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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions >> Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd [1995] UKHL 4 (06 July 1995) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1995/4.html Cite as: [1995] 3 WLR 227, [1995] 2 LLR 299, [1996] 1 AC 211, [1995] CLC 934, [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep 299, [1995] UKHL 4, [1996] AC 211, [1995] 3 All ER 307, [1996] ECC 120 |
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Parliamentary
Archives,
HL/PO/JU/18/255
Marc Rich & Co. A.G. (Body Corporate) and others
(Appellants) v. Bishop Rock Marine Co. Ltd.
(Body Corporate) and others (Respondents)
JUDGMENT
Die Jovis 6° Julii 1995
Upon Report
from the Appellate Committee to whom was
referred the Cause Marc
Rich & Co. A.G. and others against Bishop
Rock Marine Co. Ltd.
and others, That the Committee had heard
Counsel as well on
Tuesday the 25th, Wednesday the 26th and
Thursday the 27th days of
April last as on Monday the 1st and
Tuesday the 2nd days of May
last upon the Petition and Appeal of
Marc Rich & Co. A.G. of
37 Baarerstrasse, CH-6301 Zug,
Switzerland, V/O Raznoimport of
Smolenskaja-Sennaja 32, 121200
Moscow, Russia, VPO Sojuzpolimetall
of UL. Akademika Koroleva 13,
Moscow 129515, Russia, and Pertusola
Sud of Piazza Flamineo 9,
00196 Rome, Italy, praying that the
matter of the Order set forth
in the Schedule thereto, namely an
Order of Her Majesty's Court
of Appeal of the 3rd day of February
1994, might be reviewed
before Her Majesty the Queen in Her Court
of Parliament and that
the said Order might be reversed, varied or
altered or that the
Petitioners might have such other relief in
the premises as to
Her Majesty the Queen in Her Court of
Parliament might seem meet;
as upon the case of Nippon Kaiji
Kyokai lodged in answer to the
said Appeal; and due consideration
had this day of what was
offered on either side in this Cause:
It
is Ordered and Adjudged. by the Lords Spiritual
and
Temporal in the Court of Parliament of Her Majesty the
Queen
assembled, That the said Order of Her Majesty's Court of
Appeal
of the 3rd day of February 1994 complained of in the said
Appeal
be, and the same is hereby, Affirmed and that the
said Petition
and Appeal be, and the same is hereby, dismissed
this House: And
it is further Ordered. That the Appellants
do pay or cause to be
paid to the said Respondents the Costs
incurred by them in
respect of the said Appeal, the amount thereof
to be certified
by the Clerk of the Parliaments if not agreed
between the
parties.
Cler: Parliamentor
HOUSE OF LORDS
OPINIONS OF THE LORDS OF APPEAL FOR JUDGMENT
IN THE CAUSE
MARC RICH &
CO. A.G. (BODY CORPORATE)
AND OTHERS
(APPELLANTS)
v.
BISHOP ROCK MARINE CO. LTD. (BODY CORPORATE)
AND
OTHERS
(RESPONDENTS)
ON 6 JULY 1995
Lord
Keith of Kinkel
Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle
Lord
Browne-Wilkinson
Lord Lloyd of Berwick
Lord Steyn
LORD KEITH OF KINKEL
My Lords,
For the reasons
given in the speech to be delivered by my noble and
learned friend
Lord Steyn, which I have read in draft and with which I agree,
would
dismiss this appeal.
LORD JAUNCEY OF TUlLLICHETTLE
I have had the
advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble
and learned
friend Lord Steyn. For the reasons he gives I too would dismiss
the
appeal.
- 1 -
LORD BROWNE-WILKINSON
My Lords,
For the reasons
to be given in the speech of my noble and learned
friend Lord
Steyn I would dismiss the appeal.
LORD LLOYD OF BERWICK
My Lords.
On 20 February
1986 the Nicholas H was in the course of a loaded
voyage
from South America to Italy when a crack appeared in the
vessel's
hull. On 22 February she anchored off San Juan, Puerto
Rico, where further
cracks developed. On 25 February Mr. J. Ducat,
a non-exclusive surveyor
employed by Nippon Kaiji Kyokai
("N.K.K.") was called in by the master,
at the
instigation of the United States Coastguards. He
recommended
permanent repairs, for which, as it happened,
facilities were available locally.
But the owners baulked at this.
It would have involved dry docking, with
consequential discharge
and reloading of the cargo. Mr. Ducat must have
been persuaded to
change his mind. For on 2 March 1986 he pronounced that
the vessel
was fit to proceed on her intended voyage after completing
some
temporary repairs to the shell plating. She sailed the same
day. On 3 March
the welding in way of the temporary repairs
cracked. On 9 March the vessel
sank. Fortunately there was no loss
of life.
For present
purposes we are asked to assume that the loss of the ship
and
cargo was the result of Mr. Ducat's negligence in altering his
initial
recommendation, and permitting the vessel to continue on
her voyage without
effecting permanent repairs. We are also asked
to assume (1) that the damage
which the plaintiff cargo owners
have suffered is physical damage to their
cargo, and (2) that this
damage should have been foreseen as the likely
consequence of Mr.
Ducat's negligence. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal
has held
that N.K.K. are not liable for Mr. Ducat's negligence, on the
ground
that he owed no duty of care to the owners of the cargo. On
the face of it
this would seem a strange result, unless
classification societies are entitled to
claim immunity in tort on
policy grounds, like the barrister in Rondel v.
Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191, or the police officer in Hill v. Chief Constable
of
West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53. But Mr. Aikens Q.C. for
N.K.K.,
specifically disclaimed any such general immunity. He
invited the House to
approach the appeal on the facts of this
particular case, as Hirst J. had done
at first instance, and apply
ordinary, well established principles of law. Other
claims might
be brought against classification societies hereafter, which
would
have to be decided on their own facts; they were, he said,
of no assistance in
-2-
deciding the
present case. I am for my part well content to accept
Mr.
Aikens' invitation. I start, therefore, with the judgment of Hirst
J.
The judgment of Hirst J.
Mr. Aikens'
basic argument before the judge was that shipowners are
under a
non-delegable duty to take care of the cargo on board, and that
there
was, therefore, no need for, or even room for, the
imposition of a further
duty on classification societies: (see
[1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 481.) Mr. Aikens
relied on Riverstone
Meat Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Lancashire Shipping Co. Ltd.
[1961] A.C.
807. In that case cargo was damaged in the course of a voyage
by
the failure of a fitter employed by ship repairers to secure the
inspection
cover on a storm valve. The cargo owner sued the
shipowner in contract, and
recovered. It was held to be no defence
that the repairs had been carried out
by a reputable independent
contractor. Mr. Aikens makes the point that it was
never even
suggested in this House that the owners of the cargo might have
had
a claim against the ship repairers in tort.
Hirst J. was
unable to see the relevance of this consideration; and I am
bound
to say that I share his difficulty. The existence of an
alternative
remedy in tort would not have influenced the result in
any way. Why, then,
should it have been mentioned?
The judge went
on to quote extensively from the many recent decisions
in the
modern law of negligence in the Court of Appeal, Privy Council
and
House of Lords. Some, like Grant v. Australian
Knitting Mills Ltd. [1936]
A.C. 85 and Mobil Oil Hong Kong
Ltd. v. Hong Kong United Docklands Ltd.
(the "Hua Lien")
[1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 309, were cases of physical damage
to
person or property. Others, like Caparo Industries Plc. v. Dickman
[1990]
2 A.C. 605 and Murphy v. Brentwood District Council
[1991] 1 AC 398,
were cases of pure economic loss.
The judge held,
correctly, that in addition to the assumed foreseeability
of
physical damage, it was necessary for the plaintiffs to establish
the
necessary close relationship between the parties, or degree of
proximity, in
order to establish a duty of care. As to this, the
judge said ([1992] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 481, 499):
"On the
assumed facts of the present case, for the reasons given by
Mr.
Gross, it seems to me that there was a very close degree of
proximity
between Mr. Ducat and the plaintiffs. Having first
recommended
that the vessel should not leave port without having
undergone
permanent repairs, knowing that she was fully loaded and
therefore
knowing that, if it was dangerous for her to go to sea in
that
condition, the goods were just as likely to be damaged or
lost as the
vessel itself, he later recommended that she sail
after only temporary
repairs had been done. Although it is true,
as Mr. Aikens submits,
that Mr. Ducat had no actual direct
physical control over the vessel in
- 3 -
the sense that
he could bar her sailing, the sanction imposed by his
first report
rendered it highly probable that the shipowner would not
sail (as,
in fact, occurred) in view of the dire effects that this would
have
on his insurance and on other common commercial arrangements
such
as a ship mortgage.
"Conversely,
the withdrawal of this sanction in the second report
would, as Mr.
Ducat must have appreciated, almost certainly have the
opposite
effect, since the shipowner would almost inevitably accept
the
recommendation that he should set sail, which was fully in
accord with
the commercial object of his voyage. The defects
recurred almost
immediately after the vessel had sailed from San
Juan, and the vessel
sank in the very early stages of her voyage
to Europe."
