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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal >> STARRED Noruwa ( Proportionality appeal: assessment, not discretion) Nigeria [2001] UKIAT 00016 (11 December 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKIAT/2001/00016.html Cite as: [2001] UKIAT 00TH2345, [2001] UKIAT 16, [2001] UKIAT 00016 |
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STARRED Noruwa ( Proportionality appeal: assessment, not discretion) Nigeria [2001] UKIAT 00016
APPEAL No. HR/6014/01 (STARRED)
(00 TH 2345)
Date of hearing: 3 July 2001
Date Determination notified:
Eddy Edokpolar
Noruwa |
APPELLANT |
and |
|
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT | RESPONDENT |
The Facts
The Task
8. Right to respect for private and family life
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
The Law
1. - (1) In this Act 'the Convention rights' means the rights and fundamental freedoms set out in-
(a) Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention ...
6. - (1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.
7. - (1) A person who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may-
(a) bring proceedings against the authority under this Act in the appropriate court or tribunal, or
(b) rely on the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal proceedings,
but only if he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful act.
(2) In subsection (1)(a) 'appropriate court or tribunal' means such court or tribunal as may be determined in accordance with rules; and proceedings against an authority include a counterclaim or similar proceeding. [Subsection (9) gives the rule-making power. The Immigration Appellate Authorities have not been designated as 'the appropriate court or tribunal' for any purposes.]
65. - (1) A person who alleges that an authority has, in taking any decision under the Immigration Acts relating to that person's entitlement to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, racially discriminated against him or acted in breach of his human rights may appeal to an adjudicator against that decision unless he has grounds for bringing an appeal against the decision under the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997.
(2) For the purpose of this Part-
(a) an authority racially discriminates against a person if he acts, or fails to act, in relation to that other person in a way which is unlawful by virtue of section 19B of the Race Relations Act 1976; and
(b) an authority acts in breach of a person's human rights if he acts, or fails to act, in relation to that other person in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998.
(3) Subsection (4) and (5) apply if, in proceedings before an adjudicator or the Immigration Appeal Tribunal on an appeal, a question arises as to whether an authority has, in taking any decision under the Immigration Acts relating to the appellant's entitlement to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, racially discriminated against the appellant or acted in breach of the appellant's human rights.
(4) The adjudicator, or the Tribunal, has jurisdiction to consider the question.
(5) If the adjudicator, or the Tribunal, decides that the authority concerned-
(a) racially discriminated against the appellant; or
(b) acted in breach of the appellant's human rights,
the appeal may be allowed on the ground in question.
(6) ...
(7) 'Authority' means-
(a) the Secretary of State;
(b) an immigration officer;
(c) a person responsible for the grant or refusal of entry clearance.
Schedule 4
21. - (1) On an appeal to him under Part IV, an adjudicator must allow the appeal if he considers-
(a) that the decision or action against which the appeal is brought was not in accordance with the law or with any immigration rules applicable to the case, or
(b) if the decision or action involved the exercise of a discretion by the Secretary of State or an officer, that the discretion should have been exercised differently,
but otherwise must dismiss the appeal.
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) is subject to paragraph 24 and to any restriction on the grounds of appeal.
(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), the adjudicator may review any determination of a question of fact on which the decision or action was based.
(4) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(b), no decision which is accordance with the immigration rules is to be treated as having involved the exercise of a discretion by the Secretary of State by reason only of the fact that he has been requested by or on behalf of an appellant to depart, or to authorise an officer to depart, from the rules and has refused to do so.
22. - (1) Subject to any requirement of rules made under paragraph 3 as to leave to appeal, any party to an appeal, other than an appeal under section 71, to an adjudicator may, if dissatisfied with his determination, appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal.
23. - (1) If the Immigration Appeal Tribunal has made a final determination of an appeal brought under Part IV, any party to the appeal may bring a further appeal to the appropriate appeal court [ie the Court of Appeal, unless the appeal was from an Adjudicator sitting in Scotland] on a question of law material to that determination.
The Authorities: (i) B v SSHD
[A]mong the issues of law for this court in a case such as the present is the question whether deportation constitutes a proportionate response to the appellant's offending. Being a question of law, it has to be answered afresh, even if reaching an answer involves taking a much closer look than we are accustomed to at the merits.
