1	THE PATENT OFFICE TRADE MARKS REGISTRY
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3	Harmsworth House, 13 - 15 Bouverie Street,
	London EC4.
4	Wednesday, 12th April 2000
5	Before:
6	MR. G. HOBBS QC
7	(Sitting as the Appointed Person)
8	IN THE MATTER OF THE TRADE MARKS ACT 1994
9	THE TRADE MARKS ACT 1994
10	and
11	IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION NO. 2126888 in the name of CASWICK LIMITED
12	and
13	OPPOSITION NO. 47537 thereto by THE THOMPSON MINWAX COMPANY
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16	Appeal of the Opponent from the decision of Mr. D. Landau
17	acting on behalf of the Registrar, dated 5th July 1999
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18	(Transmitted St. 1
19	(Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd., Midway House, 27/29 Cursitor Street, London EC4A 1LT. Telephone No: 0171-405 5010. Fax No: 0171-405 5026)
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22	The Appellants/Opponents and Respondents/Applicants did not appear and were not represented.
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25	DECISION
26	(As approved)

MR. HOBBS: On 15th March 1997, Caswick Limited applied to register the word CONSEAL for use as a trade mark in relation to a specification of goods ultimately limited to "extruded sealants for building products; but not including fire resistant materials or products specifically designed to incorporate fire resistant properties" in Class 17. The application was advertised for opposition purposes in June 1997.

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In September 1997, a notice of opposition was filed by Messrs. Dibb Lupton Alsop in the name of a Delaware Corporation called The Thompson Minwax Company. The statement of grounds accompanying the Notice of Opposition stated that The Thompson Minwax Corporation was the proprietor of ten specified trade mark registrations and two specified trade mark applications in the United Kingdom. It went on to assert that the company had used the word RONSEAL extensively in relation to the goods and services covered by the cited registrations and applications, and had thereby established a substantial goodwill and reputation in the mark RONSEAL in the United Kingdom. On the basis of these averments, relative objections to registration were raised under sections 5(2)(b), 5(3) and 5(4) of the Trade Marks Act 1994. Absolute objections to registration were raised under sections 3(3)(b), 3(4) and 3(6) of the Act. Caswick joined issue with these pleas in a counter-statement filed in December 1997.

On 6th April 1998, the Registrar issued a certificate of

assignment pursuant to an application received at the Trade
Marks Registry on 5th March 1998. The certificate confirmed
that The Sherwin Williams Company had been registered as
proprietor of the trade marks cited in the statement of
grounds filed in support of the opposition. According to the
papers before me, The Sherwin Williams Company is a company
organised and existing under the laws of the State of Ohio.

It was the surviving corporation of a merger which took place
under the laws of the State of Delaware with effect from
11.59 pm on 31st March 1997. By means of that merger, three
Delaware corporations, The Thompson Minwax Company, Thompson
Minwax Holding Corp, and Thompson Minwax Management Corp, were
merged with and into The Sherwin Williams Company.

The effect of the merger on the status of the companies involved is governed by the laws of Delaware. No evidence has been adduced as to the operation of the laws of Delaware in that connection. My understanding of the position disclosed by the documents is that the three Delaware corporations ceased to exist at the point in time at which they were merged with and into The Sherwin Williams Company, and that The Sherwin Williams Company thereupon became the successor to the rights and obligations of the extinguished corporations.

Messrs. Dibb Lupton Alsop and their clients appear to accept that this was the nature and effect of the merger.

On that view of the matter, the Notice of Opposition filed by Messrs. Dibb Lupton Alsop in September 1997 was filed

in the name of a non-existent corporation. Evidence was filed This consisted of in support of the opposition in March 1998. two statutory declarations. The first of these was a statutory declaration made by Paul Barrow, the managing director of Ronseal Limited, on 12th March 1998. referred to the merger in passing in paragraph 1 of his statutory declaration: "My Company is a UK exclusive licensee and wholly owned subsidiary of the Opponents, whose company has recently been bought and merged with The Sherwin Williams Company of 101 Prospect Avenue, NW, 1100 Midland Building, Cleveland, Ohio, 44115-1075, USA."

The second statutory declaration was made by Alan
Fiddes, head of trade marks at Messrs. Dibb Lupton Alsop, on
24th March 1998. He says that he is authorised by "the
Opponents" to make his declaration on their behalf. He says
he has read the declaration submitted by Mr. Paul Barrow on
behalf of "the Opponents". He exhibits as his exhibit AMF1,
certified copies of what he describes as "the Opponent's
registration numbers 1391655, 738414 and 797931". He goes on
to say that "the evidence submitted by the Opponents
demonstrates that the RONSEAL name has become well known in
the United Kingdom in respect of the products sold by the
Opponents, and that there has been substantial reputation and
goodwill developed in association with the RONSEAL name".

The named opponent was The Thompson Minwax Company and these statutory declarations were expressed in terms which

suggested that The Thompson Minwax Company continued to exist and continued to own the earlier trade marks and rights asserted against Caswick's application for registration. They did so even though they were made after the application for recordal of a transfer which had been filed at the Trade Marks Registry on 5th March 1998 for the purpose of confirming the succession of The Sherwin Williams Company to the rights and obligations of The Thompson Minwax Company on 31st March 1997.