For reasons
which I will develop later, I find myself in complete agreement
with
the judge that the degree of proximity in this case was very close
indeed.
The judge then
turned to consider whether it was "fair, just and
reasonable"
to impose on Mr. Ducat a duty of care. He did not consider that
there
were any considerations of public policy which militated against such
a
duty. As I have already said, Mr. Aikens does not suggest that
the judge was
wrong in that respect. He accepts that whatever
might be the position of
classification societies in other cases
N.K.K. were not entitled to rely on any
immunity on the facts of
this case.
The judge then
considered the other circumstances of the case, and in
particular
the absence of any means of limiting N.K.K.'s liability in tort.
He
held that this might be a relevant factor if he were imposing
on classification
societies some generalised duty of care towards
cargo owners and other parties
across the board. But that was not
this case. The judge was careful to limit
his decision to the
assumed facts. So limited, he could see nothing unfair
or
unreasonable or unjust in making N.K.K. liable in full for the
damage caused
by Mr. Ducat's negligence. I quote a paragraph from
his judgment to
illustrate his approach ([1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
481, 500):
"Finally,
so far as the 'floodgates' argument is concerned, I do not
accept,
since this is a 'one-off decision, that it will open the way, as
Mr.
Aikens suggests, to the imposition of a general duty of care
to
owners of cargo, however long after the offending survey on
the
following voyage or on subsequent voyages. On the contrary, in
my
judgment the proximity test will act as an adequate safeguard
against
any such extravagant consequences."
Hirst J.
concluded his judgment with a particularly apt quotation from
the
judgment of Lord Wright in Grant's case [1936] AC 85,
107:
"Mr.
Greene further contended on behalf of the manufacturers that if
the
decision in Donoghue's case [1932] AC 562, 591, were
extended
- 4 -
even a
hair's-breadth, no line could be drawn, and a
manufacturer's
liability would be extended indefinitely. He put as
an illustration the
case of a foundry which had cast a rudder to
be fitted on a liner: he
assumed that it was fitted and the
steamer sailed the seas for some
years: but the rudder had a
latent defect due to faulty and negligent
casting, and one day it
broke, with the result that the vessel was
wrecked, with great
loss of life and damage to property. He argued
that if Donoghue's
case were extended beyond its precise facts, the
maker of the
rudder would be held liable for damages of an indefinite
amount,
after an indefinite time, and to claimants indeterminate until
the
event. But it is clear that such a state of things would involve
many
considerations far removed from the simple facts of this case.
So
many contingencies must have intervened between the lack of care
on
the part of the makers and the casualty that it may be that the
law
would apply, as it does in proper cases, not always according
to strict
logic, the rule that cause and effect must not be too
remote: in any
case the element of directness would obviously be
lacking. Lord Atkin
deals with that sort of question in Donoghue's
case where he refers to
Earl v. Lubbock [1905] 1 KB 253, 259: he quotes the commonsense
opinion of Mathew L.J.:
'It is impossible to accept such a wide
proposition, and, indeed,
it is difficult to see how, if it were the law,
trade could be
carried on.'
"In their
Lordships' opinion it is enough for them to decide this
case on
its actual facts."
Once again, I
find myself in agreement with the judge. His reasoning is
clear,
and the good sense of his conclusion is, to my mind, transparent.
The judgments of the Court of Appeal - "fair, just and reasonable"
The leading
judgment was given by Saville L.J. There were two
grounds for his
decision. The main ground was that the bill of lading contract
under
which the cargo was being carried incorporated the Hague Rules.
The
Hague Rules "create an intricate blend of responsibility
and liabilities, rights
and immunities . . . indemnities and
liberties". It would not be fair and just
to impose on a
classification society an identical duty to that imposed
on
shipowners "but without any of the balancing factors,
which are internationally
recognised and accepted:" [1994] 1
W.L.R. 1071, 1089. Since the primary
responsibility for looking
after the cargo lay on the shipowners under the
contract of
carriage, there was no need to impose a like duty in tort on
N.K.K.
I quote the concluding sentence of Saville L.J.'s judgment, at
p.
1082:
"The
balance of rights and duties between the principal parties
(cargo
owners and shipowners) has been settled on an
internationally
acceptable basis and I can see no justice or good
reason for adding to
or altering this by imposing on the society a
like duty to that owed by
- 5 -
the shipowners,
but without any of the checks and balances which exist
in the
present regime."
The second
ground for Saville L.J.'s decision was that the relationship
between
the cargo owners and N.K.K. was not sufficiently close to support
a
duty of care.
Balcombe L.J.
doubted whether "fair, just and reasonable" added
anything
to the test of proximity. But if it did he agreed with Saville L.J.
on
both grounds: [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1071, 1088-1089.
Mann LJ. held,
at p. 1087, that it was unfair, unjust and unreasonable
that the
plaintiffs should have an unlimited claim in tort against N.K.K.,
when
they had a contractual claim against the shipowners for
breach of a non-
delegable duty. In his view, the judge fell into
error by failing to take
account of the shipowner's position.
As to the first
of Saville L.J.'s grounds, I have to say that in my
opinion the
Hague Rules have little if anything to do with the case. It is
true
that the cargo happened to be carried under bills of lading
which incorporated
the Hague Rules, and that much of the world's
seaborne traffic, especially in
the liner trades (which this was
not), is carried on similar terms. But the
cargo might just as
well have been carried under a charterparty, in common
with much
of the world's bulk trade. If it had been, then "the intricate
blend
of liabilities and responsibilities, rights and immunities"
contained in the
Hague Rules would have had nothing to say on the
matter, for the simple
reason that the Hague Rules do not apply to
charterparties: see Article V.
It is of course
true that Articles III and IV of the Hague Rules, are
frequently
incorporated into voyage charterparties by a clause paramount,
or
otherwise. But this is by agreement between the parties, and
not by force of
any international convention. In this very case
the voyage charterparty dated
20 January 1986 (Stemmor Charter
Party (1983)) between the plaintiffs Marc
Rich and Co. A.G. and
the second defendants does not incorporate the Hague
Rules. It
provides, by typed insertion, that bills of lading issued under
the
charterparty should incorporate the Hague Rules - a very
different thing. If
therefore the relevant contract of carriage in
this case had been contained in
the charterparty, and not the
bills of lading, as would have been the case if
Marc Rich had been
the receivers as well as the shippers of the cargo, the
irrelevance
of the Hague Rules would have been apparent.
It would make
nonsense of the law if a surveyor in the position of Mr.
Ducat
owed a duty of care towards cargo if the contract of carriage
were
contained in a charterparty, which does not incorporate the
Hague Rules, but
not if it were contained in a bill of lading
which does.
But even if one
assumes that all carriage of goods by sea were subject
to the
Hague Rules, I have difficulty in seeing why the balance of rights
and
- 6 -
liabilities
between shipowners and cargo would be upset by holding the
defendants
liable for the consequence of Mr Ducat's negligence. As Mr
Aikens
correctly says in paragraph 18 of his written submissions: "The
Hague
Rules have nothing to say on the issue of a duty of care on
parties other than
cargo owners and carriers: why should they?".
There could be no question of
the defendants claiming an indemnity
from the shipowners on the assumed
facts of this case, any more
than the negligent architect could claim an
indemnity from the
building owners in Clay v. A.J. Crump & Sons
Ltd.
[1964] 1 Q.B. 533; and even if a claim for an indemnity
could be got on its
feet, it would not have increased the
shipowners total liability unless the
circumstances were such as
to deprive the shipowners of their right to limit.
Then it was
said that if claims such as the present became at all
frequent,
the classification societies might seek to pass on the cost
of
insurance to shipowners. I return later to the question of
insurance in another
context. Here it is enough to say that there
was no evidence one way or the
other as to the cost of the
insurance, or whether it would be passed on. It is
mere guess
work. But having regard to the prevailing competition
among
classification societies, it by no means follows that the
cost of insurance would
be passed on to shipowners; and even if it
was, I doubt if it would be a
significant factor in upsetting the
balance of rights and liabilities under the
Hague Rules.
With great
respect, therefore, the "intricate regime" of the
Hague
Rules to which all three judges in the Court of Appeal
referred, has nothing
to do with whether it is fair, just and
reasonable that Mr. Ducat and his
employers should be liable to
cargo for their assumed negligence. The
irrelevance of the Hague
Rules is underlined by the further consideration that
the
limitation provisions on which the shipowners relied to limit their
liability,
and which is said to contrast with the unlimited
liability sought to be imposed
on the N.K.K., is not derived from
the Hague Rules at all, but from section
503 of the Merchant
Shipping Act 1894, shortly to be re-enacted as section
185 of and
Schedule 7 to the Merchant Shipping Act 1995.
If therefore,
as I think, the incorporation of the Hague Rules in this
particular
contract of carriage must be left out of account, the Court
of
Appeal's judgment on this part of the case can only be
supported if the mere
existence of a contract of carriage under
which the shipowners can limit their
liability, is inconsistent
with, or militates against, the imposition of unlimited
liability
on a third party in tort.