I have no doubt that the Home Secretary's view that deportation was nevertheless merited was legitimately open to him ... . But our public law, for reasons I have explained, now has to accommodate and give effect to the requirements of EU law and, through EU law, [this was before the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998] of the European Convention. It means making up our own minds about the proportionality of a public law measure - not simply deciding whether the Home Secretary's or the Tribunal's view of it is lawful and rational.
It was common ground before us that proportionality involves a question of law and that, on a statutory appeal of this nature, the court is required to form its own view on whether the test is satisfied, although, of course, in doing so it will give such deference to the Tribunal's decision as appropriately recognises their advantage in having heard the evidence. This task is, of course, both different from and more onerous than that undertaken by the court when applying the conventional Wednesbury approach. It would not be proper for us to say that we disagree with the Tribunal's conclusion on proportionality but that, since there is clearly room for two views and their view cannot be stigmatised as irrational, we cannot interfere. Rather, if our view differs from the Tribunal's, then we are bound to say so and allow the appeal, substituting our decision for theirs.
The Authorities: (ii) Judicial Review
The discretionary area of judgement
This brings me to another matter on which there was a consensus between counsel and which, I believe, needs now to be judicially recognised. The doctrine of the "margin of appreciation" is a familiar part of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court has acknowledged that, by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, the national authorities are in principle better placed to evaluate local needs and conditions than an international court: Buckley v. United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 101, 129, paras. 74-75. Although this means that, as the European Court explained in Handyside v. United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737, 753, para. 48, "the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights," it goes hand in hand with a European supervision. The extent of this supervision will vary according to such factors as the nature of the Convention right in issue, the importance of that right for the individual and the nature of the activities involved in the case.
This doctrine is an integral part of the supervisory jurisdiction which is exercised over state conduct by the international court. By conceding a margin of appreciation to each national system, the court has recognised that the Convention, as a living system, does not need to be applied uniformly by all states but may vary in its application according to local needs and conditions. This technique is not available to the national courts when they are considering Convention issues arising within their own countries. But in the hands of the national courts also the Convention should be seen as an expression of fundamental principles rather than as a set of mere rules. The questions which the courts will have to decide in the application of these principles will involve questions of balance between competing interests and issues of proportionality.
In this area difficult choices may have to be made by the executive or the legislature between the rights of the individual and the needs of society. In some circumstances it will be appropriate for the courts to recognise that there is an area of judgement within which the judiciary will defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the elected body or person whose act or decision is said to be incompatible with the Convention. This point is well made at p. 74, para. 3.21 of Human Rights Law and Practice (1999), of which Lord Lester of Herne Hill and Mr. Pannick are the general editors, where the area in which these choices may arise is conveniently and appropriately described as the "discretionary area of judgement". It will be easier for such an area of judgement to be recognised where the Convention itself requires a balance to be struck, much less so where the right is stated in terms which are unqualified. It will be easier for it to be recognised where the issues involve questions of social or economic policy, much less so where the rights are of high constitutional importance or are of a kind where the courts are especially well placed to assess the need for protection. But even where the right is stated in terms which are unqualified the courts will need to bear in mind the jurisprudence of the European Court which recognises that due account should be taken of the special nature of terrorist crime and the threat which it poses to a democratic society: Murray v. United Kingdom (1994) 19 EHRR 193, 222, para. 47.
3. [Miss Webber, counsel for the applicant, submits] that this court is effectively in as good a position as was the Secretary of State to form a judgment as to the competing interests which militate for and against the applicant's removal. The submission promotes the question, how intensive is the proper standard of judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision? And it is connected with the issue: does the proper standard differ according to whether or not the court is considering incorporated Convention rights, and, if so, how?
