie. the Goods). The Officer, having been satisfied that the
cigarettes were to be used for a commercial purpose and that none of the proper
methods of transporting excise goods to the United Kingdom had been used,
seized them under Section 139(1) of the Customs & Excise Management Act
1979 ("CEMA") as being liable to forfeiture under both Regulation 16
of the REDS Regulations, and Section 49(1)(a)(i) of CEMA.
10. The Vehicle
itself was seized under Section 139(1) as being liable for forfeiture pursuant
to Section 141(1)(a) because it had been used for the carriage of goods which
were themselves liable to forfeiture.
11. At that point
Mr. McLaughlin was cautioned, arrested and searched, and was subsequently
interviewed on three occasions.
12. The results of
those interviews provided the factual matrix which is described above.
13. The Appellant
did not challenge the legality of the seizure of the cigarettes and the Goods
therefore were condemned as forfeit to the Crown pursuant to paragraph 5 of
Schedule 3of CEMA.
14. Obviously this
Tribunal is not concerned with that aspect of the case, and is concerned only
with the issues surrounding the seizure of the Vehicle. It is perhaps easier
to deal with the subsequent issues which arose by reference to the
correspondence which then passed between the parties as this was germane to the
Appeal.
15. The first letter
in that chain of correspondence was a letter dated 9 June 2008 from the
Appellant, through its representative Mr. Brian Wilson, by which restoration of
the Vehicle was sought. In response, HMRC wrote to the Appellant on the 10
June 2008 and asked for essentially 6 pieces of information:
"When considering restoration of
commercial vehicles seized because they are carrying goods liable to
forfeiture, Customs will consider, amongst other factors, the involvement or
otherwise of the owner / haulier and the steps that the haulier has taken to
prevent their vehicles being used to carry smuggled goods. It is for you to
decide what evidence to provide, but it is in your interest to consider sending
the following:
1
a copy of the terms and conditions of the driver's contract;
2
copies of employment references from the driver's previous
employers;
3
details of any measures you take to prevent your vehicle being
used for smuggling;
4
details of the checks that you make to ensure the legitimacy of
the consignor and the consignee;
5
details of any physical checks made of the load;
6
copies of any instructions or written procedures that you issue
to your driver or other staff.
This is your opportunity to bring to our attention
anything else that you would like us to consider in making a decision."
16. The Appellant
wrote back on the 12 June 2008 enclosing the following documents, a number of
which formed the basis of examination in chief and cross examination during the
course of the Appeal and, therefore, we expand (where relevant) in relation to
some of those documents:
(1)
the Appellant sent a copy of the "Company's" terms and
conditions of the driver's employment contract. For the purposes of this
Appeal, the Tribunal notes the following salient facts relating to that
contract:
(a)
in the first place, the employer purports to be Raven Transport Limited
of Dromad, Ravensdale, Dundalk, and not the Appellant itself;
(b)
within the text of the terms and conditions of employment, there are
various references to "Raven Transport", "McGeown
International", "McGeown Int", "McGeown Transport" and
"McGeown Tsp";
(c)
the "Employee Information" section makes it quite clear that
smuggling of contraband goods, such as tobacco, alcohol, drugs etc. constitutes
gross misconduct potentially resulting in dismissal;
(d)
the "Working Instructions" for employees sets out the Company's
policies as regards loading, security and delivery of goods in transit and the
procedures to be adopted in relation to transport documentation;
(e)
the employment contract was suggested to have begun on the 6 June 2008 –
although as we have mentioned above Mr. McLaughlin in interview indicated that
he actually started employment on the 2 June 2008 and in fact had left the
United Kingdom and indeed made his first delivery on behalf of the Appellant in
France on the 5 June 2008;
(f)
the contract provided for a basic wage of £280 per week which again was
at variance with Mr. McLaughlin's interview where he said that he wasn't
actually aware of the rate at which it was proposed that he would be paid.
