



TC06654

Appeal number: TC/2018/02233

*INCOME TAX – penalty for failure to make returns – reliance on
accountant – whether reasonable excuse - no*

**FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER**

NIALL CARR

Appellant

- and -

**THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HER
MAJESTY'S
REVENUE & CUSTOMS**

Respondents

TRIBUNAL: JUDGE ANNE FAIRPO

The Tribunal determined the appeal on 7 August 2018 without a hearing under the provisions of Rule 26 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (default paper cases) having first read the Notice of Appeal dated 29 March 2018 (with enclosures) and HMRC's Statement of Case (with enclosures) acknowledged by the Tribunal on 29 May 2018.

DECISION

5 1. The appellant is appealing against penalties that HMRC have imposed under Schedule 55 of the Finance Act 2009 (“Schedule 55”) for a failure to submit an annual self-assessment return for the 2015/16 tax year on time.

2. The penalties that has been charged is a £100 late filing penalty under paragraph 3 of Schedule 55 imposed on 18 July 2017.

Appellant’s case

10 3. The appellant’s grounds for appealing against the penalties are that he has a reasonable excuse for the delay in filing because he had relied upon his previous accountants, who had assured him that they had dealt with the tax return when they clearly had not. The appellant also argues that he had had to return to Ireland because his mother was critically ill and his father had developed a serious heart problem.

15 The appellant’s appeal to HMRC under s31A TMA 1970 was made outside the statutory deadline. HMRC initially refused consent under s49(2)(a) of TMA 1970. However, in their Statement of Case HMRC have said that they have no objection to the taxpayer’s appeal under s31A being made late.

HMRC’s case

20 4. HMRC submit that the appellant has been within self-assessment since 2002 and has been required to complete tax returns regularly and so is aware of his obligations under self-assessment.

25 5. HMRC submit that delegation of the completion of the return to an accountant does not constitute a reasonable excuse where the individual has not taken reasonable care to contact the accountant, has not set deadlines for the work required and has not made regular checks on the progress of the work.

30 6. HMRC submit that the parents’ ill health can only be accepted as a reasonable excuse if it took up a great deal of the appellant’s time and attention from immediately before the filing date until the date the return was filed. HMRC submit that the appellant has provided no detail as to the timeframe of his parents’ illness nor has be provided any evidence to support his grounds of appeal.

Findings of fact

35 7. It is not disputed that the appellant was issued with a notice to file a tax return for the tax year 2015/16 on 6 April 2017. As this was outside the normal schedule for notices to file, the filing date was set as 13 July 2017 for both paper and electronic tax returns.

8. It is not disputed that the appellant’s electronic tax return was received by HMRC on 4 October 2017.

Discussion

9. Relevant statutory provisions are included as an Appendix to this decision.

5 10. It is not disputed that the appellant’s tax return for the 2015/16 tax year was submitted late. Subject to considerations of “reasonable excuse” and “special circumstances” set out below, the penalties imposed are due and have been calculated correctly.

10 11. The test of whether something is a “reasonable excuse” for the late filing of a tax return is not set out in statute but, in my view, the test set out in *Clean Car Company* [1991] VTTR 234 should be applied:

15 “a reasonable excuse should be judged by the standards of reasonableness which one would expect to be exhibited by a taxpayer who had a responsible attitude to his duties as a taxpayer, but who in other respects shared such attributes of the particular appellant as the tribunal considered relevant to the situation being considered”

20 12. Considering this test, I find that a taxpayer with a responsible attitude to their duties as a taxpayer would have made enquiries of his accountant in order to ensure that the return was filed on time. The burden of proof is on the appellant to show that he made such enquiries, but the appellant has offered no suggestion that he made such enquiries and so I find that the appellant does not have a reasonable excuse for the late filing of his tax return.

25 13. I note the appellant’s contention that the delay was also caused by his absence from the UK as a result of his parents’ ill health. The appellant has provided no information with regard to this, to show when he was away from the UK and why this meant that he was unable to deal with his tax return or to make enquiries of his accountants. Accordingly, I find that the appellant has not established that his parents’ ill health amounts to a reasonable excuse for the late filing of his tax return.

30 14. Finally I must consider whether HMRC should have made a special reduction because of special circumstances within paragraph 16. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction in this context is limited to circumstances where it considers HMRC’s decision in respect of special circumstances was flawed when considered in the light of the principles applicable in judicial review proceedings. HMRC have considered whether to apply a special reduction and have found nothing that is exceptional, abnormal or unusual to justify such a reduction. Applying the judicial review standards, I see no reason to
35 overturn HMRC’s decision.

Conclusion

15. The appeal is dismissed and the penalties are confirmed.

Application for permission to appeal

16. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.

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ANNE FAIRPO

TRIBUNAL JUDGE

RELEASE DATE: 14 August 2018

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APPENDIX – RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1. The penalties at issue in this appeal are imposed by Schedule 55. The starting point is paragraph 3 of Schedule 55 which imposes a fixed £100 penalty if a self-assessment return is submitted late.

