O-077-13

TRADE MARKS ACT 1994

IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRATION NO. 2495199 IN THE NAME OF SAJID PARKAR FOR THE TRADE MARK  **IN CLASSES 1, 20 and 27**

AND IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR DECLARATION OF INVALIDITY NO. 83515 BY ABID HUSSAIN

REGISTERED PROPRIETOR'S APPEAL TO THE APPOINTED PERSON IN RESPECT OF COSTS

DECISION

Introduction

1. This is an appeal by Mr Sajid Parkar, the trade mark proprietor of UK trade mark registration no. 2495199 (depicted above), in relation to a costs award made in his favour following his successful defence of an application for a declaration of invalidity of the registration, brought by Mr Abid Hussain under section 47 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 ("the Act"). Mr Parkar contends that the costs award is unreasonably low in all the circumstances of the case.

History of the case

2. The trade mark in issue was applied for by Mr Parkar on 13 August 2008 and registered on 8 May 2009. On 29 June 2009, Mr Hussain filed an application for invalidity of the registration on Form TM26(I), claiming that Mr Parkar had applied to register the trade mark in bad faith, contrary to section 3(6) of the Act, citing Mr Parkar's alleged behaviour in relation to the "Aerolay" business in which they had both been involved; and that use of the trade mark by Mr Parkar would be liable to be prevented by the law of passing off, and thus it should be declared invalid under section 5(4)(a) of the Act.

3. Mr Parkar filed a notice of defence and a detailed counterstatement on 21 October 2009. Evidence was exchanged, comprising a witness statement of Mr Hussain dated 3 June 2010, with 18 exhibits; a witness statement of Mr Parkar dated 28 December 2010 (apparently re-submitted with amendments on 28 February 2011) with 18 exhibits; and a reply witness statement from Mr Hussain dated 22 April 2011 with a further five exhibits.

4. The case came on for hearing before the Registrar's hearing officer, Mr David Landau, on 6 January 2012. Mr Parkar sent in a written submission to the Registrar on 4 January 2012 and then represented himself at the hearing. Mr Hussain was assisted at the hearing by his brother, Mr Asif Hussain (who cross-examined Mr Parkar) and by a Mr Collins of Barratts & Company Business and Property Consultants (who made oral submissions for Mr Hussain).

5. In a decision dated 11 January 2012, Mr Landau rejected the invalidity application, dismissing the claim under section 5(4)(a) on the basis that Mr Hussain had failed to establish that he owned the relevant goodwill relied on, and finding that the application for the registration in issue had not been made in bad faith.

6. Mr Landau ruled that Mr Parkar was entitled to a contribution to be made by Mr Hussain towards his costs. Mr Parkar had been legally represented until 1 October 2010, but had thereafter represented himself as a litigant in person. Mr Landau referred to the Appointed Person decision of Mr Richard Arnold QC (as he then was) sitting as the Appointed Person in *Inbev SA v Air Parts Europe Limited (BECK'S/SOUTH BECK)* (BL O-160-08), which deals with the allowance of costs in favour of a litigant in person, and invited Mr Parkar to furnish a schedule of the costs incurred by him from 1 October 2010 onwards within two weeks after the main hearing.

7. Mr Parkar submitted a schedule setting out the following details:

i) Disbursements incurred:

Lakhani & Co Solicitors, invoice attached		£2,937.50
Lakhani & Co Solicitors, invoice attached		£881.25
	Sub Total (i)	£3818.75

ii) My travel costs to solicitors:

	6 journey to London 48 miles @45 pence per mile	£129.60
6 x (48)+(x.45)	miles based on return journeys	
Telephone Costs and recorded delivery costs	Approx.	£40.00
	Sub Total (ii)	£169.60

iii) Understanding applicants initial invalidity form. Time spent with solicitors providing case details and reviewing, amending and later approving all correspondence to be sent by them. Discussing ways forward and strategy with my solicitor. Going over the evidence provided by the applicant. Time spent travelling to and from the solicitors. Liaising with solicitors every time letter received from IPO. The initial witness statement was amended and this created additional work for myself (and solicitor). Liaising with the IPO after receiving correspondence on numerous occasions for example after the Applicant refused to attend the initial hearing date for November 2011.