But why should
this be so? This was surely the very error which was
exposed in
Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562, and Grant v.
Australian
Knitting Mills Ltd. [1936] AC 85. Mr. Aikens
sought to distinguish Grant's
case on the grounds that
"there was
no internationally recognised code ... for regulating the
rights
and duties of the party primarily responsible for taking care,
- 7 -
which in that
case the House of Lords clearly considered was the
manufacturer
himself": see, per Saville L.J., at p. 1081B.
I accept, of
course, that there is no internationally recognised code
governing
the manufacture of underpants. But for the reasons
already mentioned, I do
not regard this as a relevant
consideration in the case of shipowners. More
important, I am not
sure what is meant by saying that the shipowners are
"primarily"
responsible for taking care, and that this militates against the
need
to impose a similar duty on N.K.K. Of course the shipowners
are primarily -
indeed solely - responsible for getting the cargo
to its destination; and of
course the shipowners must take proper
care of the cargo as bailees, subject
to the terms of any contract
of carriage between the parties. But I am unable
to see why the
existence of the contract of carriage should "militate
against"
a duty of care being owed by a third party in tort.
The function of the law
of tort is not limited to filling in gaps
left by the law of contract, as this
House has recently
re-affirmed in Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1994]
3
W.L.R. 761, 787, per Lord Goff of Chieveley. The House
rejected an
approach which treated the law of tort as
supplementary to the law of
contract, i.e. as providing for a
tortious remedy only where their is no
contract. On the contrary:
the law of tort is the general law, out of which the
parties may,
if they can, contract.
In Adler v.
Dickson [1955] 1 QB 158, the plaintiff was injured
when
boarding a ship due to the negligence of the master and
boatswain. Her ticket
excluded all liability on the part of the
company. So she sued the master and
boatswain in tort. It was held
by the Court of Appeal that she could recover.
Jenkins L.J. said,
at p. 186:
"If the
contract with the company had contained no exempting
provisions,
the plaintiff would, as I understand the law, have had
separate
and distinct rights of action (a) against the company
for
breach of contract or, alternatively, in tort, on the
principle of
'respondeat superior,' and (b) against the
defendants as the persons
actually guilty of the tortious acts or
omissions which caused the
damage. The plaintiffs right of action
against the company is clearly
taken away by the exempting
provisions of the contract, but I fail to
see how that can have
the effect of depriving her also of her separate
and distinct
right of action against the defendants as the actual
tortfeasors."
The judgment of
Jenkins L.J. was adopted and approved by the High
Court of
Australia in Wilson v. Darling Island Stevedoring and
Lighterage Co.
Ltd. [1956] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 346. In that case
the tortfeasor was not the
servant of the shipowners, as in Adler
v. Dickson, but an independent
contractor. The facts were that
the plaintiffs' goods were in course of
carriage under a bill of
lading which incorporated the Hague Rules. After
-8-
discharge, but before delivery,
they were damaged by the negligence of a
stevedore. Fullagar J.
said, p. 364:
"The stevedore is a complete
stranger to the contract of carriage, and
it is no concern of his
whether there is a bill of lading or not, or, if
there is, what
are its terms. . . . If the stevedore negligently soaks
cargo with
water and ruins it, I can find neither rule of law nor
contract to
save him from the normal consequences of his tort."
Midland
Silicones Ltd. v. Scruttons Ltd. [1962] AC 446, is another
case
involving stevedores. The facts were in all respects similar.
Viscount
Simonds said at p. 472, that he agreed with Fullagar J.'s
judgment, and with
every line and every word of it. It is true
that in Midland Silicones v.
Scruttons Ltd. and Wilson
v. Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co.
Ltd., the
damage occurred after the discharge of the cargo. But can it
be
supposed that the result would have been different if the
damage had occurred
in the course of discharge? Clearly not. The
stevedores would have been
under the same duty of care,
notwithstanding the "primary" responsibility of
the
shipowners under the Hague Rules to carry and discharge the cargo
with
due care. It would have been hopeless to argue that the
stevedores should not
be liable on the ground that it would not be
"just, fair and reasonable" to
impose on them a duty of
care in tort with unlimited liability, having regard
to the
shipowners' limited liability under the Hague Rules or the
Brussels
Convention of 1957 or the London Convention of 1976.
Mr. Aikens
argued that Adler v. Dickson, Wilson v. Darling Island
Stevedoring
and Lighterage Co. Ltd. and Midland Silicones Ltd. v.
Scrutton
Ltd. can all be distinguished on the ground that they
are cases of direct
physical or personal injury. But what
does this mean? Take the case of
shiprepairers. Mr. Aikens was at
first hesitant to concede that shiprepairers
called in by the
shipowners to make the ship seaworthy owed any duty of care
to the
cargo on board. But in the end he accepted that this must be so. If
a
fitter employed by shiprepairers negligently leaves a tap on,
and the cargo is
soaked, presumably the damage is direct, and his
employers would be liable.
But if instead he negligently fails to
secure an inspection cover, and a week
later sea water enters the
hold, and damages the cargo, and the vessel sinks
with loss of
life, is it to be said that the damage is indirect, and that
the
shiprepairers escape liability because the "primary"
responsibility to make the
ship seaworthy is on the shipowners? If
a delay of a week means that the
damage is indirect, then
presumably the injury suffered by the pursuer in
Donoghue v.
Stevenson [1932] AC 562 was also indirect, and the
defenders
should have succeeded. The question in every case must
surely be not
whether the physical damage is direct or indirect,
but whether the negligence
of the manufacturer or the stevedores
or the shiprepairers caused the damage.
How then does the position of a
surveyor, called in by shipowners
because the vessel is leaking,
differ from that of the shiprepairer ? The answer
- 9 -
is that it
differs not at all. If it is fair, just and reasonable to hold
a
shiprepairer liable to an unlimited extent for damage to cargo
on board caused
by his negligence, even though the damage does not
occur until after the
vessel has sailed, why should it not be
fair, just and reasonable in the case of
a surveyor? Suppose in
the case of the inspection cover, the surveyor
negligently tells
the fitter that four bolts are sufficient to secure the
cover,
instead of the usual six, how could it be fair, just and
reasonable that the
surveyor should not be liable? On what
principle would the fitter be liable in
such circumstances, when
he acts unadvised, but not the surveyor who advises
him? No
"coherent system of law" to use the language of Sir Donald
Nicholls
V.-C. in White v. Jones [1993] 3 W.L.R. 730, 740,
should permit such a
result.
It follows that
I cannot share the view of the Court of Appeal that the
existence
of a contract of carriage between the cargo owners and the
shipowners
"militates against" the liability of the surveyor in tort.
To my
mind the existence of the contract is as irrelevant as is
the fact that in this
particular case it happened to incorporate
the Hague Rules.
The judgments of the Court of Appeal - proximity
I now aim to
the second of the two grounds on which Saville L.J.
based his
decision, namely, that the relationship between N.K.K. and the
cargo
was not sufficiently close to support a duty of care. It is said that
the
cargo owners were not even aware that Mr. Ducat had been
called in, and
could not therefore have relied on anything which
he did or failed to do.
In considering
proximity, it is convenient to start with a Guidance Note
prepared
by N.K.K. for the use of their surveyors. The opening sentence
reads:
"N.K.K. was founded in 1899 with the purpose of promoting
the
safeguard of life and property at sea." One would find a
similar statement in
the rules of most classification societies.
So far as safeguarding life is
concerned, it would seem almost
self-evident that Mr. Ducat owed a duty of
care towards the
members of the crew. He knew that their lives would be at
risk if
he allowed the ship to sail in an unseaworthy condition. It is true
that
he had no legal right to stop the ship sailing. But his de
facto control was
absolute. If he had maintained his original
recommendation, and not changed
his mind, it is inconceivable that
in practice the vessel would have sailed.
Mr. Aikens argued that
de facto control was not sufficient to found the
necessary
proximity. I disagree. I find it difficult to imagine a closer,
or
more direct relationship, than that which existed between Mr.
Ducat and the
crew. It calls to mind the example of the negligent
garage mechanic given by
Lord Devlin in Hedley Byrne & Co.
Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964]
A.C. 465, 516:
"A
defendant who is given a car to overhaul and repair if necessary
is
liable to the injured driver (a) if he overhauls it and repairs
it
negligently and tells the driver it is safe when it is not; (b)
if he
- 10 -
overhauls it
and negligently finds it not to be in need of repair and
tells the
driver it is safe when it is not and (c) if he negligently omits
to
overhaul it at all and tells the driver that it is safe when it is
not.
It would be absurd in any of these cases to argue that the
proximate
cause of the driver's injury was not what the defendant
did or failed
to do but his negligent statement on the faith of
which the driver drove
the car and for which he could not
recover."
Mr. Aikens was inclined to accept
that Mr. Ducat owed a duty of care to the
crew, although he made
no formal concession to that effect.
What about the
cargo? In some ways the relationship between Mr.