5 2. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 55 provides for daily penalties to accrue where a return is more than three months late as follows:

4—

(1) P is liable to a penalty under this paragraph if (and only if)—

10 (a) P's failure continues after the end of the period of 3 months beginning with the penalty date,

(b) HMRC decide that such a penalty should be payable, and

(c) HMRC give notice to P specifying the date from which the penalty is payable.

15 (2) The penalty under this paragraph is £10 for each day that the failure continues during the period of 90 days beginning with the date specified in the notice given under sub-paragraph (1)(c).

(3) The date specified in the notice under sub-paragraph (1)(c)—

(a) may be earlier than the date on which the notice is given, but

20 (b) may not be earlier than the end of the period mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).

3. Paragraph 5 of Schedule 55 provides for further penalties to accrue when a return is more than 6 months late as follows:

5—

25 (1) P is liable to a penalty under this paragraph if (and only if) P's failure continues after the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the penalty date.

(2) The penalty under this paragraph is the greater of—

(a) 5% of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and

30 (b) £300.

4. Paragraph 6 of Schedule 55 provides for further penalties to accrue when a return is more than 12 months late as follows:

6—

35 (1) P is liable to a penalty under this paragraph if (and only if) P's failure continues after the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the penalty date.

(2) Where, by failing to make the return, P deliberately withholds information which would enable or assist HMRC to assess P's liability

to tax, the penalty under this paragraph is determined in accordance with sub-paragraphs (3) and (4).

(3) If the withholding of the information is deliberate and concealed, the penalty is the greater of—

- 5 (a) the relevant percentage of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and
- (b) £300.

(3A) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (3)(a), the relevant percentage is—

- 10 (a) for the withholding of category 1 information, 100%,
- (b) for the withholding of category 2 information, 150%, and
- (c) for the withholding of category 3 information, 200%.

(4) If the withholding of the information is deliberate but not concealed, the penalty is the greater of—

- 15 (a) the relevant percentage of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and
- (b) £300.

(4A) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)(a), the relevant percentage is—

- 20 (a) for the withholding of category 1 information, 70%,
- (b) for the withholding of category 2 information, 105%, and
- (c) for the withholding of category 3 information, 140%.

(5) In any case not falling within sub-paragraph (2), the penalty under this paragraph is the greater of—

- 25 (a) 5% of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and
- (b) £300.

(6) Paragraph 6A explains the 3 categories of information.

5. Paragraph 23 of Schedule 55 contains a defence of “reasonable excuse” as follows:

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(1) Liability to a penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule does not arise in relation to a failure to make a return if P satisfies HMRC or (on appeal) the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal that there is a reasonable excuse for the failure.

(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)—

- (a) an insufficiency of funds is not a reasonable excuse, unless attributable to events outside P's control,

(b) where P relies on any other person to do anything, that is not a reasonable excuse unless P took reasonable care to avoid the failure, and

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(c) where P had a reasonable excuse for the failure but the excuse has ceased, P is to be treated as having continued to have the excuse if the failure is remedied without unreasonable delay after the excuse ceased.

6. Paragraph 16 of Schedule 55 gives HMRC power to reduce penalties owing to the presence of “special circumstances” as follows:

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16—

(1) If HMRC think it right because of special circumstances, they may reduce a penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule.

(2) In sub-paragraph (1) “special circumstances” does not include—

(a) ability to pay, or

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(b) the fact that a potential loss of revenue from one taxpayer is balanced by a potential over-payment by another.

(3) In sub-paragraph (1) the reference to reducing a penalty includes a reference to—

(a) staying a penalty, and

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(b) agreeing a compromise in relation to proceedings for a penalty.

7. Paragraph 20 of Schedule 55 gives a taxpayer a right of appeal to the Tribunal and paragraph 22 of Schedule 55 sets out the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction on such an appeal. In particular, the Tribunal has only a limited jurisdiction on the question of “special circumstances” as set out below:

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(1) On an appeal under paragraph 20(1) that is notified to the tribunal, the tribunal may affirm or cancel HMRC's decision.

(2) On an appeal under paragraph 20(2) that is notified to the tribunal, the tribunal may—

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(a) affirm HMRC's decision, or

(b) substitute for HMRC's decision another decision that HMRC had power to make.

(3) If the tribunal substitutes its decision for HMRC's, the tribunal may rely on paragraph 16—

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(a) to the same extent as HMRC (which may mean applying the same percentage reduction as HMRC to a different starting point), or

(b) to a different extent, but only if the tribunal thinks that HMRC's decision in respect of the application of paragraph 16 was flawed.

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(4) In sub-paragraph (3)(b) “flawed” means flawed when considered in the light of the principles applicable in proceedings for judicial review.

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