From 29 June 2009 to 6 January 2012 (30 Months)

110 hours @ 18/hr	£1980.00

9 full days prior to hearing researching case law and trying to understand how it relates to my defence. Time spent on reading and rereading applicants witness statements extracting contradictions in his statements to form a submission and skeleton argument. Writing the submission and forwarding it to the IPO. Time spent on questions which needed to be put forward to the applicant at the hearing.
1 Day – Attending hearing at IPO

10 days x 9 hr day x £18/hr		£1620.00
	Sub Total (iii)	£3600.00
	Total	£7588.35

8. The first invoice of Lakhani & Co (for £2,500 + VAT) was dated 10 March 2010 and was stated to relate to "PROFESSIONAL CHARGES in connection with [Mr Parkar's] dispute with the Hussain brothers and potential claim in the Companies Court and in relation (sic.) the invalidity application pending at the Intellectual Property Office.", – 15.1 hours at just over £165 per hour ex. VAT (after a discount). The second (for £750 + VAT) was dated 15 October 2010 and related to "PROFESSIONAL CHARGES in connection with the invalidity application pending at the Intellectual Property Office in relation to the trademark Aerolay" for the period 3 March to 15 October 2010.

9. On 13 February 2012, Mr Landau issued his decision in respect of costs, the substantive provisions of which are as follows:

> 2) On 24 January 2012 a letter was received from Mr Parkar in relation to the costs. He included costs relating to his legal representative and did not give a breakdown of costs from 1 October 2010 as required. Consequently, he has not identified the time taken in relation to the preparation of his evidence. Taking into account the nature of the evidence, it is considered reasonable to allow 8 hours for its preparation and 2 hours for the consideration of the evidence of Mr Hussain.
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> 3) In the letter Mr Parkar stated that he had spent 9 hours for each of 9 days preparing for the hearing and claimed 9 hours for attending the hearing. The hearing lasted less than 3 hours. It is considered that the claim for 81 hours for preparation for attending the hearing is excessive, taking into account the evidence filed and the submissions by his legal representative; when he was represented. It is considered that the most that is reasonable for preparation and attendance at the hearing (taking into account travelling to the Intellectual Property Office in London) is 14 hours (9 hours + 5 hours).
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> 4) The costs of proceedings are governed by a scale as per Tribunal Practice Notice 4/2007. Awards may be made outwith the scale. In this case there has been no untoward behaviour by Mr Hussain in the prosecution of the application. There was clearly an issue to be considered; there was nothing frivolous in the application. There is nothing that would lead to costs being made outwith the scale.
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> 5) Costs are awarded upon the following basis:
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Preparing a statement and considering Mr Hussain's statement:	£300
Preparing evidence and considering the evidence of Mr Hussain:	£180
Preparation for and attendance at a hearing:	£252
Total:	£732

10. Accordingly, Mr Landau ordered Mr Hussain to pay Mr Parkar the sum of £732 as a contribution towards his costs of successfully defending the application.

The Appeal

11. Mr Parkar filed a Form TM55 comprising a Notice of Appeal to the Appointed Person and a Statement of Grounds on 8 March 2012. His overall contention was that the hearing officer had failed to comply with the objective of ensuring that a litigant in person is not disadvantaged in comparison to a professionally represented litigant and in particular that the award did not provide fair compensation in relation to (i) his disbursements in the form of payments to his solicitors for representing him until the end of September 2010; and/or (ii) his other financial losses, especially due to time spent preparing for the case instead of marketing his product under the trade mark in issue. He requested that the award of £732 be reconsidered in the light of his direct losses over the two year period of the case.

12. There was some delay in fixing the hearing because of difficulties in contacting the parties but, after postponement of the initial fixture, the hearing was rearranged for 20 November 2012. Both parties were notified of the hearing. Mr Parkar made a further short written submission in advance of the hearing and appeared in person. Mr Hussain did not attend and was not represented.

13. Mr Allan James, Head of the Trade Marks Tribunal, made a written submission dated 26 October 2012, urging me not to accede to the appeal insofar as it sought to challenge the Registrar's decision not to award Mr Parkar the full actual cost of legal representation in the matter. Mr James' points were that:

    (1) such a challenge would call into question the Registrar's general approach of awarding costs on a contribution rather than compensatory basis;

    (2) the courts have accepted that the Registrar has a wide discretion in this area and is entitled to adopt the current practice of awarding contributions based on a published scale (*Rizla's Application* [1993] RPC 365);

    (3) the balance of opinion among users of the UK IPO's tribunals has consistently favoured the current practice on the basis that it provides better access to justice than the alternatives; and

    (4) the parties would have entered into the present proceedings with the reasonable expectation that the published practice would apply.