Caswick filed evidence in answer to the opposition in September 1998. Its evidence did not comment upon either the existence or the identity of the named opponent.

The evidence in reply consisted of a second statutory declaration of Alan Fiddes filed under cover of a letter to the Registry dated 15th December 1998. The covering letter stated as follows: "Following the merger of The Thompson Minwax Company and The Sherwin Williams Company. The Sherwin Williams Company has been recorded as proprietor of the earlier rights relied upon in this opposition. It is therefore requested that the name of the Opponents be amended from The Thompson Minwax Company to The Sherwin Williams Company. The Sherwin Williams Company have confirmed to us that they have seen all of the documentation relating to the opposition, they are willing to stand by the Statement of Grounds of Opposition, and accept liability for any costs arising from the opposition."

The accompanying statutory declaration reiterated that ownership of the prior registrations relied upon in the opposition had been transferred from The Thompson Minwax Company to The Sherwin Williams Company following the merger of the two companies.

The request for amendment appears to have been made with reference to the Registrar's practice relating to a change of opponent upon transfer of the opponent's interest in the proceedings: see paragraph 3.9 of the June 1996 edition of Chapter 15 of the Trade Marks Registry Work Manual. However, that practice envisages the existence of a properly constituted opposition in which the change of opponent can legitimately be made following a transfer of the relevant interest during the pendency of the proceedings. It is not applicable to a situation in which the transfer of the relevant interest has occurred prior to the filling of the opposition, and the Notice of Opposition was filed in the name of the transferor after it had ceased to exist.

The Registry declined to allow the name of the opponent in the present proceedings to be amended from The Thompson Minwax Company to The Sherwin Williams Company on the ground that it would bring about an impermissible substitution of one opponent for another. Messrs. Dibb Lupton Alsop disputed the correctness of the position adopted by the Registrar. An interlocutory hearing was appointed to consider whether the amendment requested in their letter of 15th December 1998

could and should be allowed. The hearing was scheduled to take place on 19th May 1999. In the event, neither party chose to attend, but Messrs. Dibb Lupton Alsop lodged written submissions in support of the application for amendment.

In their written submissions, they maintained that their request was not a request for substitution of a new opponent. They insisted that it was merely a request to reflect an administrative change which had taken place in relation to the opponent by amending the name of the opponent to read The Sherwin Williams Company as opposed to The Thompson Minwax Company. Their stated position was that the merger which had taken place did not constitute an overall change in the legal entity involved in the opposition, and that the amendment should be allowed under the practice noted in the Trade Mark Registry's Work Manual. They also drew attention to the fact that the amendment was not opposed by Caswick.

The application to amend was refused by the Registrar's Hearing Officer, Mr. D.W. Landau. In his written decision issued on 5th July 1999, he took the view that the proposed amendment should be refused, firstly, on the basis that it would involve the substitution of a new opponent, and the Registrar had no power under the Trade Marks Act or rules to allow substitution; secondly, on the basis that the opposition should be dismissed because it was filed on behalf of a non-existent person.

In August 1999, Messrs. Dibb Lupton Alsop gave notice of

appeal from the Hearing Officer's decision to an Appointed Person under section 76 of the 1994 Act. The appeal was stayed pending the outcome of an appeal to the High Court in the case of BETAMAG 12 trade mark because it was foreseen that the judgment in that case would have a direct bearing on the first of the two grounds upon which the Hearing Officer had refused leave to amend in the present case.

The judgment of the High Court in the BETAMAG 12 trade mark case was delivered on 18th January 2000 (and has since been reported at [2000] IP&T 467). Pumfrey J held that the Registrar has an inherent power to permit a successor in interest to pursue properly constituted opposition proceedings in lieu of the original opponent. The learned judge indicated that the Registrar's practice, as summarised in paragraph 3.9 of Chapter 15 of the Trade Marks Registry Work Manual, provided a sensible and workable system for substitution. His judgment has not been appealed. It is binding both upon this Tribunal and upon the Registrar. It follows that the first of the two bases upon which amendment was refused in the present case cannot be maintained.

That leaves me with the question whether the Hearing Officer's decision can and should be maintained on the second of the two bases upon which amendment was refused. It appears to me, on the basis of the judgment in the BETAMAG 12 trade mark case, and on the basis of the judgments of the Court of Appeal in Mercer Alloys Corporation v. Rolls Royce Ltd [1971]

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1 WLR 1520, The 'Sardinia Sulcis' and 'Al Tawwab' [1991] 1 LLR 201, and International Bulk Shipping and Services Ltd. v. Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India [1996] 1 All.E.R. 1017, that:

- (1) When a company which has brought opposition proceedings in the Trade Marks Registry is merged with and into another company during the pendency of the proceedings, the Registrar may allow the successor company to pursue the opposition in lieu of the original opponent and should normally do so.
- However, opposition proceedings brought in the name (2) of a company which has previously ceased to exist as the result of such a merger cannot be pursued, and must be dismissed, if those who caused the Notice of Opposition to be filed in the name of the non-existent company did so intending to identify that company rather than its successor as the opponent.
- If, on the other hand, there is no reasonable doubt that the successor, rather than the non-existent company, was intended to be identified as the opponent, the Registrar has a discretion to allow an amendment to correct the misnomer.