In any event, it became clear from questions put by the
Tribunal to the Appellant's representative that the detail of the contract had
not been made known to Mr. McLaughlin prior to his departure from the United
Kingdom and, therefore, it is difficult to conclude otherwise than that he was
not aware of the detail of that contract in any material respect prior to his
departure from the United Kingdom;
(2)
the personal reference sought by HMRC was fulfilled by a letter written
by Mr. Wilson (an employee of McGeown International Limited) confirming that
Mr. Wilson knew Mr. McLaughlin's uncle, that he did not meet Mr. McLaughlin
personally, but he offered him work for a period of six weeks;
(3)
the covering letter of 9 June 2008 itself informed HMRC that in this
particular case the consignor for which the Appellant was acting had been a new
customer, European Wholesale Suppliers, who had been referred to McGeown
International by Heritage Transport in Dover.
17. The response
under which the initial decision was taken by HMRC was dated the 22 April
2009. That letter cited the exact quantity of the excise goods which had been
seized, ie. 4,830,160 cigarettes with an excise duty of £828,758.85. On the
issue of restoration, the original decision maker, Ms. Susan Giles, offered
restoration of the Vehicle to the Appellant based on HMRC's policy, subject to
the payment of £24,600 which represented the trade value of the Vehicle. As is
normal, that letter informed the Appellant, if unhappy with the decision, that
it could apply for it to be reviewed by an impartial review officer subject to
that request being received within a forty five day period.
18. McGeown
International Limited wrote to HMRC on the 20 May 2009 requesting a review and
attaching a copy of the fax confirming the order.
19. That fax
purported to be from European Wholesale Supplies Limited, Old Brompton Road, London and mandated the collection of a full (but unidentified) load from MUK Logistics, Wunstorf, Hanover, with a destination of Total Produce, Swords Business Park, Swords, Dublin, Ireland.
20. The fax
incorporated a specific provision that "the driver must have loading
bars. Temp plus 3 [degree c]" and also confirmed that the rate agreed
for the transaction was €2,950.
21. The transmission
details on the fax suggested activity on the 6 June 2008 (the date of the
collection) at 14.24 to/from telephone number 028 30251617, ie. McGeown
International Limited.
22. The covering letter
itself indicated that McGeown International had interviewed the driver "at
length" and "confirm[ed] that he is entirely ignorant of the
cigarettes on board nor [did] he have any idea how they got on board."
The letter continued "we feel aggrieved that the blame is being placed
either at our door or at our driver's door without any proof that we are
involved or complicit with the offence of smuggling. Surely we are entitled to
the benefit of the doubt, given that there is not one shred of evidence to
point to the fact that either the driver or this company knew of the existence
of smuggled cigarettes on board. We would ask you to revisit the case and
release the lorry and trailer without payment"
23. The next letter
in sequence was a letter from HMRC dated the 22 May 2009 indicating that a
review officer would conduct a review, and suggesting "if in the
meantime you have any further evidence or information that you would like to
provide in the support of your request, then please send it to the Review
Officer …….. this is your last opportunity to provide the Review Officer with
such information: if you do not provide it now, it cannot be taken into account
in the review".
24. McGeown
International confirmed by a letter of the 27 May 2009 that all information had
been furnished.
25. That leads us to
the subject matter of this Appeal, namely the review which was carried out by
the HMRC Review Officer, Mr. R. Brenton, the result of which was communicated
to the Appellant on the 24 June 2009. Mr. Brenton's conclusion was that the
Vehicle should not be restored on the basis of HMRC's published policy that
where the haulier fails to provide evidence satisfying HMRC that the haulier
was neither responsible for nor complicit in the smuggling then (where the
revenue evaded is greater than £50,000) the vehicle would not normally be
restored. On his finding that the excise duty in this case exceeded £800,000,
he took the view that it was inappropriate for the Vehicle to be restored. It
is that conclusion which forms the basis of the present appeal.
26. Due to the way
that the appeal hearing developed, it is essential that we spend some time
looking at Mr. Brenton's decision.