The basis for awarding costs in the Registry

14. The Registrar has for very many years adopted a practice of awarding contributions to costs based on a published scale. This practice is described and explained in two Tribunal

Practice Notices issued by the Intellectual Property Office, TPN 2/2000 and TPN 4/2007, both entitled "Costs in proceedings before the Comptroller".

15. As emphasised by Mr James in his written submissions, the Registrar has a wide discretion when awarding costs. That discretion extends not only to awarding contributions based on the published scale, but also to ordering compensatory costs in appropriate cases. As indicated in TPN 4/2007, the ability to award costs off the scale means that the Registrar can deal proportionately with breaches of rules, delaying tactics or other unreasonable behaviour, with no fetter other than the overriding one that he must act judicially: *Rizla* at page 374.

16. The normal approach, by reference to the published scale, is not intended to be compensatory. Its advantage is that it provides a relatively low cost tribunal for all litigants, including unrepresented ones, and builds in a degree of predictability as to the potential costs exposure in the event of losing. This does mean that a successful party will inevitably be out of pocket at the end of the proceedings, which can seem particularly harsh in cases where a trade mark applicant or proprietor has had to fend off an opposition or invalidity attack and has done so successfully, as in this case. However, the UK IPO publishes information about the approach to costs of inter partes proceedings on its website, and it also operates an Information Centre which can be contacted by email and telephone, so most parties will be aware of the approach to costs before the case goes very far.

17. In this case, Mr Parkar said that he understood the approach, but he thought that the amount awarded was unfairly low even within the scale.

18. So far as litigants in person are concerned, in *BECK'S / SOUTH BECK* mentioned above, Richard Arnold QC set out the approach that should be taken by the Registrar, as follows:

> 36. In my judgment the approach which should be adopted when the Registrar is asked to make an award of costs in favour of a litigant in person is as follows. The hearing officer should direct the litigant in person pursuant to r.57 of [the Trade Marks Rules 2000] to file a brief schedule or statement setting out (i) any disbursements which the litigant claimed he has incurred, (ii) any other financial losses claimed by the litigant and (iii) a statement of the time spent by the litigant in dealing with the proceedings. The hearing officer should then make an assessment of the costs to be awarded applying by analogy the principles applicable under r. 48.6 [of the Civil Procedure Rules], but with a fairly broad brush. The objective should be to ensure that litigants in person are neither disadvantaged nor overcompensated by comparison with professionally represented litigants.

19. CPR r.48.6, insofar as applicable, states as follows:

> **Litigants in person**
>
> **48.6**
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> (1) This rule applies where the court orders (whether by summary assessment or detailed assessment) that the costs of a litigant in person are to be paid by any other person.

(2) The costs allowed under this rule must not exceed, except in the case of a disbursement, two-thirds of the amount which would have been allowed if the litigant in person had been represented by a legal representative.
(3) The litigant in person shall be allowed –
(a) costs for the same categories of –
(i) work; and
(ii) disbursements,
which would have been allowed if the work had been done or the disbursements had been made by a legal representative on the litigant in person's behalf;
(b) the payments reasonably made by him for legal services relating to the conduct of the proceedings; and
(c) the costs of obtaining expert assistance in assessing the costs claim.
(4) The amount of costs to be allowed to the litigant in person for any item of work claimed shall be –
(a) where the litigant can prove financial loss, the amount that he can prove he has lost for time reasonably spent on doing the work; or
(b) where the litigant cannot prove financial loss, an amount for the time reasonably spent on doing the work at the rate set out in the Costs Practice Direction.
(5) A litigant who is allowed costs for attending at court to conduct his case is not entitled to a witness allowance in respect of such attendance in addition to those costs.

20. Pursuant to paragraph 52.4 of the current Costs Practice Direction, the relevant rate referred to in rule 48.6(4)(b) is £18 per hour.