…
16. Upon the question, "What is the correct standard of review in a case such as this?", there are at least in theory three possible approaches. The first is the conventional Wednesbury position which Miss Webber says the judge wrongly adopted. On this model the court makes no judgement of its own as to the relative weight to be attached to this or that factor taken into account in the decision-making process; it is concerned only to see that everything relevant and nothing irrelevant has been considered, and that a rational mind has been brought to bear by the Secretary of State in reaching the decision. The second approach recognises that a fundamental right, here family life, is engaged in the case; and in consequence the court will insist that that fact be respected by the decision-maker, who is accordingly required to demonstrate either that his proposed action does not in truth interfere with the right, or, if it does, that there exist considerations which may reasonably be accepted as amounting to a substantial objective jurisdiction for the interference. The third approach directly engages the rights guaranteed by the Convention; it would require the court to decide whether the removal of the applicant would constitute a breach of article 8. This third position engages the first of the two issues which I identified at the outset. ...
17. If the first approach is the right one, the challenge to the Secretary of State's decision is in my judgement wholly without merit. Miss Webber submitted that there were certain important matters not referred to in the letter of 29 September 1999. I shall have to refer to those in due course, but it is enough for present purposes to state that, if the test of review is the conventional Wednesbury principle, it is impossible to conclude that the decision was an irrational one or that the Secretary of State had failed to consider any facts put to him, or misapprehended the law.
18. However the application of so exiguous a standard of review would in my judgement involve a failure to recognise what has become a settled principle of the common law, one which is entirely independent of our incorporation of the Convention by the Human Rights Act 1998. It is that the intensity of review in a public law case will depend on the subject matter in hand; and so in particular any interference by the action of a public body with fundamental right will require a substantial objective justification. ...
19. With respect [the cases I have cited show] that in a case involving human rights the second approach which I outlined at paragraph 16 as to the intensity of review is generally to be followed, leaving aside incorporation of the Convention; but that approach and the basic Wednesbury rule are by no means hermetically sealed one from the other. There is, rather, what may be called a sliding scale of review; the graver the impact of the decision in question upon the individual affected by it, the more substantial the justification that will be required. It is in the nature of the human condition that cases where, objectively, the individual is most gravely affected will be those where what we have come to cal his fundamental rights are or are said to be put in jeopardy. In the present case, whether or not the Convention is under consideration, any reasonable person will at once recognise the right to family life, exemplified in the right of the parties to a genuine marriage to cohabit without any undue interference, as being in the nature of a fundamental right (I prefer the expression fundamental freedom).
…
33. [The submission that the Court of Appeal is in as good a position as the Secretary of State to decide whether the applicant's removal would infringe Article 8] seems to me to engage a question of some constitutional significance. Much of the challenge presented by the enactment of the 1998 Act consists in the search for a principled measure of scrutiny which will be loyal to the Convention rights, but loyal also to the legitimate claims of democratic power. In this case Miss Webber's submission comes close to the proposition that the court should stand in the shoes of the Secretary of State and retake the decision in the case on its merits. In fairness, when tested, she disavowed such a proposition. But in that case her submission is without principle: the courts are in as good a position as the Secretary of State to decide; but they must not decide as if they were his surrogate. This antithesis at the same time commends but deprecates the imposition by the courts of their own views of the merits of the case in mind. It is of no practical assistance and lacks intellectual coherence. The Human Rights Act 1998 does not authorise the judges to stand in the shoes of Parliament's delegates, who are decision-makers given their responsibilities by the democratic arm of the state. The arrogation of such a power to the judges would usurp those functions of government which are controlled and distributed by powers whose authority is derived from the ballot box. It follows that there must be a principled distance between the court's adjudication in a case such as this and the Secretary of State's decision, based on his perception of the case's merits. For present purposes that principled distance is to be found in the approach I have taken to the scope of judicial review in this case, built on what the common law has already done in R v. Ministry of Defence, Ex p Smith [1996] QB 517, R v. Lord Saville of Newdigate, Ex p A [2000] 1 WLR 1855 and R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Launder [1997] 1 WLR 839. For the future, when the court is indeed applying the Convention as municipal law, we shall no doubt develop a jurisprudence in which a margin of discretion, as I would call it, is allowed to the statutory decision-maker; but in the case of those rights where the Convention permits interference with the right where that is justified by reference to strict criteria (articles 8-11, paragraph (2) in each case) its length will no doubt be confined by the rigour of those criteria in light of the relevant Strasbourg case law, and the gravity of the proposed interference as it is perceived here. But that is for the future.