27. Mr. Brenton, in
his letter, quoted extensively from the interviews between HMRC and Mr.
McLaughlin. Interviews which, as we have already said, essentially established
the factual matrix which does not appear to have been substantially in dispute
between the parties. In his witness statement and in his evidence to the
Tribunal Mr. Brenton confirmed that in coming to his conclusion he reviewed:
(1)
all of the correspondence which has been summarised above;
(2)
the circumstances regarding Mr. McLaughlin's appointment as an employee;
(3)
the transcripts of Mr. McLaughlin's statements;
(4)
the nature of the concealment and the use of the poor quality apples as
cover;
(5)
the information which the Appellant had provided during the chain of
correspondence;
(6)
the results of an HMRC investigation into the legitimacy of the CMR and,
in particular, the connection with Heuer Transport which, as Mr. Brenton
commented in his letter, disclosed that:
(a)
Heuer had been insolvent since August 2007 (although in the appeal this
was confirmed as 2008);
(b)
that they had never shipped a load of apples to the UK using MUK;
(c)
Total Produce, Ireland, was not a company with which Heuer did business;
(d)
that no lorry, registration HLZ 6460, was loaded with apples at MUK
Logistics between June and August 2008.
28. The detail of
that was contained in Mr. Brenton's review letter. He then continued:
"I note that the only individual contact
Customs has had is via Brian Wilson, and nothing from Mr. Francis McGeown, the
registered director of the Company. It has also come to my attention that Mr.
Wilson was the main contact for Raven Transport Limited (aka McGeown Transport)
in the case of the attempted smuggling of 120kg of amphetamine, 240,000 mda
tablets, and 500 grammes of herbal cannibas on the 24 March 2007, and that the
Raven Transport Limited "information pack" issued was identical
(including smudged text) to that of McGeown International Limited.
This endorses my opinion that the McGeown Haulage
Companies are inextricably linked and have been / are actively involved in the
smuggling of counterfeit cigarettes, tobacco and rebated fuel oil, and this
present case is another example of this illicit activity."
29. After that
statement, Mr. Brenton then included a table citing some 11 instances of what
he suggested was smuggling "involving the McGeown Haulage Companies"
– a point we shall return to below.
30. Mr. Brenton
then, in effect, concludes his review decision as follows:
"This was no casual concealment, or one
that could easily be arranged without the knowledge of both the haulier and the
driver. In this case not only were the smuggled cigarettes concealed, but they
were placed deep within the load that it is most likely that they were put
there when the vehicle was loaded with, what appears to be, an uneconomical
load of poor quality apples. It is difficult to see how either the haulier or
the driver could not have known about the concealment. I conclude from the
evidence available to me that, on the balance of probabilities, that you, the
haulier, was involved or at least complicit in the smuggling attempt.
To date I have not seen any audit trail or
documentation on how McGeown received the order to transport this obvious
illegitimate consignment; no evidence of payment; what checks McGeown
International made to confirm if the client was legitimate; if the consignee
was expecting the goods; if McGeown had dealt with this company in the past or
what efforts have been made to trace the person / company who placed the
initial order. The fact is, you have produced no evidence to show that you
performed the usual checks that a legitimate haulier would make confirms to me
that you were complicit in this smuggling venture."
31. His letter
proceeds to deal with the issues of proportionality and hardship as one would
expect, but no issue was taken in relation to that aspect of his decision.
32. The next letter
in sequence was a letter of 29 June 2009 from Mr. Francis McGeown in which:
(1)
he confirmed that he had a financial interest in Raven Transport, but
that it was a separately run company to McGeown International Limited;
(2)
he pointed out that some 9 of the instances of duty evasion or other
default quoted in Mr. Brenton's letter related to a company McGeown Haulage
Limited, which was completely unrelated to McGeown International Limited and of
which Mr. McGeown had no prior knowledge;
(3)
Mr. McGeown again confirmed that the instruction for this transaction
had come from European Wholesale Supplies as per the fax commented on above;
(4)
he confirmed that Mr. McLaughlin had been instructed to deliver the
trailer to Birkenhead for onward transmission to Ireland;
(5)
he confirmed (again) that, having interviewed Mr. McLaughlin at length
he was "satisfied that he loaded in MUK and knew nothing of the
cigarettes that were on board until he was searched in Dover."