Ducat and the
cargo was even closer. For it is a universal rule of maritime
law
- certainly it is the law of England - that ship and cargo are
regarded as
taking part in a joint venture. This is the basis on
which the whole law of
general average rests. This is why, if the
temporary repairs at San Juan had
been successful, and if the
voyage had been completed in safety, the cargo
would have had to
contribute to the cost of the temporary repairs under Rule
XIV of
the York Antwerp Rules. In Morrison Steamship Co. Ltd.
v.
Greystoke Castle (Cargo Owners) [1947] A.C. 265, the facts
were that the
Cheldale and the Greystoke Castle were
in collision off the coast of South
Africa. The Cheldale sank,
and the Greystoke Castle put into Durban as a
port of
refuge. There she incurred general average expenditure amounting
to
$33,127, of which cargo's proportion was $22,802. In
proceedings between
the two vessels the Cheldale was held
one-quarter to blame, and the Greystoke
Castle three-quarters.
The owners of the cargo on board the Greystoke Castle
then
commenced proceedings against the owners of the Cheldale
claiming,
inter alia, the amount which they had had to
contribute in general average.
The claim succeeded. It was
submitted on behalf of the defendants that the
plaintiffs' only
right was to stand in the shoes of the carrying ship, and that
they
had no right of direct recovery against the owners of the colliding
ship
to recover their general average contribution. This argument
was emphatically
rejected. Lord Porter said, at p. 294:
"Crews'
wages, pilotage fees and the cost of feeding the crew [the
subject
of the general average expenditure] are no doubt primarily
ship's
liability and it does not seem possible to assert that all
the
interests concerned are directly liable to pay the crew or
pilot once the
general average act has been done and general
average expenditure is
incurred. It is more consistent with the
realities of the case to hold
that the shipowner is directly
liable to pay those whom he employs,
but nevertheless in incurring
the debt and making payment is acting
not only for the ship but
also on behalf of all the interests concerned.
... So in the
present case in my view the owners of the Greystoke
Castle
pledged their own credit as principals to answer for the
general
average expenditure but yet acted as agents for the
contributories
including the respondents in incurring the expense.
The expense being
- 11 -
thus incurred
for the respondents, they can claim against the
wrongdoer to make
good their loss which to the extent of one-quarter
flows from the
wrongful act of the Cheldale ..." [my emphasis]
There are
repeated references in Lord Porter's speech to ship and cargo
being
engaged on a joint venture. At p. 297, he said:
"A further
example of the fact that, because of their close connection,
ship
and cargo are dealt with on the same principle is to be found in
the
fact that innocent cargo carried on the ship which shares the
blame
for a collision can recover against the other ship not its
whole damages
but only that proportion which the carrying ship can
recover against
the other ... In the case of carriage of goods by
sea a general
average act is one undertaken to preserve the
various interests engaged
in the joint adventure and to enable it
to be carried to a successful
conclusion. Expenditure so
incurred is in that sense incurred to
preserve those interests,
viz., the ship's safety and carrying capacity,
the cargo's
preservation and safe arrival, and the earning of the
freight."
[my emphasis]
The principle
established in Greystoke Castle is thus directly relevant
to
the present case. When the Master called in Mr. Ducat, and
thereafter
incurred expenditure for the common safety, he was
acting as much in the
interests and on behalf of the cargo as of
the ship. It seems almost impossible
to say, therefore, that while
Mr. Ducat owed a duty of care to the ship, he
owed no duty of care
to the cargo on the ground that the relationship between
the
parties was insufficiently close. The fact that the cargo owners
were
unaware that Mr. Ducat had been called in is quite beside the
point.
So, with great
respect, I find that I cannot agree with the second
ground of
decision in the Court of Appeal. To my mind the necessary
element
of proximity was not only present, but established beyond
any
peradventure. I would only add at this point that if concern
is felt that a
decision in favour of the cargo owners would open a
wide field of liability,
I would reply "not so". There
is an obvious, sensible and readily defensible
line between the
surveyor in the present case, where the cargo was on board,
and
the joint venture was in peril, and a surveyor called in to carry out
a
periodic survey. Hirst J. confined his decision to the facts of
the case. He
was right to do so. Mr. Aikens did not suggest
otherwise.
Other considerations
I now come back
to "fair, just and reasonable" and consider various
other
points made in argument before your Lordships.
First, we were
informed that there has never yet been a successful
claim against
a classification society in tort. I do not regard this
as
significant. A similar argument was advanced in Owners of
the Motor Vessel
- 12 -
Tojo Maru v.
N.V. Bureau Wijsmuller [1972] A.C. 243, where it was held
by
this House for the first time that salvors were liable for
damage caused by the
negligence of their employees, even though
the salvage operation was
successful. The point was described by
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest at
p. 272, as having far reaching
consequences for salvors and shipowners alike.
But the novelty of
the point was brushed aside.
Next it was
said that it would not be fair, just and reasonable as
between
shipowners and the classification society that the classification
society
should incur unlimited liability in tort, in contrast to
shipowners who are
entitled to limit under the equivalent of
section 503 of the Merchant Shipping
Act 1894. I have already
touched on this point. A similar point arose in the
Tojo Maru.
One of the questions in that case was whether salvors
were
entitled to limit their liability under section 503. It was
held that they were
not. Lord Reid said, at p. 270:
"I am
bound to say that I have some sympathy with the respondents on
the
issue of limitation of liability. But a court must go by
the
provisions which have been agreed and enacted. If the special
position
of salvors was unforeseen, then we must await alteration
of those
provisions if those concerned see fit to make some
alteration."
Four years
later, in 1976, the limitation provisions were extended to
cover
salvors. It was never suggested in the Tojo Maru that
the inability of salvors
to limit their liability was a ground for
holding them immune from the
consequences of their negligence. Nor
was any such suggestion made in Adler
v. Dickson [1955] 1 QB 158 or Midland Silicones Ltd. v. Scruttons Ltd.
[1962] AC 446.
Then it was
pointed out that classification societies are charitable non-
profit
making organisations, promoting the collective welfare and fulfilling
a
public role. But why should this make any difference? Remedies
in the law
of tort are not discretionary. Hospitals also are
charitable non-profit making
organisations. But they are subject
to the same common duty of care under
the Occupier's Liability
Acts 1957 and 1984 as betting shops or brothels.
Take again the
position of salvors. They also fulfil an important public role.
It
was argued in the Tojo Maru that salvors should receive every
proper
inducement on grounds of public policy, and that to hold
them liable for the
negligence of their servants in the course of
salvage operations would only
serve to discourage their beneficial
activities. This is very similar to the
argument advanced in the
present case. It did not succeed in the Tojo Maru,
and
should not, I think, succeed here. It is not as if N.K.K. are unable
to
afford the cost of insurance. It is the third largest
classification society.
A.B.S., another non-profit making
classification society, had a net income of
$11m. in 1990 on
operating revenues of $122m: see Lux, Classification
Societies,
(1993), p. 53. In paragraph 21(c) of his statement, Mr.
Mitsuo
Abe, Executive Vice-President of N.K.K., doubts whether
N.K.K. would be
- 13 -
able to survive
if they were held liable for claims such as the present. I have
to
say that I view this assertion with a good deal of scepticism.
Lastly, it is
said (although this was not reflected in Mr. Aikens'
written
submission or his oral argument) that to impose liability
on classification
societies would involve an extra layer of
insurance, and that this would be
wasteful and inconvenient. There
was no evidence that classification societies
do not already
insure. The point is simply not mentioned in Mr. Mitsuo
Abe's
statement. Traditionally the courts have regarded the availability
of
insurance as irrelevant to the question whether a duty of care
should be
imposed: see Markesinis and Deakin Tort Law, 3rd
ed., p. 114. Even if this
traditional view is gradually being
displaced, it cannot be right that the courts
should reach
conclusions on the availability of insurance, or the impact
of
imposing a fresh liability on the insurance market generally,
without proper
material. In Caparo Industries Plc. v. Dickman
[1989] Q.B. 653, it was
argued in the Court of Appeal that
auditors, if held liable in negligence to an
individual
shareholder would find it difficult to obtain professional
indemnity
cover, and that the cost, which would be high, would
have to be passed on.
Bingham L.J., at p. 689, found it hard to
assess this argument in the absence
of any evidence or inquiry.
Taylor L.J. said, at p. 703:
"It is
contended that auditors would find it difficult and
cripplingly
expensive to obtain insurance cover. It is even
suggested accountants
might decline to be appointed as auditors.
No evidence was adduced
on this aspect of the case and if I am
right about the difficulties and
disincentives affecting possible
claimants the insurance problem should
not be insurmountable."
I agree with
Bingham L.J. and Taylor L.J. that the court should be wary
of
expressing any view on the insurance position without any
evidence on the
point, and should not speculate as to the effect,
if any, of an extra layer of
insurance on the cost of settling
claims. For what it may be worth, I would
for my part doubt
whether it would make much difference. More generally,
I suspect
that a decision in favour of the cargo owners would be welcomed
by
members of the shipping community at large, who are
increasingly concerned
by the proliferation of sub-standard
classification societies; see Lux op. cit.
page viii.