Approach

21. As a starting point, I observe that it is relatively unusual to have an appeal from the Registrar that only relates to the level of costs awarded, particularly one made by the party in whose favour the award has been made. I would generally discourage such appeals, as it will be rare that they would be justified and thus successful, given the Registrar's wide discretion as to the level of costs. Hearing officers deal with costs in all inter partes cases and have some clear guidance for doing so, set out in the Tribunal Practice Notices on costs that I have already referred to, so they have a lot of experience of assessing a fair level of contribution and it is unusual for errors to be made. But of course it can sometimes happen.

22. My role on this appeal is to review the decision rather than re-hear the case. I should be reluctant to interfere with the decision in the absence of an error of principle. I should interfere if I consider that the hearing officer's decision is clearly wrong, or has reached an unreasonable conclusion; but I should not interfere if his decision is one which he was properly entitled to reach on the material before him. (See the recent summary by Floyd J in *Galileo International Technology, LLC v European Union* [2011] EWHC 35 (Ch).)

23. The decision under attack was issued by an experienced hearing officer, which makes me particularly cautious about interfering with the award that he made. I certainly should not do so if I simply believe that he has been rather less generous than I would have been at first instance.

Decision

24. I will first deal with a submission by Mr Parkar that Mr Landau should have made a costs award off the usual scale. The Notice of Appeal did not raise this point, but Mr Parkar addressed it in his written submissions for the appeal and pursued the point at the hearing. The written submissions listed a number of points by reference to the content of Mr Hussain's original grounds of invalidity and his evidence, asserting that some of the evidence was falsified and that some of Mr Hussain's statements were retracted at the hearing, having been maintained up until that point.

25. I am unwilling to conclude that these matters justify a decision to order costs off the usual scale, for two reasons. First, since they were not foreshadowed in the Notice of Appeal, the first notice that Mr Hussain would have had was on receipt of the written submissions a few days prior to the hearing, by which point he had conveyed his decision not to attend or be represented at the appeal hearing. It would therefore be unfair to rely on these late submissions to increase the award above the scale.

26. Secondly, Mr Landau will have studied the papers in detail for the main hearing and to reach his decision, and he heard oral evidence and submissions for both parties. He made clear findings in his supplemental decision on costs that: there had been no untoward behaviour by Mr Hussain in the prosecution of the application; there was clearly an issue to be considered; and there was nothing frivolous in the application. (See paragraph 4 of the decision, quoted above.) He expressly considered whether there were any matters that would lead to costs being made off the scale and concluded that there were not. Nothing that Mr Parkar submitted to me persuaded me that I should overturn that finding.

27. On the other hand, I do think there is more in Mr Parkar's main submission that, even within the scale fees, the costs awarded were unfairly low.

28. According to TPN 4/2007, the scale of costs applicable in proceedings commenced after 3 December 2007 are as follows:

Task	**Cost £**
Preparing a statement and considering the other side's statement	From £200 to £600 depending on the nature of the statements, for example their complexity and relevance.
Preparing evidence and considering and commenting on the other side's evidence	From £500 if the evidence is light to £2000 if the evidence is substantial.
Preparing for and attending a hearing	Up to £1500 per day of hearing, capped at £3000 for the full hearing unless one side has behaved unreasonably. From £300 to £500 for preparation of submissions, depending on their substance, if there is no oral hearing.
Expenses	(a) Official fees arising from the action and paid by the successful party (other than fees for extensions of time). (b) The reasonable travel and accommodation expenses for any witnesses of the successful party required to attend a hearing for cross-examination.

29. I shall consider the costs assessment made by the hearing officer under each of these heads.

Considering TM26(I) and preparing Counterstatement

30. The two grounds on which Mr Parkar's trade mark registration were attacked, based on claimed prior passing off rights and alleged bad faith, are grounds which often give rise to extensive factual investigation. It is clear from the allegations made in the TM26(I) and the content of the Counterstatement filed by Mr Parkar's London solicitors, Lakhani & Co, that it was necessary to go into considerable factual detail to be able to answer Mr Hussain's claims. Mr Parkar and Mr Hussain had been involved in a business together and both claimed rights over the trade mark in issue, and one can easily see how the costs of solicitors advising on the matter and drafting the Counterstatement would quickly exceed the upper end of the scale fee of £600 for this stage.