33. The final letter
in this chain of correspondence was dated the 2 July 2009 from Mr. Brenton in
the following terms:
"Thank you for your facsimile received by
this office on the 29 June 2009 in which you make further submissions with
regard to your case. As you have provided no documentary evidence to
corroborate your submissions, I cannot find any reasons to vary the decision
communicated to you in my review letter of the 24 June 2008."
34. It is at that
point that the correspondence between the parties effectively ceases and
proceedings with reference to this Tribunal begin.
35. The appeal
notice, which we quote for the sake of completeness, was dated the 4 June 2009
and states as follows:
"The decision fixed in the review dated
the 24 June 2009 is flawed and wrong …. McGeown Haulage Limited is nothing to
do with the Appellant and we understand that this relates to another haulage
firm in Keady or Armagh. The only references that relate to McGeown
International Transport are those of Raven Transport, which is an ancillary
company of McGeown International Limited. Considerable weight has been put on
these previous convictions when no weight should be given to these when they
relate to a company our client has no connection with whatsoever.
McGeown International Limited took all reasonable
steps to prevent their vehicles being used for smuggling. They give regular
instructions to their drivers in accordance with regulations to be on the look
out for smuggled goods. Natural justice should dictate the vehicle be returned
to McGeown International."
Legislation
36. Section 141
CEMA provides as follows:
"(1) …..
where anything has become liable to forfeiture under the Customs & Excise
Acts – (a) any ship aircraft vehicle …. which has been used for the carriage,
handling, deposit …….. of the thing so liable to forfeiture …… and (b) any
other thing mixed, packed or found with the thing so liable shall also be
liable to forfeiture."
37. Section 152(b)
provides that the Commissioners may, as they see fit, restore, subject to such
conditions (if any) as they thing proper anything forfeited or seized.
38. That obviously
is the legislation in point in relation to the seizure, but the Carriage of
Goods by Road Act 1965 ("1965 Act"), which incorporates into law the
Convention on the Contract for International Carriage of Goods by Road ("Convention")
to which we were referred is also relevant.
39. Article 4 states
that:
"The contract of carriage shall be
confirmed by the making out of a consignment note. The requirements of that
consignment note is detailed in Article 6 which requires information such as
names and addresses as well as description and weights of the consignment in
question."
40. Article 8 of the
Convention states that:
"For the purposes of this Convention, the
carrier shall be responsible for the acts and omission of his agents and servants
and of any other person of whose services he makes use of for performance of
the carriage when such agents or other persons are acting within the scope of
their employment, as if such acts or omissions were his own."
41. Article 8 also
imposes the requirement for a CMR note and states that upon receipt of the
goods the carrier should check the accuracy of the statement in the consignment
note as to the number of packages, as well as to the apparent condition of the
goods and their packaging or, where this is not possible, enter any
reservations which he may have.
42. In short,
therefore, the consignor has legal obligations imposed by the 1965 Act and the
Convention which, obviously by reference to the nature of the transport of
goods, are delegated to his instructed employees, but for which he remains
primarily responsible.
Onus of Proof / Appellant's Case
43. The function of
this Tribunal in a case such as this is supervisory only and arises under
S.16(4) Finance Act 1994.
44. Counsel for HMRC
in his summing up referred to the case of Commissioners of Custom &
Excise v Ware (E00753), which sets the tests / questions to be applied
along the lines originally set out in Associated Provincial Picture Houses
Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1KB 223.