I now turn to examine the application for amendment in the light of these considerations. Paragraph 2(f) of the Grounds of Appeal states: "The Registrar is incorrect in the belief that the Opposition should be dismissed on the basis that the Opponents had ceased to exist at the time of the

Opposition being filed. In this instance, the existence of a locus standi, and the clear Registry practice at the time, meant that the Opposition was correctly commenced in the name of the Opponents."

This appears to be the only ground upon which the second of the two bases for refusing amendment is challenged before me. I understand it to be asserting that the non-existent company, The Thompson Minwax Company, was not only identified, but correctly identified, as the opponent by those who caused the Notice of Opposition to be filed in the present case.

In written submissions filed by Messrs. Dibb Lupton
Alsop on 5th April 2000, it is contended that the Notice of
Opposition was correctly filed in the name of the non-existent
company on 18th September 1997 because the merger of that
company with and into The Sherwin Williams Company had not yet
been recorded at the Trade Marks Registry, and the
non-existent company was still identified in the Register of
Trade Marks as the proprietor of the trade mark registrations
and applications cited in support of the opposition.

In paragraph 5 of the written submissions, it is stated that: "In the present case, the Opponents had only ceased to exist by means of a merger, and therefore in essence the company and all the rights accruing to that company continued in the merged company, namely The Sherwin Williams Company.

This, in conjunction with Registry practice at the time, means that there was no reason at the time of filing the Opposition

why it should not be filed in the name of the registered proprietor of the rights relied upon at the time, namely the Opponents."

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It seems clear to me from these submissions that the Notice of Opposition was filed in the name of the non-existent company because that company, rather than its successor, was intended to be identified as the opponent.

At my request, the Treasury Solicitor wrote to the Registrar and the parties on 10th April 2000, drawing their attention to the judgments of the Court of Appeal in the three cases I have mentioned above. Messrs. Dibb Lupton Alsop then filed further written submissions in the following terms.

Mercer Alloys Corporation v. Rolls Royce Limited (1971) 1 WLR 1520 and The 'Sardinia Sulcis' and 'Al Tawwab' (1991) 1 LLR 201, in that following the merger of The Thompson Minwax Company with and into The Sherwin Williams Company, the business and assets of The Thompson Minwax Company continued, and there was a legal successor in title to the business and its assets. The case can in the same way be distinguished from the case of International Bulk Shipping and Services Limited v. Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India (1996) 1 All.E.R. 1017, in that in that instance the Plaintiffs had been dissolved, and there was no legal successor in title to the assets and business and liabilities of the company.

"2. At merger, the liabilities as well as the assets and business of The Thompson Minwax Company would have been taken on by The Sherwin Williams Company, the newly merged company, and in a case where The Thompson Minwax Company would have been or could be Defendant, The Sherwin Williams Company would be expected to take on the liabilities and burden in place of The Thompson Minwax Company. It therefore seems just and fair that the reverse should be true in a case where The Thompson Minwax Company/The Sherwin Williams Company would be claimant/opponent.

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- "3. Given that there has been a merger of The Thompson Minwax Company with The Sherwin Williams Company, there can be no mistake by parties to the proceedings as to the identity of the persons filing the opposition, as this involves the ongoing business undertaken under the RONSEAL name, the trade mark upon which the action relies.
- "4. It has been clear at all points the rights upon which the parties are relying, such rights being ongoing and existing after the date of merger.
- "5. In the interests of fairness and justice, and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, and given that the applicants Caswick Limited have at no point raised any objection to the substitution, (of which opponents are aware), we submit that the action should be allowed to continue with the substitution of The Sherwin Williams Company in place of The Thompson Minwax Company."

I do not find in these submissions any suggestion that it was ever intended that the Notice of Opposition should be filed in the name of any person other than the non-existent company. That appears to me to render the present case essentially indistinguishable from the International Bulk Shipping and Services Limited case.

The Registrar and the parties were not represented at the hearing before me. Doing the best I can, on the basis of the documents provided to me, I have come to the conclusion that the Notice of Opposition was intentionally filed in the name of the non-existent company rather than its successor with the result that there cannot be said to have been a misnomer susceptible of correction by amendment in the manner requested.

I therefore consider that the Hearing Officer was correct to hold that the amendment should be refused. It has not been suggested that The Thompson Minwax Company can, or will, be restored to the Register of Companies organised and existing under the laws of Delaware so as to validate, retrospectively, the filing of the Notice of Opposition in its name on 18th September 1997. I therefore consider that the Hearing Officer was correct to hold that the opposition should be dismissed because it had been filed on behalf of a non-existent person.

In the result, the appeal stands dismissed. In the absence of any applications for costs on the part of Caswick

or the Registrar, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. The costs of the opposition proceedings in the Trade Marks Registry remain to be considered by the Registrar.

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