Conclusion
The overriding
consideration in the present case is that the cargo
owners, as we
are asked to assume, have suffered physical damage to their
cargo,
and such damage was caused by Mr. Ducat's negligence, for
which
N.K.K. are responsible on ordinary principles of respondeat
superior. Since
the celebrated formulation of Lord Wilberforce in
Anns v. Merton London
Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 751,
a series of important cases in the
Court of Appeal and House of
Lords have signalled the "retreat from Anns",
culminating
in the decision of the House in Murphy v. Brentwood District
- 14 -
Council
[1991] 1 AC 398. Almost all these decisions have concerned
claims
to recover damages for economic loss, unassociated with
physical damage or
personal injury. The most important exception
was the Hua Lien [1991] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 309. In that case
Lord Brandon of Oakbrook said, at p. 328:
"In their
Lordships' view, however, the essential feature of the present
case
is that the damage sued for is not purely economic loss but
ordinary
physical damage to property. It follows that the decisions
relating
to claims for purely economic loss to which their Lordships
have
referred have no relevance to the present case."
The concept of
proximity, and the requirement that it should be fair,
just and
reasonable to impose a duty of care on the defendant in the
particular
circumstances of the case, have been developed as a
means of containing
liability for pure economic loss under the
principles stated in Donoghue v.
Stevenson [1932] AC 562.
At the same time, and by a parallel movement
in the opposite
direction, the House has in two recent decisions reaffirmed
liability
for economic loss based on the principle of assumption
of
responsibility as expounded by the House in Hedley Byrne &
Co. Ltd. v.
Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] AC 465, and
going back beyond that decision
to Nocton v. Lord Ashburton
[1914] AC 932. None of these difficulties
arise in the
present case. We are not here asked to extend the law of
negligence
into a new field. We are not even asked to make an
incremental
advance. All that is required is a straightforward
application of Donoghue v.
Stevenson. The ground is already
marked out by cases such as Haseldine v.
C.A. Daw & Son
Ltd. [1941] 2 K.B. 343, Clay v. A.J. Crump & Sons
Ltd.
[1964] 1 Q.B. 533, Voli v. Inglewood Shire Council
(1963) 110 C.L.R. 74
and Muirhead v. Industrial Tank
Specialities Ltd. [1986] QB 507, 532. In
physical damage
cases proximity very often goes without saying. Where the
facts
cry out for the imposition of a duty of care between the parties, as
they
do here, it would require an exceptional case to refuse to
impose a duty on the
ground that it would not be fair, just and
reasonable. Otherwise there is a
risk that the law of negligence
will disintegrate into a series of isolated
decisions without any
coherent principles at all, and the retreat from Anns will
turn
into a rout. Having given Mr. Aikens' arguments my best
consideration,
I can see no good reason why, on the facts of this
case, ordinary well
established principles of the law of
negligence should not be allowed to take
effect. Accordingly, I
would for my part allow the appeal, and restore the
order of Hirst
J.
- 15 -
LORD STEYN
My Lords,
For more than a
hundred and fifty years classification societies have
classified
merchant ships in the interests of safeguarding life and ships at
sea.
For this purpose classification societies attend to the
building of ships in order
to determine whether the ships merit
classification in accordance with their
standards. Classification
societies also conduct periodic surveys of ships to
ascertain
whether the ships are entitled to retain classification. Moreover,
if
ships sustain damage, classification societies are called in to
survey the
damage and to determine what repairs must be done, and
when, for the ship
to retain her classification. Such surveys are
called occasional surveys.
Typically, the repairs may fall into
one of two groups:
(a) those
repairs which would prejudice the maintenance
of
classification if not dealt with within a specified time;
(b) those
repairs which, since they do not affect seaworthiness, may
be left
to the owner's convenience.
While
classification societies are available to render technical
assistance
to other parties, and sometimes do so, instructions for
the survey of a vessel
are given by owners. Owners are under
irresistible commercial pressure to
obtain and maintain a
classification of their vessel. The insurance of an
unclassed
vessel and her cargo would not be feasible at
economically
justifiable rates of premium. No sensible charterer
would charter such a ship.
Owners are therefore in practice
compelled to ensure that their vessels remain
in class. For that
purpose owners must enter into a contractual engagement
with a
classification society. The classification society will grant and
maintain
classification of the ship if the requirements of its own
rules and regulations
are met. And the classification society has
in practice control over the
question whether a damaged vessel,
without permanent repairs, will be
allowed to complete her
intended voyage.
Owners have
apparently never successfully sued a classification society
in
England or elsewhere for breach of a contractual or tortious duty in
and
about the performance their contractual engagement for a
survey of a damaged
vessel. The perceived obstacle to such a claim
by owners in a case of patent
damage to the hull of the vessel may
be that the seaworthiness of the vessel
is the primary
responsibility of the owners. There may also be formidable
problems
of causation. See Sundance Cruises Corporation v. American
Bureau
of Shipping, 7 F. 3d 1077 (2nd Cir. 1993), at 1084; [1994] 1
Lloyd's
Rep. 183, 211-212; International Ore & Fertilizer
Corporation v. SGS Control
Services Inc. 38 F. 3d 1279
(2nd Cir. 1994). That is, however, not the issue
in this case and
it is not necessary to express any view on it.
- 16 -
In this case
the question is whether a classification society owed a duty
of
care to a third party, the owners of cargo laden on a vessel, arising
from
the careless performance of a survey of a damaged vessel by
the surveyor of
the classification society which resulted in the
vessel being allowed to sail and
subsequently sinking. It is a
novel question. In England no classification
society, engaged by
owners to perform a survey, has ever been held liable to
cargo
owners on the ground of a careless conduct of any survey.
Your
Lordships have also been informed that there is apparently no
reported case
in which such a duty has been recognised in any
foreign court. Given the fact
that surveyors of classification
societies have regularly performed occasional
surveys of laden
vessels for over a century and a half the novel nature of the
problem
may not be entirely without significance. Ultimately, however,
the
problem must be considered in accordance with our tort law as
it now stands
without any a priori disposition for or
against the legal sustainability of such
a claim.
The casualty
In early 1986
the bulk carrier the Nicholas H loaded cargoes of lead
and
zinc concentrate at South American ports. The vessel loaded the
cargo
under bills of lading which incorporated the Hague Rules.
Under two bills of
lading dated 29 January 1986 the vessel loaded
a cargo at Callao in Peru for
carriage to a Black Sea port. Under
a bill of lading dated 6 February 1986
the vessel loaded a cargo
at Antofagasta in Chile for carriage to an Italian
port. The
vessel proceeded on her voyage. She developed a crack in her
hull.
The master of the vessel reported this damage to the United
States
Coast Guard. There was concern as to the vessel's fitness
for the voyage.
The U.S. Coastguard persuaded the owners of the
vessel to request their
classification society, Nippon Kaiji
Kyokai ("N.K.K."), to perform a survey
of the damage.
For this purpose the vessel anchored three miles off San Juan
in
Puerto Rico. A surveyor acting on behalf of N.K.K. inspected the
damage
to the vessel while she was at anchor. On 25 March 1986 the
surveyor issued
a recommendation that the vessel should proceed to
the port of San Juan, and
undergo permanent repairs in dry-dock.
That would have required the
unloading of the cargo. It would have
been very expensive. The owners of
the vessel objected to the idea
of carrying out permanent repairs at San Juan.
Instead they
instructed the vessel to proceed to the port of San Juan
for
temporary repairs. The owners sent an engineer and welder to
the vessel.
With the assistance of local divers they apparently
carried out temporary
repairs. On 3 March 1986 the surveyor of the
classification society reversed
his initial recommendation.
Subject to the temporary repairs being further
examined and dealt
with to the satisfaction of an attending surveyor at the
earliest
opportunity after the vessel discharged her cargoes, and no later
than
May 1986, the surveyor recommended that the vessel be
retained in class for
her original voyage. That meant that the
vessel could sail. On 2 March 1986
the vessel sailed. Shortly
afterwards the vessel reported that the welding of
the temporary
repairs had cracked. Despite attempted repairs at sea the vessel
- 17 -
sank a few days
later. The cargo was totally lost. The value of the cargo was
in
excess of US$6 million.
The cargo
owners sued the shipowners, the head charterers and
N.K.K. in the
Commercial Court. The cargo owners abandoned the claim
against the
charterers. They settled the claim against the owners for
about
US$500,000 which was the extent of the shipowners' liability
having regard
to the tonnage limitation applicable to the vessel:
compare the Brussels
Convention 1957, given the force of law in
the United Kingdom by section
503 of the Merchant Shipping Act
1894 (57 & 58 vict. c. 60); now replaced
by the Merchant
Shipping Act 1979, section 14, giving the force of law in
the
United Kingdom to article 2 of the Convention relating to the
Carriage of
Passengers and their Luggage by Sea ("the London
Convention"). The cargo
owners pursued N.K.K. for the balance
of their claim, namely a sum of the
order of US$5.7 million.
The role of the classification society (N.K.K.)