45. Applying the principles,
therefore, set out in that case, it is the function of this Tribunal only to consider
if HMRC have erred in law, or if they have taken a decision which is so
unreasonable that no other Review Officer would have come to the same
conclusion.
46. The burden of proof
in relation to that question, very firmly rests with the Appellant. In the
correspondence, the appeal notice (all of which are extensively quoted above)
and in the Appeal, the Appellant appeared to suggest that the onus of proving
alleged unlawful activity rested with HMRC. That is simply not the case. The
excise fraud having been established, HMRC were within their powers to seize
the Vehicle. HMRC then have a very clear statutory discretion as to the terms
on which a vehicle once seized may be restored (or not) and this appeal is only
concerned with the examination of whether, on the facts, that discretion was
properly exercised.
47. In the present
case, distilling the facts to their bare essentials, we have a situation where
a sophisticated smuggling attempt has been foiled by HMRC. The resultant
goods, ie. the cigarettes have been forfeited and condemned to the Crown. The
Vehicle which was used in this endeavour is liable to forfeiture by virtue of
Section 141 of CEMA. By virtue of Section 152(b) HMRC can decide to restore
and have the discretion as to the terms upon which any such restoration is
made.
48. In the present
case we asked the Appellant's representative directly upon what evidence they
sought to rely to justify the restoration and/or to discharge the onus of proof
that rests on them.
49. The response was
that their case rests upon the documentary evidence submitted. No additional
evidence was produced or given at the hearing, so on that aspect we rely solely
on the documentary evidence – as did Mr. Brenton. With specific reference to
the consignment itself, as far as this Tribunal is concerned, that focuses
purely on the single fax from European Wholesale Sales and the subsequent CMR
documentation, which clearly have since proven to be false.
50. Mr. Brenton in
both his review letter and in his evidence before the Tribunal indicated that
the paucity of information from the Appellant raised his level of suspicion,
particularly when judged against the background of the legal requirements of
the Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965. In response to that suspicion the
Appellant has sought to rely on a single fax from a trader with whom they had
never undertaken previous work. No investigation into that transfer or the
nature of the transaction ever seems to have been taken out.
51. As to the nature
and timing of Mr. McLaughlin's employment, Mr. Brenton had also entertained
doubts. Having heard the evidence, it would seem, putting it at its best, that
the manner of the retention of Mr. McLaughlin as an employee was informal, if
not unorthodox. It was clear, however, from the evidence before the Tribunal
that none of the training and/or guidance against the risk of smuggling which
the Appellant asserts as its "norm" was given before Mr. McLaughlin left
the UK. Indeed, from the note of his interview under caution, Mr. McLaughlin
did not even know the level at which he was going to be paid. Again, this
informality was noted by Mr. Brenton as giving rise to his suspicion –
particularly in light of the events that subsequently occurred.
52. Taking the
detection of the contraband Goods, and coupling that with the lack of
information made available by the Appellant to justify the propriety of the
transaction, we find led Mr. Brenton to the suspicion that the Appellant was
complicit in what was a sophisticated fraud. With that suspicion in mind, Mr.
Brenton then applied the HMRC policy, viz:
"If the haulier fails to provide evidence
satisfying the Commissioners that the haulier was neither responsible for nor complicit
in the smuggling attempt, then if the revenue involved is less than £50,000 and
it is the first occasion the vehicle will normally be restored for 100% of the
revenue involved (or the trade value of the vehicle if less). The vehicle will
normally not be restored on a second or subsequent occasion within 6 months or
if the revenue involved is £50,000 or more."
53. As the excise duty
evaded was in excess of £50,000, Mr. Brenton, on review, felt that the
Appellant had not provided sufficient evidence to discharge the onus of proof
upon it to satisfy HMRC that the Appellant was not complicit in the scheme, and
decided not to restore the Vehicle.
54. Having
considered the case for the Appellant and the documentary evidence available to
Mr. Brenton (and this Tribunal), we find that it was entirely reasonable for
Mr. Brenton to firstly entertain such suspicions and then for him to conclude
that the onus on the Appellant to disprove those suspicions had not been
discharged. Indeed, we find that the documentary evidence, such as it is, in
reality raises more questions as to the provenance of the load than it answers.