31. Although Mr Parkar asserted in his written submission to Mr Landau, and repeated in oral submissions to me, that the bills from his solicitors related exclusively to these proceedings, the narrative for the earlier bill indicated that other related matters may also have been considered. Nevertheless, the earlier bill and Mr Parkar's oral submissions certainly do indicate to me that Mr Parkar did in fact spend well in excess of the £600 upper limit in relation to the consideration of the TM26(I) and statement of grounds and in preparing his counterstatement. That does not mean that Mr Parkar should automatically have been awarded the top figure, but the sum of £300 does seem to me lower than he could reasonably have expected to recover for that stage in the proceedings, given his representation up to that point.

32. On its own, I do not think that my sense that the award for this stage of the proceedings is too low would be enough in itself to overrule it and make a higher award. However, as will be seen from the next stage in my assessment, I have other concerns about the decision, which I believe entitle me to reconsider all aspects of the award.

Evidence phase

33. Mr Hussain's first witness statement dated 3 June 2010 fleshed out the passing off and bad faith claims, with a number of specific claims about Mr Parkar's involvement with Mr Hussain's business, including some very serious allegations against him which, although not directly relevant to the issues in the case, were clearly being raised as support for the bad faith claim. Paragraphs 12 to 29 of Mr Landau's main decision summarise Mr Hussain's evidence. The length of that summary, alone, is an indication of the complexity of the factual issues.

34. Mr Parkar informed me that he took advice on this statement from his solicitors before he became a litigant in person in October 2010. (Lakhani & Co. closed for business on 1 October 2010, though the particular solicitor assisting Mr Parkar appears to have continued to assist until 15 October 2010.) Mr Parkar told me that, although his own

witness statement was not submitted until December 2010, its content had been formulated with the assistance of his solicitors.

35. The second bill from Lakhani & Co., dated 15 October 2010, indicates that – before taking over the case himself – Mr Parkar had incurred legal costs of £881.25 (£750 + VAT) in relation to the evidence.

36. Mr Parkar did not break down his own time spent on the evidence between the period while he was still represented and the later unrepresented phase. Instead, he claimed to have spent a total of 110 hours between 29 June 2009 and 6 January 2012 in relation to all aspects of the case up to that point.

37. Mr Landau made his own assessment of what would have been a reasonable amount of time for Mr Parkar to spend on the evidence, allowing 8 hours for preparation of his own evidence and 2 hours for considering that of Mr Hussain, and thus coming out with a figure of £180 for the evidence phase (10 hrs x £18/hr). That seems to me to be on the low side, given the nature and extent of the evidence and what Mr Parkar had to do to try to rebut it. More importantly, this figure apparently ignores the disbursement of £881.25 in respect of legal fees during the evidence phase. I believe that was an error, which I am entitled to correct on appeal

38. The evidence in this case was not excessively voluminous. But nor would I categorise it as being at the "light" end of the scale. There were some complicated factual issues to go into and exhibits to gather. I refer to paragraphs 30 to 58 of Mr Landau's decision for a summary of Mr Parkar's evidence, and then to paragraphs 59 to 71 for a summary of the reply evidence of Mr Hussain. Again, the length of the summaries is indicative of the scope of the evidence.

39. Mr Parkar submitted his witness statement on 7 December 2010, three months after his solicitors had ceased to act. I do not see how he could have gathered all the relevant exhibits and drafted the evidence in 8 hours – even discounting his time spent meeting his solicitors in the early phase on the basis that he was then paying for their time. It seems to me that at least double that time must have been spent. I would not quibble with the suggested 2 hours for considering Mr Hussain's evidence if Mr Parkar were to be permitted to receive a contribution towards his legal costs in relation to consideration of the first of these in June.

40. A fair contribution to Mr Parkar's costs in relation to the evidence phase would seem to me to be:

solicitors' fees (before October 2010)	£500
Mr Parkar's subsequent time (15 hrs @ £18/hr)	£270
TOTAL	£770

41. This is well within the applicable scale fees for the evidence phase and also would not breach the rule that the costs allowed to a litigant in person should not exceed two-thirds of the amount that would have been allowed had the litigant in person been legally represented. Of course, in this case, Mr Parkar was legally represented for the first part of this phase and so the two-thirds rule does not apply across the board in any event.

Preparation for and attending hearing

42. Turning to the last phase, being Mr Parkar's preparation for and attendance at the hearing on 6 January 2012, Mr Parkar claimed to have spent 9 days in preparation and 1 day attending the hearing. As set out earlier in this decision, his description of the work that this involved included researching case law, re-reading the witness statements, preparing a skeleton argument and preparing to cross-examine Mr Hussain, all of which are the activities that one would expect to have to be carried out.

