Ritchie & Co. v. Sexton [1891] UKHL 945 (19 March 1891)


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United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions >> Ritchie & Co. v. Sexton [1891] UKHL 945 (19 March 1891)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1891/28SLR0945.html
Cite as: 28 ScotLR 945, [1891] UKHL 945

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SCOTTISH_SLR_House_of_Lords

Page: 945↓

House of Lords.

Thursday, March 19. 1891.

(Before Lords Herschell, Watson, Macnaghten, Bramwell, Morris, and Hannen.)

28 SLR 945

Ritchie & Company

v.

Sexton.

( Ante, March 18, 1890, 27 S.L.R. p. 536, and 17 R. 680.)


Subject_Reparation — Slander — Innuendo — Issue — Question of Construction Left to Jury.
Facts:

A person who objected to certain questions put in the House of Commons by a member of Parliament, wrote remonstrating with him for traducing him by false charges which the questions implied to be true. The writer illustrated his case by supposing that he should induce an opponent of his correspondent to put questions in the House of Commons implying that his correspondent had had delirium tremens and had been intoxicated in public, and declared that such a course would be as much justified as that to which the writer objected. He disclaimed all intention of giving pain “by the recital of these imaginary stories.”

The letter was published in a newspaper, and the member of Parliament sued the proprietor of the newspaper for damages, on the ground that the letter represented him to be a drunkard.

The defender objected to an issue being allowed and put to a jury, on the ground that the true and obvious meaning of the letter was not to impute anything to the pursuer, but only to put a suppositious case.

Held ( aff. the decision of the First Division) that the pursuer was entitled to an issue, as the letter was capable of being understood in a libellous sense, and that it was for the jury to determine whether there was libel or not.

Headnote:

This case is reported ante, March 18, 1890, 27 S.L.R. p. 536, and 17 R. 680.

The defenders Ritchie & Company appealed.

At delivering judgment—

 Judgment:

Lord Herschell—This is an appeal from an interlocutor in which it was held that in an action for libel brought by the respondent against the appellants there was an issue fit and proper to be submitted to a jury. The only question which your Lordships have to consider is, whether that determination of the Court of Session was correct? All that has been decided is that there is such an issue which the jury will have to consider and determine; and there is no controversy about the law which governs a case of this description. If the statements or letter which is charged to be libellous be of such a nature that it is capable of a construction which would be libellous in point of law — if it contains matter which is capable of such a construction that it might be read by reasonable men as libellous in point of law—then it is for the jury to determine whether a case has been made out, and the Court cannot stop the case at its inception and prevent a verdict of a jury. The question therefore resolves itself into one of simple construction, what interpretation might reasonably be put upon the document in question. I believe all your Lordships are agreed that the Court below was right in coming to the conclusion that the case could not be withdrawn from the jury, and that it was right to direct an issue. That being so, it would be obvious that there are reasons for not giving a detailed statement of the views which have led your Lordships to that conclusion, inasmuch as if the case is to be tried before a jury the reasons which' would be given by your Lordships would be arguments which might be regarded in the light of prejudging the very question which would have to be determined by a jury. Therefore I do not propose to give any reasons for the conclusion at which I

Page: 946↓

have arrived, which is, that the letter is capable of being understood in a libellous sense, and that therefore it is for the jury to determine whether there is a libel or not. For these reasons I move that the judgment be affirmed, and the appeal dismissed with costs.

Lord Watson—I entirely concur. I desire to express no opinion as to whether these letters are libellous. All that my judgment implies is that there is a question which a jury and not the Court ought to try.

Lord Bramwell, Lord Macnaghten, Lord Morris, and Lord Hannen concurred.

Their Lordships dismissed the appeal with costs.

 Counsel:

Counsel for the Appellants— Sir Henry James, Q.C.— Cooper. Agents— Neish & Howell, for Henderson & Clark, W.S.

Counsel for the Respondent— Sir Charles Russell, Q.C.— Shaw. Agents— Waddy & Waddy, for R. Ainslie Brown, S.S.C.

 1891

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