While it is
realistic to accept that classification societies by and large
are
constituted on a similar basis, and perform similar functions, it is
right to
describe the state of evidence as to the position and
role of N.K.K. in the
maritime trade. N.K.K. was founded in 1899.
Its headquarters are in Tokyo.
Ir is the third largest
classification society in the world. It is an international
ship
classification society. It is a non-governmental and
non-profit-making
entity which is registered under Japanese law as
an association or foundation
"which is related to ... public
interests and is not aimed at making a
profit. ..." The
particular purpose for which N.K.K. exists is described in
its
founding instrument (the Act of Endowment) as follows:
"Article 2
... to promote the improvement and development of
various matters
relating to ships ... so as to safeguard the safety of
life and
property at sea ..."
The role of
N.K.K. is therefore to promote safety of life and ships at sea in
the
public interest.
N.K.K. has
various statutory functions. The present case does not
involve the
exercise of a statutory function by N.K.K.. That dimension
of
N.K.K.'s functions can be put to one side. N.K.K. classifies
ships of any
nationality. An owner who is desirous of having his
ship classified by
N.K.K. submits an application for N.K.K. to
carry out a survey in accordance
with the Rules and Regulations of
N.K.K.. Ships classified by N.K.K. are
entered into the published
Register of Ships.
Apart from
classification surveys in order to obtain initial
classification,
N.K.K. conducts various periodic surveys. But the present case
is
concerned with an occasional survey which is required inter alia
when a
ship has sustained damage to her hull, machinery or
equipment to such an
- 18 -
extent that her
classification may be affected. Owners are obliged to notify
N.K.K.
if the vessel sustains such damage. Rule 1.1.3 of the Rules for
the
Survey and Construction of Steel Ships provides:
"Where any
damages to hull, machinery or equipment, which affect or
may
affect classification (e.g. seaworthiness, stability) were
sustained,
the application for examination of the Surveyors is to
be made by the
Owners or their representatives. All repairs which
may be required in
order that a ship may retain her class are to
be carried out under the
inspection of, and to the satisfaction
of, the Surveyors.
Rule 1.1.10 states:
"Where
repairs are deemed necessary as a result of the survey, the
Surveyor
will notify his recommendations to the Owner or its
representative.
Upon this notification, the repair is to be made to the
satisfaction
of the Surveyor."
The sanction is
spelt out in regulation 3.1 of the Regulations for the
Classification
and Registry of Ships. So far as it is material it reads as
follows:
"The
maintenance of class of any ship is conditional upon compliance
with
the requirements of the Rules for periodical, damage and
other
surveys. The Committee reserve the right to suspend or
cancel the
class of any ship or its machinery when:
The ship is not subjected to
surveys for compliance with the
Rules at their due date;
The ship has not been
rectified in accordance with the
Surveyor's recommendation;
Repair, conversion or alteration
which may affect classification
has been done without approval of
the Committee; . . . '
There is an
appeal procedure which enables an owner, who considers that
a
recommendation made by a surveyor is unnecessary or
unreasonable, to
challenge the recommendation. Subject to this
qualification, a failure to deal
with a recommendation will result
in the suspension or cancellation of the
classification of the
ship.
The shape of the proceedings
The case came
before the Commercial Court by way of a preliminary
issue which
was in the following terms:
- 19 -
"Whether
on the facts pleaded in the points of claim [N.K.K.] owed
a duty
of care to [the cargo owners] capable of giving rise to a
liability
in damages."
It is not
necessary to examine the pleadings. In the Commercial Court,
in
the Court of Appeal and before your Lordships' House the outline of
facts,
as well as the description of the position and role of
N.K.K., which I have
given, were uncontroversial for the purpose
of the determination of the
preliminary issue. Moreover, in the
Court of Appeal and on appeal to your
Lordships' House, four
further assumptions of fact were expressly agreed for
the purpose
of the determination of the preliminary issue. First, it was
agreed
that by reason of their proprietary interest in the cargo
the plaintiffs had title
to sue if the classification society
otherwise owed them a duty of care.
Secondly, it was agreed that
it was foreseeable that lack of care by the
classification
surveyor was likely to expose the cargo to danger of physical
damage.
Thirdly, it was agreed the damage in fact suffered by the
plaintiffs
by reason of the loss of the vessel was physical damage
to their goods.
Fourthly, it was agreed that the loss of the
vessel and cargo was the result of
the carelessness of the N.K.K.
surveyor in (a) reversing the initial
recommendation in favour of
immediate permanent repairs and permitting the
vessel to continue
on her voyage when only temporary repairs had been
carried out and
(b) in failing to ensure that the repairs in fact carried out
were
suitable to ensure that the strength of the vessel was
adequate for the voyage.
In other words, on the assumption that
the carelessness of the surveyor caused
the loss of the cargo the
question is whether in law that carelessness amounted
to
actionable negligence. In short, the question is simply whether in
law the
classification society owed a duty of care to the owners
of the cargo.
The judgments at first instance and in the Court of Appeal
At first
instance Hirst J. (now Hirst L.J.) concluded that on the
assumed
facts N.K.K. did owe the cargo owners a duty of care capable
of
giving rise to a liability in damages: The Nicholas H [1992]
2 Lloyd's Reports
481. At the risk of doing an injustice to the
careful judgment of Hirst J. I
would summarise it by saying that
the closeness of the relationship between
the N.K.K. surveyor and
the owners of the cargo led him to conclude that a
duty of care
did arise. N.K.K. appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed the
decision
of Hirst J: Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. Bishop Rock Marine Co.
Ltd.
[1994] 1 W.L.R. 1071. Each member of the court gave a
separate judgment.
Contrary to the submission on behalf of the
cargo owners, each member of the
court held that in tort claims
for physical damage a plaintiff needs to satisfy
the requirements
of foreseeability and proximity as well as the requirement
that
the imposition of tort liability is fair, just and reasonable. But
Balcombe
L.J. added that he doubted whether the words "fair,
just and reasonable"
impose a test additional to that of
"proximity."
The leading
judgment was given by Saville L.J. Relying on the
international
code constituted by the Hague Rules, he concluded, at pp.
- 20 -
1081F-1082D, it
was not fair, just , and reasonable to require N.K.K. to
shoulder
a duty which by the Hague Rules primarily lies on
shipowners.
Secondly, Saville L.J. concluded that, absent any
dealing between cargo
interests and N.K.K., the relationship
between the parties does not support the
existence of care.
Balcombe L.J., at p. 1089A-B, agreed with the conclusions
and
reasons of Saville L.J. Mann L.J., at p. 1087D, confined himself to
the
question whether the imposition of a duty of care on N.K.K.
was fair, just and
reasonable. For substantially the reasons given
by Saville L.J. he concluded
that N.K.K. owed no duty of care to
cargo interests. The present appeal calls
into question the
conclusions of the Court of Appeal.
The issues
Mr. Gross Q.C.,
who appeared on behalf of the cargo owners,
divided his attack on
the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in three parts.
First, he
submitted that, since the claim involved foreseeable physical
damage
to the cargo owners' property, the additional requirements
of proximity and
that it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a
duty of care are inapplicable.
Secondly, and assuming that those
requirements are applicable, he submitted
that those requirements
are fulfilled. He described this way of putting the
case as being
squarely based on the principles laid down in Donoghue
v.
Stevenson [1932] AC 562. Thirdly, and very much as a
subsidiary part of
his case, he submitted that N.K.K. are liable
on the ground of the doctrine of
voluntary assumption of
responsibility as explained in Henderson v. Merrett
Syndicates
Ltd. [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761, per Lord Goff of Chieveley at
773D-H
and 789C-791B.
The requirements in physical damage cases
Counsel for the
cargo owners submitted that in cases of physical
damage to
property in which the plaintiff has a proprietary or
possessory
interest the only requirement is proof of reasonable
foreseeability. For this
proposition he relied on observations of
Lord Oliver of Aylmerton in Caparo
Industries Plc. v. Dickman
[1990] 2 AC 605, 632C-633D. Those
observations, seen in
context, do not support his argument. They merely
underline the
qualitative difference between cases of direct physical damage
and
indirect economic loss. The materiality of that distinction is plain.
But
since the decision in Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home Office
[1970] AC 1004
it has been settled law that the elements of
foreseeability and proximity as well
as considerations of
fairness, justice and reasonableness are relevant to all
cases
whatever the nature of the harm sustained by the plaintiff. Saville
L.J.
explained (at 1077D-E):
"...
whatever the nature of the harm sustained by the plaintiff, it
is
necessary to consider the matter not only by inquiring
about
foreseeability but also by considering the nature of the
relationship
between the parties; and to be satisfied that in all
the circumstances it
is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty
of care. Of course, . . . ,
- 21 -
these three
matters overlap with each other and are really facets of the
same
thing. For example, the relationship between the parties may be
such
that it is obvious that a lack of care will create a risk of harm
and
that as a matter of common sense and justice a duty should
be
imposed. . . . Again in most cases of the direct infliction of
physical
loss or injury through carelessness, it is self-evident
that a civilised
system of law should hold that a duty of care has
been broken,
whereas the infliction of financial harm may well
pose a more difficult
problem. Thus the three so-called
requirements for a duty of care are
not to be treated as wholly
separate and distinct requirements but
rather as convenient and
helpful approaches to the pragmatic question
whether a duty should
be imposed in any given case. In the end
whether the law does
impose a duty in any particular circumstances
depends upon those
circumstances, ..."