It certainly fails to match the requirements imposed by the Carriage of Goods
by Road Act 1965.
55. During the
course of the hearing, the Appellant, through its representative, sought to challenge
the nature of the decision which Mr. Brenton took. Counsel for the Appellant
focused on a number of issues, which we deal with for the sake of completeness.
56. It was pointed
out that there were a number of inconsistencies in Mr. Brenton's review letter,
some examples of which are:
(1)
it was established at the hearing that Heuer Transport did not actually
become insolvent until August 2008 (not 2007) as appears in Mr. Brenton's
letter;
(2)
that Mr. Brenton was erroneous in his 2009 Review when he referred to
McGeown Transport, confusing McGeown International with an unrelated company, McGeown
Haulage Limited and the excise and other offences to which reference was made
in that letter;
(3)
that only edited and selected parts of the interview with Mr. McLaughlin
were quoted in the review letter.
57. As a matter of
record, however, the Tribunal finds that those inaccuracies do not of
themselves impact upon the overall decision.
58. Of more material
import was the argument advanced by the Appellant's Counsel that the approach
which Mr. Brenton took to this case disclosed a degree of bias. Again, that
suggestion appeared to relate in particular to the references within the review
letter to the previous connections between McGeown Transport / Raven Transport
and/or various quoted examples of illicit activity. Counsel for the Appellant,
in an exhaustive cross examination of Mr. Brenton, attempted to persuade the
Tribunal that this approach disclosed an innate bias on the part of the
decision maker that nullified his ultimate decision.
59. This Tribunal
sees no particular need for Mr. Brenton to have cited all of the illicit
activity which he did in that letter (whether inaccurate or not), but when looked
at it in context of this Appeal finds that in reality it does no more than show
that Mr. Brenton had a high degree of suspicion and that he accordingly had
been seeking a greater degree of proof of the legitimacy of the consignment
from the Appellant. We do not conclude, as the Appellant would have invited us
to, that the references within his review letter evidences the existence of
such a level of bias that Mr. Brenton closed his mind to any valid explanation
for the consignment itself. In reality, the issue is that no such explanation
or documentary evidence regarding the consignment or the reasonableness of the
Appellant's actions was ever produced for consideration either prior to Mr.
Breton's review or indeed since.
60. As we have
indicated, the Carriage of Goods Act imposes certain legal obligations upon any
haulier – an expectation of the minimum requirements to which hauliers should
conform. In a case such as this, if a consignment is found to contain illicit
goods, then obviously to avail of HMRC's discretion as it exists under Section
152 a convincing reason has to be provided. That position is amply
demonstrated by HMRC's published policies.
61. In the present
case, we find that the Appellant was given more than adequate opportunity to
explain the circumstances by which the cigarettes ultimately came to be found
in this consignment vis:
(1)
the initial letter of 10 June 2008;
(2)
the letter of 22 May 2008; and subsequently
(3)
at the hearing itself.
62. The only
evidence of the legitimacy of the consignment which was advanced was the fax
from European Wholesale Supplies – a company with which the Appellant had never
before traded. No evidence was given to confirm the legitimacy of the transaction,
nor do we find that the Appellant took all of the steps that reasonably could
have been taken to prevent the attempted smuggling. Indeed, the Appellant
accepted that the Appellant's own policies in this regard were not (at the
operative time) even known to Mr. McLaughlin or formed part of his terms and
conditions.
63. Given the
Appellant's failure in that regard, both then and since, we find no fault in
the approach which Mr. Brenton took.
64. In the
circumstances, therefore, we dismiss the appeal.
65. This document
contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party
dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal
against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)
(Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal
not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties
are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal
(Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
66. No order as to
costs.
IAN WILLIAM HUDDLESTON
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 22 June 2011