28. Since submissions were made to us in the present case judgments have been delivered in Mahmood, a decision of the Master of the Rolls, May L.J. and Laws L.J., in which, so far as one can judge from the report of the judgements which we have seen. B v SSHD was not cited.
29. The approach of this court in Mahmood was arguably marginally different from that adopted by consent in B. …
30. In our respectful judgment the approach in Mahmood is the correct approach in these cases. It is not entirely clear whether, read as a whole, the judgements in B are at variance with it, particularly since there is no indication that Sedley L.J. disagreed with the approach of Lord Hope of Craighead in Kebilene. If there is a difference between them then we consider that we are at liberty to follow the approach in Mahmood even if, as may be the case, the court in Mahmood, was not referred to the judgments in B. That is because the court in B proceeded on the basis of a proposition of law which was not the subject of consideration by that court. In such circumstances a later court is not bound by it – [see below].
30. The second issue in B v Secretary of State related to the way in which the court should approach its task in relation to the justification for an interference with rights under Article 8. It was common ground between counsel in that case, as a result of a concession by the Secretary of State in that case, that among the questions of law that arose on the appeal to the Court of Appeal was whether the decision to deport infringed the principle of proportionality.
31. In the present case, Mr Howell QC for the Secretary of State expressly disavows the concession made by the Secretary of State in B. He contends that proportionality is not a question of law and that the approach of the Court should be to review the decision of the Secretary of State and not to come to a view of its own and substitute that view if it differed from the decision of the Secretary of State. As B was based on a concession, he submits I am not bound by it. However, before considering that submission, it is necessary to refer to the decision in Mahmood.
32. In Mahmood, the Court of Appeal expressed their views on a similar question though the issue arose not on an appeal from the Immigration Appeal Tribunal but on a judicial review of decision of the Secretary of State. Unfortunately the decision in B was not cited. The decision under review in Mahmood had been made just before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force. Laws LJ's approach was to apply the law as it existed at the time the decision was made, but stated he saw no different conclusion would be reached if the court had been engaged in the direct application of the Convention. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the court was in as good a position as the Secretary of State to make the actual decision on Article 8 and should take it.
…
43. It must follow therefore that, as a decision-maker, the Secretary of State has a discretionary area of judgment in relation to the issues which he has to determine, including the issue of proportionality. That is what Parliament must have intended when it gave to him that decision making power without conferring a general right of appeal to the courts; if a discretionary area of judgment was not accorded to the Secretary of State and the issue of proportionality was therefore treated as a question of law, there would in effect be a right of appeal on each decision, not review, to the Court which would then make up its own mind on the issue. It is, in my judgment, entirely consistent with the Convention for Parliament to have accorded the power to the Secretary of State, subject only to the jurisdiction of the Courts in their supervisory role and not their appellate role. For the Court to treat the issue of proportionality as a question of law for it and for the Court to make up its own mind on the issue of proportionality under Article 8 would in reality be to take upon itself an appellate role as the final decision making power, as the decision on proportionality is at the heart of the decision under Article 8. That is not what Parliament has provided under the Immigration Acts and is not a conclusion brought about by the Human Rights Act or the Convention. The role of the court remains one of review.
44. For this reason, it is my view, on the present authorities, that the task of the court is not to make up its own mind on the question of proportionality. The decision-maker is the Secretary of State and it is he who must decide within his discretionary area of judgment whether the interference with family life by deportation is necessary in a democratic society, that is to say justified by a pressing social need, and in particular proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In that decision making process, he has in accordance with the Convention and the Human Rights Act, a discretionary area of judgment in achieving the necessary balance.
23. … Now, following the incorporation of the convention by the Human Rights Act 1998 and the bringing of that Act fully into force, domestic courts must themselves form a judgment whether a convention right has been breached (conducting such inquiry as is necessary to form that judgment) and, so far as permissible under the Act, grant an effective remedy. On this aspect of the case, I agree with and adopt the observations of my noble and learned friend Lord Steyn which I have had the opportunity of reading in draft.