That seems to
me a correct summary of the law as it now stands. It follows
that
I would reject the first argument of counsel for the cargo owners.
The duty of care deriving from Donoghue v. Stevenson
In the course
of their submissions counsel took your Lordships on a
tour of many
of the landmark cases on negligence from Donoghue v.
Stevenson
[1932] AC 562 to White v. Jones [1995] 2 WLR 187. In
this
area the common law develops incrementally on the basis of a
consideration
of analogous cases where a duty has been recognized
or desired. But none of
the cases cited provided any realistic
analogy to be used a springboard for a
decision one way or the
other in this case. The present case can only be
decided on the
basis of an intense and particular focus on all its
distinctive
features, and then applying established legal
principles to it. No doubt those
principles are capable of further
development but, for present purposes, the
applicable principles
can readily be identified and require no re-examination.
The factors pointing towards the existence of a duty of care
Not
surprisingly, there are substantial factors pointing in favour
and
against the recognition of a duty of care. Counsel for the
cargo owners
emphasized that except for the legal question whether
a duty of care exists
every element of the cargo owners' cause of
action must be assumed to be
satisfied. Specifically, he
emphasised that it is assumed that it was foreseeable
that
carelessness of the surveyor in conducting the survey of the
damaged
vessel, or in the making of recommendations, was likely to
expose the cargo
actually on board the vessel to the danger of
physical damage. The surveyor
was brought in because there was
concern for the safety of the vessel on the
intended voyage. But
exactly the same dangers would affect the hull and
cargo on that
voyage. Counsel for the cargo owners argued that in
the
circumstances, and in particularly in the light of the fact
that the cargo was
on board when the surveyor carelessly performed
his professional services,
the element of proximity was satisfied.
Turning to the question whether it is
- 22 -
fair, just and
reasonable to impose a duty of care on the classification
society
against the cargo owners, he said that neither the
contract of carriage between
owners of the vessel and the cargo
owners nor the contract between the
owners and the classification
society militated against the recognition of a
legal duty of care.
Given that third parties, such as cargo owners, are known
in
practice to rely on the recommendations of classification societies,
he
submitted that it is fair, just and reasonable to recognise a
legal duty of care
in this case. Alternatively, he argued that the
reliance placed on
recommendations of classification societies by
third parties in maritime trade
warranted an inference of an
assumption of responsibility by classification
societies as
against owners of cargo in cases when the survey work is
performed
while the cargo is on board. Lastly, he said that a recognition of
a
duty of care in such cases would promote the safety of life, ships
and cargo
at sea. All these factors and arguments are relevant and
must be taken into
account in the eventual decision.
Other material factors
It is now
necessary to examine a number of other factors in order to
put the
case in its right perspective, and to consider whether some of
those
factors militate against the recognition of a duty of care.
For convenience
these factors can be considered under six
headings, namely
Did the surveyor's carelessness cause direct physical loss?
Did the cargo owners rely on the surveyor's recommendations?
(c) The
impact of the contract between the shipowners and the owners of
the
cargo.
The impact of the contract
between the classification society and the
shipowners.
The position and role of N.K.K..
Policy factors arguably tending
to militate against the recognition of a
duty of care.
Only after an
examination of these features will it be possible to
address
directly the element of proximity and the question whether it is
fair,
just and reasonable to impose a duty of care.
(a) Direct physical loss?
Counsel for the
cargo owners argued that the present case involved the
infliction
of direct physical loss. At first glance the issue of
directness may
seem a matter of terminology rather than substance.
In truth it is a material
factor. The law more readily attaches
the consequences of actionable
- 23 -
negligence to
directly inflicted physical loss than to indirectly
inflicted
physical loss. For example, if the N.K.K. surveyor had
carelessly dropped
a lighted cigarette into a cargo hold known to
contain a combustible cargo,
thereby causing an explosion and the
loss of the vessel and cargo, the
assertion that the
classification society was in breach of a duty of care might
have
been a strong one. That would be a paradigm case of directly
inflicted
physical loss. Counsel for the cargo owners referred
your Lordships to Clay
v. A.J. Crump & Sons Ltd. [1964]
1 Q.B. 533 by way of support for the
proposition that, in this
case, there was a direct infliction of loss in the
relevant
sense. In that case an architect assured a demolition contractor
that
he could safely leave a wall standing. The demolition
contractor acted on this
advice. The wall collapsed on a workman.
The workman sued the architect
in tort. It was held that the
architect owed a duty of care to the workman.
The architect was
primarily responsible for leaving the wall in a dangerous
condition.
In the present case the shipowner was primarily responsible for
the
vessel sailing in a seaworthy condition. The role of the
N.K.K. was a
subsidiary one. In my view the carelessness of the
N.K.K. surveyor did not
involve the direct infliction of physical
damage in the relevant sense. That by
no means concludes the
answer to the general question. But it does introduce
the right
perspective on one aspect of this case.
(b) Reliance
It is possible
to visualise direct exchanges between cargo owners and
a
classification society, in the context of a survey on behalf of
owners of a
vessel laden with cargo, which might give rise to an
assumption of
responsibility in the sense explained by Lord Goff
in Henderson v. Merrett
Syndicates Ltd. [1994] 3 W.L.R.
761, 773, 789-791, in the passages
previously identified. In the
present case there was no contact whatever
between the cargo
owners and the classification society. Moreover, as Saville
L.J.
pointed out in this case it is not even suggested that the cargo
owners
were aware that N.K.K. had been brought in to survey the
vessel: see [1994]
1 W.L.R. 1071, 1082B. The cargo owners simply
relied on the owners of the
vessel to keep the vessel seaworthy
and to look after the cargo. Saville L.J.,
at p. 1082C and
Balcombe L.J., at p. 1089A, regarded this feature as
sufficient to
demonstrate that the necessary element of proximity was absent.
I
would approach the matter differently. In my view this feature is
not
necessarily decisive but it also contributes to placing the
claim in the correct
perspective.
(c) The bill of lading contracts
The first and
principal ground of the decision of Saville L.J. was the
impact of
the terms of the bill of lading contracts. He said (at p. 1080 E-G):
"The Hague
Rules (and their successor the Hague-Visby Rules) form
an
internationally recognised code adjusting the rights and
duties
existing between shipowners and those shipping goods under
bills of
- 24 -
lading. As Sir
John Donaldson M.R. said in Leigh and Sillavan Ltd.
v. Aliakmon
Shipping Co. Ltd. [1985] Q.B. 350, 368, the rules create
an
intricate blend of responsibilities and liabilities, rights
and
immunities, limitations on the amount of damages recoverable,
time
bars, evidential provisions, indemnities and liberties, all
in relation to
the carriage of goods under bills of lading. The
proposition advanced
by Mr. Gross would add an identical or
virtually identical duty owed
by the classification society to
that owed by the shipowners, but
without any of these balancing
factors, which are internationally
recognised and accepted. I do
not regard that as a just, fair or
reasonable proposition.'
Saville L.J. ended this part of his judgment by explicitly stating (at p. 1081H):
"The
question is not whether the classification society is covered by
the
Rules, but whether in all the circumstances it is just, fair
and
reasonable to require them to shoulder a duty which by the
Rules
primarily lies on the shipowners, without the benefits of
those Rules
or other international conventions."
That question
Saville L.J. (and, by adoption, Balcombe L.J.) answered in
the
negative. And Mann L.J. was in substantial agreement on this
point.
It was the
principal task of counsel for the cargo owners to try to
dismantle
the reasoning of Saville L.J. He pointed out that Saville
L.J.
apparently assumed that the limitation of the claim of cargo
owners against the
shipowners arose under the Hague Rules. In
truth the limitation arose by
reason of tonnage limitation as
already explained. This is not a point of
substance. Tonnage
limitation is a part of the international code which
governs the
claims under consideration. It is as relevant as any limitation
under
the Hague Rules.
Moving on to
more substantial matters, counsel for the cargo owners
submitted
that the allocation of risks in the Hague Rules between
shipowners
and the owners of cargo is irrelevant to the question
whether N.K.K. owed a
duty of care to the owners of the cargo. He
said the bill of lading contract on
Hague Rules terms, and the
international character of those Rules, is only a
piece of
history, which explains the positions in which N.K.K. and the
owners
of the cargo found themselves. In the course of these
submissions Mr. Gross
referred your Lordships to a valuable
article by Mr. P.F. Cane, "The liability
of classification
societies" [1994] L.M.C.L.Q. 363. Mr. Cane observed
trenchantly
(at p. 373):
"But why
should an allocation of risks between shipowners and cargo
owners
be enforced as between cargo owners and classification
societies?