43. I agree with Mr Landau that the claim of 90 hours for this stage is excessive. Even if Mr Parkar actually spent this amount of time on his preparation for the hearing, this is at a level well beyond what would be reasonable to expect to be covered by Mr Hussain. However, I believe that the write-down to 14 hours (9 hours preparation and 5 hours on the hearing day) goes too far in the other direction and is unfair. Mr Parkar is not experienced in trade mark law or in the presentation of legal arguments, whether written or oral. The time that he took out from his normal day job should not be judged by reference to how long a legal representative would take to conduct these steps. I believe that Mr Parkar was entitled to receive a contribution equivalent to at least two 8 hour days of work in preparation, as well as 6 hours on the day to account for final preparation, travel, waiting and attending the hearing.

44. At £18 per hour, I would therefore allow a contribution of £396 for this stage of the case.

Expenses

45. The only expense claimed by Mr Parkar that obviously falls within the permitted scale fees is the cost of travel to and from the hearing, where he appeared both as litigant in person and as witness. For that, I would allow £20.

46. The hearing officer made no reference to Mr Parkar's claim for expenses. While I do not say that this was an error, I do think that the cumulative effect of the failure to take account of the solicitors' fees and the expenses, as well as the harshness of the allowance for time spent by Mr Parkar on the evidence and in preparing for the hearing are together sufficient to warrant the reconsideration of all aspects of the costs award and to replace it with my own assessment.

Outcome

47. In all the circumstances, I believe that the figures below represent a fairer contribution to be made by Mr Hussain to Mr Parkar than the original award, which I show next to the new figures:

Preparing a statement and considering Mr Hussain's statement	~~£300~~ £500
Preparing evidence and considering the evidence of Mr Hussain	~~£180~~ £770
Preparing for and attendance at hearing (including travel expenses)	~~£252~~ £416
TOTAL	~~£732~~ £1686

48. I believe that this result:

    (1) falls squarely within the Registrar's general approach of awarding costs on a contribution rather than compensatory basis, pursuant to the usual scale fees;

    (2) is a fairer contribution to the actual money and time reasonably spent by Mr Parkar on the case than the original award;

    (3) does not over-compensate him in respect of his period as a litigant in person; and

    (4) lies well within the scope of the level of costs contribution that Mr Hussain might have expected to have had to pay in the event of losing, when he started the invalidity application.

Appeal costs

49. Mr Parkar drafted the Notice of Appeal himself. He also prepared written submissions and attended a hearing in London. He has been successful in persuading me that the original award was unfairly low and therefore might expect to be awarded a further contribution towards his costs of the appeal. However, there is a difficulty in that approach: Mr Hussain did not make any submissions in response to Mr Parkar's written costs submissions after the main hearing before Mr Landau; and nor did he participate in the appeal. I must therefore ask myself whether it would be fair to make him pick up any part of the costs of Mr Parkar persuading me that the Registrar's original award was too low.

50. Of course, none of this would have happened if Mr Hussain had not launched the invalidity application in the first place. So, on one view, there is nothing unfair in requiring him to contribute to the costs of each stage of the proceedings that followed. On the other hand, Mr Parkar's time and money spent on the appeal were higher than they might have been, since he chose to attend the hearing in person, even though I gave a fairly clear indication beforehand that I felt the matter could be dealt with on paper or by way of conference call. Further, the lack of clarity in the breakdown of time, costs and

disbursements provided to the Registrar by Mr Parkar could be held to be partly to blame for the error made by the hearing officer in relation to the solicitors' fees and for his calculations that I have deemed to be unfairly low.

51. Therefore, I have concluded that I should make no additional costs award in respect of the appeal.

Conclusion

52. In summary, I revise the award of costs made by the hearing officer in relation to invalidity application no. 83515 so that the Applicant for Invalidity, Mr Hussain, must pay the Registered Proprietor, Mr Parkar, the sum of £1,686, and I make no further order as to costs in relation to this appeal. The sum of £1,686 is payable within 14 days.

ANNA CARBONI

18 February 2013

The Appellant (Registered Proprietor), Mr Sajid Parkar, represented himself.
The Respondent (Applicant for Invalidity), Mr Abid Hussain, did not appear and was not represented.