27. … The starting point is that there is an overlap between the traditional grounds of review and the approach of proportionality. Most cases would be decided in the same way whichever approach is adopted. But the intensity of review is somewhat greater under the proportionality approach. Making due allowance for important structural differences between various convention rights, which I do not propose to discuss, a few generalisations are perhaps permissible. I would mention three concrete differences without suggesting that my statement is exhaustive. First, the doctrine of proportionality may require the reviewing court to assess the balance which the decision maker has struck, nor merely whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable decisions. Secondly, the proportionality test may go further than the traditional grounds of review inasmuch as it may require attention to be directed to the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations. Thirdly, even the heightened scrutiny test developed in R v Ministry of Defence, Ex p Smith [1996] QB 517, 554 is not necessarily appropriate to the protection of human rights. It will be recalled that in Smith the Court of Appeal reluctantly felt compelled to reject a limitation on homosexuals in the army. The challenge based on article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the right to respect for private and family life) foundered on the threshold required even by the anxious scrutiny test. The European Court of Human Rights came to the opposite conclusion: Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493. … The intensity of the review, in similar cases, is guaranteed by the twin requirements that the limitation of the right was necessary in a democratic society, in the sense of meeting a pressing social need, and the question whether the interference was really proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued.
28. The differences in approach between the traditional grounds of review and the proportionality approach may therefore sometimes yield different results. It is therefore important that cases involving convention rights must be analysed in the correct way. This does not mean that there has been a shift to merits review. On the contrary, as Professor Jowell [2000] PL 671, 681 has pointed out the respective roles of judges and administrators are fundamentally distinct and will remain so. To this extent the general tenor of the observations in Mahmood [2001] 1 WLR 840 are correct. And Laws LJ rightly emphasised in Mahmood, at p 847, para 18, "that the intensity of review in a public law case will depend on the subject matter in hand". That is so even in cases involving Convention rights. In law context is everything.
The Status of B v SSHD
33. We therefore conclude, not without some hesitation, that there is a principle stated in general terms that a subsequent court is not bound by a proposition of law assumed by an earlier court that is not the subject of argument before or consideration by that court. ...
38. Like all exceptions to, and modifications of, the strict rule of precedent, this rule must only be applied in the most obvious cases, and limited with great care. The basis of it is that the proposition in question must have been assumed, and not have been the subject of decision. That condition will almost always only be fulfilled when the point has not been expressly raised before the court and there has been no argument upon it: as Russell LJ went to some lengths in National Enterprises Ltd v Racal Communications Ltd [1975] Ch 397 to demonstrate had occurred in the previous case Davies Middleton & Davies Ltd v Cardiff Corpn 62 LGR 134. And there may of course be cases, perhaps many cases, where a point has not been the subject of argument, but scrutiny of the judgement indicates that the court's acceptance of the point went beyond mere assumption. Very little is likely to be required to draw that latter conclusion: because a later court will start from the position, encouraged by judicial comity, that its predecessor did indeed address all the matters essential for its decision.
Appeal and Judicial Review
The Jurisdiction of the Appellate Authorities (i) General
It is often forgotten (although not by the editor of the BILS March 1999 Special Bulletin on the Human Rights Act – see note 15 at page 29 of the Special Bulletin) that this is essentially a section about jurisdiction. Section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 gives a 'victim' (see section 7(1)) the right to bring proceedings against a public authority which 'has acted (or proposes to act) in away which is made unlawful by section 6(1)'. Section 65 does not create the right of a person in the circumstances set out in 65(1) to bring proceedings, it simply designates the forum in which such proceedings should be brought and the procedures to be followed. This is important, because it means that any restrictions placed upon the exercise of section 65 appeal rights, for example under paragraph (7) of Schedule 2 of SI 2000/2444, as described above, are restrictions on the right to appeal to the adjudicator under these procedures. In such cases the would-be appellant may retain rights to bring proceedings in the courts. The same is true in respect of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000. Section 65 of this Act is about jurisdiction to hear claims of race discrimination; it does not create the right to bring proceedings but simply designates forum and procedures.
The Jurisdiction of the Appellate Authorities (ii) Proportionality
The Jurisdiction of the Appellate Authorities (iii) Conclusions
Application to the Facts of the Present Case
Conclusion
C. M. G. Ockelton
Deputy President