Whatever good reasons there may be to do so, the mere
existence of
the Hague Rules is surely not one of them."
- 25 -
That is a
cogent argument against the reasoning of the Court of Appeal.
There
is, however, a further dimension of the problem that must
be
considered.
The dealings
between shipowners and cargo owners are based on a
contractual
structure, the Hague Rules, and tonnage limitation, on which
the
insurance of international trade depends: Dr. Malcolm Clarke,
"Misdelivery
and Time Bars" [1990] L.M.C.L.Q. 314.
Underlying it is the system of
double or overlapping insurance of
cargo. Cargo owners take out direct
insurance in respect of the
cargo. Shipowners take out liability risks insurance
in respect of
breaches of their duties of care in respect of the cargo.
The
insurance system is structured on the basis that the potential
liability of
shipowners to cargo owners is limited under the Hague
Rules and by virtue
of tonnage limitation provisions. And
insurance premiums payable by owners
obviously reflect such
limitations on the shipowners' exposure.
If a duty of
care by classification societies to cargo owners is
recognised in
this case, it must have a substantial impact on international
trade.
In his article Mr. Cane described the likely effect of imposing
such
duty of care as follows [1994] L.M.C.L.Q. 363, 375:
"Societies
would be forced to buy appropriate liability insurance unless
they
could bargain with shipowners for an indemnity. To the extent
that
societies were successful in securing indemnities from shipowners
in
respect of loss suffered by cargo owners, the limitation of
the
liability of shipowners to cargo owners under the
Hague(-Visby) Rules
would effectively be destroyed. Shipowners
would need to increase
their insurance cover in respect of losses
suffered by cargo owners;
but at the same time, cargo owners would
still need to insure against
losses above the Hague-Visby recovery
limit which did not result from
actionable negligence on the part
of a classification society. At least
if classification societies
are immune from non-contractual liability,
they can confidently go
without insurance in respect of third-party
losses, leaving third
parties to insure themselves in respect of losses
for which they
could not recover from shipowners."
Counsel for the
cargo owners challenged this analysis. On instructions
he said
that classification societies already carry liability risks
insurance. That
is no doubt right since classification societies
do not have a blanket immunity
from all tortious liability. On the
other hand, if a duty of care is held to exist
in this case, the
potential exposure of classification societies to claims by
cargo
owners will be large. That greater exposure is likely to lead to
an
increase in the cost to classification societies of obtaining
appropriate liability
risks insurance. Given their role in
maritime trade classification societies are
likely to seek to pass
on the higher cost to owners. Moreover, it is readily
predicable
that classification societies will require owners to give
appropriate
indemnities. Ultimately, shipowners will pay.
- 26 -
The result of a
recognition of a duty of care in this case will be to
enable cargo
owners, or rather their insurers, to disturb the balance created
by
the Hague Rules and Hague-Visby Rules as well as by tonnage
limitation
provisions, by enabling cargo owners to recover in tort
against a peripheral
party to the prejudice of the protection of
shipowners under the existing
system. For these reasons I would
hold that the international trade system
tends to militate against
the recognition of the claim in tort put forward by the
cargo
owners against the classification society.
(d) The contract between the classification society and shipowners.
Mr Aikens, QC,
who appears for N.K.K., argued that the contract
between the
shipowners and the classification society must be a factor
against
the recognition of the suggested duty of care. He referred
to Pacific
Associates Ltd. v. Baxter [1990] 1 Q.B. 993.
That was a case where the
Court of Appeal held that the network of
contracts between a building owner,
the head contractor,
subcontractors and even suppliers militated against
imposing
duties in tort on peripheral parties. In the present case
the
classification society was not involved in such a web of
contracts.
(e) The position and role of N.K.K.
The fact that a
defendant acts for the collective welfare is a matter to
be taken
into consideration when considering whether it is fair, just
and
reasonable to impose a duty of care: Hill v. Chief
Constable of West
Yorkshire [1989] AC 53; Elguzouli-Daf
v. Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis [1995] 2 W.L.R.
173. Even if such a body has no general
immunity from liability in
tort, the question may arise whether it owes a duty
of care to
aggrieved persons, and, if so, in what classes of case, e.g. only
in
cases involving the direct infliction of physical harm or on a
wider basis.
In W.
Angliss and Co. (Australia) Proprietary Ltd. v. Peninsular
and
Oriental Steam Navigation Co. [1927] 2 K.B. 456, 462,
Wright J. (later to
become Lord Wright) - a great judge with
special expertise in maritime law
and practice - described
classification societies, such as Lloyd's, as occupying
"a
public and quasi-judicial position." There is a refrain of this
idea to be
found in Singh and Colinvaux, Shipowners (British
Shipping Laves), vol. 13
(1967), pp. 167-169, paras. 391-394,
where the editors describe a
classification society as an
impartial critic and arbiter (as opposed to
arbitrator). These
observations are helpful but not definitive. Nowadays one
would
not describe classification societies as carrying on
quasi-judicial
functions. But it is still the case that (apart
from their statutory duties) they
act in the public interest. The
reality is simply that N.K.K. and I am
deliberately reverting to
the evidence about N.K.K. - is an independent and
non-profit-making
entity, created and operating for the sole purpose of
promoting
the collective welfare, namely the safety of lives and ships at
sea.
In common with other classification societies N.K.K. fulfils
a role which in
- 27 -
its absence
would have to be fulfilled by states. And the question is
whether
N.K.K., and other classification sometimes, would be able
to carry out their
functions as efficiently if they become the
ready alternative target of cargo
owners, who already have
contractual claims against shipowners. In my
judgment there must
be some apprehension that the classification societies
would
adopt, to the detriment of their traditional role, a more
defensive
position.
(f) Policy factors.
Counsel for the
cargo owners argued that a decision that a duty of care
existed in
this case would not involve wide ranging exposure for N.K.K.
and
other classification societies to claims in tort. That is an
unrealistic position.
If a duty is recognised in this case there
is no reason why it should not extend
to annual surveys, docking
surveys, intermediate surveys, special surveys,
boiler surveys,
and so forth. And the scale of N.K.K.'s potential liability is
shown
by the fact that N.K.K. conducted an average of 14,500 surveys
per
year over the last five years.
At present the
system of settling cargo claims against shipowners is a
relatively
simple one. The claims are settled between the two sets of
insurers.
If the claims are not settled, they are resolved in
arbitration or court
proceedings. If a duty is held to exist in
this case as between the
classification society and cargo owners,
classification societies would become
potential defendants in many
cases. An extra layer of insurance would
become involved. The
settlement process would inevitably become more
complicated and
expensive. Arbitration proceedings and court proceedings
would
often involve an additional party. And often similar issues would
have
to be canvassed in separate proceedings since the
classification societies would
not be bound by arbitration clauses
in the contracts of carriage. If such a duty
is recognised, there
is a risk that classification societies might be unwilling
from
time to time to survey the very vessels which most urgently
require
independent examination. It will also divert men and
resources from the
prime function of classification societies,
namely to save life and ships at sea.
These factors are, by
themselves, far from decisive. But in an overall
assessment of the
case they merit consideration.
Is the imposition of a duty of
care
fair, just and reasonable?
Like Mann L.J.
in the Court of Appeal [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1071, 1085H,
I am willing
to assume (without deciding) that there was a sufficient degree
of
proximity in this case to fulfil that requirement for the existence
of a duty
of care. The critical question is therefore whether it
would be fair, just and
reasonable to impose such a duty. For my
part I am satisfied that the factors
and arguments advanced on
behalf of cargo owners are decisively outweighed
by the cumulative
effect, if a duty is recognised, of the matters discussed
in
paragraphs (c), (e) and (f), i.e. the outflanking of the
bargain between
- 28 -
shipowners and
cargo owners; the negative effect on the public role of
N.K.K.;
and the other considerations of policy. By way of summary, I look
at
the matter from the point of view of the three parties concerned.
I
conclude that the recognition of a duty would be unfair, unjust
and
unreasonable as against the shipowners who would ultimately
have to bear the
cost of holding classification societies liable,
such consequence being at
variance with the bargain between
shipowners and cargo owners based on an
internationally agreed
contractual structure. It would also be unfair, unjust
and
unreasonable towards classification societies, notably because they
act for
the collective welfare and unlike shipowners they would
not have the benefit
of any limitation provisions. Looking at the
matter from the point of view of
cargo owners, the existing system
provides them with the protection of the
Hague Rules or
Hague-Visby Rules. But that protection is limited under such
Rules
and by tonnage limitation provisions. Under the existing system
any
shortfall is readily insurable. In my judgment the lesser
injustice is done by
not recognising a duty of care. It follows
that I would reject the primary way
in which counsel for the cargo
owners put his case.
Assumption of responsibility
Given that the
cargo owners were not even aware of N.K.K.'s
examination of the
ship, and that the cargo owners simply relied on the
undertakings
of the shipowners, it is in my view impossible to force the
present
set of facts into even the most expansive view of the doctrine
of
voluntary assumption of responsibility.
Conclusion
For
the reasons already given I would dismiss the appeal.
- 29 -